Victims and Courts Bill

Lord Murray of Blidworth Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 9th February 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

16: Clause 3, page 6, line 20, after “justice” insert “or that it would not be in the child’s best interests”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would enable the Crown Court to take into account the best interests of the relevant child as well as the interests of justice when deciding whether to make an order.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, my Amendments 16, 25 28 and 33 arise from the recommendations of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, of which I am a member. The Joint Committee has written to the Ministry of Justice on a number of occasions regarding these issues and has so far not met with a satisfactory response. I shall listen very carefully to what the Minister says on these points.

As the Bill stands, the Crown Court must make a prohibited steps order after sentencing. It is right that an offender should not be able to exercise parental responsibility, but there should be safeguards in the Bill to ensure that children do not suffer as a result, especially if the effect of the order is that there is no one who can exercise parental responsibility.

On Amendments 16 and 28 in my name, unlike the family court, the Crown Court would have limited discretion about how best to protect the interests of affected children, as we heard identified by the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, in the previous group. Under the Bill, the Crown Court’s main discretion is that it must not make an order if

“it appears to the Crown Court that it would not be in the interests of justice to do so”—

a well-hallowed phrase in legislation that noble Lords will find in Clause 3(4)(c).

In this context, it is unclear what is meant by the phrase—in particular, whether it would allow the court to consider the interests of the affected children or just of the offender. The Joint Committee wrote to the Minister asking for clarification as to whether the effect of the Human Rights Act would be that the Court would be able to consider the interests of the child when making the order. The Minister replied that the court would have to act compatibly with the ECHR. In fact, she said:

“Under our existing measure, the Crown Court will be able to consider all of the information available to it, as part of the criminal proceedings, when deciding whether to exercise the interests of justice test (and in doing so, will be bound to act compatibly with the Convention Rights given section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998)”.


As noble Lords can see, that is an answer that, I fear, lacks clarity.

Amendments 16 and 28 would provide clarity on this point. They would ensure that the Crown Court was able to get information about the children’s circumstances and itself consider the implications for the children before making an order. They would simply append, after

“in the interests of justice”,

the words

“or that it would not be in the child’s best interests”

to make the prohibited steps order.

On Amendments 25 and 33, there would be particular concerns if the effect of such an order was that no one was able to exercise parental responsibility for a child. In Jade’s law, as we heard in the previous group, there is an attempt to address this by requiring the relevant local authority to apply to the family court immediately after the Crown Court has made its order. We can see that in new Section 10B(2) of the Children Act 1989 in Section 18 of the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024.

Amendments 25 and 33 are carefully modelled on that provision in the 2024 Act. They would impose the same requirement on the local authority if an order under the new provisions had the effect that there was no one who could exercise parental responsibility for the child. In correspondence with the Joint Committee on Human Rights, the Minister said that such a provision was appropriate in the case of Jade’s law, where one parent had killed the other, because in those cases there would almost always be no one with parental responsibility. But in the cases covered by the Bill, in contrast, there might or there might not be. The Minister said that the local authority would be aware if the child might be left in this position and would be able to take appropriate action.

That is a very unsatisfactory answer. There can be no confidence that the local authority will simply be aware of this scenario and there would be no detriment to making it clear in the Bill. Relying entirely on a local authority’s discretion invites the risk that a child is left without someone with parental responsibility and falls between the gaps.

These amendments would mean that the local authority would be under a duty to apply to the family court in such cases in exactly the same form as it would under Jade’s law. The Minister said in correspondence that local authorities would always know the circumstances of a particular case, so the Government should agree, and have already agreed in principle, that it would be workable for the Bill to impose a duty on them. There is no good reason for these amendments not to be accepted. I beg to move.

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, I begin by commenting on two parts of the noble Lord’s amendments. I find it difficult to understand how his Amendment 16 would work in practice. These orders have to be made at the point of sentencing; they cannot come later on as an afterthought or at a later hearing. More importantly, I question how the Crown Court would be in a position to assess what is or is not in the interests of the child, and, certainly, how the Crown Court could do it without a report that typically, in the family court, might be available from Cafcass or a local authority.

