Asylum Seekers

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Thursday 28th January 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bates]

I agree that we have an obligation to ensure that the most vulnerable people who come into this country seeking asylum are placed in positions where they are cared for and safe. It might be of interest to the noble Lord to know the circumstances surrounding this. The asylum seekers were in initial accommodation in Cardiff. In that accommodation were people whose asylum claims and financial needs had been assessed and who then receive a financial contribution for food, and there were people who had just arrived who get full board and three meals a day. The wristbands were used to identify those people who were eligible for the three meals a day. I am not asking the House to accept that that is the way it should be—the practice has stopped—but that was the explanation for it. Certainly, our position is that the safety and security of asylum seekers—and the dignity and humanity with which we treat them—should be paramount. They are inspected by the Home Office on a routine basis—indeed, they have been inspected by the National Audit Office as well—and we look forward to the reports coming back.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, Azure cards, red front doors, wristbands and now refusing to take any unaccompanied asylum-seeking children from Europe: when will the Government stop giving the impression that asylum seekers are a problem to be palmed off on other countries at all costs and start treating them as vulnerable people in desperate need of our help, including sanctuary in this country?

[Lord Bates]

We can all be proud of this country’s record in offering asylum to people in need. The EU, which has a relocation scheme—it said that it would get 160,000 people out of the region into and around Europe—has so far managed to relocate 331 people under that scheme. The Prime Minister said in September that we would have 1,000 people from the region here by Christmas. We had more than 1,000 here by Christmas. The Prime Minister announced today that there will be a further review, with UNHCR, to identify unaccompanied children from conflict regions and how they can be helped further. We announced today a further £10 million to help unaccompanied children who are in Europe already. In addition, we are the second largest donor in providing aid to Syria. All that package together shows that we are living up to the high expectations and strong traditions that this country has in dealing with people in need.

Religious Hate Crime

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Wednesday 27th January 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I totally agree with the noble Lord, who speaks with great poignancy and expertise in this area. I regard religion very much as a route: we all have the same beginning and the same end, and the religion we follow is but a different path towards that end.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, can the Minister tell the House what research the Government are doing into the causes of the genuine and alarming increase in both anti-Muslim and anti-Semitic hate crime and whether the increasing anti-Muslim rhetoric in some British media—and elsewhere—might be the case?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

The noble Lord is quite right to point out what is being done. He will be aware from his own previous profession that the Government are working with the police and with communities to ensure that any kind of religious hate is formally recorded and that people are educated that they should report hate crime. From April this year, as the noble Lord will be aware, the Government will ensure that anti-Muslim hatred, along with other religious hate crime, is formally recorded by every police force across England and Wales.

Litvinenko Inquiry

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Thursday 21st January 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement made earlier today in the other place by the Home Secretary. The inquiry report confirms that the Russian state at its highest level sanctioned the killing of a citizen on the streets of our capital city in an unparalleled act of state-sponsored terrorism. We accept that time must be taken to digest the findings of the report and consider our response.

Before I proceed further, I express our appreciation to Sir Robert Owen and his inquiry team, without whose painstaking work the truth would never have been uncovered and known. I extend our thanks to the Metropolitan Police Service for what the report calls “an exemplary investigation”, and to the Litvinenko family’s legal team, who, as I understand it, supported them on a pro bono basis.

We express our sympathy to Marina and Anatoly Litvinenko, who have fought so courageously to make this day a reality. While the findings of this report raise international and diplomatic issues, this was first and foremost a family tragedy. Has the Home Secretary met, or does she intend to meet, Marina and Anatoly to discuss this report, its findings and the British Government’s response?

We welcome what the Home Secretary has said today in the Statement about Interpol notices and European arrest warrants, along with her announcement about asset freezes. Will she also directly approach all EU, NATO and Commonwealth allies, asking for immediate co-operation on extradition in respect of those named in the report as having poisoned Mr Litvinenko? Since there may be other individuals facing similar dangers, has a review been undertaken of the level of security provided to Mr Litvinenko by the relevant British services to see whether any lessons can be learned for the future?

No individuals commit crimes of this type alone, and today’s report confirms that there is a network of people who have known about and facilitated this crime. I understand that Mrs Litvinenko has prepared a list of names to be submitted to the Government, of those who have aided and abetted the perpetrators against whom, she believes, sanctions should be taken. That could include the freezing of UK assets, property and travel restrictions. Will the Minister give an in-principle commitment today to look seriously at that list and those requests?

