Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill Debate

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Department: HM Treasury

Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill

Lord McFall of Alcluith Excerpts
Tuesday 15th October 2013

(11 years, 1 month ago)

Lords Chamber
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Lord Lawson of Blaby Portrait Lord Lawson of Blaby
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My Lords, my noble friend the Minister has just pathetically addressed Amendment 87. None of his arguments stack up. We are saying here that it would be desirable—I cannot understand why the Government are opposing this—that there should be an additional external member who would have great knowledge and he might even be an academic, which would enormously please the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell. However, he need not be an academic; he could be someone who had a great knowledge of past financial and banking crises.

I think it was the philosopher Immanuel Kant who first observed that the only lesson of history is that no one ever learns the lessons of history. Financial crises are not unique; there have been a series of them over the years, both in this country and in the western world more generally. We commissioned a study of past financial crises. It was conducted by an excellent man, Mr John Sutherland of the Bank of England. It is remarkable how the same mistakes were made time and again. Everyone knows now about the crisis of 2008, but the time will come when that generation will have learnt the lessons of their own lifetime but not of the past, and it would be extremely useful to have someone on the Financial Policy Committee with such knowledge and expertise. It may not prevent a further substantial crisis but it will, at trivial cost, reduce the risk significantly. I cannot understand why the Government object to this.

My noble friend the Minister said that there should not be this guidance; that the Government should be able to appoint the best people. In other words, they should be able to appoint people who have no knowledge of past financial crises. Why do they want to do that? Why on earth is the reason they should want to do that when they have been given this opportunity to buttress all the other excellent measures in the Bill with someone on the FPC who has some knowledge and understanding of previous financial crises? Such knowledge is not widespread among the great majority of people. I have known this neck of the woods for a long time and there is very little knowledge of previous financial crises, yet there is a lot to be learned from them. It seems to me that the Government could easily accept having someone on the FPC who has this knowledge and I cannot understand why they do not do so.

Lord McFall of Alcluith Portrait Lord McFall of Alcluith (Lab)
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My Lords, I support the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, on that point. The historical issue is extremely important. If all MPC members had a copy of Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations—Adam Smith was a professor of moral philosophy in Glasgow University 250 years ago—we would not be in this crisis. If we could give them something from the 20th century, it would be John Kenneth Galbraith’s treatise. As he said, all financial crises have leverage at their core. In many ways, as the City historian David Kynaston said, the banking community has to come into the rest of society; it has been an island apart from it.

I remember when I was chairman of the Treasury Select Committee and Sir Richard Lambert was appointed to the Monetary Policy Committee. All flutters were let loose because he was not an economist and therefore could not know about or have an intelligent opinion on the MPC. He proved that he was efficient and in fact the banking community is now calling on him to chair a committee so that it can re-engage with the rest of society.

I remember when Professor Danny Blanchflower was appointed to the Monetary Policy Committee. He was resident professor of economics at Dartmouth College but those with the closed-shop mentality did not want such an individual because he was in America. However, we were in the jet age and he came across every couple of months for the MPC. He gave us an insight into the US labour market and US housing.

My plea to the Minister is to get rid of the mentality that it is only economists and those who are in the system who understand it. This crisis has had a hugely detrimental effect on society. If the economists again do not engage with society, then that is where problems will arise.

Professor Larry Summers, who was a contender for the Treasury Secretary’s job and is the Charles W Eliot Professor at Harvard, said:

“The financial crisis has made me rethink everything about economics”.

That is what he has done. The link between economics and society is so important. Let us get rid of the elitism; let us get rid of the closed shop; let us let in people with experience who understand society and can impart to people who have the great gift of economics the knowledge that they are part of society and that the consequences to society will be dire if they do not have a wide perspective on the implications of their actions.

Lord Higgins Portrait Lord Higgins (Con)
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My Lords, we are clearly getting a proliferation of Bank of England committees. We have both the Monetary Policy Committee and the Financial Policy Committee. Can the Minister say briefly precisely what the responsibilities will be of the Financial Policy Committee?