Moreover, what would the Crown Court do if the suggestion of not making the order to remove or restrict parental responsibility is strongly opposed by the other parent, as would quite likely be? That other parent, certainly in the Crown Court, would not have party status and would probably not have legal representation.

On the face of it, the Crown Court might face the prospect of a contested hearing on the question of whether to restrict parental responsibility. Clearly, that is much better dealt with by the family court in the appropriate way. Having said that, I of course understand the force of the noble Lord’s Amendment 33, which seems to present a sensible solution to a potentially difficult problem.

I move briefly to my amendments in this group. They are procedural and evidential amendments. Amendment 23 would provide for the Crown Court that is required to make the prohibited steps order to be supplied with all necessary information to make the order, enabling it to make the order in appropriate terms, covering all the children to whom it might apply and enabling it to be provided to the other parent and others holding parental responsibility. As it appears from the very length of Amendment 23, parental responsibility can be acquired by a number of different people in a considerable range of situations. It almost goes without saying that the convicted offender may not be a reliable source of information about the children for whom he has parental responsibility, or the basis on which he might hold it. The Crown Court therefore cannot be expected simply to make a blanket, generic order referring to all or any children for whom the defendant holds or might hold parental responsibility. That would be of little use to anyone. The court therefore has to be in a position at the point of sentencing to make an order that should refer to specified children. For that, accurate and reliable information should be provided. As the amendment suggests, that would be best done by the Probation Service as part of the pre-sentence report.

Once that order has been made, it is also important that those who are affected by the order are notified of it. Hence, Amendment 17 would provide for notification by the Crown Court to the relevant local authority and the provision of a copy of the order, with a duty on the local authority to convey that information by onward notification to all persons who hold parental responsibility for the child or children concerned. Clearly, they need to know what has been ordered and to understand the effect of it. The local authority is best placed to provide that information.

Finally, Amendment 29 would ensure that in rape cases the victim is promptly and properly informed that the order has been made, with an obligation on the court to notify the relevant local authority within seven days of the order being made and an obligation on that local authority within 14 days thereafter to notify the victim of rape. Without this, there is a risk that the other parent or holder of parental responsibility for the child or children concerned, and the victim of the rape, are not made aware of the order or of its implications. They may be aware if they attend a sentencing hearing, but that is not certain. In any event, a local authority, particularly one involved with the family, would be best able to explain the effect of the prohibited steps order, its duration and other implications.

--- Later in debate ---

I understand the aim of the amendments and the importance of ensuring that families are informed throughout this process but, for the reasons I have just given, legislation is not the appropriate route for achieving these aims, and I invite the noble Lords not to press their amendments.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lords who have spoken in the debate. I am particularly grateful for the comments about Amendments 16 and 28 from the noble Lord, Lord Meston, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton.

Of course, I hear the criticisms of the amendments that were levelled by the JCHR and indeed the Minister; they are points with great merit, and I cannot say that that is not the case. However, there are two points that go some way to addressing the criticism. The first is that of course the court will have some reports on the offender, and it is conceivable, in the very rare cases where it may be necessary to consider the best interests of the child, that reports may be provided. The second is that, according to the answer provided by Minister’s colleague in the Commons in her letter to the JCHR, it is already rolled into the interests of justice test, which is a slightly different complexion put on the point to that given to us this evening by the Minister at the Dispatch Box—and, frankly, the answer just given by the Minister was rather more credible and coherent.

For those reasons, I have much to think about in relation to my amendments. I am grateful to everyone who contributed. In relation to the other amendments in the group, this has been a useful tour of the technicalities of Clause 3. The Minister kindly indicated that she would meet me to discuss it, perhaps with other noble Lords who are interested. I therefore beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 16 withdrawn,

Victims and Courts Bill

Lord Murray of Blidworth Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 10th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, noble Lords will remember an amendment in these terms from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, who moved it in Committee. He is the lead tabler of this amendment on Report but cannot be here today, so he has asked me and its other co-signatory, the noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth, to present the case for it.