The Statement indicates that there will be new diplomatic pressure, which we welcome, but given what we know about the way the Russian state operates, do the Government believe there is a case for a wide-ranging review of the nature and extent of our diplomatic, political, economic and cultural relations with Russia?

On diplomacy, do the Government consider that there is a case for recalling the ambassador for consultation and for making any changes to the Russian embassy in London? Given the proven Federal Security Service involvement, are the Government considering expelling FSB officers from Britain? Has the Prime Minister ever raised this case directly with Vladimir Putin, and will he be seeking an urgent conversation with him about the findings of this report?

On cultural collaboration, given what this report reveals about the Russian Government and their links to organised crime, on top of what we already know about corruption within FIFA, do the Government feel that there is a growing case to reconsider our approach to the forthcoming 2018 World Cup and to engage other countries in that discussion?

On the economy, are the Government satisfied that current EU sanctions against Russia are adequate, and is there a case to strengthen them?

We ask these questions not because we have come to a conclusion but because we believe they are the kind of questions this country needs to debate in the light of today’s findings. While the Home Secretary ordered this review, I believe I am right in saying that she originally declined to do so, citing international issues. Will it be considerations of diplomacy or justice that influence the Government’s response?

Finally, will the Government commit to coming back to update Parliament on whatever final package of measures and steps they intend to take in the light of this report and its disturbing findings? The family deserve nothing less than that after their courageous fight. Alexander Litvinenko’s last words to his son Anatoly, who was then 12 years old, were, “Defend Britain to your last drop because it saved your family”. He believed in Britain and its traditions of justice and fairness and of standing up to the mighty and for what is right, and we must now make sure that we find the courage to show his son and the world that his father’s faith in us was not misplaced.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I, too, thank the Minster for repeating the Statement made by the Home Secretary. The death of Mr Litvinenko, although it happened almost 10 years ago, is shocking and tragic, and we hope Marina Litvinenko and her son can find some solace in the findings of this report.

There are fundamental issues at stake here. Sir Robert Owen cites as the motivation for the murder of Mr Litvinenko his criticism of the Russian domestic security service and of the Russian President, Mr Putin, and his association with other Russian dissidents. He concluded that Mr Litvinenko may have been consigned to a slow death from radiation to “send a message”. Freedom of expression and freedom of association are fundamental human rights, and we cannot allow foreign Governments to murder people in this country, let alone a British citizen, for expressing such views or for associating with critics of a particular regime. Such an act cannot be left without serious consequences for Russia.

We acknowledge with gratitude the role of the security and intelligence services and the police in keeping us safe, and we accept the Home Secretary’s assertion that some of the work the security and intelligence services carry out in combating the threat from hostile states must remain secret. We also acknowledge the constant struggle the police and the security services face in trying to keep abreast of developments in technology. Any increase in investigatory powers must none the less be necessary and proportionate and must not unnecessarily undermine the right to free speech and the right to private and family life.

Will the Minster explain how the conclusions of this report have come as such a surprise to the Government that it is only this morning that the Home Secretary has written to the Director of Public Prosecutions asking her to consider whether further action should be taken? It is the Government who should already have taken action in freezing the assets and banning the travel of all those linked to this murder. I accept that a head of state cannot be subjected to a travel ban, but there is no reason why the Government cannot signal their intention to impose one as soon as Mr Putin leaves office.

Why are the Government limiting themselves to expressing their “profound displeasure” at Russia’s failure to co-operate and provide satisfactory answers? Why are they not expressing their outrage that state-sponsored murder by Russia to silence its critics has been carried out on British soil? The Government’s response is late, lame and lamentable.

[Lord Bates]

I am grateful for the points made on this report by the official spokesmen for the opposition parties. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, is absolutely right to say that it is a substantial report, and it is right, given that it has been a thorough exercise to undertake this study, that we give it due consideration before we come forward with all our recommendations. He is also right to point to the sections of the report that talk about the exemplary Metropolitan Police Service investigation into this crime, and I know that that will be welcomed as well by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. Often in such circumstances the police are criticised, but the chair of the inquiry goes out of his way to point out how exemplary they have been.

