Occupational Pension Schemes (Levy Ceiling) Order 2011
Lord McKenzie of Luton Excerpts(13 years, 8 months ago)
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Lord McKenzie of Luton
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his eloquence in introducing these orders. If I am not mistaken, the first two will no longer be subject to the affirmative procedure as a result of provisions in the Pensions Bill, so perhaps we must make the most of this occasion. Together with the levy ceiling earning percentage increase order, they set the compensation cap, as we have heard, limiting the amount of compensation payable by the PPF and the levy ceiling which controls the maximum amount of levy the PPF can charge pension schemes. As we heard, the levy ceiling for the year commencing 1 April 2011 is £892 million, which is comfortably above the proposed levy for that year, which the Minister told us is £600 million. In respect of that levy, I do not know whether the Minister is able to give us a split between the risk-based and scheme-based components. Could he take the opportunity to say something about collection rates and how we are doing in terms of collecting what we think is due?
The increase in the general level of earnings for the period 1 August 2009 to 31 July 2010 is 2.4 per cent. On the current compensation cap, the maximum level of compensation which is payable before applying the 90 per cent requirement is increased by 0.5 per cent to £33,219. In this case, the uprating is still by earnings but by reference to a different period.
We have no problem with these two orders, although, not surprisingly, they prompt wider questions. First, it is right to reflect on the importance of the PPF and how, alongside the Pensions Regulator, it has played an important role in ensuring some stability in a turbulent period for defined benefit schemes. It has ensured that something like 55,000 individuals already receive, or can expect to receive, a decent income in retirement which, because of the insolvency of their employers, they might otherwise not have achieved. From my experience, it is a highly professional organisation. According to the website, some 212 schemes are in the PPF at the moment and, as at January 2011, almost £236 million has been paid in compensation, with the oldest recipient being 105 and the youngest four.
Things seem to be in a far from steady state, with 10 schemes just transferred into the PPF and 409 schemes and 200,000 members in the assessment stage. Perhaps I can ask the Minister about the time taken for assessment. Clearly in some cases the assessment has not been completed within two years, although in the Pensions Bill we are considering removing the requirement for the assessment period to last for a minimum of 12 months. I accept that there is no inherent inconsistency between those two positions—we support that—but what are the barriers to speeding up the assessment process?
Given the levy ceiling we are discussing, perhaps we could get an update on the PPF’s exposure to the universe of eligible schemes. It would appear that before taking account of the RPI/CPI changes, the number of schemes in deficit and the aggregate deficit has declined over the past year. It is presumed, therefore, that the headway created by the levy ceiling is something with which the Minister is wholly content. In the past, the ability of the PPF to fund the consequences of a big influx of schemes was often called into question. I think that we responded robustly then and I imagine that the Minister is in a position to do at least that this afternoon, given the change in the background to those schemes. Can he say how many compensation payments are currently limited by the cap? I tried to get my mind round this issue—I am not sure that I have completely—but, going forward, what will be the relationship between the level of the cap and what would have been provided for by underlying schemes and the PPF arrangement? If the cap gets uprated by earnings, but compensation amounts going forward are uprated generally by earnings, because that is the nature of defined benefit schemes, and partly by reference to the CPI, is there potentially a divergence of the cap from underlying compensation which thereby would weaken its purpose?
The order concerning the financial assistance scheme puts into effect, as we have heard, the RPI/CPI switch for revaluation, indexation and annual increases in the maximum cap. The Minister will be aware that we have concerns about the switch to CPI, certainly as currently constructed, as an appropriate measure of inflation. Doubtless we will have a substantive debate on that in Committee next week and on subsequent occasions.
I share the Minister’s view that no index is perfect and I was interested in his example about the formula effect and switching. When he referred to it in the Chamber he spoke about moving from one kind of biscuit to another. I am comforted to know that we can go from one jammy dodger to another and we will be okay. It was good to hear about the work going on in the ONS.
As we have heard, FAS, unlike PPF, is funded by government—net of assets taken in, of course—and a reduction in costs can make a contribution to deficit reduction. We could, in principle, support this for a period, but there is a dearth of information about how much is involved and no impact assessment has been provided. Perhaps the Minister can help on that
I am aware that the final settlement for FAS arose from a tortuous process involving, among other things, legal action in the UK and in Europe. I presume that there is nothing in the CPI/RPI switch which could be said to negate that settlement. Perhaps the Minister can confirm that. I welcome the proposals dealt with in the Explanatory Notes to consolidate the FAS regulations.
For both FAS and PPF, before entry into the appropriate scheme there would have been a judgment of what an individual could have obtained in the market and whether FAS and PPF would provide a better outcome. This judgment, presumably, would have been made on the basis that FAS and PPF payments would be uprated by RPI. If this is not the case, is there the prospect that individuals will be worse off in retrospect because of the decisions made? What analysis have the Government made of this situation? If it is not to hand, perhaps the Minister will write to me.
Let me make one further point on the PPF levy. It appears that there is to be a new levy framework introduced in 2013. What can the Minister tell the Committee about this and what are the ramifications, if any, for the levy ceiling? I look forward to his responses in due course.
Lord Stoneham of Droxford
I support these regulations and I have only limited points to make on them. The role of the Pension Protection Fund is very important—all credit to the previous Government for introducing it—and we want to make sure that it is maintained and sustained. Obviously in the current environment the investment levels on the stock market have helped some of these schemes, but can the Minister give the Committee his view on how the economic situation is impinging on companies, particularly those on the borders of insolvency, and the pressures that that is likely to place on the fund over the next couple of years as we move, we hope, towards economic recovery?
I accept that we will be discussing the CPI issue in the coming week but I make the point that none of these indices is perfect; they measure inflation for all consumers on different bases. The Minister will perhaps answer this point more fully next week, but is any further research being done on the CPI to ensure that, as we are now moving towards using it more fully across a number of measures which affect pensioners particularly, we can make the index more representative of pensioners’ expenditure and fairer in the long term? I support the regulations.
Lord Freud
My Lords, again I thank noble Lords for taking such an active part in the debate and, as ever, looking at these issues in real detail. I will aim to answer as many of the questions as I can before I resort to the expedient of the letter.
The noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, is completely right about this being our last opportunity—last unforced opportunity, if you like—to do this under the affirmative procedure, so we should—and we are—taking advantage of that opportunity. He asked about the spilt between risk-based and scheme-based. Eighty per cent of the quantum is designed to be risk-based. That varies slightly, but the figures have held pretty firm over the years so, without going through endless figures, if we look at the £600 million for 2011-12, which I referred to at the outset, the risk-based element is estimated to be £480 million and the scheme-based element is £120 million.
The noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, and my noble friend Lord Boswell asked about the impact of raising the cap and about how many people are affected by it. As at January 2011, 92 scheme members receiving compensation were affected by the cap. The noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, asked about time in assessment. The real driver in that is legal action, which can take many years. As he saw, that is connected to the change in the Pension Bill. The problem we have is that resolving some of these issues can take a lot of time. On top of that, assessment is often delayed by poor scheme data and uncertainty about what the scheme rules are. It is not people being dilatory; there are genuine problems.
My team has just informed me that, in opening, I made a mistake. I said that the newer cap applies to people entitled to compensation before 2011 and I should have said after 2011. I am sure noble Lords knew what I meant. I apologise to the Committee.
The noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, asked whether the cap was overrated if it was linked to earnings. That is not the case because, to take an example, the comparator is the position of a 50 year-old at the insolvency of the employer. We want someone whose employer goes bust this year to be capped at the same relative level as someone whose employer went bust, for example, in 2005.
The calculation of the levy formula is something for the board of the Pension Protection Fund. The proposals concern the distribution of the levy between schemes and not the overall quantum. Will individuals be worse off due to the switch from RPI to CPI? The current market conditions mean that the cost of providing RPI or CPI are equal, but we have to recognise that there may be a divergence in future and we shall review that over the summer in the light of emerging evidence.
The noble Lord, Lord Stoneham, asked about indices. Without going into a full-blown techie analysis, the question was about whether we can make CPI a better fit with pensioner inflation. The ONS is working to include owner-occupied housing costs in its statistical programme. It is a very active programme. Rather than using mortgage costs, according to its research, the likely outcome—I may be jumping the odd hurdle to reach that conclusion, but bear with me—would be to take the cost of an average house and see how that moves up and down. I cannot see that happening much before two years, but an active process is taking place and the ONS will work very closely with European statistical organisations because it would need to be a general move.
One of the most interesting things is that the CPI has been adopted as the main measure, certainly for comparative purposes in Europe. The Americans took the decision to go down this route because of the geometric approach, which basically gets elasticities closer to one, which reflects substitution, as opposed to any elasticities closer to nought, which do not show much substitution, and that is seen in the arithmetic mean used mainly in the RPI. In the CPI, interestingly, about 70 per cent is done geometrically. The other 30 per cent of goods, which are hard to substitute—oil, for instance—are left at that low-elasticity arithmetic mean. We will have more of that next week.
The noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, asked whether the implications of this switch to CPI mean that some FAS members would find that the total value of their protection from the UK Government is reduced to a level that the European Court of Justice indicated would be below the minimum lawful percentage for protection. Perhaps I slightly overinterpret the question, but we have looked at that closely and we believe that the Government continue to meet their obligations under Article 8 of the European insolvency directive.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
My question was slightly broader. It was not just on the EU judgments but on whether, given any of the negotiations—there were quite complex and tortuous discussions with various lobby groups—the switch is true to that position as well.
Lord Freud
I think that I hesitate to answer that on the Floor. Is that sensible? Yes, my team is nodding, not vigorously, but gently. We should write the noble Lord a letter on that matter.
The last real question was on the impact assessment on FAS costs. The overall change to CPI for FAS purposes is estimated to deliver around a 10 per cent reduction in assistance costs over the lifetime of the FAS, which has been projected at about 90 years. Clearly, the impact on individuals will depend on the characteristics of the member, such as age and period of service.
On the economic situation, I think I have some data on what has been happening to the overall level of surplus in the PPF. I was asked about that and I know that I have those figures. It would be easier for me to tell the Committee than to write, but if I do not have them in a microsecond I will write. I cannot put my hand on them but the question raised was: where is the overall level of surplus, by schemes, and how many of them are in deficit and how many in surplus? I wanted to look at the overall risk levels but I cannot put my hand straight on that. If we could deal with that issue of economic conditions and the place that the market got to, that would also address the question from the noble Lord, Lord Stoneham. I am irritated with myself for not having it absolutely to hand.
As your Lordships know, the Government recognise the difficulties experienced by those who lost their pensions through no fault of their own.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
I am grateful for the full reply that the Minister has given us on a range of questions but I wanted to make sure that we had covered this point or that he was going to respond to it. Looking at the PPF before a judgment is made, for example, as I understand it before somebody enters the PPF you look and see what the market would have produced. If the market would have produced something which was at or above the PPF levels, that is what would happen. Presumably when those judgments were made, they were made on the assumption that PPF levels would be uprated by RPI—obviously, that is not going to happen, at least for a period—with the expectation that indexation would be lower than RPI. Is there the prospect that that means—at least with the benefit of hindsight, and it may not matter that it is hindsight—that judgments were made that might have been made differently? In some instances, the market would have been able to do better than the PPF on a CPI basis.
Lord Freud
The answer is that currently CPI is the same as RPI in terms of current annuity pricing. Clearly that may or may not be the case in the future. At the current time, that does not make a difference. The Pension Protection Fund and the Financial Assistance Scheme will continue to provide help to people whose pension schemes fail them. These regulations will enable the continued delivery of that help in a manner that is fair and equitable to both scheme members and the taxpayer. I commend these draft regulations to the Committee.
Social Security (Reduced Rates of Class 1 Contributions, Rebates and Minimum Contributions) Order 2011
Lord McKenzie of Luton Excerpts(13 years, 8 months ago)
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Lord McKenzie of Luton
My Lords, I again thank the Minister for his full explanation of this order, which sets out the revised national insurance rebates for contracted-out pension schemes. As we have heard, the figures are provided for contracted-out money purchase schemes and appropriate personal pensions, although the planned abolition of contracting out on a defined contribution basis from 6 April 2012 means that these will never come into effect.
Again, as we have heard, these changes are based on a report by the Government Actuary which, in contrast to previous reports, sets out three alternative valuation approaches. The Government, of course, have adopted the basis which provides the lowest level of rebate—4.8 per cent—and taken account of the changes in state pension age provided for in the Pensions Bill. I noted that the Minister hinted that should those changes not proceed, there would be a review of the 4.8 per cent figure. The rate is below the 5.3 per cent rate adopted for the five-year period to 2012.
The Explanatory Notes make it clear that the annual savings to the Exchequer from reducing the rebate is about £600 million. I am trying to understand what the other side of that saving is. Is it that the cost is greater on employers and employees; and/or is it that the cost of providing the relevant benefits is reduced? What is the other side of the saving that the Government make?
The note also states that a full impact assessment has not been published because it will have no new impact on the private sector. How does this differ from public sector employees and employers, where it is confirmed that there will be a small increase in national insurance contributions by each? I do not fully understand how it can have an impact on the public sector but not on the private sector.
