Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Lord Morrow Excerpts

Friday 27th February 2026 Lords Chamber

I urge the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, to accept these amendments to provide some security and safeguards for those who will live and die in our care and nursing homes. If he is reluctant to do so, what controls will he introduce to protect the old, the isolated, the lonely and the vulnerable? I am afraid it will not be enough to answer me by saying that that is the job of the CQC. What will the Minister do to address the problems and risk that will exist in our care and nursing homes?

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

My Lords, Amendment 146A in my name requires the voluntary assisted dying commissioner to have particular regard to the right to life under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights when carrying out their functions under the Bill.

In tabling the amendment, I recognise that, under Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, public bodies are required to act in a way that is compatible with each of the convention rights. I can appreciate somebody attempting to argue that this amendment is unnecessary, but, as noble Lords will understand, Section 6 of the Human Rights Act sets a minimum floor for public bodies—they must act compatibly with the convention—but it does not provide a method for decision-making. It does not tell them how much weight to give a specific right in a particular statutory context. Without any further guidance, the balancing exercise between rights is left in the hands of the public body, with the court subsequently determining the legitimacy of the decision by a judicial review after the Bill becomes an Act.

However, in this life and death matter, we cannot wait until after the Bill is passed and until people have lost their lives; nor should we leave the question of balance solely to the courts. Parliament must take ownership and give a steer and signal to which issues matter most. Historically we have done this through “particular regard” clauses. To provide just one example, under Section 22 of the Online Safety Act, we require Ofcom

“to have particular regard to the importance of protecting users’ right to freedom of expression within the law”.

Given the concerns that freedom of expression often loses out to risk aversion or administrative convenience, we made it clear that any justification to restrict content must consciously and explicitly address Article 10 rights. In effect, the clause has Parliament take the policy choice demanded under the ECHR, rather than leaving it to unforeseeable Ofcom decisions.

Turning to the context of the Bill before us, and the reason I have tabled this amendment, I am troubled that concerns around the Article 2 right to life have too often been squeezed out of this debate. Instead, attention has been fixed on the question of whether the safeguards, which many of us consider essential to protect the lives of those vulnerable to comorbidities or potential coercion, would restrict access to assisted suicide and so impinge on the Article 8 right to family life and privacy.

I am far from alone in having this concern. Last November, after providing evidence to the Select Committee that considered this Bill, the Equality and Human Rights Commission’s Alasdair Henderson wrote to the chair of the Select Committee to reiterate the exact issue I have just raised. He said that the Government’s equality impact assessment

“does not strike the right balance as it mainly focuses on access issues. It provides more limited information on the potential risks, such as those around safeguarding and coercion, which might affect people with different protected characteristics”.

The same marginalisation of Article 2 is present in the Government’s human rights memorandum on the Bill. Several key concerns around Article 2 raised by experts in the field are simply ignored. Let me provide two brief examples to illustrate my point. First, the memorandum defends the lack of a statutory appeal for family members who might raise new evidence of coercion or other factors influencing the decision, on the grounds that it is necessary and

“proportionate to ensure the process is not frustrated through lengthy legal challenges”

and to protect

“the article 8 right of a person to choose the time and manner of their death”.

But, shockingly, the memorandum makes no reference to the Article 2 right to life that may be impinged should the panel overlook an important influencing factor.

Secondly—I raised this point at Second Reading—the memorandum fails to engage with the concern raised by Tom Cross KC and the EHRC that the Bill

“unjustifiably discriminates against those persons whose disabilities manifest in the expression of suicidal ideation”,

in so far as it lacks a mechanism to clearly distinguish whether their wish to die is a manifestation of their disability or a genuine decision unrelated to their disability. Consequently, in their opinion, as it stands, the Bill could well breach Article 14 as well as Article 2.

Again, the Government seem to have ignored this concern. The Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, said in a Written Answer on 14 July that the Government were “aware” of Tom Cross KC’s advice when updating their memorandum but chose to not to “reference it”—I find that significant. She assured the House that

“the Government has set out the articles of the ECHR which it considers are likely engaged by the bill, including Article 14 together with Article 2”.

For the sake of time, I will ask the Minister something directly today. She will remember that a few weeks ago the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, a former chair of the Equality and Human Rights Commission, called on the Government to update their equality impact assessment in line with the request of nearly 60 Members of this House. As the noble Baroness’s question was raised during the Clause 1 stand part debate, the Minister did not have the opportunity to respond. Will she do so now and explain why the Government do not seem to be following the usual guidance set out in the Cabinet Office’s Guide to Making Legislation in failing to update their impact assessment?

Returning to my argument, I think that the Government addressing these concerns around Article 2 would help correct the unhelpful impression that these are not things to be concerned about. I am worried, as I suspect others are, by the impression given at the Dispatch Box each week that safeguards are perceived basically as a barrier to equal access rather than as a justifiable and proportionate measure to protect life, which the state is obliged to do. I believe we are in danger of forgetting that it is the Article 2 right against being intentionally deprived of life by the state that is absolute, and not Article 8.

This is a dangerous place to be. The Government may indeed be neutral on the matter and claim they are just setting out what is possible with the margin of appreciation afforded by the Strasbourg court. However, as Amendments 126 and 913 remind us, the voluntary assisted dying commissioner may well not be neutral, as has already been mentioned. Indeed, they could be an advocate of assisted dying who wants to see the expansion of the regime and the erosion of safeguards.

My fear is that if the Government send the message that Article 2 does not matter, because Strasbourg has ruled that legalising assisted suicide is within the margin of appreciation of any state, rather than emphasising that the position only stands on the quality and implementation of each law’s safeguards, then we risk giving the commissioner a green light to push boundaries, potentially beyond the limits of Article 2, and only finding out after they have been breached—much too late, as I am sure everyone will agree. It must be the latter, and I urge the sponsor of the Bill to send that important message. I trust that the Minister will take time today to address that issue.