Banking Act 2009 (Restriction of Special Bail-in Provision, etc.) Order 2014

Lord Newby Excerpts

Monday 15th December 2014 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord Newby]

That the Grand Committee do consider the Banking Act 2009 (Restriction of Special Bail-in Provision, etc.) Order 2014.

Relevant document: 15th Report from the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments

[Lord Newby (LD)]

My Lords, these four draft statutory instruments are intended to transpose the requirements of the European bank recovery and resolution directive, which I will refer to as the BRRD. As a package, they will significantly strengthen and enhance the UK’s special resolution regime, which puts in place arrangements to deal with the failure of banking institutions.

I will first set out the background to these provisions. In general, when a company fails, it will enter insolvency, and the company’s creditors will be paid out in accordance with the priority of their claim. However, the financial crisis demonstrated that it is sometimes not possible to allow banks which fail simply to enter insolvency. This is due to the need to protect the banks’ customers by ensuring they can continue to access essential services. It is also because of how interconnected the banking system is, with the failure of one bank having the potential to spread problems throughout the financial system.

Responding to the financial crisis, the Government of the day introduced the special resolution regime in the Banking Act 2009. This gave the Bank of England and the Treasury a set of tools that could be used to manage the failure of a bank and limit the negative consequences for the economy and the rest of the financial system. Many other Governments found themselves in similar situations and introduced their own resolution regimes.

As a result of that common experience, there has, since the crisis, been a concerted international effort to address the problems that led to the crisis, building on the first steps taken during the crisis and making sure that we have the tools available to address bank failures in the future. The UK has been at the forefront of these efforts. We have been an active participant in the Financial Stability Board, which, under the chairmanship of Mark Carney, has established a common resolution framework endorsed by G20 leaders. This framework is designed to ensure that banks are no longer considered “too big to fail”. It includes enhanced supervision, planning for the recovery and resolution of firms and co-operation between different jurisdictions.

The BRRD is part of this global push to make banks resolvable. It is designed to ensure that European member states have a harmonised set of resolution tools that can be used to manage the failure of a bank.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Geddes) (Con)]

My Lords, a Division has been called in the Chamber. The Grand Committee stands adjourned, to resume if possible after 10 minutes. However, I understand that both participants are tellers and therefore it might take slightly longer than 10 minutes—as soon as possible.

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[The Deputy Chairman of Committees]

My Lords, the participants having returned, the Grand Committee is resumed. The noble Lord, Lord Newby, was cut off in his prime, for which I apologise.

[Lord Newby]

My Lords, as I was saying, the BRRD is part of this global push to make banks resolvable. It is designed to ensure that European member states have a harmonised set of resolution tools that can be used to manage the failure of a bank. It also puts in place mechanisms to facilitate co-operation between member states in planning for and managing failure. It covers banks, building societies, investment firms and banking group companies. The BRRD builds on the existing UK resolution regime in the Banking Act 2009, ensuring that many of the powers introduced in the UK will be replicated across the EU.

I now turn to each of the instruments in turn. First, the Bank Recovery and Resolution Order makes substantial amendments to the Banking Act 2009 to ensure that the UK special resolution regime is fully consistent with the BRRD. It inserts a new section into the Banking Act 2009 which gives the Bank of England a set of pre-resolution powers. They are designed to be used where, in the course of resolution planning, barriers to the effective resolution of the firm are identified.

These powers enable the Bank to require a firm to take action to ensure that the Bank could use its resolution powers effectively in the event that an institution fails. Where barriers have been identified, the Bank may, for example, direct a firm to dispose of certain assets or cease lines of business or change its legal or operational structure. To support these new powers for the Bank of England and its exercise of the stabilisation powers, the order gives the Bank new powers to gather information from firms. This includes a power to appoint an investigator to investigate a possible failure to comply with a direction. It also includes a power to apply for a warrant to enter premises in order to obtain documents that are required for the exercise of its functions.

Failure to comply with a requirement of the Bank of is an offence. This section replicates existing offences in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, which relate to requirements imposed by the PRA or the FCA in their role as regulator. Here, however, it relates to requirements imposed by the Bank of England. The Bank of England may delegate its enforcement of these powers to the PRA or FCA.

The order makes some amendments to the special resolution objectives, set out in Section 7 of the Banking Act. These amendments are designed to ensure full compliance with the BRRD, providing clarity and certainty for firms. There is nothing which fundamentally changes the objectives, which include ensuring the continuity of banking services, protecting financial stability and public funds and protecting depositors covered by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme.

