Chilcot Inquiry

Lord Morris of Aberavon Excerpts

Wednesday 28th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, it is an independent inquiry, but I will ensure that that gets back to the inquiry itself.

[Lord Morris of Aberavon (Lab)]

My Lords, we are told that one of the reasons for the delay in publication is the issue of the Maxwellisation letters. Last week, the Government in their reply washed their hands of all responsibility and said that this was a matter for Chilcot. If it is correct that, after all these years, some of those letters have been sent out only in the past month or so, it would be utterly disgraceful. Is the committee still sitting, on how many days a week, and are the costs rising by the day?

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, the Maxwellisation process is unavoidably a lengthy one. Noble Lords who served on the post-legislative scrutiny committee on the Inquiries Act last year—a particular special committee—raised the question of the length of time it took to carry through this process. There are issues of fairness and equity in making sure that those who may well be sharply criticised by a report should have the right to see those criticisms and comment on them before publication. That is the process that is now under way and, unfortunately, it does take some time.

Chilcot Inquiry

Lord Morris of Aberavon Excerpts

Tuesday 6th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Morris of Aberavon (Lab)]

My Lords, in setting up the inquiry, Mr Gordon Brown made a sweeping statement that all British documents, save those involving the most sensitive national security, would be made available. Has that promise been breached, in either spirit or form? The House also needs a clear, unequivocal statement as to who is responsible for apparently kicking publication into touch until after the election. Is it former or present Prime Ministers, Cabinet Secretaries or Sir John Chilcot and his committee?

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, there were two questions there. The Government made all documentation available to the committee at the outset. The further question, which has taken rather longer than anticipated, was the subsequent discussion as to how many of those documents should be published. After all, some of them are highly classified and deeply sensitive about British foreign policy and relations with other major Governments and allies. I understand that that process is also now complete. When the report comes out, it will contain more than 1 million words and will publish substantial documentation from more than 200 Cabinet meetings. That is all agreed and under way. In terms of the publication, the Prime Minister has not intervened at any point—and nor, as I understand it, did his predecessor. It is up to the inquiry and its chairman to decide when the process is complete. As we know, Maxwellisation is part of the process of completing the report. When that is complete, it will be published.

Chilcot Inquiry

Lord Morris of Aberavon Excerpts

Tuesday 11th February 2014 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Morris of Aberavon]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what are the reasons for the delay in the completion of the Chilcot Inquiry.

[Lord Morris of Aberavon (Lab)]

My Lords, I welcome the opportunity to debate the reasons for the delay in the completion of the Chilcot report. I will confine myself to some specific questions. Despite repeated requests over the years, I have never commented on the legality of the Iraq war. My duties as Attorney-General during the Kosovo war were difficult enough and many law officers have decisions to make concerning international law which are not easy. My only comments were in my recently published memoirs in which I said:

“The equivocation of the French before the Iraq war is not an argument for the failure to try for a further sustained effort”,

in the Security Council. I added:

“Or was the die already cast? The Chilcot inquiry may tell us”.

My interest in public inquiries goes back a long time. Cabinet Office records show that my name was suggested for the Franks inquiry into the Falklands War. In the event, more experienced colleagues were chosen. The Franks inquiry took six and a half months in all. The Chilcot inquiry was set up in June 2009. Its final public hearings were in February 2011 and we were told that it would deliver its report as soon as possible. In 2009, Mr Gordon Brown told Parliament:

“No British document … will be beyond the scope of the inquiry”,

and that the final report,

“will be able to disclose all but the most sensitive information—that is, all information except that which is essential to our national security”.

As a former Attorney-General, I fully understand those considerations. It is how they are interpreted that matters and whether the correct judgment is made in balancing. Mr Brown added:

“I have accepted the Cabinet Secretary’s advice that the Franks inquiry is the best precedent”.—[Official Report, Commons, 15/6/09; col. 23.]

In the difficulties about publishing Chilcot, has there been any departure from that precedent?

At that time, Mr Cameron made a number of challenges. He said that the Franks committee reported in just six months and suggested that, because of the longer period for Chilcot, people would conclude that the inquiry had been fixed to tide the Government over until after the election. A year seemed too long for Mr Cameron in 2009. Unless progress is made, it will be more than four and a half years in the case of Chilcot.

On 7 November, the Daily Telegraph reported:

“The Cabinet Office is resisting requests to make public ‘more than 130 records of conversations’ between either Mr Brown or Tony Blair … and Mr Bush … There is also a wrangle about making public ‘25 Notes from Mr Blair to President Bush’ and some ‘200 Cabinet-level discussions’”.

First, who is responsible for the delay? Secondly, what precisely are the reasons for it?

Public inquiries are set up to deal with public disquiet, to establish facts and to learn lessons. Not to publish is to undermine the whole object. Delay is unjust and justice to the public is denied. In January, in a Written Answer, Francis Maude said that,

“the completion of its report is a matter for the Inquiry Committee”.—[Official Report, Commons, 6/1/14; col. 1W.]

