Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Monday 2nd February 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howard of Lympne]

My Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow my noble friend Lord Blencathra, with whom I worked so closely and for so long in government. I am afraid that on this occasion I have to disagree with the contents of his speech. It seems to me that the answer to the points that he made was given by the noble Lord, Lord West, during his intervention. These amendments are not meant to be the last word on the provisions that the final Bill should contain; they are meant to give the other place an opportunity to reconsider these matters.

I am afraid that I was unable to be present at the debate in Committee, but I was able to listen to an exchange on the radio a few mornings ago between the noble Lord, Lord West, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. I found the arguments put forward during that exchange by the noble Lord, Lord West, wholly persuasive. That is why I came along this afternoon ready to support the amendment in his name and in the names of his co-sponsors. I have to confess to your Lordships that my determination to do so was reinforced in some measure by the belief—it is still not clear to me to what extent it was well founded—that the Conservative limb of the coalition was anxious to proceed with these proposals but were being prevented from doing so only by the pesky Lib Dems—I am so sorry, by my noble friends who sit on the Liberal Democrat Benches. That remains not entirely clear.

It seems to me that the case made by the four noble Lords who have sponsored this amendment is very compelling. It is clear from what my noble friend Lord King has said that we cannot take the matter further today and that, sadly, this legislation will not be put on the statute book before the general election. However, I join with those who have urged the Government and both of the major parties that might form the Government after that election to proceed with these measures with all possible haste.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, to address the comments made by my noble friend Lord King of Bridgwater and other noble Lords, in my opinion there is no doubt that we all face a very serious threat of terrorism. There is also no doubt at all that, because of the way that technology has moved on, there is a gap that means that the police and the security services cannot now get the information on mobile phone communication that they used to, due to changes in the way that people communicate via the internet. The first issue is: where does the balance lie between measures that would close that gap and the freedoms and civil liberties that we all enjoy? The second is: how do we fill that gap technologically?

Noble Lords will be pleased to hear that I have done some homework over the weekend. Obviously, I am not a technology expert, but this is what I have been told by technology experts. I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Blair, for saying that he has no issue with people who argue on the basis of principle. One of the effects of these amendments, as my noble friend Lord Blencathra alluded to, would be to require communications service providers to store 12 months of web logs—the history of every website visited by everyone who uses the internet in the UK. The Joint Committee that my noble friend Lord Blencathra chaired said that this has considerable implications for the privacy of everybody who lives in this country and who uses the internet. I am sure that that is immediately obvious to noble Lords across the House.

What has not been mentioned is what I have learnt since we were in Committee. When people use web-based means of communication such as WhatsApp—according to my noble friend Lord King of Bridgwater, ISIL is one of the groups that uses this means of communicating —Facebook Messenger or any others, all these communications are encrypted. The vital data that the police and the security services need are held on servers that are mainly in the United States of America. Even if these amendments were agreed to, and even if these web logs were kept, there are serious doubts as to whether the American companies would comply with the UK legislation.

Another aspect of these amendments, and of the draft data communications Bill, would require United Kingdom communications service providers to skim off the encrypted data transmitted to and from the secure servers in the United States, in case the Americans decided that they were not going to play ball. This would cost in excess of £1 billion, and it is unlikely that the UK-based communications service providers would do so. Because of the levels of encryption, and because companies such as Facebook are constantly reviewing their encryption and making it more and more difficult to decipher, even if that data were captured there is serious doubt that the UK communications service providers would be able to make head or tail of it. Plus, they would not be able to decide what part of that encrypted data was the content of messages or Facebook pages and how much was simply who sent the message to whom, from where and at what time—that is what these amendments and what the draft data communications Bill was about. The noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead, talked at length about intercept evidence. These amendments and the draft data communications Bill have nothing to do with interception. They are about only what is on the envelope of the message, if you like, not its contents.

So what do we do? Obviously, something has to be done to try to get that data. That is why the coalition Government have appointed Sir Nigel Sheinwald as special envoy on international data sharing to sit down with the US Government and US companies to identify ways to overcome legal jurisdictions so that we can tackle crime and terrorism without compromising the privacy of the law-abiding majority. This is not a situation where these servers in the United States are beyond our reach. In 2013, US companies processed around 30,000 requests for “envelope” data from UK authorities. There is already consultation and collaboration and it is producing results.

