Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (Amendment) Order 2019

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Rosser

Monday 15th July 2019 Grand Committee

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for explaining the draft statutory instrument.

It is regrettable that, in 2016, the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs advised the Government to include such a wide definition of third generation synthetic cannabinoids. Between 40,000 and 90,000 compounds captured by this wide definition were not synthetic cannabinoids and therefore were not intended to be controlled under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. In addition, it inhibited research by requiring researchers to obtain a Schedule 1 licence.

That highlights a series of issues with the Government’s approach to drug misuse. First, the ill-thought-through Psychoactive Substances Act, while making previously so-called legal highs illegal, did not make the possession of such substances an offence—only their manufacture, sale and supply, even though some of the substances are more dangerous than the substances controlled under the Misuse of Drugs Act that they were designed to replace.

Secondly, as a result, the ACMD still has to play catch-up with synthetic alternatives to controlled drugs, such as synthetic cannabinoids, which need to be controlled under the Misuse of Drugs Act because they are so dangerous. To get ahead of the game, on the basis of what the Minister said and what is contained in the material published by the Home Office on the SI, the ACMD appears to have gone to the other extreme and banned swathes of innocuous substances.

Thirdly, these synthetic alternatives to controlled drugs were created only because the controlled drugs that they were designed to replace were illegal. For example, I know a doctor who has had to deal with a number of patients with serious psychiatric problems caused by these synthetic alternatives; they took the synthetic alternatives because they were legal at the time, but they would not have had psychiatric problems if they had stuck to the controlled drugs that the synthetic alternatives were designed to replace. My understanding is that the synthetic cannabinoid Spice, which the Minister mentioned, induces far more psychosis and is far more addictive than even the strongest form of cannabis, for example. Can the Minister confirm that?

Fourthly, this sort of mistake further undermines the credibility of the system of controlled drugs under the Misuse of Drugs Act. Drugs are being classified primarily on the basis of politics rather than scientific evidence. For example, the previous Labour Government downgraded cannabis from class B to class C on the basis of scientific evidence only for the same Labour Government, under a new Prime Minister, to reclassify it back to class B for political reasons. Some drugs, such as GHB or GBL, that cause a large number of deaths—particularly among gay men, including a former partner of mine—are in class C while MDMA or ecstasy, which cause far fewer deaths, are in class A. We do not oppose the correction of this mistake by means of this SI but we clearly state it again: drug misuse should be treated as a health issue, not a criminal justice issue; all the efforts of government and law enforcement should be focused on harm reduction, not criminalisation; and the Government need to expand their review of drug misuse to include law changes, including potentially legalising and regulating controlled drugs.

The Liberal Democrats are not the only ones saying this. Last week, a survey showed that twice as many people were in favour of the legalisation of cannabis than against it. Research published last week showed that fewer teenagers used cannabis when it was legalised in the United States. The debate on drug misuse is changing. We believe that it is time that the Government paid attention to that.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, I too thank the Minister for her explanation of the content and purpose of the draft order, which we do not oppose. It amends the Misuse of Drugs Act by narrowing the previous definition of synthetic cannabinoids, as the previous definition has had the effect of requiring compounds that are not of concern to be licensed as class B drugs.

Following the control of the first generation of synthetic cannabinoids in 2009 and of the second generation in 2013, the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs first published advice in 2014 on the third generation of synthetic cannabinoids—a group of compounds commonly referred to, as the Minister said, as Spice and Mamba, which mimic the effects of cannabis. The ACMD recommended that these compounds be captured by way of a generic definition as class B drugs under the Misuse of Drugs Act. It also recommended that the compounds be placed in Schedule 1 to the Misuse of Drugs Regulations 2001, meaning that they can be legally accessed only with a Home Office licence, which is generally issued for research or industrial purposes.

Following the ACMD’s recommendations, the changes came into effect on 14 December 2016 but, as has already been said, shortly after their implementation the ACMD and the Home Office were told by research bodies that the breadth of the definition meant that it captured a large number of research compounds, many of which were not synthetic cannabinoids. The effect of this was that research institutions had to obtain Schedule 1 licences when they should not have needed to do so.

The ACMD recognised that its advice that led to the 2016 changes had unintended consequences. As a result, it made a further recommendation in December 2017 to the effect that the scope of the generic definition be reduced. Accordingly, this order amends the generic definition of third-generation synthetic cannabinoids by replacing the term “univalent” with a defined number of substituents. This will apparently reduce the number of compounds unintentionally captured by the generic definition, estimated by industry at more than 40,000 substances, while retaining those that have not been found to cause harm. As the Minister said, the revised definition does not alter the position for class A drugs or the licensed medicines previously excluded.

When this order was discussed in the Commons, the Minister said,

“so that while those compounds that have been found to cause harm are captured by it, fewer compounds are unintentionally captured”.—[Official Report, Commons, 3/7/19; col. 1263.]

In view of the Commons Minister’s words, how many compounds will still be unintentionally captured by the amended order that we are discussing now, and what level of inconvenience or difficulty will that continue to cause the research community in the pharmaceutical and healthcare sector in respect of having to continue, where necessary, to apply for Schedule 1 licences? How cumbersome, time-consuming and time-delaying is the process of applying for Schedule 1 licences, the need for which this order is designed to reduce but apparently not eliminate, in respect of compounds “unintentionally captured” by the 2016 changes? Bearing in mind that the ACMD made its recommendation, which led to the Government making this draft order some 18 months ago, why has it taken as long as it has to reach this stage?

The ACMD’s 2014 recommendations did not come into effect until mid-December 2016. Again, what was the reason for the apparent delay of at least two years? If consultation took place during that lengthy period, did any individuals or organisations raise the problem about the breadth of the definition that the research community raised shortly after mid-December 2016? If not, why did the ACMD—or anyone else—not realise the problem that this order seeks to address before its recommendations were implemented? Did the changes that were brought into effect in mid-December 2016 properly reflect the ACMD’s recommendations of two years or more previously? If not, is that one reason why the problem of the breadth of the definition came to light only after the mid-December 2016 changes came into effect?

This draft order does not seek to address the issue of the use, or rather misuse, of drugs. The UK now has, I believe, the highest recorded level of mortality from drug misuse since records began. I hope that we will soon hear from the Government the different approaches, based on what would most effectively reduce harm, that they intend to consider and adopt in response to a drug situation that appears to be getting worse.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I thank both noble Lords for their points. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made the point that this is regrettable—I agree. It is never a good place to be in, having to amend legislation for this reason. He is right that research was taking far longer because of the application process. That is why we have the order today. He also made the point that psychiatric problems would not be as problematic as they are with synthetic versions. However, I have thought back to several examples that I am aware of, for example, skunk weed, which has caused psychiatric problems. He asked whether I could confirm that Spice is more addictive than non-synthetic cannabis. It is indeed stronger than some other drugs. That is why it is controlled under the Misuse of Drugs Act, in line with the expert advice. The SI does not change the control of Spice.

He also made the point that drugs policy should be aimed at reduction. Of course, reduction of the use of drugs is at the heart of what we are trying to achieve, particularly—

Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2019

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Rosser

Thursday 28th February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

One of the few joys of being in the Opposition is that, unlike the Minister, I do not have to repeat the names of organisations and locations. I thank the Minister for her explanation of the purpose and meaning of this order. It was discussed in the Commons on Tuesday, following which it was approved without a Division. We did not oppose it, and that will be our position today in your Lordships’ House.

Ever since the Terrorism Act 2000, no proscription order brought forward by any Government has been opposed by the official Opposition, and that is not about to change. Seventy-four international terrorist organisations are now proscribed under the Act. As the Minister said, it is intended that this order will come into effect tomorrow. The Minister referred to the organisations and groupings that will be proscribed under the order. Two have been established in the last two years or so, and carry out their attacks and atrocities in specific areas of Africa. The third is Hezbollah, which has been around for rather longer, nearly 40 years. The then Labour Government proscribed Hezbollah’s External Security Organisation in 2001, and its whole military apparatus, including the Jihad Council, was proscribed in 2008.

In her letter of 25 February, the Minister said:

“Hezbollah, as a political entity in Lebanon has won votes in legitimate elections, and forms part of the Lebanese Government. It has the largest non-state military force in the country”.


The effect of this order is to proscribe the political as well as the military wing of Hezbollah, and thus proscribe the organisation in its entirety.

I have a few questions to raise with the Government about the order, and about what has led to it being brought forward today. Just 13 months ago, in a Commons debate, the Security Minister was resisting arguments for proscribing Hezbollah in its entirety—resisting what the Government are seeking to do through this order today.

The Security Minister—he is still the Security Minister—said in that debate:

“Hezbollah also represents Lebanon’s Shi’a community and, over time, has gained significant support from that community. Hezbollah provides social and political functions in Lebanon. As a major political group and the largest non-state military force in the country, Hezbollah clearly plays an important role in Lebanon … I have heard from many Members today that Hezbollah’s military and political wings are indivisible, joined at the hip and centrally led. That is not … the view of every country. Australia, New Zealand and the EU take a different view”.


He went on, just 13 months ago, to say that,

“it is difficult to separate Hezbollah from the state of Lebanon. Hezbollah is in the Parliament and the Government, and that represents a different challenge from that which we find with many other terrorist groups”.—[Official Report, Commons, 25/2/18; cols. 507-8.]

Do the Government still subscribe to the comments I have just quoted, made by the Security Minister just 13 months ago? What has changed over the last 13 months to lead the Government to adopt the approach they now propose in relation to the political wing of Hezbollah, which we will not be opposing, but which the Government were arguing against in January of last year?

In the debate in the Commons on Tuesday, the Home Secretary said:

“I can say that Hezbollah has been reported in many open sources as being linked to or claiming responsibility for many atrocities. These include a suicide bomb attack on a Buenos Aires Jewish community centre in 1994 that left 85 people dead and hundreds injured. The bloodshed came just two years after an attack on the Israeli embassy in that same city, which killed 29 people. Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian war since 2012 continues to prolong the conflict and the brutal repression of the Syrian people. In 2016, it helped besiege Aleppo, stopping humanitarian aid reaching parts of the city for six months, putting thousands at risk of mass starvation. Its actions continue to destabilise the fragile middle east”.—[Official Report, Commons, 26/2/19; col. 283.]