The noble Lord is right also to pay tribute to the legal team involved in this, and to ask about the security of individuals. The security of individuals is of course first and foremost the responsibility of the police with, where necessary, advice from the security services. We are confident that the police will be looking at the situation very carefully, particularly for individuals who may be at risk.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked if the Home Secretary will meet Marina Litvinenko, and the answer to that is absolutely. The Home Secretary wrote to Marina Litvinenko last night, and she was provided with advance sight of the report so that she could prepare her responses to it. That meeting will take place very shortly. When it does, that will be the appropriate time to consider Marina Litvinenko’s list of names on which she feels further action should be taken. Following that meeting, I will be happy to update the noble Lord and the House on what actions have been taken.

The noble Lord talked about what actions would be taken and whether we would be recalling our ambassador. At present—of course, we are only dealing with the report that has been received now—we certainly feel that the diplomatic channels have immense value in communicating to the Russian authorities our shock and outrage at this incident, which did not just involve the murder of a British citizen in the capital of the UK but involved the use of radioactive material that could have had a lethal effect upon many more people. In fact, some of the most disturbing parts of this entire report are those that show how lazy the two people who carried out this crime were and how unaware they were of the danger of the material that they were handling. There are examples of spills that were mopped up with towels. It was horrific behaviour and incredibly irresponsible, and it is amazing that only one person died as a result of it.

On the points made about this by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, I understand the frustration that will be felt but I draw his attention to appendix 1 of the report, which sets out in some detail the action that was taken. The Home Secretary has taken the action of writing to the Director of Public Prosecutions; following the conclusion of the report, we believe that that is the right course of action. The arrest warrants were issued under the previous Labour Government in 2006 and 2007—very prompt action was taken. Further action has also been taken in the light of the events in Crimea and Ukraine through the European Union, which has gone to the heart of some of the issues which were touched upon as regards cultural and commercial links. The European Union has frozen the assets of five banks, looked at commercial restrictions—and arms embargoes, as one would expect—as well as restrictions on movement. On whether there is more to be done, that is one of the reasons why the Home Secretary has written to her EU counterparts and will continue those discussions in the Justice and Home Affairs Council to see what more can be done, as well as through NATO, to see what more can be done there.

Ultimately, our objective is to ensure that the two people clearly identified as having carried out the murder are brought to the United Kingdom so that they can stand trial and so that the Litvinenko family can get justice for the crime which has been committed. We will not rest or resile from that commitment.

Immigration Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd December 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, before I get on to the Bill I start by paying tribute to the Minister, for whom I have the utmost respect. I genuinely wish him a merry Christmas and a happy new year—but this Bill really is appalling. To contrast the nature of the Bill with the character of the Minister, if I may use a corrupted 1970s cliché, “What’s a nice bloke like the Minister doing with a Bill like this?”.

Let me say clearly and unequivocally at the outset that Liberal Democrats support proper immigration control. The big question is: is the Bill the way to do it? In his opening remarks, the Minister talked about the Bill having the interests of the country as a whole at heart, but what interests are they? The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Southwark talked about the fact that there has been no White Paper since 2002, so what is the strategy? The Minister said that employment had never been higher in the UK and referred to a significant reduction in youth unemployment. At the weekend, the Irish Europe Minister gave some very interesting statistics. Apparently, 8% of workers in the UK are from overseas, which is the average for the European Union as a whole, but in Ireland it is 11%. So what problem is the Bill trying to address?

As the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked, what in hard numbers is expected to be achieved by the Bill? As my noble friend Lord Teverson said, the Government do not appear to have done the market research or the numbers. The noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, asked why we do not make what we have already work before we introduce yet more complex legislation. My noble friend Lady Hamwee said that there was little positive in the Bill; I am probably more of the same school as the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, who described it as a shocking Bill.

My real concern is about unintended consequences. My noble friend Lady Sheehan quoted the president of the National Black Police Association regarding the negative impact of the Bill on what is already a hostile environment in this country towards black and minority ethnic people in general, and migrants in particular, as evidenced by recent hate crime figures. The Bill will do nothing to alleviate this with its increased stop, search and seizure powers. The effect on existing discrimination against BME renters and job applicants is that it is likely to be made worse. This takes me back to my days as a police constable over 30 years ago, when a common reason for detaining somebody who was black was because they were a suspected overstayer. The police decided to move away from immigration enforcement on the grounds of improving community relations. As the Race Equality Foundation briefing says, there is the potential in the Bill to set us back 30 years in race relations, although I would not go as far as the noble Lord, Lord Ahmed, on that point.