These amendments are disproportionate, are likely to cost billions of pounds and certainly cannot be implemented immediately. Almost all communications service providers in the UK do not currently keep this data and have no storage capacity and capability to store it. That would be a long-term project; nothing of use would come out of it in the six months that my noble friend Lord King of Bridgwater talked about as a stop-gap measure. These amendments are likely to jeopardise the collaboration that we already have with the Americans, which is serving the police and the security services reasonably well.

Mention has been made of a debate that the noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead, and I had on BBC Radio 4 at the weekend on “Week in Westminster”. During that programme, the noble Lord said that the amendments tabled last week were too broad and that, if it had come to a vote last week, he certainly would not have voted for them. As these amendments have been changed hardly at all since last week, I assume that the noble Lord, Lord West, will not vote for his own amendments.

[Lord West of Spithead]

Having shared that with only 11 million people, I am shocked that the noble Lord should do so in here.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Monday 26th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Evans of Weardale]

I accept that this is a very important element, but it is not the answer to everything.

My second note of caution is that we need to maintain public confidence as we go down this route. That is as important for law enforcement as it is for counterterrorism. The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, referred to the masses who are concerned about the snoopers’ charter. I have to say that the polling evidence I have seen does not necessarily demonstrate that the masses are enormously concerned about this issue. On the whole, the masses seem to be more concerned about their security than about the human rights issues that some people focus on. Nevertheless, there is an issue of public confidence and I do not wish to diminish that.

Despite those notes of caution, I support the amendment. I support it because it is, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said, a restricted measure, not a blanket measure. I support it because it is drafted with a sunset clause, so that we are filling, as it were, a legislative gap until the totality of the issues can be properly considered in the light of the subsequent publication of various reviews that are under way. I think that it will fill a gap for that period. It seems to me to be a useful, rather than a hugely expansive measure, and one which has appropriate safeguards, so I support it.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I am not speaking here on a party-political, but on a personal basis. I want to tell noble Lords, first, about my personal experience of terrorism. It is not first-hand, either in terms of being a member of Special Branch or the security services, or having seen the aftermath of what took place directly. However, part of my role in the Metropolitan Police following the 7 July bombings was to talk to officers who had had to go down on to the tracks where terrorists had exploded these bombs and bring out the victims of those terrible atrocities. I know what we are talking about here in terms of terrorism and I use the Underground system every day.

In our earlier discussion on Amendment 75 and internal exile, as some put it, noble and learned Lords, in particular, as well as other noble Lords, emphasised the need for legitimacy. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, talked about the European Convention on Human Rights and the right to a private and family life. My concern is that the introduction of these amendments in this way may not be seen as legitimate by many people outside this place. A process has been set in motion. There is a process for reviewing RIPA, for example, and the whole landscape of the intelligence services. That process is in place.

The other issue that noble Lords—and, indeed, two who tabled this amendment—talked about in relation to internal exile is the danger of alienation and resentment. This follows the comments by my noble friend Lady Warsi in yesterday’s Observer about how engagement is essential. We need to engage with communities, not create alienation and resentment. My fear is that the way in which these amendments are drafted is likely to cause exactly that negative effect. My noble friend Lord King, in his opening remarks, said that we are facing a very serious situation. That is common ground. As I have said, I know from personal experience the sorts of dangers that we are facing. However, there is no common ground, I suggest, about the best way to deal with that serious issue.

There has been a lot of talk this afternoon about events in Paris. My understanding is that the information and intelligence that security services got was through mobile telephone communication between the two groups of terrorists which co-ordinated their attacks by that means. There is nothing in these amendments that would give the security services or the police the powers to identify that sort of communication. It exists already. Every day, not only the police and the security services, but other agencies specified in the amendments also have the power, as we speak, to identify who called who on a mobile phone, where and when. So despite all this talk about Paris and how the attacks could have been prevented, these amendments would not appear, on the facts as I know them, to make any difference to the situation.

Terrorists may be adept at using technology, as my noble friend Lord King said, but my understanding is that a lot of terrorists, particular the sort responsible for recent attacks—whether we are talking about the tragic death of Lee Rigby or about Paris—are using very old technology. The problem, as my noble friend Lord King rightly said, is getting good intelligence. That is about developing links with the Muslim community and with communities where the extreme right wing operates, and gaining their trust and confidence in order to get that intelligence.