The order adds a new section to the Banking Act 2009, which requires that relevant capital instruments of the firm—that is common equity, additional tier 1 capital and tier 2 capital—are either cancelled, reduced or converted into common equity at the point where a firm fails. This ensures that capital instruments do the job they are intended to do, which is to fully absorb losses at the point of failure. This write-down must occur before or at the same time as a stabilisation power is used. It may also happen in the absence of any resolution, either because the write-down is enough to restore the viability of the firm or because the firm is entering insolvency instead of being resolved.

The BRRD also introduces a new stabilisation option, the asset management vehicle. The Bank of England may transfer certain assets of the failing firm into an asset management vehicle, where they are then sold or wound down over time. This prevents destabilisation of the market through the immediate sale of the assets. It also prevents the assets being sold at an artificially low price.

The directive introduces a harmonised bail-in power across the EU. Bail-in is a tool which enables the Bank of England to cancel or modify contracts which create a liability for a failing bank. This allows the Bank of England to recapitalise the firm, stabilising it while the fundamental issues that have lead to its failure are addressed. The Government have had a policy to introduce bail-in powers for some time. Following significant progress on bail-in at an international level, and as part of the negotiations on the BRRD, the Government introduced bail-in powers via the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013. This order amends those provisions to ensure full consistency with the BRRD. In order to ensure that the bail-in is effective, it is necessary to prevent counterparties of the firm in resolution from closing out their contracts in order to avoid being subject to bail-in. The order therefore specifies that a range of contractual termination rights do not arise solely by virtue of the fact that a stabilisation power has been exercised.

The Bank of England is also given a power to impose a temporary stay on contractual obligations and security interests to which the firm in resolution is a party. This allows a short period while the firm is being stabilised, during which those obligations need not be met. This stay is very strictly limited in time to avoid having a disproportionate effect on affected parties.

This order also gives the Bank of England powers enabling it to support a resolution carried out in a foreign country. Where the Bank is notified by a foreign jurisdiction’s resolution authority that it has taken action to resolve a firm, the Bank must make an instrument that either recognises that action or refuses to recognise it. Recognition of a foreign resolution action will confirm that it has effect in the UK. This provides legal certainty about the effectiveness of resolution actions in other jurisdictions, reducing the risk of challenge and making cross-border resolution more effective. The Bank of England may refuse to recognise a third country’s resolution action, or any part of it, where certain conditions are met. These include a determination that the recognition would have an adverse effect on financial stability in the UK or the rest of the EEA, or that UK or other EEA creditors would be treated less favourably than non-EEA creditors with similar legal rights. The Treasury must approve any refusal by the Bank of England to recognise a third-country resolution action.

I move on to the second order, which puts in place safeguards for certain liabilities that may be subject to the bail-in tool in the event of failure. It protects certain types of set-off and netting arrangements that are respected in the event of insolvency. The provisions here ensure that they are also respected in bail-in. The order requires that liabilities relating to derivatives or financial contracts or covered by certain master agreements must be converted into a net debt, claim or liability prior to bail-in. Other types of liability covered by the safeguard must be treated as if they had been converted into a net liability. The order also puts in place arrangements for dealing with any breach of the safeguard. Where there has been a breach, the affected party is entitled to have that breach remedied. The remedy aims to ensure that the affected party is returned to the position that they would have been in had the safeguard not been breached.

The third order requires compensation arrangements to be put in place following the use of the bail-in powers. They are designed to ensure that the shareholders and creditors of the firm do not receive less favourable treatment than they would have done had the institution simply failed, without the exercise of the stabilisation powers. This is commonly known as the “no shareholder or creditor worse off” safeguard.

The fourth order implements the requirements of the BRRD on depositor preference. The majority of deposits in the UK, including all deposits of individuals, are protected by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme up to a value of £85,000 per depositor per institution. The Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 enhanced this protection by amending the Insolvency Act 1986 to add deposits covered by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme to the list of preferential debts. These debts are paid out first in insolvency, and are entitled to be paid out in full before other creditors receive any payments. This means that the majority of depositors in UK banks already have their deposits preferred.

The depositor preference order creates a new category of preferential debts, called secondary preferential debts. These are paid out after ordinary preferential debts but before other debts. All existing preferential debts, including covered deposits, will be ordinary preferential debts. The order designates amounts in deposits eligible for protection from the FSCS but above the £85,000 compensation limit as secondary preferential debts. Only deposits of individuals, micro-businesses and SMEs are given this preference. This change further reduces any chance that these depositors will be exposed to loss if the firm fails and either enters insolvency or is resolved using the powers in the Banking Act. This furthers the objective of protecting depositors.