To get down to specific issues, starving asylum seekers who have reached the end of the road with their asylum applications is not something that this country should be doing. The noble Lords, Lord Hylton and Lord Alton of Liverpool, made strong points on this. It is misconceived and it has been tried before. There was a trial of Section 9 of the asylum and immigration Act of 2004, which removed all support from those who had run out of road, and 39% of those families disappeared compared with 21% of those who continued to get support. During the pilot, only one family from which support had been removed was successfully removed, while nine in the control group were successfully removed. It is not just inhumane; it just does not work, and the evidence is there to show that. In any event, as the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries of Pentregarth, has pointed out, if the Government want to starve these people into submission, the British people will not allow the Government to do it. As he said, the Red Cross has helped 10,000 asylum seekers in the past 12 months.

As far as the right to rent is concerned, the Liberal Democrats reluctantly agreed in the coalition to conduct a pilot scheme on it, in the belief that the evaluation of that pilot would show that it was not worth pursuing. The Government have made much of the fact that there has been a pilot, but the actual number of black renters who were interviewed is in the 30s, so fewer than 40 people were questioned about whether they felt discriminated against as a consequence. The majority of those in the evaluation were white, which is not where we expect the problem to come from with this right to rent provision. The issue is discrimination against black and minority ethnic people, as a number of noble Lords have already said.

As my noble friend Lady Hamwee said, there are serious issues that are not being addressed in the Bill. We have heard today about the crisis of those fleeing conflicts in the continent of Africa, Afghanistan and elsewhere who are currently in Europe—1 million in the last 12 months. As my noble friend said, the establishment of safe routes for those people seeking refuge is not addressed. Family reunion is not addressed. Even Syrian and Afghan families who are already settled in the UK are not being allowed to take in family members who are currently stranded in Europe.

There is nothing in the Bill about the unlimited administrative detention of migrants, at the cost of £40,000 per detainee per year. Although I note the comments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, surely there must at least be judicial involvement in these cases after 28 days—convicted foreign criminals are of course a separate issue. The right of asylum seekers to work where there is no decision after six months will clearly reduce the burden on the public purse, and surely we are more likely to be able to keep tabs on these people if they have social ties than if they do not. Other noble Lords covered many issues with which I agree.

Like my noble friend Lady Hamwee, I am very grateful for the government briefing on the Bill, although it throws up a number of questions which highlight the fact that the Bill is ill conceived and clearly has not been thought through. I will give a few examples. The Secretary of State has the power to order asylum seekers to move from one local authority to another. Can the Minister assure the House about the safeguards that will be in place to ensure that transfers do not take place for some party-political reason? The current Government will not do that, of course, but who is to say that future Governments might not try to transfer people from one part of the country to another for party-political purposes?

This Conservative Government is apparently very concerned about national sovereignty in the face of decisions made by the EU, but, under the Bill, Council of Europe travel bans are to take effect in the UK automatically, without the need for secondary legislation. Does the Minister not see the contradiction?

As far as skills shortages in this country are concerned, as my noble friend Lord Wallace of Saltaire highlighted, the Bill will introduce a new immigration skills charge, which will apply to employers sponsoring non-EEA nationals who come to the UK under tier 2 of the points-based system. Which employers will this apply to and what amount will be set following consultation? Will we know these details before the end of our deliberations in this House, or does the Minister want the House to write the Government a blank cheque?

As my noble friend Lord Wallace of Saltaire also pointed out, the Bill changes the Government’s fee-raising powers in respect of civil registration, including that of births, marriages, deaths and passports. The reasons given in the government briefing include to allow such services to be “self-sufficient”, which is fair enough, and to have passport fees that,

“better reflect the costs incurred”,

for example the costs of processing “complex applications”. That is also fair enough. But then it says,

“to allow some passport fees to be set at above cost”.

Can the Minister tell the House which type of passport applications they intend to make a profit out of?

On the no-courts eviction process, the government briefing says that a tenant can challenge the Home Office decision to give notice administratively by contacting the Home Office or by applying to the High Court for judicial review. Does the Minister honestly believe that these are sufficient safeguards against families with children being thrown out onto the street?

It has been suggested that we on these Benches are out of touch with public opinion. We as Liberal Democrats do not subscribe to the Donald Trump school of populist politics. We will stand up for what we believe is right.