I am sure nobody would wish to do anything other than condemn the specific acts referred to by the Home Secretary last Tuesday, but the point is that all those acts he referred to were known about when the Security Minister was arguing, 13 months ago, against proscribing the political wing as well as the military wing of Hezbollah. Again, what has happened over the last 13 months to lead to the Government changing their stance?

In her letter to me of 25 February the Minister wrote:

“Hezbollah itself has publicly denied a distinction between its military and political wings”.


I think, though, that I am right in saying that that was known at the time of the debate in the Commons in January of last year, when the Security Minister was arguing against proscribing the political as well as the military wing of Hezbollah.

At the end of the debate in the Commons last Tuesday, in response to questions about why the Government had changed their stance, the Home Secretary said:

“I will give four reasons”.


It would be helpful if the Minister could repeat those four reasons, since it seemed to me that he gave only two. He said:

“First, there is secret intelligence. I think the House will understand why we cannot share it … there has been a step change in the activity of Hezbollah, particularly in Syria”.—[Official Report, Commons, 26/2/19; col. 304.]


The second, I think, was that the proscription review group had expressed the view that Hezbollah in its entirety met the definition of a terrorist organisation in the 2000 Act. Does that mean the proscription review group was not of that view at the time of the debate in January 2018, when the Security Minister argued against the course of action the Government are now proposing—namely, that the political as well as the military wing of Hezbollah should be proscribed? If so, what is it, at least in general terms, that has led the proscription review group to change its view of 13 months ago?

The Home Secretary also said that both the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development have looked again at the work they do in Lebanon. They are clear that they can continue that work and support the legitimate Government of Lebanon and its people. What exactly does that mean in practice? One of the Conservative contributors to the debate on this order in the Commons on Tuesday said that he thought Hezbollah provided,

“13 out of the 68 Members of Parliament in the governing coalition”.

That Conservative contributor went on to say that there were,

“important development objectives, particularly in the south of Lebanon where Hezbollah has the core of its support from the poorer Shi’a communities in the Lebanon”.—[Official Report, Commons, 26/2/19; col. 294.]

If the FCO and DfID think that they can continue their work in Lebanon—and the Minister for Security laid some stress in the debate 13 months ago on how the stronger the state of Lebanon is, the weaker Hezbollah will be—does it mean that they will be having, or continuing to have, contact with members of the political wing of Hezbollah in Lebanon, even though this order proscribes Hezbollah in its entirety, including its political wing?

One change since the debate in January 2018 is not a new Minister of Security, but a new Home Secretary. Maybe that is an important, though not decisive, reason behind the change in the Government’s stance. This order will be passed by your Lordships’ House, and I stress again that we are not opposing it, but I would like some answers on the record from the Government to the questions I have asked and the points I have made, because I do not think the questions addressed in the letter of 25 February sent to me by the Minister on behalf of the Government were in relation to Hezbollah.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I also thank the Minister for explaining this order. I completely agree with the words of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, on the Government appearing to fail to answer the question, “Why now?”

If somebody is demonstrating on the streets of London and there is only one flag—there are not separate flags for the military and political wings of Hezbollah—I understand that it might be difficult to prosecute them when half the organisation is proscribed and the other half is not. But the questions remains, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, said: what has changed since January last year when the Government supported the political wing of Hezbollah being kept separate? Indeed, the Minister talked about how important it is that we support the international effort to tackle terrorism. While the US, Canada, the Netherlands and Israel all designate the whole of Hezbollah a terrorist organisation, as the noble Lord said, the European Union and Australia designate only the military wing as terrorist. What has happened?

Our other concerns are around changes that have happened very recently under the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act, which we opposed. It extends the existing offence of supporting a proscribed organisation to include recklessly expressing support for it, rather than intentionally inviting support, with a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison. It also extends extraterritorial jurisdiction for these offences, so British citizens and residents who express support for Hezbollah, wear clothing related to it or wave its flags in other countries can be prosecuted in the UK. This raises a serious concern: someone who does something supportive of the political wing of Hezbollah—including recklessly expressing support for it—in a country where it is not proscribed, such as in Australia, or Lebanon itself, could still be prosecuted in the UK.

In the debate on the then Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich—former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation—said that he was concerned that, while he was in post,

“at least 14 of the 74 organisations proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000 … are not concerned in terrorism and therefore do not meet the minimum statutory condition for proscription”.—[Official Report, 17/12/18; cols. 1642.]

The Minister will recall the debate, when concern was expressed that organisations were being proscribed for political reasons rather than because they fulfilled the statutory requirements for being proscribed.

Of course, one can speculate about what has changed. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, talked about a change of Home Secretary. He may not welcome my commenting that political capital has been made from the leader of the Opposition, Jeremy Corbyn, having previously been a supporter of Hezbollah. Of course, the Labour Party is facing considerable issues regarding anti-Semitism, and the concerns of the Jewish community about Hezbollah are well known. But I am sure that these have nothing to do with the timing of the whole of Hezbollah being proscribed on this occasion.

We have serious concerns about the whole process, which we expressed in debates on the then Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill. However, like the formal Opposition, we will not oppose this order; we simply wish to place on the record our concerns about the process.

Investigatory Powers Tribunal Rules 2018

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Rosser

Wednesday 28th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

We are not opposed to this statutory instrument, which updates the rules that govern procedures in the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, including those for a new right of appeal. The tribunal investigates and determines complaints that allege that public authorities have used covert techniques unlawfully and have infringed the right to privacy, as well as complaints against the security and intelligence agencies for conduct that breaches a wider range of human rights.

The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 introduced a right of appeal, which will be on a point of law, from decisions and determinations of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. Leave to appeal will be granted only where the appeal raises an important issue of principle or practice, or for another compelling reason. Have there been any cases in which leave to appeal would have been granted had there been an appeals procedure, or is the appeals procedure being added because it is felt that it ought to be available rather than because there is evidence that its not being available has denied a right that ought to be there? How many cases is it anticipated might be appealed per year? How many determinations and decisions are made by the Investigatory Powers Tribunal each year, and is that number going up or down?

The tribunal rules are also being updated by this statutory instrument to provide, among other things, that further specified functions may be exercised by a single member of the tribunal. As a result of the public consultation, to which three substantive responses were received, 17 amendments were proposed, of which the Home Office accepted five. Those are listed in paragraph 10.3 of the Explanatory Memorandum. I am aware that the question was asked and answered when the rules were considered in the Commons, but it would nevertheless be helpful if the Minister could clarify for the record in our Hansard the reasons for not accepting the 12 amendments that have not been incorporated.

Could the Minister also give the reasons why it is proposed in the rules that further functions should be able to be exercised by a single member of the tribunal, and why in particular the listed functions in paragraph 7.5 of the Explanatory Memorandum? Did that proposed change arise from a proposition from the tribunal itself? If so, what reasons were advanced for going down that road, and did the tribunal ask for any other functions to be exercised by a single member to which the Government have not agreed?

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing the rules. The right to appeal from decisions and determinations of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal is welcome, although yet again the changes will not take effect in Northern Ireland until the Northern Ireland Assembly has given its consent, an ongoing cause for concern.

Extending the range of functions that can be exercised by a single member of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal appears reasonable. Overall, there is a move in the direction of more openness and transparency so far as that is in the public interest, which is to be welcomed. That includes the tribunal’s power to order disclosure, and a presumption that hearings should be held openly unless it is in the public interest for the complainant or the respondent to be excluded. It is good to see that not only was there a public consultation on the new rules, but the Government listened and acted on some of the responses, and explained the rationale for rejecting other suggestions in their response to that consultation.

Overall, we support these rules and the clear way in which they set out the process by which complaints of unlawful action by a public authority improperly using covert investigative techniques, and claims brought against the security and intelligence agencies alleging the infringement of human rights, are to be handled. We have no questions and we support the draft rules.

Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (Amendment) Order 2018

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Rosser

Wednesday 21st November 2018 Grand Committee

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for explaining the order to us. As she has said, this puts two substances into class C of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, on the recommendation of the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs.

We support any evidence-based scientific approach to reducing the harm caused by drugs, legal or illegal. My question is very simple. The noble Baroness talked about a very clear message being sent to the public, but why do the Government not always act on the scientific, evidence-based assessment of the ACMD?

The problem with drugs classification under the Misuse of Drugs Act is threefold. First, based on independent scientific assessment, drugs are not classified according to the potential harm that they cause. For example, GHB—gamma-hydroxybutyrate—is believed to cause a significant number of deaths—perhaps as many as several a week in the UK alone. Yet it is classified as a class C drug. Cannabis which, to my knowledge has not been the direct cause of any drug-related death, is a class B drug. Because of this, and several other misclassifications of which I could give examples, the classification of drugs under the Misuse of Drugs Act has fallen into disrepute among those who might arguably be helped most if they knew that the classification of drugs was based on how dangerous they were.

At this stage, I should point out an interest to the Committee. A former partner, who then became my best friend and who was very experienced in the use of recreational drugs, died from an accidental overdose of GHB.

Secondly, because the classification system does not reflect potential harm, only potential sentence, it has become irrelevant to most drug users. They quite simply work on the basis that the penalty is irrelevant to them as they have no intention of getting caught.

Thirdly, any drug classified under the Misuse of Drugs Act carries a heavier penalty than a new psychoactive substance covered by the Psychoactive Substances Act 2016 in that possession of a new psychoactive substance is not an offence, whereas possession of any drug classified under the Misuse of Drugs Act is an offence. This is even though some of the new psychoactive substances are more harmful than drugs classified under the Misuse of Drugs Act.

Our drugs laws are a mess, the Government’s drugs strategy is ineffective and, if we are to stop our young people dying, we need a fundamental rethink. We called for a scientific, evidence-based review of our drugs laws when we debated the Psychoactive Substances Bill—a proposition both the Conservative and Labour Benches refused to support. Therefore, I note with interest the comments of the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Home Office, Victoria Atkins, in the other place, when this order was discussed by the Tenth Delegated Legislation Committee on 12 November this year, at 6.05 pm, where she said that the Government have announced,

“an independent review of the misuse of drugs in the 21st century”. —[Official Report, Commons, Tenth Delegated Legislation Committee, 12/11/18; col. 4.]

