Lord Paddick
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Lord Paddick
Lord Paddick (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 184, in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee, concerns the power of immigration officers to examine the immigration status of those entering the UK. Clause 20(2) inserts the ability of the immigration officer to curtail existing leave to enter the UK. The amendment would replace the consideration of whether the leave “should be” curtailed, which implies an inappropriate degree of discretion, and substitute “is required to” be.
Also in this group is our opposition to Clause 21 standing part of the Bill. It seems disproportionate that immigration officers should have the power to search premises simply to establish whether an employer should be given a civil penalty for employing an illegal worker, or to establish whether a landlord should be given a civil penalty for leasing a property to a disqualified person. Immigration officers already have powers to search for evidence in relation to criminal offences related to these two activities. Surely it is only in the most serious cases, where a criminal prosecution would at least be being considered, that it would be appropriate for immigration officers to search premises in this way. It is rare for powers of search to be granted in connection with civil penalties in British law, and Clause 21 should not undermine such a principle.
We also oppose Clause 22 standing part of the Bill. This clause allows an immigration officer who is lawfully on premises to seize anything that he thinks may be evidence of any offence, under any legislation, if he thinks it necessary to prevent the evidence being concealed, lost, altered or destroyed. Initially, this appears a sensible approach, to obviate the need to call for police assistance when something is discovered that is not related to an immigration offence—for example, discovering what appear to be class A drugs.
Police officers receive extensive training in securing and preserving evidence, and in the questioning of suspects in relation to the discovery of evidence during searches. In addition to the need to carefully question the subject about the ownership of the items in question, since usually the owner of the premises denies that the item belongs to them, there is the question of whether photographic or forensic evidence is required in situ. I have been involved in searches of premises, and there have been many cases of police being involved in searches of premises where the very facts that the substance in question was on the premises and who it belonged to have been questioned subsequently in court. It is something of which the police have now had extensive experience, and they know how to handle these situations. I suggest that it would take a lot of training and experience for immigration officers to reach the level of expertise necessary to ensure that convictions subsequently take place. Either immigration officers will require extensive, and necessarily expensive, training in evidence preservation and the questioning of those suspected of non-immigration offences, or there is a real danger that valuable evidence will be lost in such cases.
There is also the question of what I might call false positives, when immigration officers seize items that they wrongly believe to be evidence of an offence and then pass them on to the police, placing a significant administrative burden on the police to process, secure and subsequently return the items to the owners. With significant cuts to police resources, the last thing the police need is for immigration officers to dump innocent items on them that they then have to deal with. We therefore believe that Clause 22 should not be part of the Bill. I beg to move.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab)
My Lords, Amendment 184 and the two clause stand part debates in respect of Clauses 21 and 22 give an important opportunity to explore here exactly what the intention is behind the clauses. It is important that the Minister carefully sets out what he believes are the reasonable grounds for immigration officers to conduct a search for documents in respect of illegal working or leasing premises to disqualified persons obtained in the commission of an offence. Will the Minister set out what he means by a search of the premises? At any point, would that include a search of the person? How would that be conducted?
These are very sensitive matters and I want to be satisfied that proper processes are in place, and that people are treated with respect. We often need to remember that asylum seekers have not always had a good experience of meeting officials of the state in other countries, and we must ensure that actions are taken in a proportionate manner and to the highest professional standards. I have the highest regard for the officers who undertake this work for the Immigration Service; they do a very difficult and challenging job.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made an important point when he talked about the extensive experience and knowledge that police officers have when it comes to conducting searches and preserving evidence to secure convictions. Are we confident that the immigration officer would have this knowledge? The noble Lord makes another important point when he talks about the burden of bureaucracy arising from items taken during a search that are then passed on to police but in the end do not secure any convictions because there is no offence at all.