[Lord West of Spithead]

Does the noble Lord not agree that in, I think I am right in saying, 100% of all the cases where we have stopped a terrorist plot in this country, it has been intelligence via the web or by some SIGINT means that has enabled us to identify the group in order to then carry out action?

[Lord Paddick]

My understanding is that that is absolutely not the case. There were numerous cases—though it may be going back some years to Irish republican terrorism—where most of the plots were foiled because of intelligence from communities, not because of anything that was intercepted. I understand that the situation is changing, but the noble Lord was not correct when he said that in 100% of cases of terrorism that were thwarted in this country it was as a result of intelligence interception of that kind.

[Lord West of Spithead]

If I may say so, it was the case during my three years as a Minister. It was very different, of course, from the time of the IRA, which we had completely and thoroughly penetrated.

[Baroness Neville-Jones (Con)]

My Lords—

[Lord Paddick]

I am sorry, but I have not yet finished, noble Lords will be alarmed to hear.

Noble Lords have said that there is a gap in the capability of the security services and the police in terms of getting similar intelligence that they get from cell site analysis at the moment using mobile phones. My understanding is that the emergency legislation that this House passed towards the end of last year and the measures contained in this Bill, unamended, help to bridge that gap. Intelligence on who is communicating with whom at what time and where can be secured using the IP address provisions contained in the Bill, without the proposed amendments. I am not technically advanced enough to say whether that is the case; perhaps the Minister will be able to tell us whether, or to what extent, the gap that has been identified by other noble Lords will be filled by the Bill as it stands.

The noble Lord, Lord Blair of Boughton, talked about the significance of communications data. Again, my understanding is that the legislation, as put forward by the Government, is designed to fill that gap.

The noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead, then spoke about how the draft Communications Data Bill was kicked into touch for political reasons. If the noble Lord means a balance being achieved between human rights—the right to privacy and a private life—and the powers being given to the security services and the police, I would say that that is an absolutely legitimate political reason.

On mass surveillance, if we are talking about internet service providers retaining web logs and information about every website visited by every individual based in the UK, so that the information can subsequently be accessed in a targeted way by the police and the security services, are we saying, if we accept these amendments, that that can be done simply by the security services or the police providing some legitimate reason why they want to access that information—without any judicial intervention or a judge deciding that there is a legitimate reason to access that data? Are we saying that that is what we want and accept?

People have made fun of the fact that the security services are not going to access where people have done their online shopping. But who in this House believed, when they passed the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, that the police would use that power to establish the identity of confidential press sources? If we pass this very broad legislation, how can we say that there will not be some reason found in the future for the police or the security services to use the legislation in a way we never intended for it to be used?

If noble Lords think that I am being party political, that is a matter for them. I was a police officer for 30 years. I encountered terrorism on a second-hand, rather than first-hand, basis. Unless we have the right balance between rights to privacy and powers for the police and security services, large swathes of communities in this country will no longer co-operate with the police and the security services. That will be an even greater loss of intelligence than any gap that currently exists in the powers of the police and the security services.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, the House faces three choices. The first would be not to accept these amendments and not replace them with anything else—in other words, do nothing. I think that the “do nothing” option is the worst that we could possibly follow. In the current situation it is not possible to argue that we do not face growing danger as a result of declining capability against the background of a growing threat. It seems to me that we have a duty to respond to that. I think it a pity that the Government have not brought forward their own amendments on this, but they have not done so yet. I believe that doing something is what this House ought to do. I commend those who have brought forward these amendments.

The other two options are: follow these amendments and vote them into law—it would then be important to accompany them with a sunset clause—or wait for the Government to bring forward something else. That choice depends on the Government’s intentions. It would be preferable for us to be able to vote on something more refined and which incorporated more of the work done by the Joint Committee. I have not been privy to any of the legislation as redrafted. The draft data communications legislation has remained with its poor reputation as a result of the Government not having indicated what they might do to refine the powers therein.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Tuesday 13th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I am very pleased to follow the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, and I broadly agree with what he said. I was a police officer for more than 30 years, but I was not directly involved in counterterrorist operations so I have no specialist knowledge of the subject. However, I was the police spokesman following the 7 July 2005 bombings in London and I was responsible for community issues for the police in the immediate aftermath of the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes on 22 July 2005.