Can the Minister provide the Committee with further details of who will be conducting this review, what their terms of reference are, and any other details that may be of interest?

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for explaining the purpose of the order and its provisions. We support it but I have some points that I would like to raise. As has been said, the order controls pregabalin and gabapentin as class C drugs under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. Currently these two substances are subject to the Psychoactive Substances Act 2016.

The two substances are used, as the Minister has said, to manage a number of disabling long-term conditions including epilepsy and general anxiety disorders. Although they have legitimate medicinal uses for which they can continue to be used, the two substances in question, when taken with other central nervous system depressants, can be the cause of serious harm including respiratory failure and, at worst, death. The Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs has said the two substances in question can be addictive, with the potential for illegal diversion and supply and medicinal misuse. Prescription rates have soared—the Minister gave the figures—while the number of deaths related to the two substances have also increased: just over 400 from pregabalin over the last five years and just over 200 from gabapentin.

Concerns were raised in 2014 by the Health and Social Care Board about the potential misuse of pregabalin. Apparently, in February 2015 Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons reported concerns of health staff in prisons that a high number of prisoners were being prescribed the drugs without a thorough assessment of their needs, and in a way that did not meet best-practice guidelines. Does that mean prisoners in prison being prescribed the drugs without a thorough assessment of their needs or prisoners prior to their coming into prisons being prescribed the drugs in the wrong way? Either way, the question must be how that has been allowed to happen. What will the planned guidance and communication say to address the issue of drugs of this kind being prescribed without a thorough assessment of the patient’s needs?

For how many years have these two substances been available? What is it that starts the procedure for the control of such substances as class C drugs as per this order? With concerns being raised in 2014, it does not seem to be a particularly quick process. Who or what organisation makes the initial move, and what is then the procedure for getting the matter before the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs? Or is it the advisory council that has to take the initiative in the first instance?

Paragraph 12.2 of the Explanatory Memorandum states:

“Enforcement of offences in relation to drugs controlled by the Order will be subsumed into the overall enforcement response to controlled drugs”.


That statement is in marked contrast to the impact of the order on pharmacies, GPs and the NHS as a whole, for which precise figures have been given in the Explanatory Memorandum with regard to the additional cost. So what will the additional cost be of implementing this order to the police, the court system and the Prison and Probation Service of enforcing these new offences? What is the estimated number of new offences that will be committed each year as a result of controlling these two substances as class C drugs? Is the reality for our overstretched police that either they will not arrest many people for offences related to those two substances or, if they do, it will be at the expense of investigating, enforcing and arresting people for other offences? Is that what,

“subsumed into the overall enforcement response to controlled drugs”,

really means? If not, what does that phrase mean?

Police, Fire and Crime Commissioner for North Yorkshire (Fire and Rescue Authority) Order 2018

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Rosser

Wednesday 21st November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I strongly support my noble friend Lady Pinnock. The whole reason for establishing police and crime commissioners was supposed to be to increase the democratic accountability of the police service. In fact, as we have heard, the only way that PCCs can effectively be held to account is through the ballot box, and then only at four-yearly intervals. As we know, in most parts of the country, votes for the PCC are usually cast along established party-political lines and are not a referendum on the performance of the PCC at all.

As my noble friend Lady Pinnock said, police and crime panels, allegedly designed to hold police and crime commissioners to account, are in fact a toothless Singapura, let alone a toothless tiger, as the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, said. My noble friend Lady Harris of Richmond provided an example from North Yorkshire of how powerless the panels are.

This supposed increase in local democratic accountability of the police is being extended so that PCCs can take over fire and rescue services—something that we on these Benches opposed when the legislation came before this House. PCCs already have a very big job on their hands, being responsible not only for the delivery of policing services in their area but for commissioning and co-ordinating other services to reduce crime and disorder. The Government may be in denial about it, but the level of crime and disorder is increasing, and violent crime in particular is reaching alarming levels across the country. PCCs already have enough on their plate.

This so-called experiment in local democracy can result, as it has here, in local democratically elected representatives of all parties—who have wider responsibility for the delivery of local services, not just the police service, and have the “big picture” in terms of their local areas and the funding of all local services—being totally ignored. The very body that is supposed to hold the local PCC to account also opposes what this PCC proposes to do. How can the Government maintain that the PCC taking over the fire and rescue service in North Yorkshire is in the best interests of local people when the benefits are questionable, or meagre, as my noble friend said, and the constituent councils in North Yorkshire—the county council, City of York Council, the North Yorkshire police and crime panel and the North Yorkshire Fire and Rescue Authority—all oppose this move?

Whether it is the police service or the fire and rescue service, multi-party, multi-member authorities will always be able to take a more balanced, more accountable and more democratic approach than a sole individual, who, among other things, can raise the police precept locally without any consideration of the overall burden on local council tax payers and without taking any account of other pressing local priorities. The economic, efficiency and effectiveness benefits can nearly always be secured by the emergency services more collaborating without the PCC taking over control of the fire and rescue service. This is all pain and no gain. This move is very much to be regretted.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, we agree with the terms of the regret Motion. I do not wish to make any specific comments about the police and crime commissioner concerned since I know nothing about the police and crime commissioner in that area. Suffice it to say that my information too, not surprisingly, is that the North Yorkshire police and crime panel has rejected proposals for the commissioner to take on responsibility for both the fire service and the police—or at least what at that time were proposals—and that the panel had urged the commissioner to reconsider what she was seeking in favour of a model that would retain the current fire authority and give the commissioner a voting place at the table. Likewise, as has already been said most eloquently, the local authorities and the fire and rescue authority expressed a clear preference for the representation model. Indeed, the information that I have received—to put it diplomatically—is that the police and crime panel has a difference of view with the police and crime commissioner over the running of her office in relation to issues of bullying and a hostile environment.

I make no comment on the rights or wrongs of it because I personally know nothing about it. I was told that the police and crime panel intended to write to the Home Office to highlight its concerns. I do not know whether it has done so or whether the Home Office has received any such letter. Clearly there is not a very happy relationship between the police and crime commissioner and the police and crime panel in North Yorkshire. One would have thought that, to get to the bottom of it, the Secretary of State would have wanted to know rather more than perhaps he does about working relationships between the two organisations, since that surely must be a consideration in whether you are going to extend the power and authority of the police and crime commissioner. Maybe the Minister will tell us that the Home Secretary has already done that, and that he is satisfied that the police and crime commissioner is in the right and that the police and crime panel has got the wrong end of the stick; I will wait and see what the Minister has to say on that.

I refer to the independent assessment on which the judgment was made that the criteria of economy, efficiency and effectiveness have been met, and indeed of public safety. On economy, in the section headed “Our Overall Assessment”, the report says:

“Our overall view on economy is that it has received little attention in the LBC”—


the local business case—

“and there is an absence of quantified benefits in relation to any reduced costs of inputs”.

Later in the paragraph, having referred to other issues, it goes on to say:

“On that basis we are unable to reach an objective conclusion on whether the proposal will meet the specific criterion of increased economy”.


Then, looking at the issue of efficiency, the independent assessment says:

“As we noted above nearly all of the savings in the LBC arise from efficiency savings”.


I am not reading out the full paragraph, but it states that:

“The only savings which can be attributed directly to the Governance model are those arising from changes in the structure of the OPCC and the FRA”—


the office of the police and crime commissioner and the fire and rescue authority—

“i.e. those savings referred to as Direct Governance Benefit”,

in the local business plan.

As has already been said by the noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock, the report goes on to say that:

“This leads to a net cost reduction of £36K p.a. from 2019/20 or a total of £204K, net of implementation costs, over the 10 year period of the LBC”.


As has already been said, the independent assessment says:

“However, the savings directly attributable to the change are modest”.


That is probably one of the understatements of the year, if you are talking about savings as low as that; and it is based on the figures that have been put forward by the police and crime commissioner and the assumptions being made proving to be correct.

Turning to effectiveness, the report says:

“Proving a direct link between the governance model”—


which is what the police and crime commissioner wants—

“and effectiveness is a subjective process”.

It ends—it is debatable whether you think this is an endorsement—by saying:

“On balance our view is that the proposed change in governance has the potential”—


I emphasise “potential”—

“to have a positive impact on effectiveness”.

In other words, the independent assessment could not produce the evidence that the change would have a positive impact on effectiveness; it would have only the potential to have a positive impact on effectiveness.

In the next paragraph—I am not reading out the whole paragraph—the assessment says:

“Having reached that conclusion we would add that there is no overwhelming case for change and that most of the proposed changes could be achieved under the other three options, subject to the willingness of all the stakeholders to work together”.


The assessors were also asked to comment, I think, on the issue of public safety, and their comment was,

“this is a very subjective area to assess”.

They concluded by saying:

“On that basis we have concluded that there is no increased risk to public safety due to the proposed change in governance”—


that is a relief—

“and that there may be benefits in the future”.

If that is a ringing endorsement of the PCC’s plan, I think the Secretary of State has got it all wrong, because, as I understand it, it is on the basis of that independent assessment that he has agreed the proposal. Subject to what the Minister may say in response, he does not seem to have taken much account of working relationships—for example, the PCC’s relationship with her police and crime panel, and perhaps with other people as well, including her own staff.

In concluding, I simply say that if the independent assessment is deemed sufficient to meet the criteria of economy, efficiency and effectiveness, it is very unlikely that any future proposal from a PCC to take over a fire and rescue authority will ever be anything other than approved by this Secretary of State.

Crime (Overseas Production Orders) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Rosser

3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 20th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I too take this opportunity to add to what the Minister has said. Despite the reality that the Bill has not exactly held this House in rapt attention, judging by the number of people who decided to participate in our debates, I thank the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Manzoor, and the Bill team for their help and their willingness to meet to discuss the important issues that have been raised during the passage of the Bill. I also thank the members of our team who have provided such invaluable and vital support to me and to my noble friend Lord Kennedy of Southwark.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I too thank the Minister. I do not know whether I am speaking out of turn in saying that I think at times she has shared some of our concerns over the implications of the Bill, if not over the Bill itself. I thank the Bill team for engaging with us so that we got a better understanding of the formulation of the treaty, the process of negotiating the treaty and what the possible implications of that might be. Clearly we are now alerted to the fact that both Houses need to be very concerned in scrutinising any treaty that is developed that this Bill relies on. I also thank my noble friend Lady Hamwee, without whom I would be lost.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Rosser

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 14th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I do not want to add to the comments that I made in the debate on whether Clause 21 and Schedule 3 should stand part of the Bill, which echoed the comments of other noble, and noble and learned, Lords.