Lord Keen of Elie
I should add that the guidance on immigration officers’ use of powers is set out in the enforcement instructions and guidance, which are published on the UK Government website. But I would be content to write to the noble Lord to set out an outline of the proposed training for those immigration officers who are going to have the limited power conferred by Clause 22 with regard to the preservation of evidence that they believe has been the product of some criminal act.
There was one further point made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, about the false positive, as he termed it, and the administrative burden. I respectfully suggest that that burden will be no greater than the burden imposed upon police officers in circumstances where immigration officers believe that they have encountered the product of a criminal act and then telephone or radio the police and invite them to attend a premises. So there is a question of balance here, but it is not, on the face of it, going to be a disproportionate burden when compared to the present circumstances in which the matter is, in any event, brought to the attention of the police.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Alton of Liverpool and Lord Kennedy of Southwark, for speaking to this group. I also thank the Minister for his explanation of Amendment 184. I will read with care what he said on that particular amendment.
As far as Clause 21 is concerned, which is the power to search premises simply to establish whether a civil penalty should be imposed, I am a little confused, because I am not sure how an immigration officer can establish whether a breach of the law is something that should be responded to by way of criminal prosecution or by civil penalty until the search of the premises and the necessary paperwork has been found. If the immigration officer has reasonable cause to suspect that a criminal offence has been committed, there is an existing power to carry out that search. Now it may be that in the course of that search, using the power under the suspicion of a criminal offence having been committed, the paperwork is found to show that it is not a serious breach and therefore that a civil penalty would be more appropriate. But the search can still be conducted without a specific power to search on the basis of a civil penalty.
The Minister said that having the power to search on the basis of a civil liability would ensure that only non-compliant employers and landlords would have action taken against them. But surely a compliant employer will offer up the necessary documentation and a search without the consent of the employer or landlord will not be required. Therefore, again, I do not see why that power is necessary.
As far as Clause 22 is concerned, if it were simply a case of restraining people who were on the premises from interfering with something that was believed to be evidence of a criminal offence while the police are called and come to investigate the matter, I might be a little more sympathetic. But the Minister kept talking about seizing and retaining property, and said that immigration officers would not be in the evidence chain. Clearly, if they seize and retain the property, they are in the evidence chain: the police cannot give evidence of the fact that the property was in the premises if the immigration officer just appears at the police station with the property and tells the police officer, “I found this”.
As I said earlier, it is very important to question people in situ about, for example, a bag of drugs. It may be necessary for there to be forensic examination of those drugs for, say, fingerprints or perhaps even DNA, or for the property to be photographed in situ. That is something that I would have confidence that only the police would think about, rather than an immigration officer who is there to enforce the law on immigration rather than to deal with these other, arguably more serious, offences.
As far as the administration burden is concerned, with property being taken and given to the police versus the time that the police would have to spend going to collect the property from the premises, with the greatest respect, I do not think that the Minister realises the administrative burden that goes with police seizing property and the problems associated with it. I say that it would be a disproportionate burden on the police were immigration officers able to seize such property. But, at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Paddick
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 185 standing in my name and that of my noble friend Baroness Hamwee. We also have Amendments 186 through to 193 in this group.
Amendment 185 relates to the power of detainee custody officers, prison officers and prison custody officers to search for nationality documents. The powers set out in Clause 25(6) can be exercised not only when the Secretary of State has made a deportation order in relation to the individual but, as stated in Clause 25(2)(b), when the Secretary of State “intends to make” a deportation order. The briefing from the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association expresses serious concerns about the new powers to conduct searches for nationality documents, including strip searches, in the light of the concerns expressed about the treatment of vulnerable persons in immigration detention made by the all-party parliamentary groups on refugees and on migrants. That review was conducted by Stephen Shaw and others.
On the particular issue of the amendment, if the Government mean to extend the power to include cases where the Secretary of State has fulfilled the procedural requirement to give formal notice of her intention to make a deportation order, this should be in the Bill, rather than the current wording, which is simply,
“intends to make, a deportation order”.