Counterterrorism: Muslim Communities

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Monday 21st December 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I thank the noble Lord, and as the Government Minister responsible for countering extremism, no one is more committed to ensuring that we unite to face up to the hijacking of a noble faith.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I was the police spokesman following the 7 July bombings in 2005. In a press conference, I said that as far as I was concerned, Islamic terrorism was a contradiction in terms. I went on to say that from my professional experience as a police officer, the UK was a much better and more law-abiding country for having strong Muslim communities. I stand by what I said then. Does the Minister agree with me?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I totally agree with the noble Lord, and perhaps I may put this into context. It is why our Prime Minister said recently when referring to Daesh that it is neither Islamic nor is it a state. That underlines how we deal with those who seek to hijack the noble faith in this country.

Prüm: UK Opt-in

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Wednesday 9th December 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, outlined, although the UK was previously party to the agreement, because this Government decided to opt out of all criminal justice co-operation with European partners in May 2014 and were ill-prepared to opt back in to it when opting in to many other criminal justice measures in November 2014, we are only now considering this measure. The right honourable Keith Vaz MP said in the other place:

“Think of the number of criminals we could have caught, or potential terrorists we could have found if only we had joined a year ago”.—[Official Report, Commons, 8/12/15; col. 924.]

Previously the Liberal Democrats had serious concerns about sharing fingerprint and DNA data because the police were retaining the fingerprints and DNA profiles of innocent people, some of whom had not even been arrested, let alone charged or convicted of an offence in the UK under legislation passed by the previous Labour Government. Because of the actions of the Liberal Democrats in the coalition Government, the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 made the holding of fingerprints and DNA profiles of innocent people illegal, save in exceptional circumstances. Having deleted innocent people’s records from the databases, we are far more relaxed about information contained within UK databases being shared with our European partners. Of course, there will be profiles of those arrested and still awaiting charge, or awaiting court cases on the database, so we also welcome the fact that only the subsets of the database containing the profiles of those individuals convicted of recordable offences will be shared with other EU countries.

We also welcome the fact that the higher UK scientific standards to ensure far more accurate fingerprinting and DNA matches will be adopted, and that there is instant notification if there is a DNA or fingerprint match, but details of the person identified are shared only once a manual request for that information has been made and once both sides are satisfied that the relevant criteria have been fulfilled. The Prüm decisions will also allow instantaneous checking of foreign registration vehicle marks, as the Minister said.

I have some sympathy for the Home Secretary, who finds herself in a bit of a dilemma on this—on the one hand, apparently positioning herself as the leadership candidate of the right of her party, and, necessarily if she is to maintain that position, to be Eurosceptic, but on the other hand apparently claiming that UK citizens are safer within the EU. She said yesterday in the other place:

“Recent events in Europe, particularly in Paris, have highlighted a very real need to co-operate with other countries in order to keep citizens safe and to hunt down criminals and terrorists”.—[Official Report, Commons, 8/12/15; col. 914.]

Can the Minister confirm what the Home Secretary said yesterday: namely, that the exchange of information that opting into the Prüm decisions enables will make UK citizens safer, that the Prüm decisions are a European Union initiative and, therefore, that the Government believe that the UK is safer as part of the EU than it would be outside?

With the additional safeguards that the Government are proposing, we support the opting in to the Prüm decisions.

[Lord Blair of Boughton (CB)]

My Lords, I think this will be the shortest speech I have ever made. It is absolutely clear that the majority of the law enforcement community in the United Kingdom has been outraged by the decision of the Government not to be in Prüm. If we are to come back into Prüm, that is fine. It will save lives. End of.

Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Codes of Practice) (Revision of Code E) Order 2015

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Monday 7th December 2015 Grand Committee

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, having been a police officer for more than 30 years, I feel qualified to speak on this subject. This is a welcome approach that will cut down on unnecessary bureaucracy. It seems counterproductive that we allow police to dispose of minor offences on the street but PACE, in its previous incarnation, required an audio recording of the interview, which is clearly not practical in many cases—although, with the increasing use of body-worn cameras by police officers, this may become less of a problem.

As for possession of cannabis, having been instrumental in the move towards street disposal of that offence, I cannot help but be supportive. My only concern is about theft offences. This offence involves dishonesty and, therefore, there are implications for the future of the individual. Because the individual is perhaps dealt with informally—it will be a formal disposal but on the street—additional safeguards may be necessary. But again, on low-level criminal damage, I do not have too many concerns. I also appreciate that there are safeguards, for example, in the case of vulnerable people, where an appropriate adult would need to be present and these changes would not apply. Generally, we support these changes.