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Lord Lawson of Blaby Portrait Lord Lawson of Blaby
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Before the noble Lord withdraws the amendment, I would like to correct the Minister on what he said before about the noble Lord, Lord King—the former Sir Mervyn King. He is a very old friend of mine, and I can assure the House that in advance of this crisis, he had no knowledge whatever: it was not his interest. He was interested in two things: monetary policy and microeconomics. He was very good at microeconomics, but he had no knowledge or interest in past financial crises at all. He mugged it up later, of course, after the crisis broke. Of course he mugged it up: he is a clever man and able to do so, but I am afraid that the Minister was briefed by his officials to say something totally false and misleading.

Lord McFall of Alcluith Portrait Lord McFall of Alcluith
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The noble Lord, Lord King, whom I know as well and for whom I have tremendous respect, told me on many occasions that he attended MIT for his PhD. He shared an office with Ben Bernanke, who was an historian of financial crises in the 1930s. He assured me that he learned quite a lot in those three years.

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Moved by
91: After Clause 15, insert the following new Clause—
“Independent Banking Regulatory Decisions Committee of the FCA
(1) After section 1L of FSMA 2000 insert—
“1LA Independent Banking Regulatory Decisions Committee
(1) There is to be a Banking Regulatory Decisions Committee of the FCA (“the Committee”).
(2) The members of the Committee are to be appointed jointly by the FCA and the PRA and hold office in accordance with the terms of their appointment.
(3) The person appointed to chair the Committee must have experience of acting in a senior judicial capacity.
(4) A majority of the members of the Committee must be persons appearing to the FCA and the PRA to have (and to have had) no professional connection with the provision of financial services.
(5) The remaining members of the Committee must include persons appearing to the FCA and the PRA to have extensive experience in senior roles in banking.
(6) The function of the Committee is to exercise the banking regulatory decisions function of the FCA and the PRA.
(7) “Banking regulatory decisions function” means the function of taking decisions for enforcing compliance with relevant requirements, within the meaning of Part 14, in cases where the authorised person is a bank.
(8) The banking regulatory decisions function of the FCA and the PRA is delegated to the Committee; and references in this Act to the FCA and the PRA in relation to that function are to be construed accordingly.
(9) The FCA shall meet the reasonable costs of the Committee in discharging its function but the Committee—
(a) is not subject to direction by the FCA or the PRA as to the exercise of its function, (b) is not accountable to the FCA or the PRA for the exercise of its function, and(c) may appoint its own officers and staff.(10) At least once a year the Committee must make a report to the Treasury on the discharge of its function.
(11) The Treasury must lay before Parliament a copy of each report received by them under subsection (10).
(12) In this section “bank” has the meaning given by section 2 of the Banking Act 2009.”
(2) The FCA and the PRA must carry out a review of the operation of the Banking Regulatory Decisions Committee of the FCA.
(3) The review must be completed before the end of 2018.
(4) The FCA and the PRA must give the Treasury a report of the review.
(5) The report must include an assessment of whether the function of the Banking Regulatory Decisions Committee would be better discharged by a body that was entirely independent of the FCA and the PRA.
(6) The Treasury must lay a copy of the report before Parliament and publish it in such manner as they think fit.”
Lord McFall of Alcluith Portrait Lord McFall of Alcluith
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My Lords, this amendment is about the regulatory decisions committee that the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards proposed, giving responsibility for banking enforcement decisions taken by the FCA and the PRA to a new, statutory autonomous body within the FCA. Unfortunately, to date the Government have rejected that proposal.

In our evidence sessions we took evidence from a number of bodies, such as the medical and legal professions. In these established professions, a number of steps are taken to separate disciplinary functions from the supervision of professional development. In the legal profession, for example, the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal is totally separate from the Solicitors Regulation Authority and has a mixture of lay and professional members. The SRA has no say in its composition. It is in effect a prosecutor before a tribunal.