Amendments 186, 187, 188 and 189 relate to the circumstance where a nationality document has been seized but the person is not removed from the United Kingdom. Clause 25(13) states that the Secretary of State “may” arrange for the document to be returned, but surely she is under an obligation to return the document, so Amendment 185 seeks to replace “may” with “shall”. Amendment 192 covers the same point in relation to documents seized by a detainee custody officer or a prison officer.
Amendment 187 refers to Clause 25(13)(b), which goes on to say that a document can be disposed of and not returned if the Secretary of State thinks that it would not be appropriate to do so. Can the Minister explain in what circumstances a search for a nationality document might produce a document that is not required as part of the process of deporting an individual but should nonetheless be disposed of rather than returned? For example, the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association reminds us that passports, one of the “nationality documents” listed in the Bill, remain the property of the issuing authority. As such, the Secretary of State has no right to dispose of these documents as she thinks fit.
Lord Keen of Elie
I am obliged to noble Lords. I shall begin by addressing the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, in the context of the report from Stephen Shaw. Of course the background to this was the detailed Report of the Inquiry into the Use of Immigration Detention in the United Kingdom by the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Refugees and the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Migration, of which the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, was a member. That led to the appointment of Stephen Shaw, and as the noble Lord, Lord Alton, has observed, he recently reported on this matter. My noble friend Lord Bates, upon receipt of that report, made a Statement to the House in which he pointed out that the Government welcomed the important contribution that Stephen Shaw had made to the debate about effective detention and accepted the broad thrust of his recommendations. That will be the subject of a further response in due course, and certainly I hope before the Report stage. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Alton, will allow me to defer any detailed comments on the points he raised until that further response is made. But what I add is that we welcome observations that he may have to make following his visit to Yarl’s Wood on Wednesday. His comments will be received in the appropriate spirit because this is a demanding area and one in which the Government are willing to seek to respond to the broad thrust of the recommendations that Stephen Shaw has made.
I turn to Amendment 185, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, but before doing so I will make this observation. He spoke about strip searches. I take issue with that term. There are full searches but they are not strip searches. It may be that he wishes to come back on that, but I take issue with the term “strip searches”; they are full searches.
Lord Paddick
Can the Minister tell us the difference between a full search and a strip search?
Lord Keen of Elie
It is set down in detail, but in general it means that someone is not stripped. It means that articles of clothing are removed and returned in turn, but without them being stripped.
I return to Amendment 185, which would limit the Secretary of State’s ability to direct officers to search for nationality documents to those in respect of whom she has made a deportation order under Section 5(1) of the Immigration Act 1971, preventing its use for those whom she intends to deport. It may help if I explain that the Secretary of State, in accordance with regulations made under Section 105 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, issues a written notice to those foreign national offenders who are liable to deportation under Section 5(1) of the Immigration Act 1971 stating that she intends to seek a deportation order against them. Such persons may be detained by virtue of paragraph 2(2) of Schedule 3 to the Immigration Act 1971. Therefore, the reference to “intends to” is simply a way to ensure that such persons are within the ambit of the new powers while in detention. Being able to direct a search for nationality documents once a person has received such a notice but before a deportation order is made reduces the risk of documents being destroyed when the person knows that deportation is a realistic prospect. That is the purpose of the provision in its present form and why we resist the proposed amendment.
Amendments 186 to 188, 190, 192 and 193 seek to limit the Secretary of State’s disposal options on nationality documents which are not used to remove a person, by ensuring that they must be returned to the person who was previously in possession of them or who appears to be entitled to them. On that last point the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, is of course right to say that the country which issues a passport is the proprietor of that passport, while the person to whom it is issued is the user. It is therefore that country which is entitled to claim ownership, as it were, of the passport document. That touches upon the point he mentioned about the potential risk of returning a document to an issuing authority creating a danger for a person in particular circumstances. That is a point I will take away and consider because it had not immediately occurred to me in this context.