More fundamentally, can the Minister expand on the rationale for adopting the best estimate approach? Paragraph 6.4 of the actuary’s report states that this basis of valuation means that the rebate,
“is expected to be sufficient, half the time, to cover the cost of providing benefits equivalent to the state second pension forgone”.
What about the other half? On what basis were the other valuation approaches rejected? To the extent that the best estimate falls short, where are the costs and risks being borne? It will be interesting to have data on what the difference will be for someone on median earnings and at or above the UAP.
The Government Actuary’s report is a complicated document and I am not sure that I have absorbed all of it. I hope the Minister and his team will be able to help us out on those particular inquiries.
Lord Freud
My Lords, I thank, in particular, the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, for his interest in this and the noble Lord, Lord Stoneham, for making that point. To summarise, this sets out the level of contracted-out rebate rates that will apply to employers and employees within defined benefit contracted-out occupational pension schemes from April 2012. As I said earlier, while we have provided rates for defined contribution schemes, that is purely to meet the statutory requirement. As I said before, we are looking at a reduction for contracted-out defined benefit schemes from 5.3 per cent to 4.8 per cent.
As I understand it, the central question that the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, put was about why we have picked that one rather than the funding basis or the gilts basis. I shall go a little into the concepts behind the three different approaches. Each approach is designed to provide the employer with a different level of guarantee about it being sufficient to cover the cost of the additional state pension foregone. Taking into account the considerable cost to the taxpayer of providing the reduction in national insurance contributions, the Secretary of State decided that adopting the best estimate approach was the most reasonable. When you think about it, the point about it working half the time is really saying that we have reached the point of indifference between whether you provide a pension scheme or do not do so and rely on the state. There is a rationale there. The other approaches in practice provide a much more powerful bias towards contracting out.
The noble Lord’s supplementary question was about defined benefit schemes. The risk is now essentially being run by the schemes. Different schemes will, of course, have different contributions rates for employers and employees, so there is no simple answer. The core answer is that moving to the point where, on balance, there is a point of indifference between whether you go in or out means that it is a neutral decision.
On the question about public versus private, for public sector schemes there is no extra cost to the employer as the Government are the employer so there is a degree of funds being recycled. Both public and private sector employees will see a slight reduction in take-home pay as a result.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
Perhaps I can clarify that. The note to the order, which I cannot now put my hands on, refers just to the public sector in that regard. It puzzled me because I understand that these rebates operate between the LEL and the upper accrual point, which is fixed in cash terms, in order to move towards a flat-rating of the state second pension, so I would have thought that there would potentially be a loss to all contracted-out employees. Therefore, I do not understand the distinction that is made in the Explanatory Memorandum between public and private sector.
Lord Freud
I think the noble Lord is right in saying that the loss is shared by the public and private sectors. Clearly, there is something slightly confusing in that note that has led him in a different direction. There should be an equalised effect.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
I am looking at the Explanatory Memorandum to the Social Security (Reduced Rates of Class 1 Contributions, Rebates and Minimum Contributions) Order that we are discussing. The impact paragraph states:
“There is no new impact of the changes to the contracted-out rebate rate. However, the reduction in the rebate rate will lead to a small increase in the National Insurance contributions of public sector employers and employees. The value of the increase will depend on individual employee earnings”.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
That is paragraph 10.1. Paragraph 10.2 states:
“A full impact assessment has not been published for this instrument as it has no new impact on the private sector and civil society organisations”.
Lord Freud
The impact is common across both the public and private sectors. The noble Lord asks about the impact assessment. I imagine that that is a reference to where the obligation to have an impact assessment is, rather than to the differential impact. By definition, we are saying that it does not have a new impact on the private sector and civil society organisations. By reference, that would also apply to the public sector.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
I am happy for the noble Lord to write to me on that. It is confusing. It specifically identifies public sector employees and employers as taking a hit. Paragraph 10.2 suggests no new impact on the private sector. That did not make sense to me.
Lord Freud
It is easy to see that confusion. I shall write to the noble Lord, but I am comfortable in stating that it is a reference to where the obligation to have an impact assessment is, not to who is getting the impact. That is the reason for the difference. However, I shall write to the noble Lord to lay that out very clearly. I am very impressed that anyone has got to note 10.2. I think I have dealt with all the outstanding issues.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
I am sorry to press the noble Lord but this may be part of the discussion we have just had. Is the £600 million saving by government just replicated as an extra £600 million of costs on employers and employees?
Lord Freud
Yes, I can confirm that, obviously. There is an argument there: it is a rather complicated sum, not just the sum of what has gone in and out in terms of all of the factors. To the extent that there is an extra cost, it is partly because it has become more expensive to get pensions for one reason or another. Some of that reflects the marketplace and what it costs to purchase annuities outside the Government’s scheme. Rather like me, the noble Lord will, I suspect, have gone through this understanding some, but not all, of the bits in it. However, that is the process, so the saving becomes a cost for employers and employees, given how we have split it.
I have one main item on which to write formally to noble Lords but, with that, I hope that I have dealt satisfactorily with the issues. As everyone in this Room will realise, they are highly technical. I commend the draft order to the Committee.
Women: Assistance in Pregnancy
Lord McKenzie of Luton Excerpts(13 years, 8 months ago)
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Lord Freud
I thank my noble friend for reinforcing this important point. There will be a gap, probably of around nine months, before we can formally change the budgeting loans. We are making the very firm point—I made that firm point formally in the Chamber yesterday—that we are encouraging people to use the scheme to the utmost extent that they can and to apply it to slightly wider items than those around budgeting for the baby.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
My Lords, the Minister has confirmed again, as he did in the debate yesterday, that families will eventually be able to access budgeting loans. However, is he aware that just last week the Minister for Pensions announced a further tightening of the screw on the availability of crisis loans from the Social Fund on the basis that this would enable the trickle of budgeting loans to continue? Is this not making the very poor pay for the poor?
Lord Freud
My Lords, the trouble was that the crisis loans were being used in a non-crisis context to buy ordinary items of household expenditure, so we were in danger of running out of funding for the whole system because of the way it was being used. Our concern with controlling the crisis loan situation was to make sure that funding was left available for budgeting loans for exactly this kind of thing.
Pensions Bill [HL]
Lord McKenzie of Luton Excerpts(13 years, 8 months ago)
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Lord McKenzie of Luton
My Lords, I speak to Amendments 20 and 21 in this group, which concern the trigger. Their thrust is not dissimilar to that of the amendment moved by my noble friend, although they are perhaps less ambitious. We will shortly discuss changes to or, indeed, the deletion of the trigger, but these amendments are predicated on the trigger remaining at its current level.
Amendment 21 would give an opportunity for jobholders to bring to the attention of employers the fact that by including earnings from other employments the trigger is reached or exceeded. Therefore, if the other conditions for auto-enrolment were present, the employer would have a duty to act accordingly. I underline how modest this provision is, as it is effectively an alternative to opting in. The employer would have no auto-enrolment duty unless, among other things, the employee had qualifying earnings in respect of that particular employment. It would be of advantage only where, in respect of any particular employer, the trigger had not been reached but qualifying earnings with that employer had. As has been expressed—my noble friend Lady Drake will develop this when we discuss a subsequent group of amendments—we have concerns about the potential widening gap between the trigger and the start of the band of qualifying earnings. If that is right, being able to access contributions on that band, even though the trigger has not been met in respect of any employment, becomes more important.
Like the amendment moved by my noble friend, this amendment is in part about putting down a marker for the ambition that, at some stage in the future, the various thresholds—the trigger and the qualifying earnings—might be amalgamated with payments allocated among two or more employers, but this amendment does not seek that. However, we would be interested in the Minister’s view on the extent to which HMRC might routinely have a role in identifying where the trigger is reached for multiple earnings. In a sense, it is like the allocation of personal allowances across various notices of coding. Could that be done on a more systematic basis? The noble Lord’s work on the universal credit seems predicated on amalgamating on a real-time basis income from a range of sources, so we wonder whether there is a read-across to auto-enrolment. If there were, it would address the inertia issue that is present in the formulation of this amendment and the equivalent opt-in route.
The amendment in the name of my noble friend Lady Hollis is, as I said, pretty much on the same page, although I understand that it is not necessary for the earnings trigger to be reached for a jobholder to opt in. The right exists if the employee has qualifying earnings, but it would not allow the employee to specify a particular scheme, be it NEST or any other scheme. I think that that would be the employer’s choice, although the Minister may be able to enlarge on that. By and large, however, we are seeking to achieve the same thing. The prize for and the challenge to the Minister is to see, consistent with confidentiality of information, whether the systems that enable some more automatic notifications in some circumstances can be deployed where the trigger is in aggregate reached but not in any one employment.
Lord Freud
My Lords, on Tuesday we discussed the possible aggregation of many jobs for credit towards the basic state pension. I admit to being indebted to the ever persuasive arguments of the noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, about the effect of portfolios of many jobs, especially in rural communities, and her concern that as many low earners as possible should be able to qualify for auto-enrolment and an employer contribution.
I also note the wise cautions of the noble Lord, Lord Boswell, on Tuesday about the potential effect on employers—where aggregation is mooted—and on the labour market. As I said on Tuesday, I am sympathetic to the principle of aggregation for basic state pension purposes. I am cautious but optimistic that this could be possible in the new world of the universal credit. This is because, if Government systems can track information for universal credit, it may not be a huge leap from there to having national insurance contributions or making credits on a state pension record. However, we are now about to discuss a somewhat different issue—that of the aggregation of earnings from many jobs in relation to auto-enrolment into workplace pensions. I need to emphasise again that it is important to encourage part-time jobs and to look for a way of aggregation. However, there are greater barriers in this area than there are in the area of the state pension in terms of aggregation. That it is more complicated was stated by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, in her speech.
The main and unique barrier is a need not only to aggregate earnings across employers but also to apportion pension contributions between those different employers. This is quite a problem in terms of employer burden cost and complexity, which we would need to find a way to resolve. The automatic enrolment duty falls on each employer for the people they employ. There is no sharing of the duty between employers. If a person has two jobs, each of their employers is responsible for enrolling them as the legislation is presently set up. Workers who do not earn enough to qualify for automatic enrolment clearly may opt in. Those who have the qualifying earnings have the right to employer contributions, which is ground we went over just now.
The first amendment raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, seeks to increase voluntary pensions saving for people who do not earn enough to be automatically enrolled by enabling the aggregation of the many jobs and any earnings from self-employment for a person who also works on their own account. This would allow people who earn under the automatic enrolment earnings trigger, and opt in, to have their earnings for more than one job taken into account for calculating pension contributions. This looks like a straightforward proposal. However, there are considerable practical problems that would, in practice, increase employer administration burden.
Let me turn to the two amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, and the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, which seek to enable aggregation by solving one of these practical difficulties about information sharing between employers. These amendments enable earnings from separate jobs for separate employers to be added together where the person can demonstrate to the employer that they have another job with other earnings in that week or month and that they are therefore entitled to be auto-enrolled. This is a very neat amendment that shifts the burden of proof from the employer. However, it is not quite as modest as the noble Lord suggested because it does not entirely solve the issue of the employer administration burden.
It is not immediately obvious how the employer contribution could be easily calculated or divided up. No mechanism currently exists to do that. Would multi-employers share the cost of the employer contribution? If so, how would that be done? Which employer takes responsibility for paying contributions to the pension scheme? If they share the cost, how would one employer recover the cost from the other employer? If they do not share the cost, is it fair that one employer bears the entire cost and the other none of it? Overall, we cannot see how it could be done without placing a significant and unfair burden on employers. I sympathise with the intention behind these amendments in terms of those with multiple jobs, and it is certainly an issue to keep an eye on as we go forward. It clearly—and noble Lords all acknowledge this—is not feasible with our present technology; but even if it became feasible, which it very well may, moving the burden of proof on to the worker is not the way to do it.
Standing back just a little, our first priority at this point must be to ensure that employers understand, and are able successfully to implement, their duties under automatic enrolment. That is the priority. This is not the right point to contemplate introducing significant changes to those duties, and I think noble Lords today recognise that. Introducing new and significant burdens would disrupt that process. However, noble Lords have successfully put down a marker for 2017. On that basis, we do not accept the amendment and invite noble Lords to withdraw it.
Lord Boswell of Aynho
Well, they are, and it is the Conservative Party agents’ superannuation scheme, but I promise not to detain the Committee on that. I hope I would have given the same attention to anyone else with whom I was in a trustee relationship.
May I just make two points? I fully understand that the Minister was kind enough to quote my slight reservation in our earlier exchanges on related matters. The first is a note of concern: it would certainly be unfortunate if one employer were somehow to be delinquent because of the failure of another employer to declare, which had created excess over the qualifying limit. I just make that point; I am sure my noble friend will have it in mind.