As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, has said, regulations that we recently considered that were made under the Investigatory Powers Act radically redefined “serious crime” to mean offences which carry a minimum sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment but also all offences involving communication or the invasion of privacy. The Government are quite capable of redefining—and in fact have redefined—serious crime to fit more precisely the powers referred to in different pieces of legislation, even regulations made under a piece of legislation in which the definition of serious crime is different. So I do not agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, who mentioned earlier that it would not capture Official Secrets Act offences, because the Government, as has been suggested, can change, have changed and could change the definition of serious crime in relation to Schedule 3 powers.

[Lord Rosser]

I will be very brief indeed. We will listen with interest to what the Government have to say in response to the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, but—obviously, subject to what the Government say—it seems to us to have considerable merit.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Rosser

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 31st October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, as I have added my name to this amendment, I should like to say briefly that we support the principle that there should be the possibility of a review to ensure that these provisions are necessary and proportionate. The appeal process appears to get round any possible issues with matters that cannot be placed in the public domain.

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, I shall be very brief. My name and that of my noble friend Lord Kennedy are also attached to this amendment. As has been said, it reflects a recommendation from the Joint Committee on Human Rights. I simply comment that circumstances can change and therefore ask whether it is unreasonable that an individual covered by the enhanced notification requirements should be able to seek a review of the necessity and proportionality of those requirements, as recommended by the JCHR.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Rosser

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 29th October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser]

Clause 2(4) confers on the police power to seize clothing or any other article, including flags, associated with a proscribed organisation. The Bill would enable the officer in the circumstances to seize items such as flags, provided that the officer was satisfied that it was necessary to seize such an item to prevent the evidence being concealed, lost, altered or destroyed—evidence that could well be crucial in pursuing an investigation and bringing a successful prosecution.

When this matter was discussed during the passage of the Bill through the Commons, the Government were asked what engagement there had been with the Police Service of Northern Ireland and the Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland about the terms of Clause 2 and the difficulties in pursuing such prosecutions. In response, the Government accepted that taking away a flag in certain parts of Northern Ireland had on occasions acted as something of a lightning rod for a riot or a breakdown in civil order, and that in Northern Ireland a flag does not necessarily, in the context of the provisions of this Bill, have pure terrorist content. The Commons Minister said he did not want to see,

“flag protests becoming more and more polarised than they were in the past”.—[Official Report, Commons, 11/9/18; col. 661.]

In view of the potentially sensitive nature of this issue in Northern Ireland, the amendment would ensure that Clause 2(4) on seizures could not come into force until the Secretary of State had consulted the Police Service of Northern Ireland and the Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland on the introduction of the new provisions in the Bill in relation to the power to seize.

It would be helpful if the Minister could say how the Government envisage the power to seize working across the UK generally. Presumably, there will still be the same potential confrontation over seizing an item, whether on arrest or subsequently reporting the person for summons, with an indication of that course of action being given to the individual concerned at the time. On the basis of what evidence do the Government believe that the likelihood of confrontation will be reduced? Presumably, those on marches or demonstrations will soon know that court proceedings are still likely or possible under reporting a person for summons. Or is the purpose of this option of seizure—of, for example, a flag—in reality a reason to do it this way and then not pursue the matter any further through the courts?

Presumably, there will still be a need to obtain an individual’s name and address on the street at the march or demonstration before or after the seizure of the flag or other item in question, and that information may or may not be given. Both issues—namely, trying to seek such details and the seizure of the flag before or afterwards—might still provoke confrontation. It would be helpful if the Minister could address that point in her response, as well as the more specific issue of the application of the clause in Northern Ireland. I beg to move.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, briefly, I support the amendment. Judging from the Minister’s non-verbal reaction to it, the consultation proposed seems extremely sensible given the history in Northern Ireland. On whether or not the police will use these powers in a public order situation, the police are very experienced—I declare an interest as a former advanced public order trained police officer who dealt with such situations—and, clearly, a decision has to be made on the basis of the circumstances at the time whether items can be safely seized without escalating the situation. The police service is very well equipped in deploying professional photographers and others gathering video evidence which can be used instead of, or in addition to, seizing those items. So although I agree with the sentiment behind the amendment concerning Northern Ireland, I do not share the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, about the seizure of items potentially escalating a situation.

Crime (Overseas Production Orders) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Rosser

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 10th September 2018 Grand Committee

[Lord Rosser]

In the other direction, would an order made in an American court against a British provider that is not complied with lead to contempt proceedings in a United States court, and how would that court enforce it against a British provider?

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

While we are waiting, am I right in thinking that in the recent Facebook case it was not that the service provider did not want to provide the information that would be of use to UK law enforcement but that domestic law in America did not allow it to provide that information, and that in the overwhelming majority of cases to which this legislation would apply we anticipate that the service provider would be more than keen to provide the data, provided it can be done lawfully, and that this mechanism provides the lawful means of doing that?

Crime (Overseas Production Orders) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Rosser

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 5th September 2018 Grand Committee

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I am grateful for the Minister’s explanation. I am not sure that it entirely satisfies us about the potential for misuse of the legislation, but we will reflect on what she said and perhaps discuss it with her before Report.

[Lord Rosser]

If there is any doubt in this matter, as I understand it from the briefing that we had from the House of Lords Library, the UK’s Deputy National Security Adviser, giving testimony to the US House of Representatives’ Judiciary Committee in June 2017, said that the UK Government were “in full agreement” with the US Department of Justice that a UK-US bilateral data sharing agreement should limit access to targeted orders for data and not bulk access to data.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I thank the noble Lord because that underlines my point.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 19 in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee, I will speak to our Amendments 33 and 34 in this group.

Journalistic data of any kind is not excepted electronic data as set out in Clause 3, despite representations made by media organisations that it should be. Instead, under Clause 12 the application for an overseas production order, if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the electronic data specified or described in the application consists of or includes journalistic data that is confidential journalistic data, must be made on notice. Confidential journalistic data consists of data created or acquired for the purposes of journalism and in circumstances that give rise to an obligation of confidence that continues or is held subject to a restriction on disclosure or an obligation of secrecy.

This begs the question: how does the judge make a judgment about whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that confidential journalistic material is involved? Does the judge take the word of the applicant? If the judge determines that confidential journalistic material is involved, how will notice be served on the parties concerned and how will those parties make representations? To probe these issues, Amendment 19 inserts the requirement that:

“The judge must be satisfied that the electronic data specified or described in the application is not confidential journalistic data”.


Clause 13 prohibits the overseas parties from concealing, destroying, altering or disposing of the data, or disclosing the application to anyone else, once they are given notice of the application. What sanction can be imposed for failing to comply? Can it be contempt of court, bearing in mind that at that stage the judge has made no order, only given notice that an application for an order has been made?

Amendment 33 provides that Clause 12(1) should specify that the notice should be served on the data controller and the data subject specifically, as well as anyone else the judge considers necessary. Amendment 34 amends Clause 12(4) to specify that notices should be served on a person R, referred to in Clause 12(3): that is, the person who receives electronic data from another person who intended it to be used for journalistic purposes. I beg to move Amendment 19.

[Lord Rosser]

I referred to the general issue that is the subject of the amendments spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, when I spoke to Amendment 8. We share the concerns expressed by the noble Lord, subject to what the Minister may have to say in response, about the possible difficulties or issues that might arise.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for his points and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for his intervention. The effect of Amendment 19 would be to exclude confidential journalistic material from the scope of an application and order. I should first point out that Clause 4 reflects the position in the PACE Act 1984. Journalistic material can already be sought under Schedule 1 to PACE through special procedure, and under Schedule 5 to the Terrorism Act 2000, when it is held by a company or person based in the UK. The Bill extends this to circumstances where the data is held by an entity based outside the UK and where a relevant international arrangement is in place.

I do not think that we should introduce in the Bill a difference between material that can be obtained—subject of course to appropriate requirements and safeguards—when it is held in the UK, as opposed to being held by an entity based on the country with which we have entered into an agreement. I should also stress that similar standards are set out in the Bill as already exist in domestic legislation, and that the term “reasonable grounds for believing” is readily used by our court system. Reasonable belief requires more than just a guess or a hunch. It will require the judge, marshalling all the facts before them, to come to an assessment on whether the information sought does or does not contain this type of data. It is not the first time that that standard has been used in legislation, and of course it will not be the last. Where confidential journalistic material is sought, the Bill requires that such applications can only be made on notice. That means that anyone put on notice, which can and may include the journalist whose data might be sought, has the opportunity to make representations to the court as to whether it is appropriate for the data to be obtained.

The effect of Amendment 33 as drafted would be that an application for an overseas production order that included confidential journalistic material had to be made on notice to a data controller and the data subject. I understand the sentiment behind the amendment but I do not agree that it is required, for two reasons. First, the rules of court will set out the process by which a judge can ensure that anyone affected by the order is notified of any given case. Consideration of notice by the judge relating to such a request is left to his or her discretion to allow for the circumstances where notice to a data controller, data subject or anyone else is deemed appropriate by the judge when granting an overseas production order. I think giving the judge discretion to determine which is appropriate in any given case is the right approach.

Secondly—this is a point that I have made before and will make again—we are providing in the Bill the means to serve an order on a company based outside the UK in a country with which we have a relevant agreement, in the same way as is currently the case with a company based in the UK. In those cases the respondent and any other person affected by the order would ordinarily be given notice and therefore the opportunity to make representations, unless under rules of court the judge is satisfied that there are good reasons for not doing so—for example, because of the risk of prejudice to the investigation. We are proposing that the same should apply to overseas production orders.