The reason why the Secretary of State should be given the wider power indicated in the present clauses is because there may be circumstances in which she would wish to remove from circulation forged or counterfeit documents. The idea that, having identified a passport as forged or counterfeit, she should return it to the person who had been using it seems a little unusual. It is in these circumstances that the wider power is sought.
Lord Keen of Elie
The noble Baroness is of course quite right and I apologise to the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, for omitting her name from the reference. Of course it is acknowledged that the report was the precursor to Stephen Shaw’s helpful and incisive report on this matter. I am obliged for that.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for his explanation. As noble Lords will be aware, many amendments at Committee stage are probing amendments, so the explanations given by the Minister on this occasion have been very helpful.
On Amendment 185, I mentioned that the Secretary of State has to serve a notice on people—a formal notice of the intention to make a deportation order. The Minister pointed to that as being the meaning in the Bill. I asked the question: if that is the case why is that wording not on the face of the Bill rather than the rather vague wording that is currently there? Maybe the Minister can reflect on that between now and the next stage.
As far as the definition of nationality documents is concerned, I accept that under the Dublin agreement, as long as we are a member of the European Union, it is important to establish the first place of safety in terms of where the person should apply for asylum. I am reassured that Secretaries of State must at all times act reasonably. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Paddick
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I move the amendment in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. We also have Amendment 201 in this group.
Amendment 194 relates to Schedule 5 and amendments to the search warrant provisions in the Immigration Act 1971. We have already debated all premises warrants under Amendments 171, 172 and 173 in relation to the seizure of vehicles driven by someone illegally in this country. These provisions relate to search warrants issued to search for personnel records and nationality documents, and again allow any premises owned or occupied by the person specified in the warrant without having to specify the premises. The only thing I would say to that is that the explanation given under those previous amendments appeared to be simply to bring the Immigration Act into line with the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. Will the Minister say whether there are other specific reasons why all premises warrants would be valuable in the circumstances?
Amendment 201 is to probe the extension from one month to three of the time during which a search warrant issued under the Immigration Act 1971 can be executed. I accept that these provisions bring Immigration Act search warrants into line with those issued, predominantly to the police, under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, as amended by Section 15 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005. However, is this necessary or safe in immigration cases?
The Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association points to evidence in the March 2014 report of the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration in relation to the use of the power to enter business premises without a warrant by immigration officers. It found that in 59% of the cases examined, the required justification had not been made out. I appreciate that this provision is to extend powers given by warrant but the chief inspector’s report indicates the need for increased, not less scrutiny by the courts of the powers used by immigration officers. I beg to move.
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, I am obliged to the noble Lord. As he indicated, Amendment 194 would remove the ability for immigration officers to seek an all premises warrant where they have a power to enter and search premises for material which is likely to be relevant evidence of an immigration offence under the 1971 Act. As the noble Lord anticipated, one purpose of this is to bring the provisions on such warrants into line with those for police warrants under PACE.
In addition, Amendment 201 is intended to do the same thing, but I should perhaps explain that when the immigration warrants were originally provided for, as running for one month, that was in parallel with the time that a police warrant would run under PACE. Subsequently, the warrant under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act was extended to a three-month period, so they fell out of sequence. The difficulty is that, from time to time, there are joint immigration officer and police operations which involve warrants being granted, and it is not convenient that the immigration warrant should be a period of one month while the police warrant is for a period of three months. The purpose of Amendment 201 in particular is simply to bring the time limit back into line with that which applies for police warrants.