I was a police officer during most of the IRA bombing campaign on the UK mainland and regularly attended briefings by the Anti-Terrorist Branch, as it was then. The IRA threat was very different in nature from that presented by Islamist extremists. The IRA was conventionally organised through an established hierarchical structure and, as such, it was capable of being infiltrated. Even so, the then head of the Anti-Terrorist Branch, John Grieve, said that the police and security services alone could not defeat terrorism; it was communities that would do this. I spoke to John Grieve this morning and he reiterated what he said in the 1990s: the role of communities is even more important in combating the sort of tragic and totally unjustifiable outrages that we saw in Paris last week.

Lone individuals or groups that come together to carry out acts of terrorism are very difficult to identify, intercept and thwart without intelligence from the communities they live among. What we understand from the Paris shootings is that, although the two brothers involved were known to the security services, they were among hundreds who had the potential to be a threat. It is those closest to those individuals who will notice changes in their behaviour that might highlight to the security services that these are the few from the many who may act on their perverted beliefs.

In an interview this weekend, the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe, talked about how important it was, for example, for the parents of those preparing to leave to join the conflict in Syria and Iraq to tell the police and other agencies. We should consider how many parents would want the authorities to prevent their children travelling to Syria and Iraq to engage in terrorist activity. He went on to say that he recalled how the 7/7 bombers accidentally bleached their hair and the vegetation outside the flat where they prepared their explosive devices with one of the components from their home-made bombs. Their friends, family and local people would have noticed and could potentially have prevented the atrocity by telling the authorities. They did not, and 52 innocent people died.

That is why increased powers for the security services and the police must be balanced against winning the confidence of communities which fear that powers may be used against their innocent members. We cannot have, do not want and cannot afford to have a police officer on every street corner and an intelligence officer in every community. Whatever surveillance powers we might agree, if we have learnt one thing from the recent tragedies it is that there are too many people who could potentially pose a threat to be able to monitor all of them. Community intelligence is as important as any powers we give to the intelligence agencies.

There is also the wider civil liberties issue. This country has a liberal tradition that citizens should be allowed to do what they will, provided it does not harm others, free from interference from the state. This freedom is anathema to the Islamist extremists who carry out terrorist attacks against the West. They want a society where every aspect of people’s lives is controlled. If we curtail people’s liberties, we are taking society in exactly the direction the terrorists want us to go.

Of course the police and security services will always ask for more draconian powers in order to carry out surveillance of those suspected of criminality. The Liberal Democrats have been criticised for scuppering the Communications Data Bill—the so-called snoopers’ charter—but we must always seek to find the right balance between security and civil liberties.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

Does the noble Lord agree that the term “snoopers’ charter” is emotive claptrap? I have worked with GCHQ over a period of 30 years, on and off, and I am not aware of a single case where people working in that agency have “snooped”, which is the word used, on any ordinary member of our society in any way at all. Yes, it has used due and proper process and looked at and found people who wish to damage us. Indeed, in all the plots that we managed to stop during my time as a Minister and since, nearly everyone got their heads-up from that type of intercept information. Using the words “snoopers’ charter” is emotive and gives completely the wrong impression of what it is.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I acknowledge what the noble Lord has said and that there are differences of opinion on both sides of the argument. It is a pejorative, probably unhelpful, term that has come into popular use. I added that description for the benefit of those reading the proceedings of this House who may not be familiar with the Communications Data Bill. I agree with the noble Lord that it is not a particularly helpful term to use.

Noble Lords will understand that my main interests in the Bill concern the new powers it confers on the police and security services and, as far as those aspects are concerned, I substantially welcome its provisions. To that extent, and with some trepidation, I disagree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick. As my noble friend the Minister said, the nature of the threat has changed. There are many British citizens—mainly young and impressionable—who are being persuaded to travel abroad to participate in terrorist activity. If prevented and provided with the right intervention, they could be diverted from radicalisation. We need to examine in detail the powers given to the police to seize passports and travel documents. Sadly, we have seen well intentioned legislation being misused in practice in the past, and we must do all we can to minimise the potential for misuse of these new powers.

“Temporary exclusion orders” is an unfortunate term for what is intended to be a mechanism to ensure the managed return of those suspected of having been involved in terrorism-related activity and who pose a threat. It is clearly necessary to control the return of those who have either been trained in terrorist training camps or been engaged in acts of terrorism to ensure that they do not pose a threat to the safety not just of members of the public, as the legislation says, but of the police, the Armed Forces and the security services. Again, it is important that these individuals are properly assessed and that appropriate interventions are provided, including prosecution and imprisonment if necessary. As my noble friend Lady Hamwee has said, we must ensure that there is proper scrutiny of such decision-making above and beyond the very limited ability of a young man or woman abroad to challenge the decision of the Secretary of State by means of judicial review. Many of those young people will have been exposed to one of the most brutal regimes that we have seen. It is unlikely that they will not be changed by that experience and potentially pose a more serious threat as a result.