The intention of Clause 12 is to require an application for an overseas production order to be made on notice where there are reasonable grounds for believing that the electronic data sought consists of, or includes, confidential journalistic data. The effect of the clause as drafted is that notice should be served on the respondent—that is, the person who would be required to produce the data if the order is made. In most cases, this would be a service provider rather than the customer on whose behalf the data is stored. However, a requirement to give notice to the respondent under Clause 12(1) does not preclude the judge considering the application from exercising his or her own discretion under rules of court. Under rules of court they may require notice to be given to other persons who may be affected by an order requiring the production of confidential journalistic material, including a person who in his or her professional capacity has acquired that data. It will be a matter for the judge’s discretion, but he or she is likely to insist on notice being given unless the applicant can demonstrate that doing so would prejudice the investigation—for example, where the journalist himself or herself is the subject of the investigation or prosecution.

An example of where it might not be appropriate is where there is a hacking investigation and the journalist might actually be the subject of an inquiry. The judge may decide that putting someone on notice could potentially harm the investigation or risk the dissipation of the material. It is the Government’s intention, however, to ensure that where an application relates to confidential journalistic data, notice can and should be served on journalists and on whoever the judge deems appropriate given the circumstances of the application. The PACE Act 1984, for example, requires service to be made on the respondent only, otherwise notice requirements are set out in court rules.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made an important point about sanctions to comply. It is difficult to construct a proportionate regime to ensure nondisclosure prior to an order being made and, in practice, law enforcement would not apply for an order where there was an unacceptable risk of damaging disclosure. I ask noble Lords not to press their amendments and I shall consider their comments before Report, if that is amenable to them.

Amesbury Update

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Rosser

Monday 9th July 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement made earlier in the House of Commons. We associate ourselves with the condolences already expressed to the family and friends of Dawn Sturgess, who, tragically, has died after exposure to the nerve agent Novichok, and extend our good wishes for a full recovery to Charlie Rowley. We also take this opportunity to express again our thanks and gratitude to the security and intelligence services, the military, the police, emergency services and medical staff, who have worked continuously to protect and look after us and to help ensure that we have a country in which it is safe and enjoyable to live.

Four months ago it was the attempted murder of the Skripals. That was awful and outrageous enough. Now, it looks like not attempted murder but in all probability, in effect, the murder of Dawn Sturgess and the attempted murder of her partner Charlie Rowley, two innocent British nationals, on our own soil. The circumstantial evidence that the attempted murder of the Skripals was an act by the Russian state against Britain is strong—certainly strong enough to convince many of our allies to act with us against Russia.

Can the Minister say what the prospects are for naming, if not apprehending, the actual perpetrators of the earlier attempted murders four months ago, and now of the very recent murder and attempted murder, in effect, of two British nationals? The Government have stated that the risk to our citizens is low, but it is lethal when it happens, and presumably is not quite so low for people in Salisbury and its vicinity, compared with elsewhere in the country.

The Chief Medical Officer gave advice after the Salisbury incident that people should not pick up any unknown or already dangerous objects such as needles and syringes. In the light of what has now happened to Dawn Sturgess and Charlie Rowley, are the Government satisfied that that advice was repeated frequently and regularly enough, particularly to people in Salisbury and the surrounding areas? Messages only tend to get through if they are said and given time and again. Could the Minister say how often, by what means and to whom that message was repeated over the last four months?

The Home Secretary said last Thursday that it was,

“completely unacceptable for our people to be either deliberate or accidental targets, or for our streets, parks or towns to be dumping grounds for poison”.—[Official Report, Commons, 5/7/18; cols. 535-36.]

I am sure we would all agree with that. But what advice do the Government now intend to give to the people of Salisbury and the surrounding areas, particularly in view of what has just happened? If the Government are sure that no more of the poison Novichok has been dumped, to use the Home Secretary’s word, no doubt the Minister will tell us that when she responds. But if the Home Secretary is not sure, how will the Government update the advice given after the attempted murder of the Skripals to reflect the fact that the threat from the poison Novichok being dumped has materialised in such a tragic and horrific manner? Equally importantly, what steps will the Government take to maximise the chances of getting their message and advice across to as many of our fellow citizens as possible, not just now but in the days and weeks ahead?

I will make two final points. First, how long will it take to develop the suitable support package for local businesses that was mentioned in the Statement? Secondly, what exactly is the role and responsibility of the elected police and crime commissioner for the force area affected when an attempted murder and an actual murder take place of British nationals, quite probably as a result of actions by a hostile state, within the area of that PCC when the investigation is being led by detectives from Counter Terrorism Command?

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I also thank the Minister for repeating the Statement. Our thoughts are with the friends and family of Dawn Sturgess and Charlie Rowley, who must be very concerned about him, as he is still critically ill. Clearly, we support the Government, the police, the security services and the military in their attempts to uncover what has happened here and in the earlier poisoning of the Skripals. We also commend the staff at Salisbury District Hospital for their unstinting efforts to treat the victims.

Assistant Commissioner Neil Basu, the head of UK counterterrorism policing, which is leading the investigation, said of the most recent incident:

“This means they must have got a high dose and our hypothesis is that they must have handled a container that we are now seeking”.


Can the Minister confirm that the police have not been able to talk to either victim and therefore do not know for sure how they were contaminated, what sort of container they are looking for or where to find it?

One hundred detectives were already working round the clock to try to establish how Dawn Sturgess and Charlie Rowley were contaminated with Novichok. What will change as a result of this becoming a murder inquiry? Has what has been assumed to be an accidental poisoning resulting in the tragic death of Sturgess been caused by an even higher dose of nerve agent than the deliberate poisoning of the Skripals, or has this case been fatal for some other reason?

Neil Basu also said that he was “unable to say” whether the incident in Amesbury was linked to the poisoning of the Skripals on 3 March, although that was the police’s working hypothesis. Yet the Statement says that both individuals were exposed to the same type of Novichok used to poison Sergei and Yulia Skripal in March. Can the Minister explain the difference between what appears to be those two very different statements?

There is reportedly growing unease among some people in Salisbury and Amesbury that they are not being given enough information. Ricky Rogers, a Wiltshire councillor and the leader of the Labour group on Wiltshire council, said that the death of Sturgess had “heightened tension”. He said:

“Local residents have never been told enough about the first incident back in March. I think someone from counter-terrorism needs to come here and tell us what they know”.


I repeat the question that I asked the noble Baroness on Thursday, to which I received no reply. What can she say to the people of Salisbury and Amesbury to reassure them?

Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Codes of Practice) (Revision of Codes C, E, F, and H) Order 2018

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Rosser

Monday 25th June 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for setting out the purpose and content of the draft statutory instrument that we are considering, which is applicable to England and Wales. We support its objectives. The revisions to the codes of practice are intended to reflect changes in the light of the Policing and Crime Act 2017 and current operational policing practice. The changes cover the audio and visual recording of interviews with suspects and the detention and questioning of persons by police officers, including under terrorism legislation. All four codes have been previously revised, two as recently as, I think, February last year. Has it really been necessary to revise Codes C and H twice in 16 months, when the revisions we are discussing relate in part to a 2017 Act? Surely, frequent revisions are time-consuming and hardly encourage an understanding of what the codes say at any one point in time by those who are expected to pay regard to them.

I want to raise the question of resources. No impact assessment has been prepared. Can the Minister confirm that none of the revised codes of practice will require any additional police resources to implement them, whether human or financial, in any police force or organisation, and that they will take up no more police time to implement than that already required for the existing applicable codes of practice?

The revision to Code C also reflects the provision in last year’s Policing and Crime Act to ensure that 17 year-olds are treated as children for all purposes under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. When this order was considered by the Commons, one of the issues raised was whether this change meant that children aged 17 could no longer be named in media reports when they are a victim, as applies to children up to the age of 16. I believe the Government said in the Commons that they would take this matter away to see what more could be done. What has so far happened in respect of this undertaking, albeit I accept that it was given only pretty recently?

Codes E and F introduce what the Explanatory Memorandum describes as,

“substantial changes to the approach to audio and visual recording of suspect interviews”.

The Explanatory Memorandum goes on to say:

“The new and revised provisions cover all interviews for all types of offence, for all suspects—whether or not arrested and irrespective of the case disposal outcome”.


How many extra audio and visual recordings per year is it estimated that this provision will lead to compared to the current figure? Does this have any additional resource implications, after taking into account any expected decrease in written interview records?

Finally, paragraph 8.4 of the Explanatory Memorandum refers to the outcome of the consultation, which,

“prompted a number of significant changes to the original proposals”.

Were any concerns or proposals in the 32 separate responses not reflected in those changes to the original proposals to which the Government refer in the Explanatory Memorandum and, if so, what did those concerns or proposals relate to?

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I too thank the Minister for explaining these measures but I want to take up the theme that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, mentioned about resources. While we welcome the tightening of safeguards for children and vulnerable people, we are concerned that some of these measures are a worrying sign of the pressure the police are under. I shall come to that in a moment.

In the meantime, is the Minister aware of the difficulties in the police securing appropriate adults to attend police stations? This has arisen out of the centralisation of charging, meaning that appropriate adults are having to travel much longer distances than when they simply used to attend a local police station. Has any work been done to quantify the problems of centralised charging, set against a potential need for more appropriate adults to attend interviews as a result of the tightening of the guidelines in these codes of practice?

A worrying sign of the times is the fact that a superintendent could potentially authorise an extension of detention of up to 36 hours using a live link. This is an indication of the worrying reduction in the number of senior police officers. The noble Baroness will agree that this is a serious decision. Bearing in mind the rank of the officer required to authorise the detention, is it really appropriate that this be done via a live link rather than by the superintendent attending the police station in person? The lack of detectives in the police service has been in the news recently. There is a national shortage of detectives. Allowing a live link to be used so that a detective can question a suspect, even if the detective is not at the police station, seems a retrograde step. I speak from personal experience when I say that nothing beats being in the room with the suspect when you are trying to determine whether he or she is telling you the truth. Have any concerns been raised by police detectives about the extension of the use of a live link in the way suggested in this order?

Clearly, we welcome the fact that 17 year-olds are going to be treated as children for all purposes under PACE, but that goes back to what I was saying about the need for more appropriate adults and the difficulties that have been brought to my attention in securing appropriate adults.

It is very important that suspect interviews are recorded, except in exceptional circumstances, and therefore we support this order. However, recordings have to be made on suitably compliant authorised recording devices. Has any work been done on whether there will be additional cost to ensure that these suitably compliant authorised recording devices are available in every circumstance, in order to ensure that the interviews can be recorded? The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, also asked this question.

