Localism Bill

Lord Newton of Braintree Excerpts

Thursday 23rd June 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Whitaker]

My Lords, in rising to speak to this group of probing amendments, I want to ask the Minister one question. Anxiety has been expressed to me by the Gypsy and Traveller community that there is a risk that councillors could run campaigns and make decisions to remove unauthorised Gypsy and Traveller sites in an area, which of course is not in itself wrong, but they could do so without focusing on a long-term, sustainable solution to Gypsy and Traveller accommodation needs. Dale Farm springs to mind. Therefore, I should like to ask the Minister: if there is this risk, can he say what safeguards there will be against it?

[Lord Newton of Braintree]

My Lords, I rise to do something which my noble friend on the Front Bench will regard as unusual, if not unique. In the absence of an opportunity to speak on whether the clause should stand part, I state that, although I am interested in the answers to the ingenious questions that my noble friend Lord Greaves has asked, I am principally concerned to declare my undying support for this clause, as I understand it.

I have already indicated that my wife has been chairman of Braintree District Council, is currently the cabinet minister for planning and strategy—I think that that is the right description—is on the planning committee and, indeed, represents me on Braintree District Council. Indeed, I even voted for her. When my wife became a district councillor for the second time about eight years and a few months ago, I could not believe it when I discovered what these predetermination rules were. Any MP would have had a fit if he had been told that he could not indicate to his constituents that he shared their view on a matter that was likely to come before Parliament and would vote accordingly. I think that I have the purport of this right. Noble Lords are indicating that I have. Why should councillors not be able to say to their constituents that they agree with them on a matter and that they will vote accordingly when it comes before the council? I cannot see the slightest merit in that position. I do not think that it is democratic or defensible and, if, as I understand it, this clause gets rid of it, I am in favour of the clause.

[Lord Beecham]

Surely the noble Lord thinks that there might be a distinction between a quasi-judicial function such as a planning or licensing matter and a matter of general policy.

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[Lord Newton of Braintree]

I am made nervous by the intervention of the noble Lord because he knows much more about local government than I do, except in the indirect way that I have described. However, these are decisions of the local authority. I think I am right in saying that ultimately planning decisions could go to the whole council, although they are normally dealt with by the planning committee. Am I wrong on that? Some real issues arose towards the end of the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, concerning decisions delegated to officers by the planning committee.

However, I find it very odd. I know about the worries that underlie this sort of thing, but I make the point that planning decisions are often very, very important to local communities—I am thinking of things like supermarket applications and the like. It cannot be right that a councillor representing an area should not be allowed to express a view to his constituents that he then reflects in what he does on the council, or indeed the planning committee. If there is corruption involved, that is a different issue; but if it is a genuine view, formed on the basis of what constituents have put to him on the effects of that application on the neighbourhood, he should have the same right as a Member of Parliament in respect, for example, of an airport application, which is to express his views to his constituent and to reflect those views in his votes in the House.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

My Lords, I rise to speak to our amendment in this group, Amendment 96ZA, which calls for a review and report on the operation of the section and is framed really as a probing amendment. I support the probing that has been undertaken by the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, because we are seeking to understand how much difference this provision will make to the status quo. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Newton, that his exposition of what he believes the current arrangement to be is not the full position, as I understand it. That is my understanding from a non-legal background, but I will try to come on to it and explain that point.

Views have been expressed to me that this clause provides a slippery slope that will potentially undermine the integrity of decision-making, especially on planning decisions, and will be a charter to allow bias. Others welcome the clause, as we have heard today, and consider that perhaps it does not go far enough, with some confusion around the term “closed mind”. In order to understand it, I have tried to set down a baseline to judge whether it has moved us on from the current position. Perhaps the Minister will take the opportunity to explain what this intended change will mean in practice.

As I understand it, the courts currently recognise two types of predetermination: actual predetermination and apparent predetermination—the latter is why the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, is pursuing the point about “to have appeared to have had”. Actual predetermination is where,

“a person has closed their mind to all considerations other than an already held view”.

That means that the exercise of a discretionary power where one or more of the decision-makers does not in fact exercise the discretion at all is unlawful as an abuse of that discretion. Apparent predetermination is where,

“the fair minded and well-informed observer, looking objectively at all the circumstances, considers that there is a real risk that one or more of the decision makers has refused even to consider a relevant argument or would refuse to consider a new argument”.