We took evidence from Sir Peter Rubin, who chairs the General Medical Council, who described similar recent developments in the medical profession. He told us that following the Shipman inquiry, it was pointed out to the GMC that its previous arrangements, whereby it was the police, the Crown Prosecution Service, the judge, jury and everything else, in his words, were incompatible with Section 6 of the Human Rights Act. Essentially, no one should adjudge their own cause so last year, as he told us, they hived off the adjudication process under which cases against doctors are heard to a separate body in a separate building. It is still funded by the GMC but, crucially, a judge now runs the adjudication process. It is now petitioning Parliament to give the GMC the power to appeal when it does not agree with one of its findings. In his opinion, that would really get the complete separation going.

In our deliberations the commission noted that an entirely separate statutory body for enforcement could be a solution but we recognised that there were a number of obstacles to that, not least because it would generate a new regulatory body that could be a source of confusion and conflict. An independent enforcement body would still be reliant on supervisors for many referrals that could in effect result in fewer cases if there were any problems co-operating with the FCA and the PRA. The body that we mentioned should be chaired by someone with senior judicial experience.

We also recommended a joint review by the regulators of their enforcement arrangements in 2018 but to date the Government have been silent on that issue. In the debate in the House of Commons, our chairman Andrew Tyrie made the point that the Government have rejected the need to wind up United Kingdom Financial Investments, and that the regulatory reforms to provide statutory autonomy for the decisions committee are especially regrettable. I would like the Government to give us their views on that joint approach by 2018.

We are seeking a body to be appointed by agreement between the boards of the PRA and the FCA with a majority of members with a non-banking or financial services background, containing several members with extensive and senior banking experience. It should be chaired by a person with senior judicial experience. In that way, it could publish a separate annual report of its activities and of the lessons for banks that emerged from its decisions.

When the FCA representatives were giving us evidence, Tracey McDermott, the director of enforcement, told us that the FSA had still not solved the problem of ensuring that senior figures were properly subject to the enforcement process. She said:

“The focus on senior management is something that we have talked about a lot in the FSA but we have found it very difficult to bring home the responsibility, particularly in larger firms, to those who are further up because of confused lines of accountability and because of confused responsibility”.

I would ask the Minister to keep in mind that there is an inherent tension between the role of real-time regulators and the enforcement function that can involve reaching judgments on which matters supervisors were involved in at the time, and that regulators are focused on the big picture, such as maintaining financial stability. Again, from experience I have witnessed the enforcement process being devalued in that area. There were a number of areas where the FSA at the time should have been on to enforcement procedures, particularly in the 2004-06 period of the financial crisis. It avoided those areas.

The proposal that we are making here is quite a modest one. It is for a statutory autonomous body within the FCA, and in 2018 there should be a review. I hope that Government will take those propositions seriously, reflect on them and come back to us. I beg to move.

Lord Eatwell Portrait Lord Eatwell
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My Lords, I was a member of the first regulatory decisions committee established under the Financial Services Authority. It was established at that time because it was felt that the FSA’s procedures would run counter to the Human Rights Act, in the sense that those procedures were both judge and jury. The role of the committee was to act as an independent assessor of the regulatory and enforcement proposals put forward by the FSA.

It worked reasonably well, at least from the perspective of a member of the committee, but not from the perspective of the FSA; we tended to give it a rather difficult time when we felt that its cases were ill prepared and ill focused. It played a particular role for a short period. Then, after a particular dramatic case was lost by the FSA in the tribunal, the FSA decided that it did not like the RDC being foisted upon it, and the role of the RDC was slowly downgraded. I think that was unfortunate—obviously I do, because I participated in the early days when I thought it was working rather well, but be that as it may.

The role here is slightly different from the challenge role that the RDC played. Will the Minister address the question of whether any effective enforcement role for a regulator is compatible with the Human Rights Act?

Lord Newby Portrait Lord Newby
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My Lords, we have considered extremely carefully all the recommendations from the PCBS. They contain a number of observations about the importance of banking expertise, accountability, clarity of responsibility and consistency of decision-making, which we certainly agree with.