As the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, also said, the outcome of the consultation has prompted a number of significant changes to the original proposals. It is to the credit of the Government and the Home Office that the consultation has taken into account these concerns, such as not raising the level required to determine whether somebody is vulnerable to “belief” but keeping it to “any reason to suspect” the suspect is vulnerable. We welcome that approach. Overall, we agree with the changes to these codes of practice, but we are concerned that they may have some operational and financial impact on the police service that is not reflected in any of the surrounding literature the Home Office has provided in connection with these provisions.

EU Settlement Scheme

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Rosser

Thursday 21st June 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement, which has just been made and may still be being debated in the Commons. We, too, value the contribution of EU citizens and their rights need to be protected after Brexit.

The Government, as the Statement indicates, intend to introduce a new settlement scheme for EU citizens resident in this country. The uncertainty felt by EU citizens over their position in the country in the light of Brexit has had serious consequences. These have been reflected in a number of ways, including concerns over staffing shortages in key areas of the economy as the enthusiasm of EU citizens for being in this country has diminished. Providing clarity on their future position and rights is in our national interest, as has become all too obvious. Whether the Government’s actions and proposals will achieve the desired result is another matter. The absence of the promised immigration White Paper and Bill has done nothing to ease the damaging uncertainty that the Government have allowed to fester.

What is the Government’s estimate of the expected take-up rate by EU citizens of the registration scheme? What will be the consequences for EU nationals who do not register? Will EU citizens in this country post Brexit be allowed to travel and stay in other countries, including their country of origin, and retain their rights on their return? What additional resources, and at what cost, will be required to administer the scheme? What right of appeal will there be for those who believe they have been wrongly denied registration under the criteria against which registration will be determined? What publicity, and through what means, will the Government be providing for the procedures announced today?

According to today’s papers, the Government have expressed concern about the lack of detailed reciprocal plans from other EU countries and the Home Secretary has been quoted as saying it is “not good enough”. If the newspaper reports are correct, I am not quite as sure as the Government are that that is the kind of comment that will create an atmosphere of understanding and willingness to compromise in any forthcoming negotiations with the EU. Clarity of their objectives over Brexit has not exactly been a hallmark of this Government.

The Government must have a clear view about what they would regard as acceptable from the EU and other EU countries in response to the intentions and details set out in today’s further Statement. Can the Minister spell out what the Government would regard as an acceptable response from the EU and EU countries in respect of British citizens living in Europe post Brexit? Can the Minister say whether the Government have had any indication of whether the arrangements set out in today’s Statement will prove acceptable to the EU and EU member states?

Turning to some of the paragraphs in the Statement, towards the end of the first page it says:

“Irish citizens will not need to apply for status under the scheme but may elect to do if they wish”.


Can the Minister clarify what benefit, if any, there would be for Irish citizens in electing to apply for status under the scheme?

On the second page, the Statement says:

“Subject to parliamentary consideration of changes to the fees regulations, applications will cost £65, with a reduced fee of £32.50 for children under 16”.


How did the Government arrive at the figure for the proposed charge?

On the third page of the Statement, it is acknowledged that processing applications will prove a challenge but it says that,

“the Home Office already issues around 7 million passports and 3 million visas each year and so processing applications on the scale required is not new to us”.

Some might think that a trifle complacent, particularly those who recall what has happened over Windrush and those who recall the percentage of successful appeals against Home Office decisions. According to the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, the Home Office has a 10% error rate in immigration status checks. The Statement may also yet prove a little complacent in the light of the track record of the Home Office in managing to lose documents. I am sure a very close eye will be kept on the efficiency or otherwise with which the Home Office manages this scheme. Others—I think the Home Affairs Select Committee might be one—have identified weaknesses in recruitment, retention, training, decision-making and management, which would seem to cover most aspects of the department’s work.

The Statement says that there will be a dedicated customer contact centre to help people through the process. Who will that be staffed by? Will the Home Office be sufficiently dedicated to make sure that it is staffed by its own staff, or will it be staffed by an outsourced organisation?

The immigration exemption in the Data Protection Act denies people the right to access their data when they need it most. Will this exemption apply to EU citizens? Will employers, landlords and banks be required to check the documents of EU citizens in the same way as they have been required to check the immigration status of non-EU citizens?

In conclusion, if we leave the EU without a deal, what will happen to EU citizens? Will this agreement and their rights be protected? Finally, on the criminal check, which is one of the criteria against which registration will be assessed, what exactly will the threshold be, and how far back will offences be considered relevant?

I appreciate that I have asked a number of questions and I say to the Minister now that I will be more than happy to accept a written response if that is required.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I, too, thank the Minister for repeating the Statement. We welcome it if we take it at face value, but the noble Baroness will understand that we need to probe.

The Statement gives the impression that the Home Office will be bending over backwards to help UK-resident EU citizens to apply for and be granted settled status or pre-settled status. This appears to be completely at odds with the Home Office’s attitude towards the Windrush generation. Can EU citizens have confidence in this Statement in the light of the Windrush fiasco?

The Statement says that persistent offenders or those who pose a security threat will not be eligible. I appreciate that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has already asked what the threshold might be in respect of which criminals will be excluded, allowed in or allowed to remain, and she may be ready to answer that. In the other place, the Minister said that UK criminal record databases and watch-lists would be searched and that applicants would be asked about overseas convictions. Currently, ECRIS can be searched by the UK, but access to ECRIS looks as though it is in jeopardy. How confident is the Home Office that its systems will be robust enough to identity those with serious overseas convictions?

The Statement says that close family members living abroad will be able to join EU citizens resident in the UK. Can the Minister confirm how close a relative would have to be in order to be able to join an EU citizen who is resident here?

The Statement also says that negotiations are under way with non-EU EEA countries with a view to extending the scheme to their citizens. I think it mentions EEA countries and Switzerland. I should declare an interest in that I am married to a Norwegian and own property in Oslo. Can the Minister say any more on what progress is being made with regard to EEA countries and Switzerland?

Penultimately, will these arrangements be dependent on reciprocal arrangements being put in place for UK citizens resident in the EU and EEA countries, or will they be in place no matter what the response from those countries is?

This is a detailed and complex proposal, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has indicated by the number of questions he has asked. Will the Minister agree to a debate to allow proper consideration of all the issues that we have raised today?

Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2017

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Rosser

Thursday 21st December 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, noble Lords will be pleased to hear that I will be brief. However, these are very serious matters. As the Minister just outlined, this measure can interfere with people’s human rights. Therefore, I have to ask: can she tell us any more about the four organisations being proscribed? I understand that the first group has been involved in attacks in Bahrain and is suspected of financing terror in Qatar; the second group has also been involved in attacks in Bahrain; the third group has been involved in attacks in Egypt; and the fourth group has been involved in attacks on the army and the police in Egypt. However, clearly, this order primarily has effect in the United Kingdom. Is the Minister able to say whether there is any evidence that these groups are active in, or have supporters in, the United Kingdom that would require such draconian steps to be taken? However, I understand that it may not be possible to give those details for security reasons, as she said.

As regards the group being de-proscribed, again it is good to see that the Government are actively considering groups that have been proscribed in the past, and are prepared to de-proscribe where the evidence suggests that is merited. My only concern is that the reasons the Minister gave for de-proscribing the organisation to which she referred raise questions about the amount of evidence available to support the proscription of the other organisations, bearing in mind the alternative measures that can be taken against individuals, in particular, who might be supporting terrorism in the United Kingdom.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for her explanation of the purpose of, and reasons for, this order, which we support, and which proscribes four groups based in Bahrain and Egypt, and removes one group from the list of proscribed organisations. Fortunately, I do not have to go to the same lengths as the Minister in giving the full names of these organisations.

The order, which is the 22nd proscription order under the Terrorism Act 2000, went through the House of Commons two days ago and will come into effect tomorrow, subject to it being passed by this House today, as the noble Baroness said.

The effect of proscription is that a listed organisation is outlawed and unable to operate in the UK, with it being a criminal offence for a person to belong to, invite or provide support for, or arrange a meeting in support of, a proscribed organisation. The assets of a proscribed organisation can become subject to seizure as terrorist assets. As I understand it, some 51 people have been charged with membership of proscribed groups and 32 have been convicted.

I also thank the Minister for the letter she sent to me at the beginning of this week setting out the reasons why the Home Secretary had come to the conclusion that each of the four groups is concerned in terrorism. As the noble Baroness said, having reached that conclusion and belief, the Home Secretary then has to decide whether to exercise her discretion to proscribe each organisation, which she has decided to do in each case. One of the factors that the Home Secretary takes into account in considering whether to exercise that discretion is the need to support other members of the international community in tackling terrorism. There are, however, four other factors the Home Secretary has regard to in deciding whether to exercise her discretion to proscribe: the nature and scale of the organisation’s activities; the specific threat it poses to the UK; the specific threat it poses to British nationals overseas; and the extent of the organisation’s presence in the UK.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Rosser]

I do not want the noble Baroness to regard this as a challenge to what she has just said; I am merely asking for confirmation. Is it really regarded as a security issue to give any indication of which of the five factors set out in the Explanatory Memorandum weighed with the Home Secretary in her decision? I ask that in the context of the noble Baroness’s opening statement, when she referred to supporting international partners in the fight against terrorism, which is one of the five factors. One could take it as a pretty good hint that that was a factor, but that would then be inconsistent with the noble Baroness’s statement that she cannot say which of the factors weighed in the mind of the Home Secretary on this issue.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, perhaps I can assist. I do not know whether it is beyond my pay grade to suggest something to the Minister but perhaps she could consult after today’s proceedings and, if there is any other information that she can possibly put into the public domain, perhaps she can write to us.

Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Search, Seizure and Detention of Property: Code of Practice) Order 2018

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Rosser

Tuesday 5th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for that explanation of the purpose and content of the four orders we are considering, which we support. Clearly, they do not have quite the same attraction for Members of your Lordships’ House as the business we discussed prior to this, judging by the attendance in the Chamber at present.

The orders seek to ensure that powers are used appropriately and proportionately by those exercising them, as well as giving those exercising them the necessary powers to achieve the required objectives in recovering the proceeds of crime. As the Minister said, the orders bring into force revised codes of practice and one new code of practice, providing guidance and procedural requirements for the exercise of certain functions under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. The revised and new codes are required because of amendments to POCA made by the Criminal Finances Act 2017, which was passed last April—in the days when this Government had a working majority in the House of Commons and before this Government gave a certain large sum of money to secure a smooth, lasting and harmonious working relationship with the DUP.

