Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Lord Murray of Blidworth Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 4th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, to pick up on a theme identified by the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, and as identified by my honourable friend Tom Tugendhat on 9 September, when he noted in his speech at Second Reading of this Bill in the other place, yes, negotiations were commenced under the last Government. As Ministers, both he and I wrote to the Prime Minister—both Prime Ministers—to complain about the decision to institute those negotiations. We were right: the treaty was not one that should have been considered then, and it is not one that should be considered now; the whole principle was wrong then, and it is wrong now.

Why do I say that? The main rationale for handing over the islands is that an international tribunal—the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea—may abuse its jurisdiction in treating the ICJ’s advisory opinion as if it had established, as a matter of binding international law, that Mauritius was sovereign over the British Indian Ocean Territory. As I said when the House debated the treaty on 30 June, the risk of an adverse judgment and the real risk to the operation of the UK-US airfield at Diego Garcia are very significantly overplayed by those who favour this treaty. The ICJ had no such power and did not, in fact, reach the conclusion that Chagos should be transferred to Mauritius. Its advisory opinion left open other courses of action on the UK’s part other than surrender of the islands to Mauritius.

Mauritius cannot, as a matter of international law, secure a binding judgment before an international tribunal establishing that it is sovereign over the Chagos Islands, because the United Kingdom is not required to consent to a dispute of this nature being adjudicated by the International Court of Justice. Accordingly, if I might expand on the point made by my noble friend Lord Lilley, the Government explained their position by saying that they anticipated that another tribunal—as I said, specifically the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, which, I may add, has no jurisdiction over questions of sovereignty over territory—will presuppose that the ICJ’s 2019 advisory opinion has settled that Mauritius is sovereign, and will thus proceed to exercise its jurisdiction in relation to disputes about the law of the sea on the premise that Mauritius, rather than the United Kingdom, is sovereign. Yet how can this be, since there is not a word about sovereignty over the Chagos Islands in that advisory opinion of the ICJ?

We must be in no doubt that the Government, on their own account, are handing over a priceless strategic asset and trampling over the Chagossian people as they do so, because they want to avoid being on the wrong end of a potential future abuse of adjudication. However, this is a premature and wholly unnecessary surrender that blazes a trail for other abuses of the ICJ’s advisory jurisdiction to be leveraged into future United Kingdom defeats and compromise of our vital interests. We need to resist now, not only for our national security and that of our global allies but also to refute this abuse of law.

Furthermore, the deal is a terrible one, for the reasons ably outlined by my noble friend Lord Blencathra. Some of the examples are that the terms of the treaty provide very little in the way of leverage or protection for the UK. We cannot, for example, withhold payments for a breach of the terms that nominally protect our interests, and there is no machinery to enforce Mauritius’s commitments. Instead, Mauritius will be well placed to take our money and to reach accommodations with other states in relation to the archipelago that are injurious to our interests.

[Lord Beamish (Lab)]

I am following the noble Lord very closely, and I do not disagree with some of the points is making. Could he, however, clarify why it was that James Cleverly on 3 November said that the Government were to

“begin negotiations on the exercise of sovereignty over the British Indian Ocean Territory”?—[Official Report, Commons, 3/11/22; col. 27WS.]

Clearly, the Government then were talking about the sovereignty of the actual islands.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

As I said earlier in my remarks, that was a decision with which I strongly disagreed then, and I strongly disagree now. He was plainly wrong in so saying.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords—

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Forgive me: I have given way once, and time is limited.

Professor Ekins, professor of law and constitutional government at Oxford, set out in detail, when he gave evidence to the House of Lords International Agreements Committee, the failings in the treaty. In particular, he set it out in even more detail in his Policy Exchange paper published at that time. I strongly urge the Minister to consider those two items in detail during the pause in proceedings brought about by the decision not to proceed with the committal Motion tonight.

There can be little doubt, contrary to the Government’s expostulations about saving the base, so ably outlined by my noble friend Lord Altringham, that this in fact weakens the strategic interests of our country. It does so without any sound legal or geopolitical basis, and, as many noble Lords have noted, without any reference to the wishes of those who lived in the archipelago, shamefully removed on the orders of a Labour Government —a shame that, as the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, noted, is about to be repeated and amplified by this present Labour Government.

Finally, the Minister said that the previous Government had entirely overlooked the Chagossian people, a calumny that was repeated by the noble Lord, Lord Beamish. Not so. Section 3 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 —a Conservative piece of legislation—was the first legislation to make provision for Chagos Islanders and their direct descendants to obtain British nationality, something successive Labour Governments had failed to provide.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Forgive me, but the shame, as I am sure the noble Lord will agree, comes from the removal of the Chagossian people from the Chagos Islands, not from the agreement itself.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

Yes, and as the noble Lord will recall from the debate that we had on the treaty, that was accelerated under the Heath Administration in 1970 and concluded under the Conservative Government. The denial of repatriation was then subsequently under another Conservative Government. My point is that all of us in this country have a dark record when it comes to Chagossian rights. Our task now should be how we at least restore some of those.