The Bill purports to allow the security services to link a particular IP address with a particular device and therefore to make it easier to identify individuals who are communicating using the internet, in a way similar to what can be done at present with landline and cellular telephone communications. I seek reassurance from the Minister that the data that the Bill requires internet service providers to retain are only those that are necessary to link communications to devices and hence individuals, and that the Bill would not allow the trawling of data in a way that would be a considerable infringement of innocent people’s civil liberties. As for whether this provision needs to be fast-tracked, if it has been identified as a gap in the ability of the police or the security services to prove communication between individuals, surely it is best if that gap is filled as quickly as possible.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, is also concerned about TPIMs. However, my understanding is that the changes to TPIMs in this legislation have been recommended by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation—someone for whom the noble and learned Lord has the highest regard.

I have other concerns about other parts of the Bill that others will cover in more detail, particularly the banning of radical preachers, which could lead to their perverted messages of hate being preached in secret where they cannot be challenged by those who oppose their views.

We saw unintended consequences of the actions taken following 7/7 under the Prevent strand of the then Government’s counterterrorism plan, with councils forced to spend money where none was needed and some minority ethnic communities feeling that they were being penalised for not harbouring terrorists. Prevent deals with all types of terrorism and I have no issue with a statutory requirement for local authorities to carry out an assessment as to the nature and extent of the danger of local people being drawn into terrorism. I have no issue with a statutory requirement to address the dangers identified, but what action is taken should be a matter for the local authority concerned.

On Saturday, George Churchill-Coleman sadly died. He was head of the Metropolitan Police Anti-Terrorist Branch for seven years, from 1985 to 1992, longer than any other postholder. John Grieve worked closely with Mr Churchill-Coleman and the one message that Churchill-Coleman delivered over and over again during his time at the peak of the IRA bombing campaign was, “Don’t overreact”.

The Bill, properly amended, as I am sure it will be by this House, is a measured and appropriate response to the dangers that we face, and I believe that we should, in principle, support it.

Police and Crime Commissioners

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Wednesday 3rd December 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, in the light of the report in the Times at the weekend, which claimed that more than half of the police and crime commissioners had been investigated by the Independent Police Complaints Commission, do the Government consider it necessary to reconsider the whole issue of the accountability of police and crime commissioners?

[Lord Bates]

Of course, because they are now elected and accountable, they can be referred to the Independent Police Complaints Commission. Previously, the chairs of police authorities could not be referred to that organisation, so it is a step forward.

Police and Crime Commissioners

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Wednesday 29th October 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bates]

I respect the noble Lord’s great experience in this area, but we need to remember what the system was before. The previous Government commissioned an HMIC report—entitled, appropriately for the time, Police Governance in Austerity—which found that only four of the 22 police authorities inspected were judged to have performed well in two of their primary functions: setting a strategic direction and ensuring value for money. There has been a change there, and that is to be welcomed.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, one of the two objectives that the Government set for police and crime commissioners was to save money. In addition to the vast expense of many of these police and crime commissioners appointing deputies, we have also had to have two by-elections—once, tragically, because of a death and once because of resignation—which have cost between £1 million and £3 million. How much money has the change actually saved?

[Lord Bates]

Police budgets overall are reducing, which is not something that we chose to do but was the situation that we were faced with when this Government came into office. It should be said that the police are also overseeing one of the largest falls in crime that we have ever had in recent years. That is to be welcomed. The average salary of a police and crime commissioner is about half that of a chief constable. In many areas, people will regard them as delivering value for money. If people feel that they are failing in their responsibilities, they can vote them out, which they could not do before.

Parliament Square: Occupy Protests

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Tuesday 28th October 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bates]

I am very happy to convey the sentiments of my noble friend to the police on the role that they do, which is incredibly difficult. The point has to be reiterated that one of the reasons that the police are taking the actions that they are, and why we passed the legislation that we did, was to ensure that Parliament Square is available for those who want to come to make a peaceful protest as part of a democratic society in which we want to live.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, does my noble friend agree that the police should be there as much to facilitate peaceful protest as to prevent it?