The second point is intended to be more positive and it might help to inform trains of thought. One always has to be careful about these sorts of things, not least for data protection reasons. I happened yesterday to have gone to a completely unrelated meeting in this building about occupational health, which is an interest of mine. We were looking at the new construction workers’ smart card scheme. Of course, once there is something that is able to identify the individual with known characteristics—dates of birth, for example, or presumably one could incorporate an NI number—and that is portable, it is possible for that to be tendered, or even required to be tendered, through various places of work. It might be possible to aggregate electronically in that way. I just offer that to my noble friend as a way forward. I am pleased to see the noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, also nodding; at least it is a thought. We always have to be careful with these things, because there will be some people on manual, some people who do not understand and minority interests and industries. But if we can possibly start working toward some sensible protocols people could use, it would be generally beneficial.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
I wonder whether the Minister would allow me to intervene, because he challenged the description I gave of my amendment as being modest. He may have misunderstood the intent of part of it. All it was seeking to do initially was to say that if someone had qualifying earnings, with a particular employer, but not earnings that reached the trigger, and if there were a process of the employer being made aware that the trigger had been reached, the employer would automatically enrol and be responsible for contributions in respect of the earnings in that employment between the start of the qualifying earnings band and whatever that band reached. That would in a sense be stand alone for an employer. That gives exactly the same result as employees now have in being able to opt in, because if you have earnings above the threshold, but not at the trigger, you can simply opt in and get the employer contribution.
Along the way, the hope would be that, rather than relying on the activity of the employee—because we are always trying to deal with the inertia problem—you could somehow make it more automatic. It would be automatic, though, only in the sense of the employer being aware that the trigger had been reached. It would not require any aggregation of earnings by any employer. I instance how HMRC deals with notices of coding. If people have two or more jobs, on one basis or another the personal allowance is divvied up across their notices of coding—don’t ask me how. In a sense, an employer would be aware that other earnings may be involved. That sort of process could be a trigger for automatically alerting the employer that the trigger had been reached and simply then requiring them to deal with auto-enrolment on the earnings that the employee is being paid by that employer. My amendment would do no more than that.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
My Lords, my noble friend Lady Turner is not here but as my amendments, which are grouped with this, would effectively achieve the same thing, perhaps the Committee might allow me to formally move on her behalf, if that is in order. I will also speak to Amendment 19 in this group, which should strictly have had attached to it a current year date of 2010-11, because without that it obviously has other ramifications. All these amendments are, to all intents and purposes, identical, although they have to be considered in the context of the review provisions of Clause 8, which my noble friend Lady Drake will deal with shortly. These amendments would reduce the trigger to the current primary threshold for national insurance purposes, so effectively this equates the trigger with the starting point of qualifying earnings. We consider this the right place to be.
The pensions commission originally recommended that individuals would be automatically enrolled when they had earned, in 2006-07 terms, £5,035, which was the national insurance primary threshold at that time. However, it also recommended that this threshold should be uprated by earnings. Indeed, that is what the legislation said. I remember that when we were debating the Bill, we as a Government tried to get a little bit of wriggle room on that uprating, and a combination of Liberal Democrats and Conservatives, led by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, pressed an amendment that locked us into what the legislation currently says. They were the early actions of the coalition and I still bear the scars.
One of the lessons learnt is that it is better to insert a figure in the legislation and have rules for reviewing it rather than link the threshold to a particular measure—be it the personal allowance for income tax or the primary threshold for national insurance purposes—the reason being that it can move for policy reasons in a way that does not have any particular regard to the impact on the auto-enrolment analysis. We know that the coalition Government have an ambition to move the personal tax allowance to £10,000. Should a trigger threshold or a qualifying earnings threshold be tied to that, it would have devastating consequences for auto-enrolment. It would leave 1.4 million people, three-quarters of them women, outside auto-enrolment.
Changes to national insurance—part of the coalition Government’s approach to tackling the deficit—mean that the primary threshold increases from April this year, as does the rate, to £7,200, nearly closing the gap with the personal allowance. There have, from time to time, been ambitions to align the personal allowance with the primary threshold. We hold to the view that realigning the start of qualifying earnings with the current primary threshold level, with clear caps on its uprating, is the right place to be. This holds good to the pensions commission analysis that the crucial issue was the level of replacement income in retirement—a point to which the noble Lord referred a moment ago.
In our view, the case for the trigger at £7,475 is not made. On the basis of the Johnson report, it would exclude some 600,000 people from auto-enrolment and would save only some £3 million a year in administration costs for employers. Indeed, one wonders whether it would have some impact on opt-in arrangements, which would be likely to be more costly.
This takes us back to the question of whether people on low earnings benefit from savings, although I believe that the Johnson report dealt with that very clearly. It made the point that earnings are highly dynamic and that relatively few people have low earnings throughout their lives. Also, most of those on low earnings within family units have a working partner with significant earnings and so should benefit from pension savings. There is also the risk of missing out on employer contributions and the favourable interaction with tax credits. Perhaps the noble Lord would comment on that favourable interaction in relation to universal credit.
Given the acceptance of the appropriateness of savings from the start of a band of qualifying earnings, which we can agree for the current year, the argument advanced for a higher trigger is a bit thin. Essentially, it is that it will reduce the number of small pots of pension savings—that is, those that would accrue to people earning between approximately £5,700 and £7,300—because that creates a cliff edge and does not necessarily equate with consistency of savings. In any event, NEST is geared up to deal with just that sort of situation. Therefore, the introduction of a trigger that is different from the start of the qualifying earnings band is something that we strongly oppose.
Lord Freud
She would make an argument to that effect, no doubt. However, how that would happen and its timing would be very sensitive, so it is simply not appropriate at this stage to make any presumption which would drive one into this very uncertain territory.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to the debate on these amendments. I had intended to say at the start of these deliberations on auto-enrolment, but forgot to do so, that we obviously have a number of challenges in some areas. However, we should make it absolutely clear, as I hope we did at Second Reading, that we thoroughly support the Government’s decision to proceed with auto-enrolment and with NEST. Those are hugely important developments to the pensions landscape. Whatever our challenges might be now, they need to be seen in the context of our fundamental support on that issue.
The debate has almost conflated two issues: the it-pays-to-save issue, which the noble Lords, Lord Stoneham and Lord Boswell, touched on, and the practical issues around having small pots, which the Minister relied on and to which the noble Baroness, Lady Greengross, referred. We need to unpick those. Perhaps I may refer noble Lords to the Johnson report in relation to the “it pays to save” argument. Page 30 states:
“This analysis raises significant questions about the validity of an annual earnings threshold of £5,035. Even at earnings substantially above this level, individuals see very high replacement rates from the State. Based on this analysis alone, we might easily argue that an earnings threshold of over £10,000 would be more appropriate to encourage the right individuals (those who actually need to save) to begin saving into a workplace pension. There are two key reasons to question such a conclusion. Firstly, earnings are not static. For many, earnings could change dramatically over their lifetime. For these people, saving for a pension whilst on relatively low income could be beneficial as it improves persistency of saving and increases income in retirement. Secondly”—
this point has already been made—
“many individuals live in a family unit. It is the circumstances of the wider family that are more important in determining whether it is appropriate for a particular individual to save”.
So on the “it pays to save” argument, the report seems to support the contention that an earnings band starting at the current primary threshold is the right place to be. It is in relation to the practicalities that the report argues the trigger. Separating the earnings threshold and the manner in which contributions are paid will help to reduce the number of small pots of pension savings, which are disproportionately costly. The smallest contribution going into a pension pot will be £130 a year.
The Minister is right: of course you can always argue that someone can opt in, but the whole purpose of auto-enrolment is to challenge the inertia which has undermined our pension system for decades; it does not really help with that pot. In any event, it picks up the point about persistency of savings. There might be small pots to start with but if people save persistently, even in respect of low income for a period, that builds up a pot which might not be insignificant. However, using arguments about practicalities and small pots seems potentially to punish the wrong people, as we are saying that some 600,000 people are not going to benefit from auto-enrolment because we do not want to handle small pots. NEST was created, in part at least, to handle that very issue. There are questions about the profitability of the pension sector and pension providers, and there is a balance to be struck in all of that.
Therefore, I very much hang on to the point that the argument for the trigger seems to be based overwhelmingly on the question of the practicalities of dealing with small pots. It does not fully address “pays to save” and the question of whom we should be encouraging to save.
Lord Freud
Perhaps I may respond to the noble Lord on that and make absolutely clear the arguments that we will be taking from the Johnson review. It said that you needed to look at three things: replacement rates, earnings dynamics, and family make-up and characteristics. Looking at all three of those, on balance the recommendation was for a higher threshold of roughly £7,400, the reason being that it got the right people saving. That must be the core argument, along with the practical argument relating to costs. It is very expensive to manage small pots. The economics of running a NEST operation, let alone other operations, where it is important to get costs down, is an important secondary consideration. However, the primary one is to get the right people saving. After all, this is, as I have said previously, the biggest experiment in asymmetric paternalism. Let us get it right first and fine-tune it later.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
My Lords, we could go on for ever on this, although it may not be hugely productive to do so for much longer. Of course we accept that these recommendations come from the report, and there are obviously recommendations in the report which, thankfully, the Government did not pursue. However, I would hang on to the point about conflating two issues—“it pays to save” and the question of whom we should be encouraging to save in order to achieve good replacement income in retirement. As the noble Lord acknowledged earlier, the Turner commission—I should call it the pensions commission out of deference to my noble friend, who spent such a large part of her life contributing to that—still holds: a 45 per cent replacement rate, with 30 per cent coming from the state and 15 per cent coming from auto-enrolment. That band of earnings is encouraging people to save. Therefore, that seems to deal with replacement rates and “it pays to save”.
The other issue, which I accept comes from the report about the trigger, is the practical one of dealing with small pots. It is a question of where you make the judgment. We would say that excluding people from the opportunity of auto-enrolment simply because they are below that trigger, even though they are within the band of earnings that the report acknowledges should be building pension pots, is not the right thing to do. Doubtless we will return to this on Report. In the interim, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
My Lords, I will also speak to Amendment 24. These amendments could be degrouped because they are alternatives. The fact that they are grouped together may have given rise to some confusion. Both these amendments touch on proposals for postponement—effectively, the opportunity to defer automatic enrolment for a worker for up to three months.
As the Johnson report recites, there have been strong and consistent calls to introduce waiting periods from employers and from many in the pensions industry. Employer groups have supported the introduction of waiting periods, principally to reduce the administrative cost of enrolling people who are with the employer only for a short period of time and to allow probationary periods to pass. They believe that waiting periods will help employers to adjust to the additional cost of the employer duties and will minimise the need for refunds. The costs associated with deferral or waiting periods have been analysed by the Johnson report and the key features are that a three-month period will involve about 500,000 fewer people being automatically enrolled. Given that, on average, people have 11 different labour-market interactions during their lifetime, that would mean individuals accumulating something like three years’ less savings than would otherwise be the case. Someone whose work pattern is a perpetual cycle of short-term, say, seasonal work could miss out to a much greater extent.
The amendments do two things. Amendment 23 just tests and basically asks why, if there is to be a waiting period, there is the magic period of three months. Why would one month not be sufficient? Perhaps more substantially, Amendment 24 is predicated on the assumption that the three-month waiting period will stay broadly in place, but it seeks to limit the time period, where the starting date of the three choices is the staging date—the date where an employer first comes into the system or where, say, a worker becomes a jobholder on reaching the age of 22. If the fundamental rationale for a waiting period is not to have to auto-enrol somebody who will leave within three months, why defer for longer than three months from when the individual is first employed? Someone reaching the age of 22 may have been employed already for three months, three years or even longer, so why defer in those circumstances? Similarly, at the staging date most employees will have been employed already for three months, and many maybe for years. I do not understand, if the fundamental rationale is to deal with the issues of short-term workers who leave and are likely to opt out, why we would operate a deferment date for people who have been around potentially for a long time.
One effect of Clause 6 seems to be to replace the existing Section 4 of the 2008 Act. From recollection, this was designed to allow some deferral for DC schemes that contributed well in excess of the minimum. This, in a sense, was a reward for being a good scheme. That seems to have disappeared and we have this blanket opportunity for deferral for everyone, whether they are paying at the minimum or are doing better than that. It would be interesting to hear an explanation as to why that particular provision, which was designed to be an incentive, is effectively removed by this Bill. I beg to move.
Lord Freud
A waiting period will also allow employers to align automatic enrolment processes with their existing processes and avoid part-period calculations of contributions. In addition, it will allow them to stagger auto-enrolment of large workforces. An employer will be able to apply a waiting period to all employees at their staging date. It will also be possible for an employer to apply a waiting period when a new employee joins the workforce or from the date when an employee becomes an eligible jobholder—for example, when they turn 22.
It is important to note that an employer will be allowed to apply a waiting period only if he gives the worker information about the waiting period within a certain deadline. This will ensure that workers are informed of their right to opt into pension saving during the waiting period. It is only right and fair that those who wish to start saving for retirement earlier are not prevented from doing so.
The waiting period is intended to ease the administrative burden and has been widely welcomed by employers. However, it means that, for those individuals who have frequent job changes, there could be a significant impact on their overall pension savings. This is particularly so, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, pointed out, if they are subject to a waiting period in every post. Allowing individuals to opt in during the waiting period will address this imbalance so that no one is denied the opportunity to save. As I said, if auto-enrolment has the impact that it should have, the psychology of saving should change for many people.
Noble Lords will be pleased to hear that much of the detail is on the face of the Bill. We propose taking regulation-making powers in just two areas. First, we will specify in regulations how quickly the employer must give notice to the individual about the waiting period. Secondly, we will set out what information that notice must contain and any other accompanying information that the employer must provide. For example, workers will need to be provided with information about the right to opt in during the waiting period. It is important that we have the flexibility to set the period and to provide for additional accompanying information in regulations once we have had an in-depth consultation with our stakeholders.