Coming back to Amendment 194 and the use of all premises warrants, it is considered appropriate that an all premises warrant should be available to immigration officers, not only because that is consistent with the form of warrant available to police officers pursuing their own powers but because there are many circumstances in which an all premises warrant will be required for effective recovery of material pertaining to either illegal working or potential offences in respect of landlords and illegal renting. For example, where you have someone who has a number of restaurants employing persons who may be suspected of being illegal immigrants, you may have a warrant in respect of particular premises and then discover that all the records are actually kept elsewhere—in an office, a lock-up, or something of that kind. Therefore, it is appropriate that all the premises that are subject to the control of a particular employer should be available under the warrant, otherwise we would have a very long, drawn-out, step-by-step process of knocking down one domino, going from one warrant to the next one, and so on. It is in these circumstances that it is considered appropriate that an all premises warrant should be allowed in the case of immigration officers. I hope that that addresses the concerns or reservations expressed by reference to Amendments 194 and 201. In a sense, they bring immigration warrants into line with police warrants, but they were in line with police warrants before the amendment to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. In addition, there are substantive reasons why it is practical and effective for immigration officers to have an all premises warrant facility available to them.
Government Amendments 195 to 200 and 202 to 209 may look rather complex, but have at their core a very simple proposition; that is, in Scotland it is not lawfully possible to secure an all premises warrant and a multiple entry warrant. Therefore, it is necessary to ensure that immigration officers operating in Scotland do so within the bounds of the Scottish criminal justice system.
Lord Keen of Elie
I shall go on to deal with government Amendment 214B, which is not concerned with warrants per se, but to clarify that the person who can undertake the role of custody review officer under Section 24A of the Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995 includes a police inspector and is not limited to a person of equivalent rank. In Scotland, immigration officers currently have a power to detain pending arrest, and charge for immigration and nationality offences under Section 24 of the 1995 Act, which is similar to arresting a person pending charge in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Under Section 24A of that Act a “custody review officer” may authorise an extension of the period for which a person can be held in detention under Section 24. This role has always been undertaken by a police inspector and the amendment is simply to ensure that there is no possible ambiguity in the provision that provides for this operational practice. Amendments 214C and 214D are minor and technical and simply remove redundant wording from the Bill.
I hope that these explanations will satisfy noble Lords and that they will feel able not to press their amendments, and I shall move the government amendments.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for the explanations that he has given. I still have concerns relating to the Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration’s report on immigration officers’ use of powers to enter premises without a warrant. In 59% of cases examined the required justification had not been made out. Giving immigration officers similar powers to those of police officers to enter any premises owned or occupied by the person named in the warrant and to do it over an extended period where it is not a joint operation with the police still causes me some concern.
I am not sure whether there is similar malpractice, so far as police officers are concerned, in the execution of PACE warrants, but the Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration’s report seems to suggest that the exercise of powers by immigration officers is not perhaps as thorough as it is by police officers. My concerns remain, but at this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Paddick
Lord Paddick
My Lords, in moving Amendment 210, in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee, I shall speak to Amendments 211 to 213 and Amendment 215.
Amendment 210 suggests the addition of “reasonably” in the power of the Home Secretary to direct public agencies to supply documents, so that she must “reasonably suspect”, rather than simply “suspect”, that someone may be liable to deportation under new Section 20A(2). Amendment 211 suggests a similar change to the power of the Secretary of State to retain such a document. Amendment 212 requires the Secretary of State to return a nationality document that is no longer required to the person who supplied it, as previously debated on Amendment 188.
Amendment 213 again queries extending the definition of “nationality document” from “a document showing” the individual’s “identity, nationality or citizenship”, to one that “might establish” the individual’s “identity, nationality or citizenship”, as previously debated on Amendment 189. I do not think that the Minister addressed in that debate the broadening of the definition from a document “showing” the individual’s identity to one that “might establish” their identity. That is a considerable broadening of the definition.
Amendment 215 would insert a new clause after Clause 30 relating to complaints and the investigation of serious concerns relating to the conduct of immigration officers. It suggests that a commission be established to,
“make recommendations about the establishment of an independent oversight body”,
for immigration officers and other authorised officers, in so far as they exercise powers available to immigration officers. My understanding is that the Independent Police Complaints Commission currently investigates complaints against immigration officers, but only relating to powers similar to those exercised by the police. There is not one overall coherent complaints investigation or recording system. Would the Minister confirm this? Even if the IPCC has a role, we believe that such arrangements may be inadequate and should at least be reviewed to ensure that they are effective.