The noble Lord, Lord Callanan, started his remarks by saying that the House of Commons was denied the opportunity of debating the treaty during the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act period of scrutiny. He knows, because he will remember the debate we had on the treaty, that, as Erskine May makes perfectly clear, one of the mechanisms for the House of Commons to deny ratification of a treaty would be through an Opposition day debate. During the scrutiny period of this treaty in the House of Commons, the Conservative Party chose a different subject for its Opposition day debate. It had the chance, if it chose to take it, of debating and moving an amendment in the House of Commons during the scrutiny period.

We are here today debating this Bill for one reason and one reason alone: the previous Administration made a political decision to cede sovereignty and to enter into negotiations to conclude this. I hear noble Lords saying no, and I will come on to that, when they may wish to change their minds. Not one Conservative colleague today said why the previous Government opened negotiations to cede sovereignty in 2022. The then Government did not open negotiations to improve relations or co-operation with Mauritius. They made the principal decision to cede sovereignty, but they still have not said why. I hope the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, will outline clearly today why that was the case.

All legal considerations on this issue, which have been debated quite a lot during this debate, predate 2022. The complaints received in this debate predate James Cleverly and that Government’s decision. We have had complaints in this debate from the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, of the current Attorney-General and the advice given to this Administration. As my intervention on the noble Baroness suggested, the same would have been the case under the previous Government. I assume that when the previous Government made the policy decision in November 2022 to open negotiations which would conclude with the ceding of sovereignty, they were also advised by Attorneys-General. I have a hunch that it might have been the Attorney-General at the time of November 2022, but it could have been any of the three Attorneys-General that the Government had in 2022. No doubt, history will tell us which one of those it was.

A new argument has been presented today by the noble Lords, Lord Lilley and Lord Blencathra, that the Conservative Government were powerless and feeble and that their Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries were forced against their will by officialdom to make that statement in 2022. This is the argument of being in office but not in power. It was our suspicion at the time that the Conservatives were in office but not in power, and I am glad noble Lords have confirmed that.

I understand the argument that might say that this is a bad deal or that it has been handled badly. I think that many parts of it remain problematic, and I would have liked the Government to have handled it differently. But that is different from the Conservative Opposition in the Commons, who said in their amendment that they were “implacably” opposed to “ceding sovereignty”. They were not implacably opposed to ceding sovereignty in November 2022, so what changed?

Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Lord Murray of Blidworth Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 18th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Jay of Ewelme (CB)]

My Lords, after the history lesson from the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, I am tempted to recount my time in Malta in the 1950s or my visit to Djibouti in 1965, but I will resist that temptation—at least this evening.

As I said at Second Reading, I support this necessary and sensible Bill, but I want to pick up something that the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, said. I do not agree with the proposed Amendment 1 of the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, but, as I said at Second Reading, the Government need to give very serious thought to how the rights, interests and wishes of the Chagossians— I say Chagossians in the plural to mean not just those who have written to us from the United Kingdom but those from elsewhere as well—need to be taken very seriously into account by the Government. I look forward to hearing more about the Government’s intentions later in our discussion in Committee.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, for fear of treading on the toes of my noble friend Lord Hannan, I want to add to the debate that took place a moment ago concerning the intervention by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, on my noble friend Lord Callanan’s amendment. I invite noble Lords to look at Clause 1. Clause 1(1) provides that the treaty is the treaty that was considered by Parliament. Clause 1(2) expressly provides that:

“When the Treaty comes into force, so do sections 2 to 4”


of the Bill.

The Bill is indivisibly connected to the implementation of the treaty, as the Minister will no doubt tell us in her closing speeches to all the groups that we have today. This is reflected in the Explanatory Notes to the Bill. I commend to the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, paragraph 18 of the Explanatory Notes, which sets out in crystal-clear detail that:

“Entry into force of the Treaty is defined in Article 18 of the Treaty, as being the first day of the first month following the date of receipt of the later note”.


There is nothing in the fact that this Parliament has considered the treaty that precludes an amendment of the type advanced by my noble friend Lord Callanan, because it is a statement of the purpose of the Bill. Purpose clauses have become something of a norm in legislation, and there is nothing wrong in principle with such a statement being placed in the Bill. Indeed, the purpose of the second part of his amendment is simply to state, as a matter of fact:

“Nothing in this Act grants or recognises that Mauritius has sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago”.