As I said, a key aim of the reforms is to encourage more people to start saving for retirement. However, at the same time, we have been mindful of the costs for employers of implementing the reforms. We believe that a three-month waiting period provides the correct balance between easing employer burden and maximising individuals’ savings. This amendment introduces a variable length of waiting period depending on the circumstances. There are two main issues with such an approach. First, introducing a one-month waiting period for existing employees would remove some of the flexibility afforded to employers through waiting periods; for example, they would not be able to stagger automatic enrolment of large workforces. Secondly, we are keen to ensure that the introduction of waiting periods does not make the automatic enrolment process more complicated. We believe that a simple process is key to employers understanding and preserving their support. A two-tier waiting policy would add complexity and would be difficult for employers to understand or use. It would add to the burden on employers, which is not the intention of waiting periods.
Waiting periods were designed with employers in mind and have been welcomed. We believe that they will provide a real easement for employers, as well as ensuring that individuals’ savings are protected. I urge the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, to withdraw the amendment.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
My Lords, of course I intend to withdraw the amendment. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Boswell, and my noble friend Lady Hollis for their participation. The noble Lord, Lord Boswell, made an interesting point about recyclable employees effectively coming back in one form or another. My noble friend Lady Hollis emphasised the issue of what this could mean in terms of savings for people who are perpetually caught up in this deferral. We accept the point about some flexibility on the alignment of processes. This does not seem unreasonable. I also acknowledge that there may be some amelioration of the lost savings years; if people are perpetually caught up in this, opting in may catch on. However, we know how damaging inertia around pensions has been, so that could not be assured.
With respect to the noble Lord, I do not think that he dealt with the point about the original provision in this clause, which I understood was there to be an incentive for good provision and to give people some extra leeway in their easement. This seems to have gone and, in effect, been replaced by a sort of blanket easement. Although I will not convince the Minister, I also hang on to my point that, if the fundamental easement for employers—and I understand that they would welcome this—is that it helps them with the problem and administrative costs of the coming and going of short-term employees, and if, as I accept, a three-month waiting period is needed to address that, why on earth should it be applied to somebody who has been employed for months or years who reaches the age of 22 and becomes a jobholder? There is no logic to the position. The employer will know the track record of that individual, yet they are being treated exactly the same as somebody who has just walked through the door. If the proposition is that you need a waiting period to deal with short-term employees, I still do not understand why you need to have it for people who have been employed for many years and who simply, by virtue of their age, become a jobholder.
“4A Annual report on implementation and monitoring of section 4
(1) The Secretary of State must publish an annual report about the implementation and monitoring of the postponement provisions of section 4 and must lay a copy of this report before parliament.
(2) The report required under subsection (1) must, in particular, include—
(a) the numbers and categories of jobholders receiving notices that their automatic enrolment is deferred; and(b) the numbers of such jobholders who in respect of that employment do not become automatically enrolled.”
Lord McKenzie of Luton
My Lords, this amendment is very straightforward and simply seeks the publication of an annual monitoring report concerning the deferral provisions provided for in Clause 4. Noble Lords will have gathered from our earlier discussion that we have considerable concerns over these provisions and how they will be applied in practice, and whether their application will deter individuals from auto-enrolment. We are not prescriptive about the detail of the report or its timing but we need to be reassured that any provisions are working fairly. As I understand it, there is no requirement for all employees to be treated in the same manner under these provisions and therefore we need information about how this is working in practice. So the intent of this amendment is clear. There needs to be some process of reporting so that we can understand in practice how these provisions are working. I beg to move.
Lord Freud
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, for this amendment. As he has pointed out, it would compel us to publish a report every year on the implementation and impacts of the waiting-period provision under Clause 6. As we have just discussed, Clause 6 introduces the concept of an optional waiting period into the automatic enrolment process. We agree that the effects of the waiting period should be monitored. We have made a commitment to fully evaluate the effects of the reforms and how they are delivered. This will include a proportionate check that the legislation is operating as expected for individuals, employers and the pension industry. As part of this, we intend to monitor employers’ use of waiting periods and the effects on workers’ savings. It is important that we retain the flexibility to design appropriate methods and processes for this evaluation in response to changing circumstances. For example, our decisions about who we survey, how and how often may change over time.
Our plans for monitoring the progress and impacts of the reforms will be set out in a detailed evaluation strategy which we plan to publish this year. We also intend to publish key findings from our evaluation. We therefore feel that there is no need to legislate specifically to ensure monitoring of the waiting period provision, and that to do so may unintentionally constrain us from adopting the most appropriate approach to evaluation in future. I therefore urge the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, to withdraw this amendment.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
I thank the noble Lord for his response. I was reflecting on how many times I have deployed exactly those same arguments in his position. I am not sure that they grow more convincing. However, I understand and am grateful for what the noble Lord said about an evaluation process. I understand that the strategy will be published later this year; we will see what sort of timeframe is attached to that. I am grateful for that and, accordingly, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord German
My Lords, this is a relatively straightforward amendment to provide some certainty in a situation where an employee could have their auto-enrolment deferred more than once because they failed to reach the earnings threshold in one or more months in the three-month waiting period. Perhaps it might be sensible if I gave an example. A jobholder works for two months and their pay is above the threshold, but in month 3 their pay falls below the threshold. Then, when month 4 arrives and their pay perhaps goes back to being above the threshold, it is not clear whether that triggers a new three-month starting period or adds to the two months when it previously happened. Whether the waiting period begins again in month 4 or concludes is the key question here. Should the three months’ earnings be cumulative or consecutive?
This could be the case for many workers in the leisure and tourist industries where work is perhaps seasonal and in the catering trade where it is often related to the number of customers and people are called to work more or fewer hours according to the demand on their services. So a situation where people may not reach the threshold in one month but have reached it in the previous two months is not unlikely. It seems quite unfair if, as soon as they fall below, they have to start again. I remember somebody who formerly worked for me who then went off to train as a barrister and it took him many months to get his final qualification because he could not get to the number of dinners that he had to achieve in the right order. Every time he missed one, he had to start again from dinner number one. It seemed a strange mechanism and we do not want this archaic methodology in this Bill. I beg to move.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord German, has raised an interesting point, which I hope the Minister can clarify. I assume that the situation is that, if you have got to month 3 and you do not have qualifying earnings, there is nothing at that point to trigger automatic enrolment. When you next have your qualifying earnings is presumably when you would be automatically enrolled. Certainly, if you had to start again, that would add injustice to something about which we are already not very happy.
Lord Freud
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord German for this amendment, which would restrict an employer to using one waiting period per worker and would ensure that automatic enrolment would take place once a worker’s earnings had reached the earnings threshold for three months, whether those three months were consecutive or not. Thus the single three-month waiting period could be accrued over a far longer period of time where the individual’s earnings fluctuate. I should take this opportunity to clarify for the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, how it would actually work. If you had low earnings for the first two months and hit the target at the third month, you would be auto-enrolled. However, if you did not hit it in that third month, you would effectively be back to your dinner problem and have to start again. That is how it would work.
As I explained, Clause 6 introduces the concept of an optional waiting period into the automatic enrolment process. This is central to our commitment in this Bill to rebalance the administrative burdens on employers while ensuring workers’ access to pensions saving. The waiting period is designed to meet employers’ requirements by being simple and easy to understand and use. This is clearly crucial to its success. At the point at which the employer applies a waiting period, they will not be required to undertake a check on whether the worker is eligible for automatic enrolment. The employer must check eligibility at the end of the waiting period and we are keen to avoid them having to check it twice or more.
The waiting period consists of a single block of time, regardless of whether the individual’s eligibility for automatic enrolment fluctuates during that period. If the worker satisfies the automatic enrolment eligibility criteria at the end of the period, they will be enrolled into the employer’s scheme on that date. If not, the employer will monitor the worker’s status until they satisfy the eligibility criteria. At that point, the employer may apply a further waiting period if they wish. It need not be for the full three months.
We recognise my noble friend’s concern that workers with fluctuating earnings could miss out on pension saving due to the use of multiple waiting periods. While it is difficult to estimate the likelihood of this occurrence, our analysis suggests that few people are likely to have fluctuating earnings around the level that they traverse in and out of automatic enrolment eligibility. Are we, therefore, devising something very complicated for a problem that is pretty small, which is what our analysis suggests? It is also the case that, for those on sustained low earnings throughout their working life, state benefits can replace most income in retirement. Common sense suggests that it would not be rational to lever such people into private savings. It is important to remember that they will have the right to opt in at any point during the waiting period.
This amendment would add a substantial additional burden and complexity to the waiting period process and would not be easy for employers to understand and use. It would require the employer to monitor an individual’s automatic enrolment eligibility continuously throughout the waiting period and to keep a record of the period of eligibility accrued during the waiting period.
Employers requested the waiting period as an administrative easement. To make the process so burdensome would negate its value. At this stage, it is crucial that we get the reforms bedded in and that we ensure that employers find it easy to comply with these new duties. It is therefore critical that the processes are simple for employers to understand and use. In the absence of any persuasive evidence of a problem, we feel that it would not be right to introduce greater complexity and a significant burden to a process whose very purpose is to offer administrative easements to employers.
I offer noble Lords my assurance, however, that we are committed to fully evaluating the effects of the reforms and how they are delivered. As part of this, we intend to monitor employers’ use of waiting periods and the effects on workers’ savings. I urge the noble Lord to withdraw this amendment.
Lord German
My Lords, I am still a little confused over the explanation. I understand fully the point about somebody hitting the relevant target in the third month. However, my question was the other way round—where someone hits the target in months one and two but does not hit it in month three. In seasonal worker terms, this could happen if someone was picked up and employed in May, perhaps worked through May, June and July and found a bad—wet or something—August, for which they could not get the money in. The important issue is simplicity but also understanding. It may be that a three-month period applies, but it was not absolutely clear from the Minister’s reply when, once you have a first waiting period, the second test would occur. What if you fail to meet the criteria that he has just described in that first three-month period? You will then need to have another piece of information made available to the employee to say, “You have not quite done it but this is the way you go next”. It seems to become far more complex if you cannot have it in some way accumulatively worked out. I will obviously withdraw the amendment. However, I hope that the Minister will come back at some stage with some further explanation of the anomaly of the people who are in the position that I have described, in which they pass the threshold in months 1 and 3 but not in month 2, yet wish to maintain their position within the company.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
Before the noble Lord withdraws his amendment, I wish to follow up on that point. I was somewhat surprised by the answer that the Minister gave. There is a simpler process. Somebody becomes employed; they have their three-month waiting period and, at the end of the three months, you look to see whether they have qualifying earnings and need to be auto-enrolled. If they do not, presumably they are in the same position as everyone else who has been around for a long while—you continue to monitor them at an appropriate date to see whether they have qualifying earnings or if they have reached the age of 22. It will be the same for everyone. Is that not the simpler way to do it? I do not understand why there is the need to start the cycle again, which is what the Minister said. That seems to be fundamentally wrong and not the simplest route.
Lord Freud
Perhaps I could just interrupt. What I have not made adequately clear, for which I apologise, is how big this problem might be. The universe of people who earn between £7,000 and £7,475 is 140,000 people, so we are talking about very small numbers. Moreover, they would have to be fluctuating at the wrong time. We could be setting up a very complicated system to look after a very small number of people. We cannot quantify this exactly but I give an order-of figure to give noble Lords a feel for it. We are talking about between 8 million and 9 million extra people going into pensions, so this may be just too much of a burden relative to the potential number of people whom we are protecting.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
Will the Minister just help me on one point? I do not want to prolong this. If the complexity he suggests arises from the need to monitor cumulative earnings over a two-month or three-month period, I can accept that, but we do not need that. If we just had the proposition that somebody waits for three months and if at the end of three months they do not have qualifying earnings and are therefore not auto-enrolled, you simply roll them on to the next point that they do have qualifying earnings. You put them in the pot the same as anyone else. Is that not a simpler system than having an alternative system whereby you have to see who has been previously deferred and had a waiting period and keep the clock running on them individually? I would have thought the simpler system was not to have to take account of cumulative earnings but, once you get past that three-month period, simply to check, as you would have to for everyone, whether they have reached the age of 22 or qualifying earnings, et cetera. There is quite a lot of disquiet around this. We are not trying to be difficult. I urge the Minister to take this away because I see it as something that could be brought back on Report.
Lord Freud
My Lords, I can see when I am up against the wall. I am not completely insensitive. I will look to see whether there is some simple fix and, if there is, I will write to noble Lords. However, it would have to be very simple, because the risk/reward in terms of burden versus people who are at risk is just on the wrong side. It does not seem to add up to me.
Baroness Hollis of Heigham
My Lords, I have high hopes for the thrust behind these amendments, given that all sides of the Committee today share a similar take on the problem. I know that the Minister shares this view and I hope that he can give us some positive indications of ways forward. I am particularly happy to follow the noble Lords, Lord Stoneham and Lord Boswell, on this.