I apologise for speaking at such length, but as the orders make extensive revisions to existing legislation I felt that they merited a thorough run-through. Taken together, they significantly enhance the UK’s resolution regime. Along with the other reforms that have been implemented to date, they will equip us well to deal with future bank failures in a way that protects taxpayers and the financial stability of the UK.

[Lord Flight (Con)]

My Lords, I would just like to put on record some concerns about the bail-in arrangements and what they are broadcast as achieving.

My first point is that, as the CEO of the Association of Corporate Treasurers recently said to the Lords EU Economic and Financial Affairs Sub-Committee, once there is any whiff of concern about a bank, any company will withdraw its deposits immediately. It is not going to hang around and wait for the bank to be subject to a bail-in. One thing that the bail-in arrangements do is actually accelerate the possibility of runs on banks. It will not be just corporate deposits; any form of lending to a bank will be subject to bail-in. If there is any whiff of trouble about that bank, that money will be withdrawn as soon as possible.

The second point, which perhaps has not been learnt from the recent banking crisis, is that the key thing that hugely accelerated the downturn in the economy in 2009 was allowing the money stock and the money supply to contract substantially, just as happened in America in the 1930s. If you are going to do a bail-in on a bank and its capital is going to get exhausted, it will have to contract its balance sheet dramatically, all other things being equal. While I note the comment that the Bank of England will come in and help, effectively it would have to be the state that came in and recapitalised banks or, again, the result would be a massive contraction of the money supply if any of the major banks were in trouble and thus required bail-in. Unless that happened, again, it would have the knock-on effect of a major economic contraction.

The bail-in arrangements make sense—we know what they want to achieve, which is to eliminate or at least reduce the extent to which the taxpayer has to bail out banks in a crisis—but people are kidding themselves if they believe that it is as simple as that. Fundamentally, even as a result of how the bail-in arrangements operate, unless the Government are there to replenish capital—whether they do so as the Bank of England or directly—you would have a huge monetary contraction, which would be damaging to the economy.

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In other words, “We won’t know it works until we’ve used it and it has”.

[Lord Newby]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords who have spoken on the debate on these orders. Their concerns fall into two parts. The first relates to whether this is a sensible way to do it, and what the negative consequences will be, and the second is a series of practical issues raised by the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe.

The noble Lord, Lord Flight, said that these provisions could accelerate the possibility of runs on banks when it looks as though they are getting into difficulties but before we have got to resolution, and that if you get to resolution there will be a contraction of the money supply. If you have a banking crisis, whatever you do in advance, or even during the crisis, it will be extraordinarily difficult to deal with the crisis without there being costs somewhere. We are trying, with this regime, to ensure that the costs are minimised, for several reasons, and that the concept of “too big to fail”—that is, that the Government should be required to bail out banks if they get into difficulty—should no longer obtain.

First, we want the very fact that these provisions exist to have some impact on behaviour before we get to a crisis. We hope that well before you get to a crisis, shareholders and creditors will hold banks to account to a greater extent as regards their decisions. I hope that these provisions will give them an incentive to do that.

As regards the money supply, the Monetary Policy Committee monitors the money supply as part of its objectives and has a number of tools at its disposal to deal with that. Of course, resolution itself is intended to protect financial stability rather than the money supply, but the Bank has other tools in its locker to address the position as regards the money supply.

[Lord Flight]

If a bank loses its capital—and there are rules about how many multiples of its capital its expansion can be—it has to contract its expansion dramatically. That is the key problem: if you have a bail-out situation, it will most certainly remove all the bank’s capital, and that bank will have to contract dramatically. The question is: how will that be handled as regards the money supply?

[Lord Newby]

I accept that, my Lords, but if a bank gets into difficulties there are only two broad ways of dealing with it. One is for the Government to bail it out, and the other is for it to contract its capital in the way that the noble Lord describes. I think that there is a consensus internationally that we must get to the position that these orders will bring us to, where the primary responsibility will fall on the banks. As I say, it inevitably has an impact on the money supply—I do not deny that for a minute—but the simple point I was making is that the Bank of England has other tools in its locker to look at money supply.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

Forgive my enthusiasm for money but it is a fascinating subject. The Minister says that the Bank of England has a series of tools in its locker. It would be unfair to ask him about them now but I wonder if he could do a small illustrative note to myself and the noble Lord, Lord Flight, about what particular tools he has in mind for that situation. Creating money supply would be a real challenge in those circumstances, and for us—and indeed the market—to know that the Bank of England had considered this and felt that it had the adequate armoury to tackle such a situation would be very good for my happiness and perhaps the wider happiness of the money environment.

[Lord Newby]

My Lords, I am very happy to write to the noble Lord in those terms. His happiness is always at the forefront of my mind.