[Viscount Simon (Lab)]

My Lords, first, would I be right in thinking that the only way one can check the records for a first-time offence is via the police radio? Secondly, on cannabis, how will the police establish whether it is first-time use? Otherwise, I support this order.

Equipment Interference (Code of Practice) Order 2015

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Monday 7th December 2015 Grand Committee

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Bates) (Con)]

My Lords, with the leave of the Committee I will also speak to the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Interception of Communications: Code of Practice) Order 2015.

Members will know that on 4 November 2015 the Government published draft legislation relating to the security, intelligence and law enforcement agencies’ use of investigatory powers for pre-legislative scrutiny by a Joint Committee of Parliament. The intention is for the Bill to be introduced early in 2016 and enacted before the sunset provision in the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 takes effect on 31 December 2016. In the mean time, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and the codes of practice made under it provide the legal basis for the essential investigatory techniques necessary to acquire the communications of those who mean us harm. Today we debate two codes of practice made under the existing legislation: an update of the existing code of practice on the interception of communications and a new code on equipment interference.

Interception is a vital tool that helps law enforcement and intelligence agencies to prevent and detect serious or organised crime and protect national security. It is also among the most intrusive powers available to law enforcement and the security agencies. For that reason, it is subject to strict safeguards in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and the code made under it. Interception warrants are issued and renewed by the Secretary of State for a small number of agencies and for a strictly limited range of purposes. RIPA also provides for independent oversight by the Interception of Communications Commissioner and an impartial route of redress through the Investigatory Powers Tribunal.

The interception of communications code of practice first came into force in 2002 and needs updating. There is now far more that can be said about the safeguards that apply to security and law enforcement agencies’ exercise of interception powers and the revised version of the code includes that extra detail. On what is new in the code of practice, the safeguards described in these codes are not new in themselves. In respect of the interception code, the law enforcement and intelligence agencies have always had robust internal arrangements, overseen by the Interception of Communications Commissioner. The draft code provides more detail about those arrangements.

First, it provides additional information on the safeguards that exist for the interception and handling of external communications under Section 8(4) of RIPA—that is, the ability to undertake bulk interception. Secondly, it sets out further information on the protections afforded to legally privileged material and other confidential material. To give an example, the code requires the Secretary of State personally to consider the likelihood that privileged material will be intercepted when determining whether it is necessary and proportionate to grant a warrant. It also requires additional internal safeguards to be applied in cases where legally privileged material is intercepted, including that where such material is retained it must be reported to the independent Interception of Communications Commissioner. Thirdly, it includes minor changes to reflect developments in law and practice since the code first came into force in 2002. For example, it reflects regulations introduced in 2011 which amended RIPA to create the power for the interception commissioner to impose a fine for certain kinds of unlawful interception. Much of the new material on the safeguards that apply to the exercise of interception powers reflects information disclosed during legal proceedings in the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, and it is right that this information is included in codes of practice so that it easy for members of the public to access it.

The equipment interference code of practice is new. Equipment interference is a set of techniques used to obtain a variety of data from equipment. This includes traditional computers or computer-like devices such as tablets, smartphones, cables, wires and static storage devices. Equipment interference can be carried out either remotely or by physically interacting with equipment. It allows the security and intelligence agencies in particular to keep pace with terrorists and serious criminals, who increasingly use sophisticated techniques to communicate covertly and evade detection. Equipment interference has been instrumental in disrupting credible threats to life, including those against UK citizens. MI5 has relied on this capability in the overwhelming majority of high-priority investigations it has undertaken over the past 12 months.

The Security Service Act 1989 and the Intelligence Services Act 1994 provide the legislative basis for the security and intelligence agencies to interfere with computers and communications devices. Warrants may be issued by the Secretary of State only when he or she considers the activities to be authorised are necessary and proportionate. The use of the powers is subject to independent oversight by the Intelligence Services Commissioner. Prior to the draft code, which we are debating today, equipment interference powers have not had their own bespoke code of practice.

The code does not confer new powers, but simply makes public the robust internal safeguards that the intelligence agencies already apply. It brings greater transparency to the robust processes that the agencies adhere to when interfering with computer equipment to prevent terrorism, disrupt serious crime and identify and stop others who seek to harm us and our country. For the first time, this code of practice publicly sets out the stringent safeguards that the intelligence agencies apply to their use of equipment interference. This includes strict rules on how data acquired through equipment interference must be handled, how they must be securely and safely stored, and how they must be destroyed when it is no longer necessary or proportionate to hold them. The code also explains the consideration of necessity and proportionality that the Secretary of State must take before authorising any use of equipment interference. That ensures that this vital capability may be used only when the scope of the interference has been carefully considered and compared to the potential benefits of the operation. Furthermore, the code explains that equipment interference should not be considered a proportionate power if other less intrusive methods of acquiring the same data are possible.