We discussed earlier the question of the number of job changes and we know that, as I said, the median number of job changes is around 11—25 to 26 per cent will have between 11 and 15 job changes and others will have even more than that. That means, depending on the rules of individual schemes and how long people are required to work before they can join a scheme—it could be two years or up to two years, or your contributions could be returned to you and you might decide to hold them in a pot—that it is likely that low-paid employees and some not necessarily low-paid employees, but people who have moved a lot in their first five, 10 or 15 years of earning, will build up some pension entitlement in five of those jobs. At, say, £11,000—half women’s average earnings—with a fairly conventional DC scheme, which I know applies in a lot of the charitable or voluntary world, a five plus five would mean that such a woman would have something between £1,000 and £1,200 a year in her pot for each year in her job. That could mean that she had five or six pots of anywhere between £1,000 and £3,000, depending on the rules of the scheme. The question then is what happens to those pots.
I am cross with myself because I missed a trick and I should have put it down as an amendment, because one way to approach this, obviously, is to follow in a slightly larger form the thrust of the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Boswell, which is to raise the trivial commutation limit, which at the moment is £18,000— 1 per cent of the lifetime savings allowance. A trivial commutation limit of, say, £25,000 or £30,000 would pick up quite a lot of these very small pots without having to hassle about whether they were at or above a certain level. Of course, some providers—some banks and so on—will allow you to bring together five or six small pots and consolidate them, because they are then worth handling.
In addition, the Government propose in due course to remove annuitisation at the age of 75. However, the Treasury—bless it—has insisted on a quite absurd de minimis figure of £20,000 income. That is quite unnecessary; it merely needs to be about £8,000. Of course, if the new state pension comes into play at £140, you will not need any de minimis for failing to annuitise, because it will float you off all public funds, apart from housing benefit. Therefore, with, I hope, the new state pension of £140, not only would NEST be safe but so would all other small savings schemes. You would not then need things such as trivial commutation rules because the choice would be left entirely to the individual. We would be kicking out a lot of silly mess and tangles that have been imposed by the Treasury, which is more concerned to avoid £1 being lost through manipulation of the tax system than it is to encourage £10 being gathered into the savings system. I consider that to be really rather sad. I am sorry that I missed that point, but we will come back to the trivial commutation issue later if it seems worth doing so.
If the person in question cannot trivially commute and she is handling pots of, say, £3,000 each, she will be getting somewhere between £1 and £4 a week from each of those small pots. The Pensions Advisory Service—I should declare an interest as a board member of TPAS—has been very concerned about what noble Lords have called “orphan assets”. At the moment, a poor woman can use these small pots altogether, but she may end up with, say, £20,000 or £25,000 in her NEST pot, have three, four or five other pots of £3,000, £2,000 or £1,000 and lose all those small pots, which are above the trivial commutation figure, are too small to be annuitised and cannot be bundled together. She would effectively lose a third of her lifetime savings, even though she is on a very low income. No one would regard that as decent. Therefore, I think that she should be able to bundle or consolidate her various pots. For this purpose, I am talking about NEST but I am perfectly happy for it to be any willing provider. The important thing is that she can access all her savings.
What would be the advantage of my proposal? It is very simple. First, above all, the person in question retains the full value of all her savings, rather than possibly losing some of them. Secondly, it represents simplicity for her in retirement, as she could be handling just one flow of pension income rather than multiple flows of small pots. Thirdly, there is a sort of best-value option going on here—a version of the open-market option. In this Bill we have not yet talked about disinvestment strategies, but I suspect that she would get a better return on disinvestment were she to purchase an annuity if all these small pots were bundled together and consolidated into one scheme, rather than if she were trying to play around with various small pots to avoid losing them.
In my amendment, I stipulate that the transfer should be able to take place the year before retirement simply to recognise the concerns—they may be exaggerated but they certainly exist—among some pension funds that existing scheme providers will not want a wholesale flood of money from their schemes under management going earlier into NEST, possibly because NEST will appear so much more attractive in terms of the reduced fees that will be charged and therefore the amount that will be available for accumulation. I do not mind that, but they might, and therefore it may be a price that has to be paid.
Given the support around the Committee today, given that I know that the Minister is sympathetic to the issue that has been raised and given that we have produced two or three different ways in which we can approach this problem, I hope that we will get a sympathetic hearing from the Minister.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
My Lords, given the hour, I rise briefly to say that we have put our names to the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lady Hollis because we support the thrust of it. We certainly also support the thrust of the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Stoneham, as amended by that in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Boswell. This issue seems to have been around for a long time. The Minister may well push that back at us and ask why we did not do something about it, and that would be a good question.
If I have any caveat at all in relation to NEST, it is one that the Minister himself may have. That there should be no transfers into NEST was part of the consensus, although the consensus has been a little disturbed by the Bill, so that does not preclude this being opened up. It changes systems and the costs as well, but those are second-order issues in relation to the substantive matter that has been raised. The time is now right to deal with that.
Lord German
My Lords, I want to say a brief word about Amendment 38, which is in the group. Clearly, the Johnson review looked at this issue and having weighed up both sides of the argument, recommended that the Government should proceed to legislate. The words of the recommendation were quite ambiguous. It said:
“We are therefore recommending that the Government legislate for the removal of the contributions cap in 2017”.
One could read that as recommending legislating in 2017 for removal of the contribution cap, or as recommending legislating now. Actually, the text of the Johnson review does use the word “now”—in other words, it should be part of this Bill—but because neither the Minister nor the Government are on record yet as saying why they have not chosen to follow that advice, it would be very helpful if this amendment could be probed in that manner.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
My Lords, perhaps I may comment briefly. I can see the thrust of my noble friend’s amendment. I remember that, when we debated the cap, we debated whether there should be an additional lifetime element as well. I think that, at one stage, we debated whether there could be a two or three-year period when one carried forward the unused amount. My recollection is that, other than the annual cap, which is as it now is, all that fell by the wayside, but the Minister may be able to update us on it.
It seems a good idea to me to be able to use the headroom in respect of unused bits, although I do not think there is anything that precludes someone who is, or might become, a member of NEST making a voluntary contribution up to the limit. The limit is not, as I understand it, an employee and an employer limit; there is a limit in respect of contributions for an individual. Certainly, for the reasons that my noble friend advances, if there were opportunities to use some headroom to get more into NEST, that would be good, so far as the removal of the cap supports the thrust of that. Again, given the consensus that was there and the existence of the cap, everything that has the potential to disturb that in the interim makes life a bit more difficult, although it would be good if it could go at the earliest opportunity.
Lord Freud
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness and my noble friends for bringing the important issue of the NEST contribution limit to the attention of the Committee. I shall deal with the amendments in the order they were raised. The noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, has raised, through Amendment 36, a vital point about the ability of NEST members to make contributions to their retirement pots that exceed the minimum contributions required by automatic enrolment. NEST has been designed to provide a low-cost, portable pension scheme for low to moderate earners. We want to encourage people, where possible, to save more than the minimum. The NEST order and rules already allow a member to make contributions up to the annual contribution limit in the financial year in which the contributions are made, as the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, pointed out.
The current limit is already set at such a level that it enables median earners to contribute as much as twice the minimum contribution requirement in a tax year. Allowing NEST members to make use of unused annual contribution limits in subsequent years would undermine the purpose of the annual contribution limit. This limit was designed to ensure that NEST does not adversely impact on existing good-quality pension provision. While I understand the principle behind this amendment, we should not forget the purpose of NEST. This is to enable millions of people to participate in pension saving from which they are currently excluded because they do not have access to suitable workplace pension provision. Filling this supply gap requires NEST to be both low-cost and as straightforward a scheme as possible. Adding to the complexity of administering NEST through complex arrangements for calculating the maximum annual contribution would undermine those aims.
Moving on to Amendment 37, the noble Baroness raises another important point, about how the annual contribution limit should be calculated. The limit, alongside the transfer restrictions, is designed to focus NEST on its target market of low to moderate earners. This is to ensure that NEST will complement existing good-quality pension provision, not replace it.
The baseline contribution limit was set at £3,600 in 2005 terms, following wide consultation on the proposals in the White Paper, Personal Accounts: A New Way to Save. Responses on the appropriate level for an annual contribution limit were based on analysis of several factors, in particular, the potential impact on existing schemes and the ability of individuals to save flexibly for their retirement. In line with the provisions in the scheme order, NEST Corporation has adjusted the contribution limit for 2011-12, prior to scheme launch, to £4,200. The current method of setting the annual contribution limit strikes the right balance. It ensures that NEST focuses on its target market of those excluded from pension savings as a result of market failure, while providing for a level of contributions that is sufficient to allow employers and individuals to contribute more than the minimum required.
I turn to Amendment 38, tabled by my noble friends Lord Stoneham and Lord German. This puts forward the recommendation from the Making Automatic Enrolment Work review that the Government legislate now to remove NEST’s annual contribution limit from 2017. That review recognised the importance of the NEST contribution limit during the introduction of the reforms. It acknowledged that there was broad consensus behind the reforms, and that NEST’s role was to fill the supply gap that those in the existing industry currently find difficult to serve. The review saw the contribution cap as a key lever in ensuring two things: that NEST remains focused on this target market as the reforms are staged; and that during this important period it does not adversely impact existing good-quality pension provision. However, the review team considered that once the reforms were fully implemented it may be appropriate to remove the cap. This is both to ease the administrative burden on NEST and to avoid any unintended message that there was somehow a maximum appropriate level of pension saving.
Great minds think alike. Section 74 of the Pensions Act 2008 already requires the Secretary of State to appoint a person to review the effect of the annual contribution limit in 2017. By this time, the reforms will have been fully implemented and we will have more evidence on the effect of the reforms as a whole, including the impact of NEST on the marketplace. I am not saying that the review team was wrong. I am saying that, given that it saw 2017 as the right time to remove the cap—by then we will have much more evidence of the impact of NEST in the real world—2017 is also a more sensible time to consider changing or removing the NEST annual contribution limit. Since this can be achieved by secondary legislation, there is no need to legislate now. I understand the principles behind these amendments. However, now is not the time and, given the scope individuals already have to make additional contributions and our intention to review the contribution limit in 2017, I urge the noble Baroness to withdraw this amendment.
Lord Stoneham of Droxford
In the interests of brevity as time is short, I am very happy to speak to Amendments 40 and 41, which are grouped separately.
Amendment 40 is related to the previous amendment, which concerned small pension pots. We want to ensure that small contributors to pensions over short periods are given due protection. We want to see that individuals do not lose out where they have less than two years’ service, particularly losing the employer’s contribution if withdrawn. We should like to see some ongoing discussion and review of how the position of these savers and pensioners can be protected. However, I accept that the transfer of pension capital is critical to this.
Amendment 41 is a probing amendment. It goes back to the discussion that we had on the past couple of amendments on the whole issue of the costs of pension schemes. We remain concerned that there are still no incentives for employers to be responsible for minimising the costs of the occupational pension schemes in which they are involved. We accept that progress has been made on this but we also accept that the Turner commission originally recommended more action on this point. We would like to make sure that, as the scheme is developed, there is an ongoing commitment to review whether the employer’s contribution should be net of the costs of the schemes. I beg to move.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
My Lords, in relation to Amendment 40, from the earlier response that we got from the Minister in relation to small pots and all the activity that is going on there, I presume that the sort of protection that the noble Lord, Lord Stoneham, is looking for will be encompassed within that whole exercise. Accordingly, I should be interested to see the outcome of that in due course. Unless I am misunderstanding this, that is where it would be dealt with.
Lord Freud
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Stoneham for these two amendments, which concern the same issue—that of protection. Amendment 40 seeks to give us the powers to make arrangements to support short-term workers to build their pension savings. It is particularly those individuals who will receive a refund when they leave an occupational scheme within two years who will lose that opportunity. Clearly, the refund can be a default action, although they can choose to transfer the whole pension pot to another scheme if that is appropriate. Clearly, there is a very legitimate concern here that the default refund may mean that some individuals do not build up any kind of decent pot over time.
These are the areas that we are considering through the call for evidence on regulatory differences between different types of pension schemes, so I confirm to the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, that our activity here addresses this issue. It is a very complex area and there are many considerations on both sides that we need to take into account before making a decision or changing legislation. The issues are the trade-offs between helping employers and schemes and increasing pension savings. We cannot, for example, limit short-service refunds without considering appropriate processes to help occupational schemes to manage additional small pension pots. Therefore, everything connects to everything else. As I have already described, we issued a call for evidence on 31 January to initiate a debate on possible solutions. The response will come this summer.
Amendment 41 would ensure that employers take into account pension charges when calculating their employer contributions. I assure noble Lords that we are not complacent on this issue. We fully appreciate the impact that charges can have on an individual’s pension pot, particularly given the beta returns that we are currently seeing. We are taking steps to ensure that such charges do not have a disproportionate impact on members’ savings. We will publish guidance on default investment options on automatic enrolment schemes later in the spring. That will cover suitable charging structures, as I said. The guidance will encourage appropriate charges which, first, match members’ interests, and, secondly, protect individuals from charges that are excessive in relation to the product that they are paying for.
Pensions Bill [HL]
Lord McKenzie of Luton Excerpts(13 years, 8 months ago)
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Lord McKenzie of Luton
My Lords, I take this opportunity to thank the Minister and his team, who have been very helpful and accommodating as we have gone through our amendments. There have been some government amendments, and I am grateful for their explanations.