The amendment seeks a review of the issue of compensation for victims of economic crimes such as fraud, bribery and money laundering without the need for civil proceedings. Noble Lords will no doubt remember the frustration that the noble and learned Lord expressed in Committee that, after all his years campaigning on this issue and for all the warm words of support he has received from successive Governments, he has not made progress in getting acceptable provisions enacted. The arguments in favour of this amendment are extensive and were extensively canvassed in Committee, so I hope that I will be forgiven for setting them out in reasonably staccato form, without the academic support they received in Committee.

First, the present arrangements for the victims of economic crime are unsatisfactory, and in the vast majority of cases of serious fraud, bribery, money-laundering and other economic crime, very few victims receive compensation. This is particularly true of overseas victims.

Secondly, resort to civil proceedings is difficult and expensive; the costs are often prohibitive. Potential claimants inevitably have difficulties in finding and calling evidence on economic crimes, for a host of reasons—again, which is particularly true of overseas claimants. Successful claimants, even after winning cases, face serious difficulties with enforcement of judgments against fraudsters and other economic criminals—again, particularly overseas victims. Then, fines which are levied as a result of prosecutions in the UK go to government, and a derisorily small amount is awarded to victims in the form of compensation. That is also true in the case of deferred prosecution agreements and arrangements made pursuant to them, which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, was active in introducing when he was Solicitor-General.

It was agreed around the Committee—this is the reason for the form of this amendment, both then and now—that it is not yet clear what the best arrangements for providing adequate compensation for criminal cases involving economic crime might be. That is the reason why a review is essential and why the amendment calls for a review. Then, it may be that a new scheme to enable compensation to be awarded in cases involving overseas victims might just involve arrangements to award compensation not only to the direct losers who might qualify as claimants in civil proceedings, but also, or alternatively, to some Governments abroad, some NGOs, or some other organisations which may not be claimants in civil proceedings or even entitled to be so, but may well nevertheless be substantial actual and identifiable losers and victims of such crimes.

It is certainly the case that, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, said, successive Governments have reacted to the call for sensible and fair compensation arrangements for victims of economic crime with warm words but no action at all. So, the need for a review of what should be done to fill this gap is urgent. This is why the amendment has a tight timetable for public consultation, for undertaking the review itself and for a report to Parliament.

Finally, a set of sensible and respected arrangements for providing such compensation would enhance the reputation of this country as a financial centre. We are already leaders in many fields: in insurance, in legal services—including arbitration—the quality of our courts and judiciary, and banking, to name to just a few. Arrangements for proper compensation for economic crime could raise our international standing even further.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, it gives me great pleasure to say that I agree entirely with the noble Lord, Lord Marks—not something I perhaps say terribly frequently in this Chamber.

There is one material distinction between the proposed new clause the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, brought forward in Committee and the proposed new clause before the House today. That is in proposed new subsection (3), which requires that

“The Secretary of State must conduct a public consultation on the review, … which must be published no later than 1 June 2026, and which must open on that date and close on 1 September 2026”.


Members of the House might ask why that is so specific. The reason is a simple one: I know that the noble and learned Lord met the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, to discuss this issue, and was told a review was going to be conducted, but that it would not report until 2028.

Given that this campaign has been going on for some time, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, had a justifiable point in trying to bring forward that date through this amendment. As he rightly said in his Second Reading speech and in Committee, it is important that the United Kingdom Government make it possible for victims of fraud, bribery and money-laundering offences, both here and overseas, to recover compensation from the offending person or company, rather than the fines simply going into the system here in the UK.

There is one final point from the noble and learned Lord’s Second Reading speech that warrants repetition here:

“The African Union estimated in 2015 that 25% of the continent’s gross domestic product was lost to corruption. Every company convicted of overseas corruption in this jurisdiction should be ordered to compensate the communities it has harmed”.—[Official Report, 16/12/25; col. 689.]


Can any of us disagree with that?