[Lord Bates]

That is absolutely right. In fact, the guidance actually states that the first responsibility is with the Greater London Authority in conjunction with Westminster City Council, and it is the local authority representatives who made the first contact in the first instance; and the police are there only in support of the local authority.

Foreign National Offenders

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Wednesday 22nd October 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, the Liberal Democrats want a fair immigration policy; clearly, we believe that foreign criminals who should be deported should not remain in this country. Will the Minister say how many of these dangerous foreign criminals are at large as a result of multiple appeals against deportation, and how many are at large due to Home Office incompetence?

[Lord Bates]

My Lords, my noble friend, of course, has great expertise in this area and will know that the basis on which we collect data is not quite as finely siloed as that. We recognise that there is a major problem here: it is a cause for public concern and it needs to be addressed. The measures that we are putting forward—to reduce and replace the appeal/re-appeal conveyor belt, by which many of these prisoners are attempting to work the system; and to ensure that we have better information at the point of entry into this country by signing up to the Schengen information system and the European Criminal Records Information System—are the approach that we should emphasise.

Data Retention Regulations 2014

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Tuesday 29th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach) (Con)]

My Lords, the regulations are made under the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act, which became law two weeks ago. They provide the detail of how communications providers can be required to retain data and the increased safeguards that will be in place for these data. They therefore form part of a wider package of protection, oversight and reviews—reviews that will be informed by, and inform, a wider public debate on these important issues.

At this point, I reiterate my thanks for the constructive approach taken by noble Lords during the passage of the Act, in particular the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, and her colleagues on the Opposition Front Bench.

These regulations relate specifically to communications data. That means the context of a communication—the who, where, when and how of a communication—and not the content. The regulations maintain the status quo, allowing those investigating such crimes to continue to have access to the evidence they need. They add no new powers; rather, they increase safeguards.

As I told the House when we debated the Act a fortnight ago, these regulations and the additional safeguards form a crucial part of our response to the European Court of Justice judgment on the EU data retention directive. That judgment called into question the legal basis for the retention of data in the UK, and these new regulations made under the Act play a key part in ensuring a new sound footing for retention. Therefore we need to have them in place before the House rises.

The regulations we are debating today are substantially the same as those we made available to Parliament during debates on the Act. As noble Lords may be aware, the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments has done its usual helpful work with great speed, and I am grateful to it. Equally, I must thank my noble friend Lord Goodlad, and the members of the Lords Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. They too have swiftly reviewed and reported on the regulations.

I now turn to the detail of the regulations. They will revoke and replace the 2009 data retention regulations. They will provide the detail and safeguards for data retention notices to be issued to communications providers under the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act. Such notices will be issued where necessary and proportionate. Under the new regulations, existing notices under the 2009 regulations will remain in force until the end of the year unless revoked. The regulations are categorical as to the types of data that communications providers may be required to retain, and these are a small subset of all the communications data that providers generate and process. These data types are no different from those covered under the 2009 regulations. Similarly, as with the 2009 regulations, security controls and provisions for financial compensation for providers are included in these regulations.

The key elements of the new regulations are the enhanced safeguards. The regulations make plain certain matters that have to be taken into account before the Secretary of State may issue a retention notice. To be clear, I state that Ministers have always taken their responsibilities when issuing notices very seriously. These regulations now set out key considerations on the face of legislation.

The regulations require the Government to take reasonable steps to consult providers before issuing them with a retention notice. Again, we have always consulted providers and have always worked closely with them as they undertake their obligations under the law. This is now included on the face of the regulations. The retention notices must also be kept under review. Further, the regulations will help us to work with communications providers by making a new data retention code of practice. In this code we will set out the best practice guidance for implementing data retention obligations.

The regulations now stipulate that a notice may require the retention of data for a maximum of 12 months. We have evidence that 12 months is an appropriate length of time for retaining data, including, as my right honourable friend the Home Secretary told the Commons during the debate on the Bill, the fact that half of communications data used in child abuse investigations is more than six months old. However, in circumstances where it is appropriate to retain data for less than 12 months, these regulations provide the flexibility to reduce the retention period.