The purpose of this group of amendments should be very clear. Collectively they seek to review the Bill’s acceleration of the equalisation of the state pension age for men and women. They preserve the existing timetable set out in the Pensions Act 1995, which means that women will reach pensionable age at 65 if born after 5 April 1955. For women born between 6 April 1950 and 5 April 1955, state pension age will gradually increase over a decade, rising one year in every two.
The state pension age needs to rise in order to pay for a more generous basic state pension linked to earnings. This was a principle established by the Labour Government in 2007 and one that we continue to support. By retaining the table contained in the Pensions Act 1995, the increase in state pension age to 66 for both men and women is negated. However, our Amendment 4 brings forward the increase for men and women to 66, accelerating this by four years to between 2020 and 2022.
The amendments make no specific proposals for changing the current timetable for increasing SPA to 67 between 2034 and 2036 and then to 68 between 2044 and 2046, legislated for in the Pensions Act 2007, although we accept—as do the Government, I believe—that increasing longevity will eventually cause that to be revisited. We do not challenge the life expectancy projections that the Government have used to underpin their policy changes. We do, of course, accept that life has literally moved on since 2004, and the data which underpin the Turner settlement have moved on. Average life expectancy for those who reach 65 in 2026 has increased by 1.5 years for men and 1.6 years for women. Our challenge to the Government and their response to these changes is to the speed and equity of the adjustments that the Bill seeks to make, particularly for women.
When the Conservative Government legislated to equalise the state pension age for men and women at 65 in 1995, they gave 15 years’ notice from the beginning of the change and indeed 25 years’ notice of the end of that change. When the last Labour Government legislated to increase the state pension age to 66 in 2007, they gave 17 years’ notice to the start of the process. In this Bill, the coalition Government give just six years.
In setting out their policy objectives, the Government instance the need to take account of the increase in life expectancy, the need for spending on the state pension to be sustainable, the need for intergenerational fairness, and the need for fairness in the balance of support given by the working age population. We do not disagree with these aspirations, but consider that there is another policy objective that has been overlooked: fairness for those going through the transition, with sufficient notice for them to have the chance to adjust to changed expectations of receiving the state pension age at a later date. We know from the impact assessment that the timetable proposed in the Bill will affect some 5 million people; 500,000 will have to wait more than a year extra to receive their state pension, all of them women. Of these, 300,000 women will have to wait for more than 18 months and 33,000 will have to wait for two years. Contrast this with our proposal in this amendment, which affects 1.2 million fewer people. It will affect about the same number of men and women, and no one will have to have an increase in state pension age of more than a year. In terms of intergenerational equity, measured as a proportion of adult life spent in receipt of a state pension, the timetable we propose has a smoother transition to the long-term trend of 32.5 per cent for men and 34.8 per cent for women.
It is accepted that the Government’s proposal will save more in resources, although the savings do not begin to accrue until 2016-17. As the impact assessment makes clear, there is a judgment to be made. Indeed, we thought that it was a judgment that the coalition Government had made when declaring that the date when the state pension age started to rise to 66 would not be sooner than 2020 for women. Perhaps the Minister will take the opportunity to say why the Government have changed their mind on that issue. Just look at some of the unfairness. A woman born in April 1953 will be able to get her pension at 62 years and 11 months. A woman born in April 1954 will have to wait until she is 66. Many women and men affected by these changes would already have plans under way for hitting what they thought was their state pension age. We have heard from many who have reduced hours or given up work and taken on caring responsibilities for parents or grandchildren. The position for women is compounded because of the disadvantage that this generation of women has experienced in terms of lower earnings, interrupted careers and restricted access to private pension schemes. They have less flexibility to respond to the changes that see their state pension age rise by six years between 2010 and 2020, compared to just one for men.
I take this opportunity to particularise some of this unfairness. I am sure that other noble Lords have received, as we have, a host of representations from people and I would like to quote from two. One is as follows:
“Yes, I’m now 55, with only a small additional work pension on top of the State pension to come, because I wasn’t able to contribute anything extra to my employers scheme when I was younger—my husband & I separated and I was a single parent of 2 children and there just wasn’t the spare cash. I used to be a part-time worker—part-time women used to be discriminated against in not being able to participate in pension schemes (look up ‘Beswick Cases’ and the ‘Barber judgements’). So like many women the same age I’ve grown up in one era ‘Your husband will take care of you financially’, then things changed. I would have been able to retire with a full pension (such as it is) at 60; then, the Equalities legislation was moving it slowly towards 65 but at least I had due warning”.
Another person makes a point that I highlight:
“The law when I was younger prevented me from paying into a private scheme when I was not working or was working part time which happened because due to rearing children and the ill health of one of them, which he will have on and off throughout his lifetime. I feel it was a waste of money buying the extra NI contributions because since I bought them the government is now proposing to give me no pension at all for 2 of the years for which I thought I was buying a full pension”.
I pick up on that point in particular. The noble Lord will be aware of the buy-back opportunities—six years’ buy-back with class 3 contributions. He may also be aware of the further buy-back opportunities that were argued for and recommended to the House by my noble friend Lady Hollis. I imagine that more than a few people found themselves buying back extra class 3 contributions to secure a full state pension, on the assumption that they would give up working at a known date, given that the state pension age was set down in the 1995 Act. Now, like this person, they may find themselves waiting an extra two years for their state pension, continuing to work to be able to survive. By working, they would pay their national insurance contributions, and the buy-back that they had already made would be a complete waste of money. It seems to me a point to pick up and pursue further. I was alerted to it particularly by this representation. We need to reflect on what notice and information were given to people that caused them to go through these buy-back arrangements and to waste a not insignificant amount of money.
I also say to the noble Lord, Lord Boswell, that his amendments look on the face of it to be somewhere between the Government’s position and ours, but doubtless he will expand on that when he introduces them. It would be helpful if he could give us an analysis, in terms of the increase in the state pension age, of those affected who will have to wait less than a year for their state pension in comparison to the current arrangement, those waiting more than a year, those waiting a year and a half, and whether there are any up to the two-year mark.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees
My Lords, I should point out that, if this amendment is agreed, I cannot call Amendment 1A, for reasons of pre-emption.
Lord Freud
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, for that. I have to confess that I was not aware of those events in 1982. I was aware of some events—I think that I was writing a Lex column in 1982 so I was not completely out of the picture. The noble Baroness makes the point that there were five years of notice. Clearly, the smallest amount of notice that we have in this instance is 6.5 years for those who are affected at the tightest level. We believe that that period, which admittedly is shorter than other periods that we have seen, will still allow women to plan for their retirement.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
My Lords, I thank every noble Lord who has spoken in what has been a well informed debate. When I hear my noble friends in full flight, it almost makes me glad that I am not the Minister any more. Pretty much everyone who spoke, apart from the Minister, recognised the unfairness embedded in these proposals and was supportive of one way or another—either a timetable or mitigation factors—to address that unfairness. The Minister focused principally on the differential costs between our proposals in this amendment, the Government’s position and the proposals made by the noble Lord, Lord Boswell. Of course there is a cost, but judgments have to be made, and the Government will have made a judgment on this. Why did they not do things even faster than they proposed, which would have saved even more money? Presumably the answer is that they made a judgment about what they thought was fair and where the balance lay in all this. We are saying that see the balance lying in a somewhat different position. Let us put this in context. We are looking at about £10 billion not as an annual hit, but over a period of years and when we get to 2016-17, GDP will be of the order of £2 trillion a year. Of course, there needs to be fiscal responsibility, but we think that the Government have got the balance wrong in this.
The noble Lord said that he thinks that it is a good thing that one ramification is that women will be working longer, which will make them healthier and potentially better off. The issue is whether people have the time to adjust. Many of the case studies that we have are of people who have already made their dispositions on an assumption about when they can access the state pension. That upheaval is creating problems. I was interested in what the noble Lord said in response to my noble friend about the cliff edge and continuing entitlement to pension credit. That was particularly illuminating and I am grateful for it. I note that we are going to pick up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Boswell, about the EU aspects of that later; I look forward to that.
Like the noble Lord and my noble friends Lady Turner and Lady Drake, I think that the people who are contacting us about this are not blind to the changes in longevity. People accept that the issue has to be addressed, but we come back to the speed and manner with which it is being done. That is the bone of contention. That is why we will continue to press the matter.
A number of the points raised in the debate—the pension credit point in particular—will feature in subsequent amendments, so I shall not go into detail on them. The noble Lord, Lord German, made a point that my noble friend Lady Hollis picked up on when he said that part of the mitigation would be to have a decent state pension of £140 a week. That would be good if it were achievable, but it is down the track on any basis. How far down the track, we may elicit a bit further during the course of our proceedings; or perhaps not. However, it does not mitigate what is happening to women now and over the next few years, with people not being able to access the state pension that they thought they were going to get, and which it had been legislated that they would get.
We are bound to return to this issue on Report. On one basis or another, I hope that we can find common cause, whether the middle route preferred by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, or our proposal. I hope that we can stick with this consensus and get some real change, because it will make a real difference. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
For noble Lords who were anticipating a debate around PUCODIs, I advise them not to blink. This is just a gentle probe about the effects of getting rid of PUCODIs; hopefully, we communicated the nature of the inquiry to the Bill team to make it a bit easier on the Minister’s time. Clause 2 removes the right to receive payable uprated contracted-out deduction increments from 6 April 2012. It does not, as I understand it, affect awards already in payment, so the noble Lord, Lord Boswell, can relax, although I understand that he will be CPIed on it in the future. I imagine that at the moment it will buy him a thimbleful of petrol, if that.
Let me be clear: we support this measure and consider it to be a sensible tidying-up. My probe is about what we understand to be the range of PUCODIs that would have been payable but for this abolition. The notes accompanying the impact assessments point out that the overall saving is less than £1 million—pretty small beer. For those currently in receipt, we are told that 80 per cent receive less than £1 per week, and for inherited rights the mean is about 60p per week. However, we are also told that the maximum payment is £14 per week, and £6.30 per week for inherited rights. Removing a few pence as a top-up is one thing, but taking away £700 per year is potentially something else. Perhaps amounts build to these levels only after a period of time, so maybe it is not an issue. Nevertheless, I should be grateful for the Minister’s comments about the spread of what would otherwise have arisen, to see whether there are any issues there or whether it really is de minimis.
Lord Boswell of Aynho
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, has been kind enough both to mention my name and to tempt me. I shall disappoint the Committee, I am sure, by indicating that I have no intention whatever of explaining how PUCODIs work or how important they are to one’s lifestyle. All I can say is that I indicated at Second Reading, and a further reading of my recent annual pension statement appears to confirm this, that I think that I have one. However, rather in the manner of one of my masters at school who conducted a survey among the masters’ common room into the wearing of long johns in the winter and found that a significant number of people did not know, I am not absolutely sure that I have one. For the avoidance of doubt, it certainly is not in the range of £14 a week; it is much lower than that, although it is more than £1.
I simply make the point that this is an example of complexity and I am sure that we need to remove it. I am pleased to see the noble Lord who moved the amendment nodding to that. It is an example of how even people who know a modest amount about the system do not know everything that is applied. It creates problems that are almost in geometric progression: the more complex the system is, the less easy it is for people to understand it and the greater the chance of making mistakes. As one building block of the programme of simplification and consolidation, this is a modest but essential measure. I look forward to the Minister’s explanation—if he understands PUCODIs too.
Lord Freud
My Lords, I really am grateful to the noble Lord for giving me this incredible opportunity to talk about PUCODIs. I have to quote the noble Lord himself from 2007, when he said:
“This is a technical area and, despite the hour, I hope that the Committee will bear with me as I explain”.—[Official Report, 4/6/07; col. 875.]
He then gave an explanation, but I am convinced that, to his disgrace, he has forgotten every single word that he said to the Committee.
The essential point regarding the payable uprated contracted-out deduction increment is that these payments are very small. As the noble Lord pointed out, 77 per cent of recipients get less than £1 per week. Where it is in payment, it represents 0.6 per cent, on average, of an individual state pension income. Most of the people in receipt are women—93,000 out of 118,000 people are women—and the average received by women is slightly higher than by men. Bluntly, though, both are around 20p per week.
Around 6,000 of the 9,000 in receipt of inherited awards are women. The average received by women is again similar to men: around 30p per week. The original policy intention of the PUCODI was to ensure parity between those who were contracted out, and those who were not. However, as noble Lords will be aware, contracting-out on a defined contribution basis is being abolished from April 2012. The proposed abolition of new awards of PUCODIs for members of such schemes is linked to the abolition of defined contribution contracting-out. I shall not go into the detail of the timings, except to assure the noble Lord that it has never been the Government’s intention to bring the proposed legislation into force before 6 April 2012.
I am not sure that I have a reliable spread, although I am very happy to write making clear what the spread of payments is. However, given the averages we are talking about, there are going to be fairly few outliers. The point is that, as the name suggests, there is an element of choice for people when they take them. They are delaying payment of their contracted-out pension, and there is therefore an element of choice. If the loss is too much, they can start to take it, so there is an element of market balance for the outliers. I will write about that very specific point beyond the averages.