Later in the month, he said:

“The Iraq Inquiry has been provided with all of the documents it has requested”.—[Official Report, Commons, 20/1/14; col. 32W.]

Your Lordships may consider, from the very tight drafting of both answers, that they are less than frank.

In December, the noble Lord, Lord Hill, said that the Prime Minister had been updated by Sir John Chilcot, who had,

“reported that continuing discussions over certain classified documents had caused a delay to the Maxwellisation process, and hence publication of the report”.—[Official Report, 12/12/13; col. WA 139.]

That was much more transparent. Maxwellisation is the name for the way the common law has developed of providing a person who is criticised in a report with an opportunity to comment. It is nothing more than fairness. If you cannot resolve what should be in the contents of a report, both the inquiry and the criticised are in an intolerable situation. Following freedom of information requests, the Information Commissioner ruled in favour of disclosing the minutes of two Cabinet meetings in 2003 prior to and concerning military action in Iraq. The Cabinet Office—would you believe it?—had curiously argued that the public interest in favour of disclosure diminished with the passage of time. That is risible. It is the original long-grass argument.

The commissioner considered that there was a presumption running through the Freedom of Information Act that openness in itself is to be regarded as something which is in the public interest. The commissioner concluded that, in line with recent legal authority, material which,

“can provide a better understanding of how the decision to go to war was made is subject to an exceptionally strong public interest in disclosure”.

The Library has failed to find any record of an appeal and I am particularly grateful for its help.

On 31 July 2012, the commissioner said that he was disappointed that a ministerial veto, as allowed by the Freedom of Information Act, had been used to override his recent decision on the two Cabinet meetings to which I have referred. Why was the route of a ministerial veto followed rather than an appeal to the court as in the recent case of Plowden—or were the Government, in whatever manifestation, afraid of another adverse finding? Perhaps I may remind the House of the background statement of the policy of the Freedom of Information Act. It states:

“The Government considers that the veto should only be used in exceptional circumstances and only following a collective decision of the Cabinet”.

Has that policy been changed by this Government? Was the Cabinet consulted? If not, who took the decision? Was it the Prime Minister or the Cabinet Secretary?

I surmise that each and every word of Prime Minister Brown’s statement announcing the Chilcot inquiry had the blessing of the then Cabinet Secretary—if indeed he did not draft it. The crucial question is: how much wider is the veto now being used than the actual words used by Mr Brown, to which I have already referred, that restrictions in publication would be limited to that which was essential to national security?

A blanket refusal to disclose Cabinet discussions, especially having regard to the commissioner’s carefully considered and balanced ruling of the need to publish, seems miles wider than Mr Brown’s promise to Parliament. Will the noble Lord give a categorical answer to my question: Has Mr Brown’s promise to Parliament been breached, either in form or in spirit? Parliament was deceived at the time of Suez. It would be most unsatisfactory if any similar allegation over Iraq were not cleared up in this independent inquiry, which Mr Brown promised,

“will receive the full co-operation of the Government”.—[Official Report, Commons, 15/6/09; col. 23.]

Accountability of Civil Servants: Constitution Committee Report

Lord Morris of Aberavon Excerpts

Thursday 7th February 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Morris of Aberavon]

My Lords, I congratulate the Select Committee on its report under the chairmanship of my noble friend. It is both an illuminating report and enjoyable to read. However, I also share her regret about the extreme lateness of the Government’s response.

My experience of civil servants arises from having been a Minister for a very long time in five government departments. There is no issue with the integrity and dedication of civil servants. The real issue is whether they are organised in the best way to serve the state. The highest point for me, as a very young Minister in 1964—well before the Ark—was to be told by the person who was in effect running the Ministry of Power, Matthew Stevenson, that he had everything in place to implement the Government’s plans to bring the steel industry into public ownership, for which I had been given a small responsibility. In Stevenson’s words, by my recollection: “When I was a young man at the Ministry, I helped to nationalise steel. When I was older, now at the Treasury, I helped to denationalise it. Now that I am older still, I can assure you that I have the plans and staff to nationalise it once again”. That great civil servant was as true as his word, and put flesh on the bones of our shoulders, which had been pretty bare and innocent of too much detail. The low point for me was the Cabinet Office’s procedures for handling the memoirs I was obliged to submit to it as an ex-Cabinet Minister. All I would say is that I warn future writers to be wary.

A report not available to the committee was that of the Comptroller and Auditor-General. Had it been available, the committee might have pondered on its words:

“The Civil Service is badly managed, lacks vision … and fails to ensure value for money”.

It points to “fundamental management weaknesses” and recalls nine major attempts to reform Whitehall in the past 40 years: challenging words, to say the least.

I turn to some of the committee’s conclusions. First, it says:

“We maintain our view that there is no constitutional difference between the terms responsibility and accountability”.