That brings me to the issue of Northern Ireland and these orders. As the Minister said, a legislative consent Motion has not been obtained because the Northern Ireland Assembly was dissolved during the passage of the Criminal Finances Act. The Minister said that the Government were working with the authorities in Northern Ireland to commence the powers as soon as possible. Does this mean that further legislative measures are on the way or are such measures all covered by these orders? Which powers are the Government working with the authorities in Northern Ireland to commence there as soon as possible? Is it just the new powers and amendments made under the Criminal Finances Act 2017, to which the revised and new codes of practice we are discussing relate, or powers unconnected to these codes of practice? Who are the authorities in Northern Ireland to which the Minister referred? What are the actual or potential consequences on the effectiveness of the matters covered by the Criminal Finances Act in relation to proceeds of crime, not only in Northern Ireland but in Great Britain, of not being able to obtain a legislative consent Motion and bring them into operation on the intended day?

Since one of the orders apparently covers Northern Ireland—the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cash Searches: Code of Practice) Order 2018—can the Minister say why that order includes Northern Ireland, in view of the issue over a legislative consent Motion not being obtainable? The Commons Minister stated when it was discussed there that,

“there is nothing in these codes relating to the new powers that is a devolved matter in the competence of the Northern Ireland Assembly ”.—[Official Report, Commons, Delegated Legislation Committee, 4/12/17; col. 4.]

Is the answer to the question I have raised that the order to which I refer covers an aspect of POCA that is not devolved?

A second point relates to the resources that will be available to ensure that the new powers and provisions in the Criminal Finances Act 2017, to which the revised codes relate, can be effectively implemented. For example, the codes cover the extension of certain authorities and powers to the Serious Fraud Office. There is also a new code of practice providing guidance, as the Minister said, on the use of search powers for the recovery of listed assets that are suspected to be the proceeds of crime or intended for use in crime. New codes are of little relevance if the resources are not there to bring their content into operation.

What steps have the Government taken recently to satisfy themselves that the necessary resources are available to implement effectively the powers and authorities to which these codes relate? What are the asset recovery rates of the agencies concerned, and how have those changed over the last five years? Do the agencies have a target figure they are expected to achieve and are they achieving it? Are the Government satisfied with the performance of the agencies concerned on asset recovery and, if not, what action is being taken? Finally, can the Government give an assurance that, since the codes refer, I believe, to immigration officers, among others, the important powers covered by these codes will not be conferred on outside bodies acting for the Government, such as G4S and Serco?

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, we also support these instruments and see the importance of extending the ability to recover criminal assets to precious metal and precious stones. There is a serious concern in some communities, for example with drug dealers who display their wealth ostentatiously, that young people should not be encouraged to go down that route by such behaviour. The police and other law enforcement agencies sometimes have difficulty in proving substantive offences against such people, so for them to be able to seize such precious metal and precious stones where people are not able legitimately to account for them is an extremely important move.

It is a concern that these powers will not be able to be commenced in Northern Ireland. This highlights again the importance of Northern Ireland in matters that the country is concerned with at this time.

It is important that these agencies have the necessary resources to implement the powers to which these codes of practice relate. While it is possible that fewer resources will be required to seize assets than would be necessary to prove sometimes difficult substantive offences against the individual, we are content with these instruments.

Terrorist Attacks

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Rosser

Tuesday 5th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement made earlier in the House of Commons. We share the view expressed that responsibility for these awful incidents rests solely on the shoulders of the perpetrators. We all owe a debt of gratitude to our intelligence and security services and the police for the work they do seeking to protect us from acts of terrorism. Without their commitment and dedication, this country would not feel like a safe place to live. We know only too well from an act of terrorism here on our doorstep that their commitment and dedication can result in loss of life—in this instance, of a police officer doing his duty to the full. We should all be grateful to David Anderson QC for his report, although our first thoughts must be with the families and loved ones of those who died or suffered life-changing injuries in these awful incidents.

Those who have the burden of responsibility of protecting us are entitled to expect our full support. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary has recently reported that policing is under significant stress. Officer numbers have declined significantly since 2010 and further reductions in numbers of officers and police staff are on the way. A government claim that reserves totalling £1.6 billion are available to the police has been dismissed by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate, which said that not only was the figure £200 million less than the Government had claimed but also that two-thirds was already earmarked to be spent.

The chair of the National Police Chiefs Council has been quoted as saying, “We’ve made £1.6 billion efficiency savings in the last five years and predict we’ll save another £0.9 billion in the next five. This at a time when HMIC recognises policing is under significant stress from rising demand and reported crime that is increasingly complex with … budgets due to fall in real terms over the next three years”. The Metropolitan Police Commissioner has warned of cuts to officer numbers if her force has to make a further £400 million in savings because of budget pressures. The indicative profile of the counterterrorism police’s grant allocation over the next three years sees a reduction of 7.2% in its budgets. Can the Minister say what the Government now intend to do to address that situation in the light of the Anderson report and the continuing, indeed increased, terrorist threat?

The Anderson report refers to the work of M15 and counterterrorism police in improving their co-ordination and reliance on community policing, even though the Government have previously attempted to maintain, in the face of reductions in community and neighbourhood policing numbers, that counterterrorism and community policing are unrelated activities. What do the Government intend to do to bolster community policing, now that they have been told, not for the first time, that it is a vital part of counterterrorism activity, building confidence and trust among communities and securing crucial intelligence?

David Anderson has said that, in the case of the Manchester terrorist attack, MI5 and counterterrorism police,

“could have succeeded had the cards fallen differently”.

How do the Government interpret that? We know that the police and security and intelligence services have more people who should be monitored than they can properly cope with. Do the Government intend to increase the resources available to address that reality?

Another area that is important in countering terrorism is the effectiveness or otherwise of border controls. Currently, scarce resources are available to be spent on telling people who have lived in this country for over 50 years that they face deportation before bundling them off to an immigration detention centre. On the other hand, resources are not available to prevent 11 people in a lorry from apparently being smuggled into this country undetected by border controls and found in a layby in Wiltshire only when they start banging on the side of the vehicle—11 people who could have constituted a terrorist threat. Is it not time that the Government had a hard look at not only whether they are providing sufficient resources to our hard-pressed security and police services to counterterrorist threats but whether they have their priorities right in how the resources available should be used?

The Statement refers to the fact that the Government will shortly be announcing the budgets for policing for 2018-19. The Home Secretary has said that she is clear that we must ensure that counterterrorism policing has the resources needed to deal with the threats that we face. In the Statement, the Home Secretary also said:

“I would like to remind honourable Members of the context. Andrew Parker, the director-general of MI5 recently said that we are facing ‘a dramatic upshift’ in terrorist threats”.


If the Home Secretary is to deliver on what she has said, and the Government with her, about the need to ensure that counterterrorism policing has the resources needed to deal with the threats that we face, it has to be very clear in announcing the budgets for policing for 2018-19 that no one will have any grounds for saying that the police and counterterrorism activity are being left underresourced.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I too thank the Minister for repeating the Statement and associate these Benches with the Home Secretary’s sentiments concerning those affected by the terrorist outrages. As the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has just reiterated, there is no doubt that the blame for the suffering that was inflicted remains with those who carried out these criminal acts and those who supported them. As far as I am concerned, we have the best intelligence and policing services in the world.

It is important to explain what a “dramatic upshift” in terrorist threats actually means. Having been briefed by those at the highest level, my understanding is that the number of people being influenced by extremist propaganda, particularly online, who are then tempted to conduct unsophisticated attacks such as those at Westminster, London Bridge and Finsbury Park, is increasing. Can the Minister confirm that it is the volume rather than the degree of sophistication, the amount of strategic planning or the co-ordination that is seeing a “dramatic upshift” in the threat?

In the case of the Westminster, Manchester and Finsbury Park attacks, which were apparently carried out by so-called “lone wolf” attackers, can the Minister explain how end-to-end encryption mentioned by the Home Secretary would have made any difference to the likelihood of those attacks being prevented? Bearing in mind that in all these attacks, except the London Bridge attack, none of the murderers was under active investigation, how would their communications have been monitored, whether end-to-end encrypted or not? In the case of the one attacker who was an active subject of interest, can the Minister confirm that the investigative means that were deployed against him could have overcome end-to-end encryption? Is it not the fact that end-to-end encryption is a global issue that cannot be banned, and that we should be focused on what we can do something about, rather than on what we can do nothing about?

Can the noble Earl confirm that David Anderson agrees with MI5 and Counter Terrorism Policing’s conclusion that they could not,

“find any key moments where different decisions would have made it likely that they could have stopped any of the attacks”?

The Home Secretary reflects David Anderson’s conclusion that intelligence is imperfect and investigators are making tough judgments based on incomplete information, and she promises to deliver the resources Counter Terrorism Policing needs to deal with the threats we face. Does the Minister agree that a vital part of the intelligence picture is provided by community policing, to which the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, alluded? The day after the London Bridge attack, a neighbour of one of the attackers told journalists how he thought that the man was being overfriendly and was asking about hiring a van without using a credit card on the day of the attack. Despite, as the Home Secretary said, a “number of” investigative means being deployed against him, this intelligence, which might have been discovered by a community policing team to whom the neighbour may have had links, did not surface until afterwards.

Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, among many others, have warned about the erosion of police resources and the demise of community policing. Despite assurances from Ministers to the contrary, the facts are that police budgets continue to fall in real terms. For example, the Metropolitan Police has already had to make savings of £600 million, with £400 million of cuts in the pipeline. Does the Minister agree that effective community policing is as important, if not more important, against the current unsophisticated threat, as Counter Terrorism Policing, and that community policing must also have the resources needed to deal with these threats?

Deaths in Police Custody

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Rosser

Monday 30th October 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement made earlier in the House of Commons. I agree with the Statement’s acknowledgement of the tremendous efforts of our police forces and officers.