As the noble Lord said in his introduction, it is not his intention to do anything more than find out some of this detail, and I am sure that he will be pleased to withdraw the amendment.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
I thank the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Boswell, for participating and will be delighted to withdraw the amendment. I will be very happy to receive a letter in due course. I remember reading out a script in 2008 or 2007 when I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Skelmersdale, who was leading on the opposition Benches. He assumed I did not understand it because I read the script very quickly. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Stoneham of Droxford
I support the amendment. It is related to the amendment that we will discuss in a moment about including part-time earnings to qualify for NEST. This is an important issue, and we need the Minister to look at it with a view to recognising the fact that part-time work is growing and is going to grow. There is a lot more out there in the unseen economy than we probably realise, which should be revealed as we move towards the universal credit system. We must therefore address it. As an employer myself, I have seen discrimination happen over the years. People deliberately keep employment below a certain limit so that they can avoid national insurance, and in future they will be doing this on pension contributions as well. This needs to be addressed.
I accept that there is an administration problem, but systems are improving. We should be trying to address this problem in the light of that. Because it is linked to the problem that we will be discussing on a later amendment, I am very sympathetic to this one.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
My Lords, my noble friend Lady Drake and I have put our name to this amendment because we support its thrust. Having heard my noble friend, I gather that, perhaps unsurprisingly, she is even more ambitious for this amendment than I took it to be on first reading. It is entirely consistent with the progress that has been made in crediting people into the pension system, in any event, over many years. It is highly relevant—we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Stoneham, and my noble friend Lady Hollis about the growing importance of part-time work in our economy.
When I first read the amendment, I thought that its thrust was to say that when you aggregate employment earnings, if you are above the lower earnings limit, you get credited in. That in itself would not require any payments from the individual or any payments on behalf of any employer. That, at least, would be progress from where we are. There are arrangements that you have to aggregate if you are within associated companies, but that is a separate case.
If it is possible, as my noble friend suggested, perhaps in discussion with the noble Lord, to go further and say that we could aggregate and then work out what the employee and employer contributions would be and how we divvied that up across employers, then that would be a significant improvement and an advance. That is not only because of the state pension arrangements, with credited and contributory benefits in any event, but for the point that the noble Lord, Lord Stoneham, made about auto-enrolment. If we can aggregate and reach qualifying earnings, particularly if qualifying earnings are going to be pitched at the primary threshold, or at the secondary threshold, which I think is the same thing at the moment, then we can also seek to ensure that people on part-time earnings who would not otherwise qualify in respect of a single employment could, on some basis or another, by aggregation and then divvying up across employers, be entitled to auto-enrolment. At its most basic, lowest level, the ability to aggregate and credit in, for the purposes of the state pension, would be a valuable gain. To be able to go further, as is the ambition of my noble friend, would be a very considerable advance, and if the Minister’s command of technology enables him to deliver on that, we would all be delighted.
Lord Freud
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, for raising this matter. Clearly this debate has been conducted before, although I was not present, but there is a potentially a new context for it. The fundamental issue of the aggregation of low earnings from multiple part-time jobs and how they could be made to qualify for basic state pension has been a matter of concern to her for some time. It was considered by the Pensions Commission and during the passage of the Pensions Act 2007.
Like her, I am keen to encourage mini-jobs, which I think are not just good in themselves for people in supplementing income, but are an invaluable stepping stone which we have made difficult for people to use in the current welfare system. A system that encourages that process and takes it out of the informal or grey economy and into the proper economy, will be immensely valuable for many people. What I am going to say at this stage and in this debate will be rather correct, in the sense that, in the present situation and in the context of our present systems, it is not be possible to go ahead with something like this. Until we have a new system defined, laid out, and understand its technology, we will not be able to look seriously at what we can do here, and it is an immensely complicated issue in practice. The structure of this answer may be negative as I go through it.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
My Lords, we are back on a couple of probing amendments. In reverse order, Amendment 15 is merely probing whether the specified date would always be at the commencement of a tax year. I can see that it could be organised this way, but is it inevitable? If not, then something along the lines of this amendment would be appropriate. Amendment 14 is a more substantial probe, though I see that the date has come out as 2005, rather than as 2025, which was originally intended. It is not particularly significant, because it was just a peg on which to hang a question.
Clause 3 introduces Schedule 3, which changed some of the provisions in the Pensions Act 2008 concerning the consolidation of the additional pension. The idea is, at some point in time, to effectively bundle together the various contracted-out rights, and to apply actuarial factors to smooth the disparities in entitlement. We obviously support this approach, but as the notes to the Bill set out, a consequence of smoothing in cash-flow terms is that the Government are likely to pay more earlier and less later than under the current system. I understand that that is the thrust of it. Rather than lock in to the flat-rate introduction year for the start of this process, the Government now seek flexibility by way of an order. I would be grateful if the Minister could say how much flexibility they consider it necessary to have. By how many years is it estimated that the consolidation will have to be delayed or indeed advanced, if that is the thrust of it? Could he give us some indication of what this change means in terms of the likely process of consolidation? What does this mean for the wider aspiration, touched on earlier in our debates, of consolidating the basic state pension with the state second pension? I understand what the Minister said earlier about being unable to advance much on that, so I will not press him on that point, but there is a point about the interrelation of this with that process. Presumably, consolidation of the additional pension is a necessary prerequisite, and perhaps he will confirm that.
On one other practical point, I have a recollection that we were chided during the passage of the 2008 Act by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, who is not with us today, on our adherence to advice from actuaries. We had some discussion on whether the actuarial smoothing had to be effectively determined by the actuaries, or by Ministers on the basis of advice. Perhaps the Minister could remind me where we ended up on that issue. I beg to move.
Lord Freud
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for the opportunities to speak to Amendments 14 and 15, which seek to define the latest possible group for whom the additional pension consolidation would be introduced. The amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, seek to fix the affected group in relation to a somewhat arbitrary date of 2025. It might be helpful if I provide some context as to why we have taken steps to replace the previous certainty as to the start date and the affected group with a power to define both by way of regulations. Clause 3 and Schedule 3 of the Bill provide flexibility around the implementation of consolidation, which, as provided for in the Pensions Act 2008, simplifies past earnings-related pension rights.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
I thank the Minister for that response. I will read the record with interest, but I will certainly withdraw the amendment.
I just want to be clear on a couple of points. I think the Minister said that something like £200 million per year would be involved in the smoothing exercise. Did I understand that correctly?
Lord Freud
Yes. At the early stages there are some years where the figure peaks at around £210 million and then comes back later, so it is a net early annual cost to the state with that maximum, coming down later to a net present cost that is neutral. From memory, the peak year was coming out at—was it 1925? Sorry, 2025. I will get the right century soon. The peak would be early in the 2020s until 2025.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
I am grateful for that response. I rather took from reading the literature that the cash flow issue was the real driver in all this, but from what the Minister has said there are obviously broader ramifications. I will read the record.
Might the Minister deal with the point about the other minor amendment about defining a tax year? At the moment the Bill says,
“the tax year beginning with the specified date or a subsequent tax year”.
That presupposes that the specified date would be at the start of a tax year. My question was: does that inevitably follow?
Lord Freud
The noble Lord, as ever, is spot on in his assumption. Yes, it is at the start of the tax year.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
I am grateful for that. I can see that it is meant to be at the start of the tax year. I suppose that I have a question about what makes it the start of the tax year, but perhaps we will leave that for another occasion. I am happy to beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Pensions Bill [HL]
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Lord McKenzie of Luton
My Lords, this has been a powerful and exceptionally well informed debate that was enlightened yet further by the great sweep of history from the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville, with his insights into actuarial practice in the EU. I, too, congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Freud, on the manner in which he introduced the Bill and the very clear way in which he set out its contents. He reminded us about the golden years under a Labour Government in 2006. I am especially pleased to have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Boswell, because he actually has a PUCODI. I have been seeking someone who has one for a long time, and what I thought was going to be a fairly sterile and short debate in Committee will, I think, be much more extensive, as I am sure the Minister will attest. Like many others, I also congratulate my noble friend Lady Drake not only on a very impressive first appearance at the Dispatch Box but on her incisive analysis of why we have concerns with this Bill.
The Bill seeks to address the right issues—increasing longevity and undersaving—but in a way which we cannot fully support. Fundamentally, we consider accelerating the equalisation of the state pension age for men and women to be unfair. Of course, we recognise that life expectancy has increased beyond the 2004 projection, as spelt out by the Minister, and we adhere to the Turner commission proposition that intergenerational fairness argues for the proportion of adult life spent in receipt of state pension to be broadly constant. That would be catered for as much by the approach we support as by the Government.
It is our view that the existing timetable for equalisation of the state pension age to 65 should be left unchanged and that the increase to 66 for men and women should take place between 2020 and 2022. We accept that it would also be necessary to review the subsequent timetable for increasing the state pension age to 67 and beyond. Perhaps we could make common cause on that with the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and the noble Lord, Lord Flight, although whether we would end up in the same position is another matter. The noble Lord, Lord Boswell, opposed the suggestion about accelerating the state pension age to 66 for men but not for women, but there are issues within the EU about that.
It is to our disappointment that we could not have consensus on this Bill. Had the coalition Government stuck to their commitment that the date at which the state pension age for women would not start sooner than 2020, we could be at one—a point pressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Greengross. Now, as we have heard, some 300,000 women will have to wait for between 18 months and two years longer to receive their state pension. This means that they will lose up to £10,000 in pension income, and more if they are eligible for pension credit.
The timeframe within which these changes are to take place will make it very difficult for women to mitigate their loss. Women are less likely than men to be in private pension saving and have fewer financial assets to bridge the gap. Some have caring responsibilities and will have left the labour market having anticipated their state pension at a certain date. Those women are now faced with the dilemma of seeking to rejoin the market when employment prospects are particularly weak. My noble friend Lady Bakewell referred to these issues as issues of discrimination, poverty and injustice.
However, dealing with these matters in terms of percentages, aggregates or cohorts belies the fact of the change on individual lives. We have heard the stories from my noble friend Lady Hayter about how individual women will be affected and we have heard powerful reasons why the Government should stick to the legislative timetable for equalisation. The noble Lord, Lord German, offered us some mitigation if the Government are not to change their position around pension credits and in addressing those who are seriously ill. Perhaps we can seek common cause in Committee on that, but that does not address the fundamental unfairness in the Bill.
None of this unfairness can be claimed to be in the cause of eliminating the deficit by 2015, as the savings from the Bill would not begin to accrue until 2016-17. We accept that holding to the existing equalisation timetable would reduce the savings, but fairness has implications. That would mean that more would be borne by the working age population, but it would still give rise to savings of some £20 billion, including additional tax receipts of about £8 billion.
We have heard from the Minister about the triple lock and the relinking of the basic state pension with earnings in 2011, which is earlier than required by legislation. However, on the basis of Treasury forecasts—a point made by my noble friend Lady Turner—it looks likely to be 2013 before earnings become the highest of the three components of the lock. With the switch to CPI, it is possible that pensioners will be no better off and that some may be worse off under the lock than they would have been had there been continuance of uprating in line with the RPI.
As many noble Lords have said—everyone who has spoken, I think—we strongly support the coalition Government’s decision to proceed with auto-enrolment and with NEST. Indeed, why would we not? The proposals were created on our watch: my noble friend Lady Drake was a member of the Turner commission and was later chair of PADA; my noble friend Lady Hayter served as a trustee of NEST; and my noble friend Lord Myners was chair of PADA. We are, as it were, up to our necks in it. The prospect of between 5 million and 8 million people newly saving, or saving more into a workplace pension, is a profound change that will allow millions of workers, who never had the chance previously, to build up their own pension and give them an opportunity to save.
Of course, auto-enrolment will not transform matters overnight, but it is part of a broader pensions settlement, grounded in the intellectual rigour of the Turner commission. That settlement proposed improvements to the basic state pension, especially improved access for women, accelerated the flat-rating and simplification of S2P and proposed the imperative to redress market failure through the creation of a national low-cost saving scheme, which is now NEST.
The Turner commission’s analysis holds good and is not fundamentally disturbed by the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Stoneham, made that point. The practical ramifications of that analysis have been subject to compromise—for example, the cap on contributions, the contribution levels, the staging and phasing and the restrictions on transfer—and not everyone has been happy with the outcome. We may have a difference of view with the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, for instance. However, the Bill disturbs that compromise and tilts the balance in favour of employers and against participation of the lower paid. The Government deserve our support for resisting the clamour to remove micro businesses from its scope and to exclude older workers. However, setting the trigger, as we have heard, at the personal allowance threshold for income tax denies 600,000 people—nearly half a million women—the opportunity of auto-enrolment. More worrying is the concern expressed by my noble friends Lady Drake, Lady Donaghy and others about the start of an upward movement of the personal allowance, which will be tracked by this trigger. Should the trigger reach £10,000, 1.4 million people will miss out on auto-enrolment. Linking the entry point for auto-enrolment to the primary threshold for national insurance is more appropriate.
Our further concern, voiced by several noble Lords, is the introduction of an optional waiting period of up to three months before employees are auto-enrolled. While we see the benefit of not having to enrol individuals who up and leave quickly and opt out of pension savings, there is another side of the coin: seasonal short-term working may be the pattern of somebody’s working life and they could miss out completely. Even if not, as we have heard, the number of job changes routinely undertaken during a lifetime will mean a significant period when an employee will have to opt in to gain continuity of saving.