Akin to the interception code of practice, this document also provides reassurance that the acquisition of legally privileged and confidential information is subject to even greater oversight and safeguards. The code sets out a series of tests that must be applied before any authorisation is granted and then the subsequent handling arrangements, should confidential material be acquired.

Finally, the code also provides information regarding the use of equipment interference targeted at equipment outside the British Isles. This section ensures that the public have a comprehensive guide to the use of equipment interference powers by the intelligence agencies and the range of safeguards and oversight that applies to such important activity.

The codes of practice contain no new powers; instead, they reflect the current safeguards applied by the relevant agencies. The purpose of the codes is to make more information publicly available about the stringent safeguards that the agencies apply in their use of investigatory powers. They ensure that the powers can be used only when it is necessary and proportionate and when it will help keep us safe from harm. I commend the orders to the House.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I must first say that I am not an expert in this area. Our expert on this matter is on the Joint scrutiny Committee, which is about to sit. That is why he is not here. For this to come up when the people considering the draft investigatory powers Bill are elsewhere and engaged in that business is rather an unfortunate clash of tabling.

We are very concerned about interception, but that is and has been a widely known and accepted practice over the years, although the nature of that interception has obviously changed as means of communication have changed. It tends to be specific and targeted at particular individuals who, as the Minister said, intend to cause us harm or who are involved in serious crime. The code of practice on interception, which, as the Minister said, is an updated code of practice rather than a completely new one, is not the major area of concern for us.

We are very concerned about the use of equipment interference and the fact that very little—if any—debate has taken place, in Parliament or outside, about the use of these powers. While the Minister points to legislation that the security services rely on to carry out equipment interference, explicitly setting out what that means was not part of the discussion when those pieces of legislation were presented to Parliament. While what interception of communications involves is reasonably straightforward, equipment interference potentially means gaining complete access to a computer, for example. Speaking for myself, my life is on my computer. Therefore, if there were intrusion through equipment interference on to my computer, practically everything about me would be learnt by the security services, including websites I had visited and passwords that would give access to, for example, online banking. It is a much more intrusive power for the police and the security services than interception.

Hacking into computers and mobile phones was made an offence in the Computer Misuse Act 1990. My understanding is that a clause introduced in the then Serious Crime Bill 2015 exempted the police and the security services from that provision. Does the Minister accept that engagement in equipment interference by the police and the security services between 1990 and 2015 must therefore have been illegal because it was an offence under the Computer Misuse Act 1990, the exemption not coming in until 2015?

As far as I can see, the equipment interference code of practice relates only to the security services. There is no mention of equipment interference being used by the police. Again, I am not an expert on this, but it would appear that the police have to rely on legislation that allows them to interfere with property. That was intended for planting bugs in homes or offices—that sort of thing—rather than interfering with computers. Will the Minister say what the code of practice is for police use of equipment interference, as opposed to that of the security services?

There is also serious concern about general warrants being issued for equipment interference, rather than for named individuals. Indeed, the Intelligence Services Commissioner’s latest report expressed concern that GCHQ was using thematic warrants for equipment interference. How many thematic warrants have been issued?

I have another question for the Minister: why are the Government bringing forward these orders now, when the primary legislation on which they are based is currently being completely reviewed? As he said, the Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill is currently looking at the primary legislation, so why now?

Among other things, the Government have produced HM Government Transparency Report 2015: Disruptive and Investigatory Powers. I cannot find any reference in it to equipment interference. As the Government are being transparent about these things, can the Minister assist me with where we can learn how much equipment interference has been going on?

Paris Attacks: Violence Against Muslims

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Tuesday 1st December 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

Let me assure the noble Lord that the British Government take all hate crime seriously. That is why, in October, the Prime Minister announced a new hate crime initiative, which will be published in January, against all forms of hatred and bigotry. On the recording of anti-Muslim hatred, all religious hate crime and bigotry from anywhere in the country will be recorded officially by all police forces across England and Wales from April next year.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, following the London bombings in 2005 there was a similar increase in Islamophobic hate crime. The then most senior Muslim officer in the UK said that this,

“can lead to these communities completely retreating and not engaging at a time when we want their engagement and support”.