The independent review by Dame Elish Angiolini QC into deaths and serious incidents in police custody was commissioned by the then Home Secretary in July 2015 to alleviate the pain and suffering of families still looking for answers. We thank Dame Elish for her comprehensive report and all those who contributed to it. However, will the Minister say when that report was received by the Home Secretary, as there appears to have been a lengthy delay between the report being received and the independent report being placed in the public arena—a delay which does not seem entirely consistent with the objective of alleviating the pain and suffering of families still looking for answers? What parts of the report, bearing in mind the delay, would have caused the Government a problem if the report had been placed in the public arena much earlier? Remarkably, after all the delay, the Government still do not intend to give their response to the recommendations, including the ones on healthcare in police custody, inquests and support for families. I hope the words “kicking” and “long grass” do not prove to be all too accurate.

The report is critical of the current processes, protocols and procedures for investigating deaths in police custody and of the role and approach of the agencies and organisations involved. It makes a considerable number of recommendations for speeding up the process of investigating deaths in police custody, including following contact with the police, in the light of the lengthy delays that currently occur, in contrast to the urgency, haste and mindset that is normally associated with potential and actual murder investigations. The delay in the current process leads to frustration, anger and suspicion that justice is not being done, and does not exactly enhance confidence and trust in the police, particularly among and within the families and communities most directly affected. The campaigning group Inquest has, I believe, said that more than 1,000 people have died in police custody or following contact with the police since 1990. No police officer apparently has been convicted in a criminal court in connection with any of those deaths.

The report makes a number of recommendations. For example, it states:

“For the state to fulfil its legal obligations of allowing effective participation of families in the process that is meaningful and not ‘empty and rhetorical’ there should be access for the immediate family to free, non-means tested legal advice, assistance and representation immediately following the death and throughout the Inquest hearing”.


I would have to say that, from the Statement, the Government appear to be a little lukewarm on implementing this recommendation in full. The Statement says, for example, that legal aid may be necessary in some circumstances. There is reference later on to “considering” the issue of publicly funded legal advice and representation at inquests.

The recommendations also include the comment that NHS commissioning of healthcare in police custody was due to have commenced in April 2016 but was halted by the Government earlier in the year. This report strongly recommends that this policy is reinstated and implemented. Perhaps the Minister can say why the commissioning of healthcare in police custody was halted by the Government, particularly since the report seems to have commented somewhat adversely on it.

The report also addresses the extent to which police use of restraints against detainees was identified as a cause of death by post-mortem reports in 10% of deaths in police custody between 2004-05 and 2014-15. It also says that a significant proportion of deaths involved people with mental health needs, and the report makes specific recommendations providing for change in how such people are treated, as indeed it does for those who have issues with drugs and/or alcohol. Drugs and/or alcohol featured as causes in around half of deaths, and an even higher proportion of those who died had an association with drugs or alcohol—namely, 82%.

The Statement indicates exactly what actions the Home Secretary now intends to take—and, I would have to say, not take—in the light of the report’s recommendations. By when do the Government expect to see a considerable improvement in the practices, procedures and mindsets identified in the independent review as contributing to and exacerbating the impact of the current delays in investigations into deaths in police custody? Against what criteria will the Government assess the effectiveness or otherwise of the actions that they are announcing today in light of the review? What are the specific goals that the Government expect their actions announced today to deliver? Who will be responsible for ensuring that those goals are delivered? What, if any, additional resources will be made available to implement even the actions announced today in the Statement, let alone if we implemented all the recommendations set out in the report?

In the light of the recommendation in the report, can the Government say any more—since I have questioned them—about the arrangements that will be introduced to make sure that there is proper legal representation for the families of those who have died in police custody at coroners’ court inquest hearings? Surely, the Government can be a bit more specific than they have been, because this report was submitted many months ago. Indeed, that applies to most of the recommendations in the report, bearing in mind that they have said that they do not intend to give a detailed response to all the recommendations today—and, indeed, they have not.

The report states that its recommendations are necessary to minimise as far as possible the risk of deaths and serious incidents in police custody occurring in future and to ensure that, when they do, procedures are in place that are efficient, effective, humane and command public confidence. It is now principally, although I accept not solely, up to the Government to make sure that those objectives are achieved within the shortest possible timescale. So far, the Government will appear to many to have dragged and still be dragging their feet. To allay those fears, will the Government report back to this House within no more than six months on the progress being made on the implementation of the recommendations in this comprehensive and valuable independent report?

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I, too, thank the Minister for repeating the Statement and express our sympathy to all those who have lost loved ones as a result of deaths in police custody. I declare an interest in that, when I was borough commander in Lambeth in south London, there were a number of deaths in custody. It is important to express that to the House, because the impact that it can have on the officers involved is also something that needs to be taken into account—particularly those officers who have acted in good faith and have done nothing wrong.

There are 120 recommendations, and it would be impossible to cover the whole ground, but there are a couple of issues that I want to highlight. The Minister has said, and the report talks about the fact that inquests are intended to be inquisitorial and should not be adversarial. When I represented the family of somebody whose son died as a result of a police action, it was the most adversarial court appearance that I have ever appeared in, bearing in mind that the overall majority of my experience had been in adversarial criminal courts. Surely, in those circumstances, and unless and until that situation is changed, families of those who have lost loved ones at the hands of the police should receive equality of arms in terms of legal representation with the police as recommended in this review—no ifs, no buts and no conditions.

On another issue, 15 or more years ago I was the Association of Chief Police Officers lead on mental health issues in policing. Following a number of deaths in police custody, training was introduced on the safe restraint of those suffering from mental illness. That was 15 years ago. Why does this report say that:

“National policing policy, practice and training must reflect the now widely evident position that the use of force and restraint against anyone in mental health crisis … poses a life threatening risk”?


This has been evident for decades, yet people are still dying in those circumstances at the hands of the police. What are the Government going to do differently this time to make a real difference?

Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (Amendment) (No. 2) Order 2017

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Rosser

Tuesday 24th October 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

Since I, too, was caught out by the earlier than anticipated start of this debate, I can thank the Minister for only that part of her explanation of the reasons for and purpose of the draft order that I actually heard. The purpose of the draft order, as has been said, is to make it an offence to possess, import, export, produce, supply or offer to supply the drug methiopropamine, or MPA, without a Home Office licence. MPA is a stimulant, psychoactive substance that has been subject to temporary control orders, the latest of which is about to expire—at the end of next month, if memory serves me right. There is evidence of MPA having adverse effects when taken, including abnormally fast heart rate, anxiety, nausea and breathing difficulties. I have to say that my list is more abbreviated than that given by the Minister when she introduced the order.

MPA has been associated with a number of deaths in the last five years and, as the Minister said, there were 46 cases where MPA was found in post-mortem toxicology, with MPA being implicated in the actual cause of death in 33 of those cases between 2012 and 2017.

MPA has not infrequently been marketed as a legal alternative to cocaine. In June of this year the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs, the ACMD, indicated that MPA continued to be misused and, as a result, was having harmful effects that could constitute a social problem. The ACMD recommended that MPA should now be permanently controlled as a class B drug under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971—which means, as I understand it, that among other things, including higher maximum sentences, possession of MPA also becomes an offence, which is not the case for substances controlled under the Psychoactive Substances Act 2016.

The ACMD also found that MPA had no recognised medicinal use, or industrial or commercial benefits other than potentially for research. I simply conclude by saying that we support the decision to accept the ACMD’s recommendation, and hence we support this order.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Newby made the point last week, when the Leader of the House asked for this House to suspend its Standing Orders in order to consider this matter today, that this legislation has not been scrutinised by the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments because of the Government’s failure to appoint their Commons members of that committee. This is clearly unacceptable and must be resolved as soon as possible.

In this particular case, the order is the result of a recommendation, as we have heard, by the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs to permanently classify the drug MPA as a class B drug. I am therefore confident in supporting this order as the recommendations of the ACMD are evidence based.

However, the comments of the parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Office to the first Delegated Legislation Committee in the other place yesterday, which presumably were a repetition of what the Minister said this evening to the House—again, I apologise for being slightly caught out by the early start of this particular debate—draw questions around bigger issues about the Government’s approach to controlling drug misuse.

MPA is a synthetic drug designed to replicate the effects of cocaine or MDMA. MPA started off life as a legal replacement for these class A controlled drugs. Prior to the Psychoactive Substances Act and the temporary class drug order, MPA would have been legal to both supply and possess. As we have heard, the Psychoactive Substances Act permanently made manufacture and supply of the drug illegal, but not possession, while the TCDO and this measure make possession as well as manufacture and supply illegal. Whether it sends a message to users about how dangerous the drug is is questionable.

The development of synthetic alternatives to existing controlled drugs—and in this case I am thinking in particular of things such as spice, the synthetic alternative to cannabis—runs the risk of creating even more toxic, and far more dangerous, drugs than the drugs they are designed to replace. The risk of continuing with a prohibition-based strategy of controlling the misuse of drugs is likely to increase the number of drug-related deaths.

Can the Minister tell the House, or write to me subsequently to tell me, how many deaths have resulted from the misuse of cocaine and MDMA between 2012 and 2017, compared with the 46 cases where post-mortem toxicology showed traces of MPA, and the 33 cases where MPA was implicated in the actual cause of death, as a proportion of arrests for possession of each type of drug—which we can assume is a proxy for how much cocaine, MDMA and MPA is being used? Can the Minister also tell the House how many deaths have resulted from the misuse of cannabis between 2012 and 2017?

If MPA is as dangerous, or more dangerous, than cocaine or MDMA, the question must be: why is it being classified as a class B drug while the others are classified as class A drugs? If MPA is, as I suspect, more dangerous than cannabis, at least in terms of fatalities, why is it in the same class of drugs as cannabis? Assuming, as I do, that the ACMD has made the right evidence-based decision in terms of its recommendations as to which class MPA should be placed in, what does this say about the classification of cocaine, MDMA and cannabis?

The point I am trying to make is that the current classification of drugs under the Misuse of Drugs Act lacks credibility, certainly with users. No one I know who misuses drugs starts from a point of asking, “What class is it in?” when deciding which drug to take.

We should be taking a harm reduction-based approach to the misuse of drugs, which should be treated as a health issue and not a criminal justice issue. That having been said, just because the classification of drugs under the Misuse of Drugs Act lacks credibility and other drugs may be wrongly classified, this does not mean that this evidence-based recommendation from the ACMD is wrong. On that basis, we support the order.