I am not sure. The Government’s response points out an important distinction between them. The consequences can be different, so far as blame is concerned. Crichel Down is said to be the high point of accepting responsibility. Since then, a much more complex system of government has evolved, with the development of arm’s-length bodies. The growth of the modern state has led inevitably to the diminution of direct parliamentary accountability. Indeed, as a young man I was able to put a question to the Postmaster-General, asking why a letter to one of my constituents had been delivered late—another age.

Fortunately, the growth of Select Committees in the House of Commons, and the flexing of their muscles in demanding more evidence, is helping to fill the vacuum. I suspect that our committees still have some way to go to be as strong as the committees of the American Senate. That leads me to my second point: endorsing the committee’s recommendation that the right of access by committees to civil policy should not be weaker than those making a request under the Freedom of Information Act. The committee has struck the right balance in underlining protection for civil servants under the decision-making wing of the Minister. The Government’s response seems to accept that.

Thirdly, I turn to some interesting paragraphs, which have been touched on already, on the appointment of Permanent Secretaries. The committee rightly maintains that appointment should be on merit. I believe that Ministers are entitled to, and should get, the men and women they want as Permanent Secretaries. In a recent letter to the Times, the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin of Roding, pointed out his experience on that score. The noble Lord, Lord Rodgers, in his contribution seemed to endorse that.

In 1974, when I became the Welsh Secretary I got my man, albeit in slightly different circumstances. For six years, I was served by the man in whom I had confidence and whom I wanted. The committee concedes that the Government’s proposals are in some respects the formalisation of practices that already occur. I agree with that too. I have considered the Government’s response, which underlines the involvement of the Secretary of State at each and every level. That must be so, and I accept and agree with it. I hope that the review being conducted will not ignore the reality of what happened certainly in my experience and in that of the noble Lords, Lord Jenkin and Lord Rodgers.

The bottom line is that a Cabinet Minister must have confidence that his Permanent Secretary will organise the department in such a way that it can deliver his policies. When, in 1966, I went with Barbara Castle to the Ministry of Transport, it was a failed department. The Minister was in the wrong job and he was sacked. He had failed to produce a transport policy. It was widely understood that the Permanent Secretary would not be sacked. He was sidelined and Barbara brought in a distinguished academic, Christopher Foster, an expert in transport, who distinguished himself as an adviser to many Governments to run the policy side of the department.

Fourthly, the Select Committee is nervous about having temporary civil servants on fixed-term contracts. Provided they have the vital qualities for a most senior civil servant, the appointment should be for the Minister to make and not have to be the Permanent Secretary, who may well have failed. The Government’s response seems to be the right one, which I warmly welcome.

Fifthly, the committee recommends the presumption that a single senior civil servant will lead the implementation of a major project from beginning to end. The Auditor-General welcomes the creation of the Major Projects Authority in 2010. Despite the difficulties that we have heard, I agree 100% with that laudable aim. An official should have a personal promotion, if necessary, in order to maintain continuity in the department. These projects are complex, and it is very important that a person should maintain their responsibility. I hope that the Browne review, to which reference has been made, will certainly ensure that there is an improvement on that score.

As well as persons in charge of projects, Permanent Secretaries come and go far too frequently, as do Ministers. Procurement Ministers should be in post for much longer. Over the years, the history of defence procurement is an indication of the lack of continuity of proper ministerial control. I am proud to have been a Minister of Defence for Equipment, although, fortunately or unfortunately as the case may be, the electorate sacked the Government. I would have regretted very much not being able to continue with some of those projects, which have the gestation period of an elephant. The most effective Minister under whom I have served was the noble Lord, Lord Healey, who was Defence Minister for six years. He knew the beginning and the end of all projects in that time.

I could not help smiling when I read about a departing woman Permanent Secretary of great distinction complaining about the lack, perhaps rightly, of women Permanent Secretaries when she was moving on to other pastures. That seemed to me to be a very odd comment to make. The committee might have spent a little time scrutinising the length of tenure of Permanent Secretaries in one post. It is a great worry that they seem to go from one department to another incredibly quickly.

Finally, when I had been Attorney-General for only a few months, I was asked to approve the bonus of a distinguished government lawyer. It was the first time I had heard of bonuses. I thought that the rate for the job had been negotiated. How could I as a Minister of only a few months’ standing in a matter of months decide on the exceptional performance and worthiness of this distinguished senior lawyer? Past Governments have gone down the wrong road with bonuses. I welcome the recent Parliamentary Answer that the number receiving awards has been reduced since 2010 from the astonishing figure of 65% to 25% of civil servants.

I am proud to have worked with a large number of dedicated civil servants, but I will not enlarge on that. I hope that what I have said is sufficient. All I will say is that I had no more suspicion of any diminution in quality when I last took office in 1997 than when I first became a Minister of the Crown in 1964—a span of more than 30 years.