We will explore these matters further in Committee and seek reassurance from the Minister that the application of the easement will be monitored. It is claimed that one of the benefits of a waiting period is fewer small pots, an issue which my noble friend Lady Hollis has rightly continued to pursue. To a certain extent, this is solved by the use of NEST, where employees automatically collect their pension pots from a range of different employers. However, that solution does not cater for circumstances where the providers chosen are other than NEST. We support my noble friend in her exploration of whether small pots might be collected together in NEST at the point of retirement, a matter pressed also by the noble Baroness, Lady Greengross. My noble friend rightly revisited the opportunities to amalgamate earnings from mini-jobs for the purposes of national insurance credits, qualifying earnings and, now, the trigger.
What is the Government’s position on changes to the rules on NEST which would allow transfers into the scheme? What is their position on removal of the cap on contributions into NEST? On a more general point, how will the rules which allow pension contributions to be deducted in computing tax credits be carried forward to the universal credit?
The issues around self-certification have proved intractable in the past. The challenge has been to facilitate sensible mechanisms to encourage employers to stay with existing good provision provided that it has delivered at least the equivalent of 8 per cent on qualifying earnings without employees who should be auto-enrolled dropping through the net in large numbers or systematically. Consultation on how this might work is being undertaken, but we are unfortunately unlikely to see it brought to a conclusion by the time that we have finished our deliberations. Unless these matters are clear, there are those who would seek to use the rules to circumvent the auto-enrolment requirement. Evidence, if it were needed, can be found in attempts to exploit the differences in trust-base and contract-base refund rules, although we are pleased to see that the Government are on this particular case.
On judicial pensions, a matter spoken to by the noble and learned Lords, Lord Woolf and Lord Mackay of Clashfern, and my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer of Thoroton, I am aware that there is sensitivity and history surrounding this issue. If I were not, I was woken up to it pretty quickly. When I raised the issue with a couple of colleagues and said that judicial pensions were on the agenda in the Bill, there was a sharp intake of breath and I was told, “You’re on your own”. We all agree that we are incredibly well served by the judiciary, although I cannot speak from personal experience on the matter. The issue of public service pensions has been most recently addressed by the noble Lord, Lord Hutton of Furness. His interim report was issued in October and we await his final report. The interim reports recited that the best way to make savings would be to increase member contributions but to protect those on lower earnings. Can the Minister let us know how the Government’s acceptance of the recommendation is to be implemented and within what time frame?
Clause 24 is an enabling measure and, in principle, has our support. It cannot be right to exempt judicial pensions from the financial discipline which is to be applied to other public service schemes. However, changes must, as for all public service schemes, respect accrued rights. It is important also, as the noble and learned Lords contend, that these matters proceed in a manner that does not impair the independence of the judiciary.
Time does not permit a review of all the other essentially technical changes in the Bill—we will pick up on these in Committee—but perhaps the Minister can help us on one point raised by several noble Lords. Paragraph 3 of Schedule 3 seeks to introduce some flexibility into the arrangements for consolidation of S2P. There seems to be nothing in the Bill to address the much heralded consolidation of the basic state pension and S2P on the way to a £140 basic pension. That was referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Greengross, my noble friend Lady Hollis, and the noble Lord, Lord Stoneham, who said that he has had some engagement on this with the Pensions Minister. Can the Minister update us on this and say when we can expect firm proposals?
A further issue of significance, which the Bill addresses in part, is the consequences of the switch from RPI to CPI in determining the general level of prices for revaluation and indexation purposes. The major impact of this on occupational pensions will, as the Minister said, be delivered by order and not by the Bill. From the Government’s point of view, this seems to be yet another item of work in progress as their consultation is not due to close until the beginning of March. Can the Minister let us know when the responses will be shared with us? The impact assessment has also become a bit of a moveable feast by some £20 billion in the space of a few days.
We have generally signalled our acceptance of the switch to CPI for uprating benefits, not necessarily as a permanent change but for a period while the deficit is being addressed. We will continue to examine the appropriateness of CPI as currently configured as a suitable measure for inflation compensation purposes.
We have much to discuss in Committee but our efforts will be focused on seeking a reversal of the unfairness at the heart of the Bill. That unfairness goes against the grain of recent pension legislation, which has been to redress the historic discrimination that women have faced in the pension system. However, the Government will have our support—if not uncritical —in taking forward the auto-enrolment proposals.
Disabled People: Disability Living Allowance
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Lord Freud
My Lords, we are taking a very close look at the mobility requirements of people in residential care. The existing arrangements are pretty patchy; the payments are used for different purposes in different places and are often pooled in a way that they are not designed for, in a very complex regulatory framework. We will be looking very closely, as part of the consultation exercise, at what the best form of support should be for people in residential care in this way.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
My Lords, following on from that question, has the Minister read the evidence in the report from 27 leading disability groups entitled, Don’t Limit Mobility? The report points out that mobility needs tend to be factored into care packages only to meet specific needs in the community care assessment and not generally to meet individuals’ personal mobility needs. Do the Government therefore accept that the proposal to withdraw the mobility component of DLA for those in residential care because of double funding is based on a false premise, is simply wrong and should be withdrawn?
Lord Freud
My Lords, I have indeed read with great interest that particular piece of research. We are talking to the lobby about it and are very interested in some of the data behind it. We are in the process now of collecting a lot of information about what is really happening. It is a very fragmented area in terms of regulatory support and practice, and when we have that information I will be very pleased to share it with the House.
Housing Benefit (Amendment) Regulations 2010
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Baroness Dean of Thornton-le-Fylde
My Lords, this has been quite a long discussion but I would say that its impact on our communities is as important as what we have been discussing in this House over the past two weeks.
Of all the government cuts, the ones in this area are probably the cruellest. They affect people’s homes, where they live and how they live, and how communities operate. Indeed, if a decision in this House were based on merit, the Motions of my noble friend Lord Knight would carry the day in this Chamber. The Minister may have the comfort of getting votes from those around him but I cannot convince myself that all members of the coalition—I am looking particularly at the Liberal Democrat Benches—are sitting comfortably while supporting this policy. That is based on the many debates that we have had in this House in the nearly 20 years in which I have been a Member.
I can picture a House that did not have a coalition but would be faced with support from the Lib Dem Members. It is also telling that the Minister, who I know will put up a brave fight for his Government’s policy, must be feeling very isolated. Not one member of the coalition has stood up in this debate in support of the Government’s policy. I think that speaks volumes about the many Members on the Benches opposite.
I will support, and I hope the Minister will support, the Motion in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Best, who has enormous experience and knowledge of the housing sector and communities. In this rather lengthy debate, we have not covered other areas of the impact of this policy. Naturally, the House has as a priority the impact on single parents and other people in our community who have the narrowest shoulders with which to bear the implications. However, I suggest that this has enormous economic implications, too. We have a shortage of housing in this country; the impact of this policy will be that, in three or four years’ time, that shortage will have increased and will be extremely costly to rectify.
It also means, without being too emotional about it, the increasing ghettoisation in our cities, London most of all. How will our businesses be able easily to get labour when many people in their community have had to move outside of the city because they could not afford the rents inside? So this is a very far-reaching policy; it is not about simply taking an average of £9 out of someone’s weekly income. It has a much more far-reaching impact than that.
I hope that the Minister will accept the Motion of the noble Lord, Lord Best—second best though it may be, and I think it is. The wording is quite specific, and I know the department will carry out a review annually: that is its responsibility. But the Motion of the noble Lord, Lord Best, covers quite specific areas: children, homelessness and the resources that local authorities can allocate to this important area.
If a citizen does not have a home, he does not have anything. Therefore, I hope the Minister will accept the Motion in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Best, and that this House, operating at its best, as it usually does, will monitor the policy very closely and debate it as often as is necessary, until we rectify some of the cruelty we now face.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
I support the two Motions moved by my noble friend Lord Knight of Weymouth and that moved by the noble Lord, Lord Best. The noble Lord, Lord Best, anticipates a significant statement from the Minister, and I look forward to that as well. If it were to signify the withdrawal of these orders at the twelfth hour, the Minister would become an even greater national treasure than that described by the noble Lord, Lord Kirkwood, but I do not hold my breath.
My noble friend was right to signify that he was not going to press his Motions. In many ways, it would be good to test the view of the House to see if we could stop these orders in their tracks, but I think it has helped the tenor of our debate, as the noble Lord, Lord Kirkwood, has said. Of course, if we did defeat the orders, we would have to carve out, perhaps through the welfare reform Bill, those two parts of the order that we do support, as my noble friend has said: the provisions relating to carers and an additional room being allowed, and the removal of the £15 excess. We sought to do this before the election, and some noble Lords may recall that one party represented here was quite opposed to that. I think it is right now to remove that excess.
Others have explored the thrust of these orders. The most damaging are the setting of the local housing allowance at the 30th percentile of rents in each broad rental market area and the introduction of absolute caps relating to the number of bedrooms in a property. The noble Lord, Lord Kirkwood, asked whether the Minister could say what proportion of the rental market is in fact available to housing benefit claimants. I understand that the 30th percentile would mean, at least on day one, that 30 per cent of rents would potentially be affordable. It does not mean that 30 per cent would be available, and once we move to uprating by CPI, not even that first proposition would hold true.
Who bears the cost of the benefit savings is at the heart of the debate we are having. Will it fall wholly or mainly on landlords or on tenants who are, by definition, the poor? In considering these matters, we need to be mindful that they are just part of a package of measures aimed at cutting the cost of housing benefit. Still to come are increases in non-dependant deductions, the uprating of LHAs by CPI rather than by actual movements of rents, the docking of 10 per cent for those on JSA for more than 12 months and the extension of the single room rate for individuals up to the age of 35.
The need to tackle the budget deficit is acknowledged, which is why we accept and, indeed, initiated the withdrawal of the £15 excess, but the speed and depth of the cuts proposed is not something we support, as my noble friend has explained. The distribution of the cuts, which the IFS analyses will mean that by 2013-14 there will be an increase in absolute poverty by 300,000 children and 200,000 working-age parents, largely driven by the housing benefit cuts, is simply not acceptable. The DWP issued an impact assessment in November, together with an equality impact assessment. My noble friend Lady Sherlock spoke with some passion about this. The DWP suggests that it cannot assess the behavioural effects of the housing benefit proposals, although it provided an assessment on the assumption that housing choices on rent levels would be unaffected. As we have heard, it estimated that households would lose £12 a week on average, but declared itself unable to estimate the number of households that may move. In contrast, Shelter estimated that 68,000 to 134,000 would move nationally, and the GLA estimated that some 9,000 households may need to move in London.
In the context of our debates, £12 is sometimes not seen as a meaningful figure, but the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Hereford brought us down to earth on that, as did my noble friend Lady Sherlock who said that it is better to talk in terms of a pair of shoes or enough food on the table. Excluding the removal of the £15 a week excess, the impact assessment still shows that 68 per cent of LHA claimant households will lose on average £10 a week and that losses for those in five-bedroom accommodation will average £74 a week.
Another consequence the impact assessment acknowledges but does not quantify is the prospect of increased homelessness. It also acknowledges that local authorities have a duty to find school places for children moving into their area and that that can lead to increased costs and that children who experience disruption in their schooling may do less well than would otherwise be the case. It recognises that there may be additional burdens on local authorities when families move into an area requiring a care-and-support package, and for disabled people, as we have heard, the DWP states that the LHA proposals could reduce options to help independence and lead to the loss of informal carers and support networks. They are retrograde provisions indeed, as explained by my noble friend Lady Wilkins. For individuals in work, an enforced move could extend their commute to their place of work.
There is a list of probable consequences, but there is no fundamental assessment of or research into the extent to which these circumstances will arise or into how people’s lives will be affected. There is just a cruel acceptance of the traumas that these proposals will visit on poor families and the damage they will inflict on them, their families and their communities. All of this has to be considered in the context of 48 per cent of people on LHA already facing shortfalls between their benefit and their rent. It is inevitable that people having to move, homelessness increasing and debt rising will become a reality. The Government assert that these matters will be mitigated principally by downward pressure on private sector rents, by transitional relief, by households choosing more appropriate accommodation, and by additional funding for discretionary payments.
Benefits
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Lord McKenzie of Luton
My Lords, in what way does the Minister consider that docking 10 per cent off someone’s housing benefit after they have been a year on JSA is meeting their individual needs?
Lord Freud
The purpose of our reforms is to make sure that there is a very strong incentive for people to find work and, once they find work, to work. That is the purpose of that reform.
Disabled People
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Lord Freud
Residential care homes have an obligation to meet residents’ mobility and other requirements, which are translated into individual care agreements with those in residential homes.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
I want to ask the Minister about Supporting People, which is a vital programme that has helped around 1 million of our most vulnerable citizens each year. The programme is a qualifying service for the purposes of the disabled person’s right to control regulations to the extent that it helps people to live independently. Given the 28 per cent cut in local authority expenditure—which we will hear about officially shortly—and given the fact that Supporting People funding is no longer ring-fenced, what assurances can the Minister give disabled people that there will be effective monitoring of the programme to ensure that their rights are protected and delivered?
Lord Freud
My Lords, we are protecting the Supporting People budget and are spending up to £6.5 billion until 2015, which is roughly the same as the current spend. Clearly, with the localisation agenda, it is for local authorities, particularly in their personal spending approach, to ensure that the money is spent in the most efficient way possible.