What guidance have the Government given to police forces on engagement with Muslim communities in order to maintain their trust and confidence?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, the noble Lord referred to the tragic events of 7/7. In Britain today, no community, including the Muslim community, has retreated. We are a thriving democracy—multifaith and multicultural—where we celebrate the diversity of our country as a strength. However, the noble Lord is right to ask what the police are doing. We are working hand in glove with the police to ensure that reassurance is conveyed to all communities, irrespective of whatever faith they may be, that the police, the Government and all of us stand with them against all forms of bigotry.

Police: Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Monday 23rd November 2015 Grand Committee

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I also thank the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, for the debate. I note his comments about crime figures being underrecorded by the police—was there ever a greater case of shooting yourself in the foot, bearing in mind the justification that the Government have given for reducing police numbers by so great an amount is the drop in crime?

I have a great deal of sympathy for what the noble Lord, Lord Blair of Boughton, said about the way his career came to an end, which I think was entirely inappropriate. As far as the noble Lord, Lord Wasserman, is concerned, the report majors on holding PCCs to account. I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Bew, not only for the report but for raising that as an issue, because I want to concentrate on concerns with the police and crime commissioners, rather than concerns with police leadership.

In 2010, the Liberal Democrats raised concerns about PCCs. We had concerns about concentrating so much power in one individual. As an alternative we suggested that, where police authorities were coterminous with local authority areas, the police authority should be made of the local elected councillors. Where they were not, there should be directly-elected police authorities, but not just one individual. In particular, concerns are highlighted in the report about the hiring and firing of police constables, the transparency of the selection processes and the ability to hold the police and crime commissioner to account when their conduct falls below the standards expected of them but short of criminal conduct.

I will illustrate the report’s abstract concerns by reference to a real-life example. A police and crime commissioner selected and appointed a chief constable to head their force. Some time after appointment, serious allegations of misconduct against the chief constable were reported to the PCC by a whistleblower. The allegations were of a sexual nature, involving the alleged abuse of authority, with the chief constable using his position, as both the chief constable and a man, to behave in inappropriate ways towards female staff. Because the chief constable had only recently been appointed by the PCC, there was clearly potential for the allegations to cast serious doubt over the judgement of the PCC in appointing the chief constable in the first place.

It has been brought to my attention by some of those involved that this confidential report of serious misconduct, including the name of the whistleblower, was passed to the chief constable by the police and crime commissioner. Those who brought the matter to my attention felt that, as the PCC was elected, and because of the sensitive nature of the allegations and the impact on the victims if their identities were made public, there was nothing they could do about what they considered to be the entirely inappropriate behaviour of the police and crime commissioner.

Eventually the allegations against the chief constable were formally recorded and investigated, and findings against him were made, short of requiring him to resign. Only after relentless pressure, mainly from his own officers, whose representative organisations, rather than the PCC, said they no longer had confidence in him, did the PCC finally agree to start the proceedings that would result in requiring the chief constable to resign. Eventually he did resign of his own volition.

Apart from the question of lack of judgment by the PCC in the first place, there are serious questions about her conduct—such as the leaking of confidential information about the identity of the complainants to the perpetrator—that have still not been addressed. This report by the Committee on Standards in Public Life queries the robustness of the selection of chief constables by PCCs, the effectiveness of police and crime panels in holding the police and crime commissioner to account, the confused complaints system in relation to PCCs, the lack of a code of conduct for PCCs, and insufficient powers to take action against PCCs whose conduct falls below the required standards.

Those are not abstract or theoretical concerns. As I have outlined in this one case, of which I have some detailed knowledge, the whole system by which PCCs work together with chief constables, how they are appointed and how they are then held to account and disciplined is, in my opinion, flawed. As the report highlights, because there is only one person holding the chief constable to account—in an increasing number of cases, the same person who appointed that chief constable—the relationship between the chief constable and the PCC in terms of their combined skills, their experience and their personalities becomes critical.

Do the Government not accept that, with the best will in the world, even if we have the codes of conduct and an independent element in the chief constable appointments process—as the report recommends—and a clear understanding of operational independence and effective measures to hold an elected police and crime commissioner to account, is having only one person responsible for selecting the chief constable and co-operating with the chief constable to deliver politically critical goals, for holding the chief constable to account and for sacking the chief constable really a workable system? I raise that not as a theoretical question but in relation to the case that I have outlined to the Committee this afternoon.