National Security Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 6th December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, in general we support the aims of this Bill. We agree that our national security law needs updating, and we agree that many of the threats posed by foreign actors to our national security are new and require fresh and targeted solutions. The Bill attempts to achieve all that and in many ways, which the Minister ably explained, it does so. I add our thanks to those of the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, to the security services for all the brave, efficient and crucial work they do to protect our national security. However, we have a number of concerns. I shall concentrate largely on the criminal offences proposed in Part 1 of the Bill.

Our first concern is one of principle, because restrictions proposed in the Bill threaten important rights and liberties, but we are also concerned that the Government have missed serious adverse and almost certainly unintended and unforeseen consequences which follow from this proposed transformation of our national security law. These concerns overlap, where there are restrictions of our rights and liberties which were almost certainly unforeseen, and I shall deal with them together.

Our first objection in principle is that the breadth of many of the definitions in the Bill would substantially and unacceptably broaden the scope of the protections ostensibly afforded to national security. Let us consider protected information. The definition within Clause 1 is unduly wide. It covers any information where

“it is reasonable to expect that access to the information … would be restricted in any way”.

So the information does not need actually to be restricted to classify as protected information, disclosure of which is to be criminalised by the Bill.

Then there is the foreign power condition—the foundation of a major expansion of the reach of the national security provisions, and applicable to a number of the new proposed offences. I quite understand the need to replace the concept of a national enemy with the concept of a foreign power, in the attempt to update our legislation and rid it of old-fashioned distinctions between friend and foe and to make it “actor-agnostic”, as the Minister described it. But the attempt is not trouble-free.

In particular, the foreign power condition must be met for an offence under Clause 1 of obtaining or disclosing protected information to be made out. The condition is defined by Clause 29 and relates, broadly, to conduct that is carried out for or on behalf of a foreign power, which may be any friendly non-UK Government. Conduct qualifies as carried out for or on behalf of a foreign power if it is carried out with financial or other assistance provided by a foreign power, so a state-backed broadcasting organisation or state-run company funded by a friendly Government would have such financial assistance. It follows that anyone who obtains or discloses information which they “ought to know” is prejudicial to the interests of the United Kingdom, however defined—and I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, that there is no definition available; it is a desperately controversial test—on behalf of a foreign nationally owned broadcaster is at risk of prosecution and conviction of this very serious national security offence.

The freedom of journalists working for foreign broadcasters might be substantially restricted if, for instance, they came by and used leaked information which the UK Government might prefer that they did not have and thereby found themselves at risk of being prosecuted for a Clause 1 offence. The relationship between the conduct and the foreign power may be indirect, so any such conduct meets the foreign power condition wherever it appears in the Bill. For example, it also appears in the definition of the new offence of obtaining or disclosing trade secrets under Clause 2, which carries a maximum term of 14 years. Clause 2 again is very widely drawn; it covers unauthorised obtaining, recording or retention of a trade secret, for whatever purpose, on behalf of any body deriving financial assistance of any sort from a friendly overseas government body. This presents a significant threat to a wide range of investigative journalism on matters of importance and public interest, which ought to be aired in public even if the owners of such information might regard such airing as highly unwelcome.

In the unforeseen consequences category, the Clause 3 offence of assisting a foreign intelligence service presents a serious difficulty. Under this Bill, the foreign intelligence service can be that of any friendly foreign country; an offence under the clause, again carrying a 14-year term, penalises all conduct to assist any foreign intelligence service in carrying out UK-related activities—that is, any activities, of whatever nature, taking place in the UK. So, a UK citizen who assisted Mossad within the UK to recover goods looted by the Nazis, or who helped the CIA find and arrest war criminals, would be guilty of an offence, unless they could show that they were acting under a UK legal obligation or effectively on the direction of the British Government. If they could not show that, I can see no defence under the clause as drafted. How can that be right?

The unauthorised entry to a prohibited place offence under Clause 4 is also far too wide, penalising even inspection of a photograph of a prohibited place, even for journalism, if the accused should have known that the purpose was prejudicial to the interests of the UK. And that is not just UK defence or security interests, but any interests at all. So, photographs of any environmentally damaging activity carried on by government as a matter of policy—fracking, for example, if it were ever again authorised—would count. That is not the defence of national security; that is the suppression of legitimate investigation and dissent.

The Home Secretary told the House of Commons in a Statement on national security and this Bill in particular on 1 November, a week after her reappointment:

“Now, as our markets integrate, we need to think about the future of our industry and innovation. Our economic security guarantees our economic sovereignty just as our democratic security guarantees our freedom … Britain has been on the frontline of the defence of liberty for generations”.—[Official Report, Commons, 1/11/22; col. 790.]