As noble Lords who closely followed the debates on the draft communications data Bill will be aware, there was disagreement on the scope of the duties of the Information Commissioner in the 2009 regulations. These new regulations clarify that his duties include oversight of the security of data, the integrity of data and the deletion of data at the end of their retention. Further details on this oversight will also be specified in the new retention code of practice. In addition to these safeguards, we will be adding further protections that are not on the face of these regulations. These include amending the Acquisition and Disclosure of Communications Data Code of Practice to increase clarity and to reduce the number of bodies with access to communications data under RIPA.

As was discussed at length in this Chamber a fortnight ago, the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act will expire on 31 December 2016. There is no room to extend this sunset clause and these regulations will fall when that Act falls. Therefore, this House will need to return to these topics after the general election. To inform the debate ahead of new legislation, the Act requires the Interception of Communications Commissioner to produce half-yearly reports and requires a review of investigatory threats, capabilities and safeguards. David Anderson QC, the current independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, will undertake this review. These, in turn, will provide crucial background information for a Joint Committee of Parliament, sitting after the next election.

These regulations do not extend existing powers and they do not introduce elements of the draft communications data Bill. As my right honourable friend the Home Secretary has made clear, this Government still believe that the powers contained in that draft Bill are necessary to allow effective policing in the 21st century. The Government have begun the process of a wider review of investigatory powers. In combination with this, the sunset clause in the Act will require us, and for that matter those who disagree with us, to give these issues proper consideration once the review process has concluded, and after the general election next year. This will enable us to ensure that the legislative regime in this important area properly balances our rights to privacy and security.

These regulations, as with the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act which underpins them, add safeguards while otherwise maintaining the status quo. Maintaining the status quo is, however, an important job—these are vital regulations. The data that will be retained under these regulations are critical for the police and the security services to continue to do their job in keeping this country and those who live here safe. I commend these regulations to the House and I beg to move.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, as a Liberal Democrat and a former senior police officer I am acutely aware of the need to balance privacy and security. In these regulations, as my noble friend the Minister said, the Government appear to be maintaining the status quo with some additional safeguards, going a little further for example in enshrining what has been best practice to date into the new regulations. Pending the wholesale review of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act and related legislation, which we successfully negotiated with the Government and the Labour Party in the other place managed to get into the primary legislation, it is the best that we can do in the circumstances. On that basis we support the passing of these regulations.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (LD)]

My Lords, I have been through these regulations and the Explanatory Memorandum with some care and I have also taken the trouble of ascertaining the views of David Anderson QC, the independent reviewer to these regulations. There were a number of unanswered questions during Second Reading recently, particularly relating to the future role of the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. I look forward to receiving a response from my noble friend the Minister to those questions in due course, I suspect when the answers are clearer than they were at Second Reading. However, I am totally satisfied that these regulations do the absolute minimum to give effect to the minimum requirements of the Government. The regulations provide every possible safeguard there could be in all the circumstances and I, too, hope that the House will support them.

Police Reform

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I agree with my noble friend. It is certainly the case that many people who have been active in the Armed Forces have qualities that could be important in policing. I do not know that I would go as far as to say that they should be given priority but they should clearly be encouraged to apply for those posts.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, while I welcome the Statement by the Home Secretary—and clearly there are serious issues with the current investigation of police complaints and the police’s disciplinary procedures—is the Home Secretary aware of the dangers of articulating direct entry at a senior level and changes to the inspectorate of constabulary, where we now have for the first time a Chief Inspector of Constabulary who has no experience of policing and a majority of inspectors who have no experience of policing? Is she also aware of the impact on senior officers of the utmost integrity who have spent their whole careers in the police service of saying that those changes are a positive difference to police integrity, and the impression that she appears to be giving to the public about the integrity of the police service at the moment? Is the Home Secretary aware that every time she runs down the police service in this way it makes the police service less effective because the police service relies on public confidence and trust to ensure that the public give information and support the police in their work?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I refer my noble friend to the second paragraph of the Statement that I have just read, in which the Home Secretary pays tribute to individual police officers and the way in which they conduct themselves, “honestly and with integrity”.

If I am honest with my noble friend—and I think I owe it to him to be honest—the way in which he presented his question shows all the problems that policing has: it is the notion that only the police can know how to manage the police. What the Home Secretary has done with this series of reforms is to say to the police service, “There are better ways of doing these things. Other people will be able to get you to the place you want to be”. It is very important that we back those changes. At the heart of it all, the degree to which the police have seen themselves and their problems as being something for them alone is something that the public are no longer prepared to tolerate.

Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Thursday 17th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, I support the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. After what he said yesterday I did some swotting last night. It is important for the legislation to get this sort of wording right. It is quite divisive legislation because of the speed at which it has taken place. This is a sensible amendment.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I also support the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead. At Second Reading, the noble and learned Lord made a compelling case for addressing the precise wording in the European Court judgment. With the greatest respect to my noble friend the Minister, his response to that assertion did not quite come up to the level of the case made by the noble and learned Lord. I also support the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Stamford, in that it would not only help lawyers to avoid court cases as a result of not addressing strictly the wording in the judgment but it would also be reassuring to the public to have the wording as suggested in the amendment.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, for tabling his amendment as it gives us a chance to talk about these issues. Perhaps he will not mind if I turn first to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Stamford, and thank him for his kind words about the work that has been done by my officials overnight. They exemplify the sort of support that the Civil Service can give to Ministers. It has been greatly, I hope, to the advantage of noble Lords to have this information available.

I will deal with the issue that the noble Lord raised, which was the point in the Constitution Committee’s report about why we are dealing with these provisions now rather than in 2012. As the Government made clear last week, some companies have already now started to question whether they are under a duty to comply with their obligations under RIPA. The details are obviously sensitive but, as the Prime Minister made clear, we are approaching a cliff edge. A failure to legislate could result in a damaging loss of capability. We were discussing earlier, when I was dealing with the Urgent Notice Question, an area where that capability was necessary. If companies cease to comply, the security agencies will lose the visibility of what targets are saying to each other and in turn could lose the ability to understand the threat that they pose. The Opposition have been briefed in detail on the issue and the Intelligence and Security Committee is well aware of the challenges that we face. Indeed, I happened to meet the chairman of that committee, Sir Malcolm Rifkind, in the street on my way to work this morning.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Earl of Erroll]

Yes, treason rather than corruption. I do not mind what you want to call it—whatever. All I am saying is that we in Parliament are here to protect the people. We happen to have the senior members of the Executive here as well, which is very useful for holding them to account. But they have to be double-hatted and remember that they are putting in place processes for their successors.

The noble Lord, Lord Rooker, made the point about the public needing to be reassured that the people at the top are being watched. We are seeing enough conspiracy theories emerging in the press at the moment about rings protecting themselves. We do not need any more of those suggestions. That is why I think we need an earlier debate on this. It is not about the technical part of it; it is about reassuring the public that we have the right checks and balances at the top. That is not technical; it is about how we watch people.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I want to say just two things. The majority view of this House yesterday at Second Reading was dissatisfaction with the lack of time for public consultation and parliamentary scrutiny of this legislation, not dissatisfaction with the sunset clause. The last thing we need to do is to recreate that problem by not allowing enough time for public consultation and parliamentary scrutiny of the whole area of RIPA and the associated legislation.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)]

My Lords, I support the amendment to have the timetable brought forward because two and a half years is a very long time. While I want to put to one side ideas of conspiracy theories, I do think that there is a hope that somehow the current high level of interest in this will dissipate and that the usual British torpor about what happens with the security services will settle itself back on to our society and we will become unquestioning again. This is about kicking it into the long grass; this is really about postponing it for as long as possible because by that time people will have forgotten the disclosures that we recently had through Snowden and others. We should be concerned to ensure that we act while people are interested and concerned about these issues because they are pressing and very important to a vital and vibrant democracy.

It is important that we have proper scrutiny of the activities that are done in our name at whatever level in our society, and we have to have proper controls. What I am concerned about is when I hear about the setting up of Joint Committees and so on because we always know that the people who are put on to such Joint Committees are hand-picked. There was a period in my life where I remember this happening with the vetting of juries. They are hand-picked to be people who are already very much on the side of protecting the security services.

The security services are vital to the interests of our nation but they need to be questioned. They need to be questioned with some scepticism at times and I am not sure that we get that when people become comfortable in the security committees, as we have seen, and scrutiny is not of the level that it should be. So if we are going to set up these committees and so on, I hope we will see on them the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, and some of the people who have been niggling at these issues and asking the questions that were not asked about rendition and so on. There was a complacency in this House and elsewhere about some of the things that happened, which we should have been much more scrupulous about. I hope that when we come to set up committees we will see a greater variety of presences than the ones we have seen until now.

I do not think that two and a half years is the right period of time; 18 months would be perfectly satisfactory and I urge that we look to a shorter period because it concentrates minds while minds are concentrated on this issue.