The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, mentioned the effect of the exercise of these powers on funding for SMEs. In the immediate term, SMEs’ deposits would be protected, but in the aftermath of 2008 we certainly saw a big squeeze on funding for SMEs, which is now at best being only partially reversed. Part of the answer is that we are keen to see a much more broadly based and competitive environment so that SMEs are not forced, as they have been, to go to one of the handful of banks if they want funding. That is why we are so keen to see the establishment of new challenger banks for SME lending and the growth of peer-to-peer lending, which means that over a period we envisage that the proportion of SMEs that will be at risk from the small number of large banks will be greatly reduced.

The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, raised two broad questions about the way in which the orders will be implemented. The first related to the fact that it is virtually impossible to understand the orders because they amend other bits of legislation—how on earth is anyone to make any sense of them? We are in the worst possible position to make sense of them for the simple reason that, because the regulations are not yet in place, there is not readily available the kind of consolidated version of the Act, particularly the 2009 Act, that will rapidly be available via commercial databases—I was going to say “within seconds”, but more probably within a very small number of hours—after the orders have been approved. More generally, the National Archives is working on the production of amended versions of the primary legislation, which will be available to all, although I am not quite sure of the timing of that. If you are a depositor with a bank and you are worried about how this works, I would not actually direct you to the primary legislation in any event; even when it is consolidated, it is very difficult for the lay person to make any sense out of primary legislation all. People will need to look at the more general advice that will no doubt be available by googling “resolution”, “depositor protection” and the features of this scheme, because I am sure that many firms—banks and others—will have some commentary available on their websites as well. Of course, although I have not had a chance to look at it, I am sure that the Treasury will also have much relevant information available.

The noble Lord asked about contingency planning and resources. These are areas that he has, quite rightly, asked about in the past. In anticipation of him asking about them again, I have asked the Treasury the following questions. What is the name of the team in the Treasury and the Bank dealing with contingency planning? How many people are in it? Have they actually done any and, if so, what form did it take? The answer is that the financial stability group in the Treasury is responsible for identifying and analysing emerging risks to the financial stability of the UK and preparing and responding to them. In particular, it is responsible for the effective stewardship of government-supported banks; delivering structural reform in the UK banking system; developing the necessary legislation; and contingency planning for the possible failure of UK banks and putting those plans into action in the event of failure.

The group co-operates closely with the resolution directorate of the Bank of England. The resolution directorate co-ordinates the Bank of England’s resolution of failing UK banks. It also has responsibility for identifying the broad resolution strategy that outlines how a firm will be resolved, and for preparing the resolution plans that set out in detail how a firm will be resolved. The legislation introduced since the crisis requires banks to provide the authorities with information that will enable them to exercise their resolution powers and this includes detailed information about the firm and the identification of any substantial barriers to resolution that must then be addressed. This is an ongoing process, with the banks submitting information on an annual basis and the Bank of England updating its plans accordingly. The introduction of the recovery and resolution plans was a recommendation of the Turner review of the regulatory response to the financial crisis.

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[Lord Newby]

My Lords, I had just answered the first of four questions that I had asked myself and my officials in respect of contingency planning under these orders. The second question was how many people were involved in the teams that I described before the Division. Around 40 people work in the financial stability group in the Treasury. In addition, contingency plans are in place enabling the group to draw on additional resources in the event that that becomes necessary. The list of reservists was one of the recommendations of Sharon White’s review of the Treasury’s response to the financial crisis, published in March 2012. The Treasury’s capability in this area has been significantly enhanced as a response to the crisis. Around 50 people work in the Bank’s resolution directorate. The Bank also has in place contingency plans that would allow it to rapidly increase the size of the directorate when necessary. Of course, in addition to the staff in the directorate, there are many more staff in the Bank and the PRA who work on financial stability more broadly.

I asked whether the teams had actually done any contingency planning. The authorities regularly carry out contingency planning in relation to economic trends and events that could have an impact on financial stability; for example, contingency planning in relation to instability in the eurozone. Finally, I asked: if so, what form did this work take? Among many other things, earlier in the year the Chancellor and the governor and deputy governors of the Bank travelled to Washington to participate in an exercise designed to further understanding, communication and co-operation between the US and UK authorities in the event of the failure of a cross-border globally systemically important bank. The exercise furthered our understanding of the key aspects of resolution planning that would require co-operation and communication between the UK and US authorities and how this would be achieved.

That is one example of the work undertaken in this area and the Government remain committed to the agenda of financial sector reform, including ensuring that robust contingency plans are in place to deal with the possible failure of UK banks. I hope I have been able to satisfy the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, at least in part.

Motion agreed.