The Independent Police Complaints Commission is fighting an uphill struggle to win the trust and confidence of the public in general, and the black and minority ethnic communities in particular. Those most likely to come into contact with immigration officers are those seeking asylum and others in a very vulnerable position. The likelihood that such people will have a good understanding overall of their rights and the standard of conduct expected of immigration officers and other authorised officers is far less than among those born in this country or who have lived here for some time. Indeed, the way they may have been treated by officials in their own country may well be far below the standard expected of immigration officers and other authorised officers in the UK.
In all the circumstances, it seems that there is at least a question that needs to be examined as to whether the existing arrangements by which long-standing residents of the UK—well-versed in their rights and the conduct expected of officials—can have their concerns about the police and immigration officers investigated are adequate for asylum seekers and those newly arrived in the United Kingdom. I beg to move.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, this group of amendments concerns the supply of information to the Secretary of State and the establishment of a commission for standards for immigration officers. I was somewhat surprised that without Amendment 212 or something similar—it may need refining—it would be left to the Secretary of State to dispose of nationality documents as they think appropriate, without any further clarifications. It would be useful if the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, would confirm that there is no question that these documents will not be returned to the person when they are no longer needed by the Secretary of State or their officials. I understand that we would not want to return the documents to someone who had no right to have them, but if they have been obtained lawfully they should go back to them.
Amendment 215 requires the Secretary of State to establish a commission to make recommendations for an independent oversight board to set standards for immigration officers. Given the sort of powers that immigration officers exercise as public officials, it is right that we should have in place a proper process to look at complaints about their conduct and standards. It would be helpful if the noble and learned Lord were to set out what happens at present. Is this safeguard in place with regard to certain things but not to others, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, indicated? Does the noble and learned Lord think that the present system is adequate in all respects?
Lord Keen of Elie
On the last point, the Secretary of State will act reasonably, and is lawfully obliged to act reasonably, so there cannot be any real difficulty about that. On the noble Lord’s first point, our complaints procedure may be so comprehensive that it is difficult for him to get his arms round it. However, I would be content to write to outline that procedure in more detail if he felt that would assist.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for the explanations that he has given. As he said, many of them were similar to points that we had already debated. I am very grateful for his explanation about the broadening of the definition, which he did not cover on the previous amendments. I shall read with interest, and very carefully, what he has said on that issue.
On Amendment 215, I echo what the noble Lord has just said about the many and different avenues of complaint. How can somebody who has a genuine grievance against the Immigration Service possibly know which body to turn to among all that complexity? The Minister did not address the concerns that I expressed on behalf of many communities about their lack of trust and confidence in the Independent Police Complaints Commission, and the concern that those who are likely to come into contact with the Immigration Service are likely to be more vulnerable and less aware of their rights than those who do make complaints to the Independent Police Complaints Commission.
The Minister made reference to the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration. I have to confess to not knowing exactly what the chief inspector’s remit is, but if it is similar to that of Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary, it is purely a monitoring function—an investigation and review function—rather than a complaint-examining function. Indeed, if any complaint were made to the Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration about the conduct of the immigration office, I would expect him to refer it to—
Lord Keen of Elie
I should have added that Independent Police Complaints Commission’s remit was extended to investigating complaints and serious conduct matters relating to the exercise of immigration enforcement powers by Section 41 of the Police and Justice Act 2006 and the UK Border Agency (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2010. I had omitted to mention that.
Lord Paddick
I am very grateful to the Minister for that.
As I was saying, I expect that we would find in practice that complaints made to the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration would just be passed on to the many and various organisations and bodies that the Minister highlighted.
I am therefore still unconvinced that there is no need to review whether the current procedures for making complaints against immigration officers are user-friendly to people who are going to find it very difficult to navigate all these different systems. But in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.