However, predetermination of course has to be distinguished from predisposition, where a councillor may hold a view for or against a particular development, say, but has an open mind as to the merits of an argument before making a final decision. There is a difference between predetermination and predisposition. The courts, as I understand it, have moved towards a more pragmatic approach in recent years. The Standards Board of England summarised the position in a rather helpful way—I think we will miss that body—so perhaps I can just read what it says are the practicalities of local government from the case law and what has happened to date. The Standards Board says:

“The courts have accepted that these practicalities mean that the fair minded and informed observer accepts that … Manifesto commitments and policy statements which are consistent with a preparedness to consider and weigh relevant factors when reaching the final decision, are examples of legitimate predisposition not predetermination … The fact that the member concerned has received relevant training and has agreed to be bound by a Code of Conduct is a consideration to which some weight can properly be attached when determining an issue of apparent predetermination … Previously expressed views on matters which arise for decision in the ordinary run of events are routine and councillors can be trusted, whatever their previously expressed views, to approach decision making with an open mind … To suspect predetermination because all members of a single political group have voted for it is an unwarranted interference with the democratic process … Councillors are likely to have and are entitled to have, a disposition in favour of particular decisions. An open mind is not an empty mind but it is ajar”.

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[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister and I am sorry to have interrupted him on two or three occasions, but this is a very important issue. We accept the anxiety in local government about what councillors can and cannot do, and the importance, as the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, said, of the democratic component of this so that people are not precluded from campaigning on issues they feel strongly about. But that is the position at the moment, for as long as their minds are ajar.

Sometimes very cautious advice is given and therefore people tend to be more restricted than the law may otherwise allow, but notwithstanding all that—I think we have common cause in what we see as a proper outcome in this, so that if you have a closed mind or you are going to be involved in a decision, you should be able to judge the facts objectively and not predetermine the matter—I still see a difficulty in this provision. That is because I cannot see how you would ever get evidence of someone having a closed mind on the basis of this provision. It seems that you would have to ignore what they had said and done and campaigned around right up to the point when they make the decision. That seems to me to be an anomaly and I am still not sure where it leaves us.

[Lord Newton of Braintree]

My Lords, I am so encouraged and enthused by being described as helpful by my noble friend on the Front Bench—for the first time in a long time, perhaps even uniquely—that I feel the need to intervene again. I agree to some extent with what the noble Lord has just said, but my concern is that, in all honesty, I feel as though I have strayed into wonderland or into a bit of my philosophy course when I read PPE some 50 years ago. This distinction between predisposition and predetermination is like angels dancing on the head of a pin. As a councillor, you would have to be mad not to say, if you wanted to have any effect at all, that while you had had a view, you had looked at the new evidence and it had not changed your predisposition. That would not amount to predetermination. The whole thing is complete nonsense.

My concern is that it leads to a fracture in the relationship between councillors and their constituents. They have to fence with issues, pretending that they do not have a view, or telling their constituents that they do not have a view or dare not have a view because it might affect their ability to vote. That will not be understood by any ordinary person. Councillors are elected to represent people and in relation to their views. Indeed, in some circumstances they may want to express a view. This is daft, and MPs would not put up with it.

Let us take the example of Stansted, which I think has been the subject of votes in Parliament. The MP for Saffron Walden, my neighbouring constituency in the old days, was against it and would no doubt vote against it. In Braintree I was cautious because I was in favour of Stansted, but not all my constituents were, so I did keep my head down a bit. But if I had been against it, I would have been appalled if I could not have said so and then voted in Parliament. If my noble friend has a chance to say another word, can he say why things should be different for councillors from how they are for Members of Parliament? I can see no answer to that.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

As I understand it, the impact of this clause will make it clear that individuals can campaign as you would want, but I hang on to the point that for as long as they leave open the possibility of a change of mind in due course, having examined the facts and merits of a case, they are not precluded from campaigning at the moment either. That is why I am seeking to probe just how much difference this clause makes.

[Lord Newton of Braintree]

I understand that, but reference was made to Mr Justice Andrew Collins, a great and good man. However, I would not want to be the judge who had to distinguish between predisposition and predetermination in circumstances where the person involved denied predetermination. You would have to be a mind reader, so it is not sensible.