That statement is absolutely correct. I give way to the noble Lord.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way; I have listened carefully to what he has said, as I always do. Does he agree that there is a distinction, however, between debating legislation that gives effect to a treaty that has been agreed and ratified by Parliament, which this treaty has, and implementing legislation which seeks to alter a treaty that has been agreed?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

The noble Lord seeks to justify his intervention but fails to do so. Because of the way the treaty is drafted and the way Article 18 operates, the treaty can come into force only when this legislation is implemented. That is unusual, but it has the effect of not allowing the noble Lord to make the point he tries to make. He argues that my noble friend Lord Callanan cannot make this amendment because it is in some way in breach of the agreement that has already been signed by the Government, but that agreement is not in force. This is a point we have explored in great detail. I am sure the Minister would agree with me on that point.

Moving to the other amendments in the group, I entirely support the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Lilley. I am very grateful to the reference that he and my noble friend Lord Bellingham made to the points that I made at Second Reading in respect of the non-recognition of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. I would just add one point in furtherance of that. The International Court of Justice also has no power and no jurisdiction to query the dispute over the Chagos.

The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, who I am sad to see is not in his place, heavily relies on the evidence of Sir Christopher Greenwood, but he chooses to ignore evidence which does not favour his case. A very powerful exposition of the contrary case was put by Professor Richard Ekins, KC, professor of constitutional law at Oxford. He made it clear that the International Court of Justice’s jurisdiction specifically excludes any dispute with the Government of any other country which is or has been a member of the Commonwealth. Mauritius’s acceptance of the ICJ’s jurisdiction also excludes disputes with the Government of any other country which is a member of the British Commonwealth of nations.

If there had been any basis upon which Mauritius could have sought a binding ICJ judgment against the UK, it would have already done so. The fact is that no such basis exists or has ever existed, which is why Mauritius was forced to use the advisory opinion route to obtain its non-binding advisory opinion. Its bargaining position would have been far stronger if it had had a binding ruling against the UK, but the fact is that it has chosen to negotiate without seeking such a ruling, because it obviously knows that there is no way in which it can obtain such a binding ruling.

For those reasons, I strongly support the lock that is present in my noble friend Lord Lilley’s amendment. It would mean that only if there is a binding ruling should this treaty come into force, and therefore the Chagos Islands should remain in British possession and this act of strategic self-harm should be avoided.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

I am speaking for myself; other noble Lords may take different views on that point.

Mauritius could also pursue a legally binding judgment through further arbitral proceedings against the UK under Annex VII of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS. A judgment from such a tribunal would be legally binding on the UK—and I will come on to the points about the extent of those judgments and sovereignty, too. Such cases could be brought rapidly and include provisional measures, themselves legally binding, which could be introduced within weeks. The long-standing legal view of the United Kingdom is that the UK would not have a realistic prospect of successfully defending its legal position on sovereignty in such litigation.

The other important element to note here is that, even if the UK chose to disregard any legal rulings—that is not something that this Government would want to do, but we could—we rely on third countries to service the base. Therefore, the operability of the base depends on other states taking a view on such rulings. We of course control what we do, but we cannot control what other states do. If we need those states to agree with us and to ignore a legal ruling too, we may not be successful. It may be that we then compromise the operability of the base. That is a very real threat; we were concerned about that, as were our allies and partners, including the United States.

The risk of a binding ruling relating to sovereignty from this type of tribunal is simply too great, given the importance of the base for national security. Some have pointed to the 2015 arbitration between the UK and Mauritius, in which the tribunal was clear that it did not have jurisdiction over the question of sovereignty. That is right. However, that was before the advisory opinion in 2019 and before the 2021 judgment of a special chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in a case about delimitating the boundary between Mauritius and the Maldives. In that case, it was ruled that Mauritius’s sovereignty was inferred from the ICJ’s advisory determinations. These have changed the legal landscape.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Will the Minister confirm that, in those proceedings to which she just referred, the United Kingdom was not a party and made no submissions?

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

I never said that we did; that was between Mauritius and the Maldives. My point is to make the case to noble Lords that the advisory opinions—advisory though they are—stand to inform subsequent opinions of international tribunals. That is what happened in that case, and that is why I bring that as a supporting argument for the Government’s case—to help noble Lords understand how we have got to where we are.

While an arbitral tribunal under UNCLOS almost certainly would not address the question of sovereignty directly, it may reach decisions on related matters based on conclusions about sovereignty. Noble Lords may disagree, but the Government’s position is that we are concerned about this—and I suggest that the previous Government were also concerned about this; otherwise, what were they doing? We are concerned not just about the effects of a binding judgment on the UK but about the legal effect on third countries and international organisations, which could give rise to real impacts on the operation of the base and the delivery of all its national security functions.

Although I do not expect there to be agreement on this, I believe that we cannot say that the Government have not fully considered all the potential legal jeopardy in which we would place ourselves. Further, we believe that the suck-it-and-see approach that the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, advocates would leave us in a much weaker position when it comes to negotiating with Mauritius.