I shall explain how the current arrangements already deliver all those things in a way that is tailored to the regulators’ individual approaches. First, on expertise, the call to create a separate decisions committee solely for the banking sector partly reflects concerns about the level of banking expertise on the RDC. At the FCA, the regulatory decisions committee is responsible for taking enforcement decisions. Its remit extends beyond banking, but that does not mean that it does not contain banking expertise. Indeed, the FCA has recently addressed the balance of expertise on the RDC through the appointment of two new members with banking expertise. At the PRA, of course there is no lack of banking expertise on its decision-making committees.

Secondly, on clarity of roles and responsibility, Section 395 of FiSMA provides for the separation of supervision from disciplinary decision-making. Under the current arrangements, there is also a clear separation of the function of making enforcement decisions from that of judicial consideration of the issue.

I do not accept the argument that the fact that the PRA does not have an RDC gives rise to human rights concerns. We do not believe that there is a problem on that front. The prospect of decisions being appealed to the Upper Tribunal means that the system already provides an independent judicial challenge function to the decision-making process for all financial services cases. The proposed requirement for regulatory decisions to be made by a committee chaired by a person with senior judicial experience, on the other hand, would appear to give this new committee a quasi-judicial role more suitable for an external review tribunal than an internal decision-making body.

On consistency of decision-making, I understand that a key part of the recommendation was to encourage a greater consistency of decision-making across the PRA and the FCA. Unfortunately, I believe that the creation of an additional statutory committee for banks would create only new inconsistency. The new committee relates only to banking, so any enforcement decisions relating to a building society, insurer or investment firm would be made under the existing framework and the FCA would have to maintain the existing RDC. This would mean one body dealing with the breach of a rule by a bank and a different body dealing with the same breach of the same rule by a building society, with potentially different outcomes, which seems undesirable. While I think that the PCBS report contains some useful observations in this area, I believe that the current, flexible arrangements are the right ones. On that basis, I would be grateful if the noble Lord withdrew his amendment.

Lord McFall of Alcluith Portrait Lord McFall of Alcluith
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I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 91 withdrawn.
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Lord Newby Portrait Lord Newby
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My Lords, this amendment proposes that the Treasury should be required to undertake a review into the effects, including the social, cultural and ethical effects, of exempting certain gaming contracts from the rule which used to provide that no gaming contract or wager can be enforced in a court of law. That exemption applied to certain categories of financial contracts, such as derivative contracts like contracts for differences, which could be regarded as gaming contracts within the meaning of the Gaming Acts because of their characteristics. Only those transactions which were subject to regulation under Financial Services legislation, such as the Financial Services Act 1986, and more recently the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, ever benefited from the exemption.

However, the law has changed significantly in this area. Since the Gambling Act 2005 came into force, gaming contracts and wagers are now enforceable through the courts, except in Northern Ireland, and the effect of the exemption is therefore limited to Northern Ireland. In the rest of the United Kingdom, there is no difference in the enforceability of derivative investments and other gaming contracts and wagers. Much of the purpose of the review proposed has therefore, in the Government’s view, gone.

It is also unclear what action could be taken following such a review. Trading in financial instruments is subject to European law, and in particular the markets in financial instruments directive. This limits the extent of the action this country could take in relation to financial instruments falling within the scope of the directive. It is unclear what benefits such a review could bring and we suggest that the noble Lord withdraws his amendment on the basis that it is not proportionate or objectively justified.

Lord McFall of Alcluith Portrait Lord McFall of Alcluith
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My Lords, I am surprised that the Minister is saying that we do not know what benefit this could bring. After all this is a derivatives market. We are talking about a derivatives market globally with $66 trillion or more. Not only is there a complexity in that market but there is a total opaqueness. Warren Buffett called derivatives weapons of mass financial destruction. So there is benefit in looking at this issue. Given that the parliamentary banking standards commission’s remit was to look at culture and standards, I would like the Minister to reflect on that issue with culture. In my opinion, culture is about behaviour and ethics is about conflicts of interest. In an opaque market, there are many conflicts of interest, and therefore it would do the Government good to open up this market and see what benefits could result.

The noble Lord, Lord Phillips, has done the Committee a service in this matter. We know that the market will not change overnight, but we must understand what is in the market, particularly the derivatives market. I would like the Government to take this a bit more seriously than the Minister has taken it in saying that we cannot learn anything at all from this.