The Bill fails to ensure that the steps we take to defend our liberty are targeted and limited to what is necessary for that defence of liberty. So, the first task for this House at the later stages in the Bill will be to cut down the scope of conduct that is unnecessarily and wrongly caught by the Bill as drafted.

However, much of the discussion on the Bill has been as to whether there should be a public interest defence to the new offences. We regard such a defence as essential. It offers the prospect of avoiding convicting journalists, investigators, campaigners, whistleblowers and many others who should not be targeted by the criminal law at all. Such a defence must be broad enough to protect the free flow of information on which democratic political discourse depends, and it must protect from criminal sanction activities that may infringe private rights of physical or intellectual property where such infringement is justified in the public interest. As the NUJ briefing, which many of us will have received, put it succinctly:

“There should be no situation in which journalists risk being classed as spies or traitors … A free press is one of the conditions of a pluralistic democracy and the UK government should not close down scrutiny of its activities.”


I do not believe that the public interest defence should be available only in Clause 1 cases of obtaining or disclosing protected information. It should be no less applicable in cases under Clauses 2 to 5 and Clause 16, and possibly Clauses 13 and 15 as well.

The possible conditions of a public interest defence have been widely discussed, but I suggest they should include, in some form, each of the following. First, it should be for the defendants to raise the defence. I leave open the question of whether the burden of proof should be on the defence to prove the defence, or whether, once that defence is raised, it should be for the prosecution to rebut it. However, if the burden is to be imposed on the defendant to prove the defence, that should be on the balance of probabilities, and it should also be specifically incumbent on prosecuting authorities to consider the prospect of such a defence succeeding before a decision to prosecute is made. Unnecessary and unmeritorious prosecutions cause untold heartache and substantial loss. The prospect of being prosecuted has a serious chilling effect on conduct in the public interest, and the risk of such prosecutions should be carefully weighed before they are ever brought.

Secondly, the manner in which the defendant has acted should always be a factor to be considered. Thirdly, so too should the good faith of the defendant be considered, and whether or not the defendant reasonably believed that their conduct was in the public interest. Fourthly, proportionality should always be a factor, whether or not the conduct was no more than was necessary to protect the public interest asserted by the defendant. Fifthly, whether or not the conduct was for personal gain should be considered, but the fact that a defendant stood to gain from their conduct should not be enough to rebut the defence; after all, journalists stand to gain from scoops. Finally, a jury should always be left to consider the overall reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct in the light of a balancing of possible harms risked against possible benefits to be derived by the public.

In an interconnected world, many of us work in a number of professional fields, collaborating with agencies of foreign Governments. Particularly sensitive is the work of journalists, academics, researchers in commercial fields, and many working directly for friendly foreign Governments and international organisations. My noble friend Lord Wallace of Saltaire will elaborate our concerns about the foreign influence registration scheme, or FIRS, and the degree to which academics will be snowed under by a bureaucratic avalanche in working out what they need to do to comply with this law’s requirements, and then in undertaking the necessary registrations to comply with an unnecessary and overcomplicated registration system which threatens to stifle and deter international academic co-operation. Journalists, broadcasters and researchers in the commercial world, as well as the media, are equally under threat.

On a happier note, it is a relief to note that the Government have excluded giving and taking legal advice from the scope of this part of the Bill; a completely justified protection of legal professional privilege and the right of all to secure legal advice in confidence. However, the Bill contains a pernicious attack on the right to equality before the law. Clauses 82 to 84 give a court power to reduce damages payable by the Crown to any claimant bringing national security proceedings against the Government. But national security proceedings include any case where any of the claimant’s evidence or submissions, of whatever nature, relate to the activities of any security service, here or overseas. So if a claimant sues the UK Government—any department—and adduces evidence of wrongdoing by, for instance, the Saudi or Rwandan intelligence services, the Crown is entitled to seek an order that the damages will be reduced, and to seek that order at any stage in advance of final judgment. Granted that one of the factors the court must take into account is whether the claimant has been guilty of terrorist wrongdoing, but the lack of that factor does not avoid a reduction in damages. That is inequality before the law. It hands the Government a tool to stifle legal claims against them. It is inimical to liberty.

So too is the proposed ban of up to 30 years on the grant of civil legal aid for anyone convicted of any terrorist offence or an offence having a terrorism connection. The ban is not just for the most heinous terrorist offences but minor accomplice offences, which may have been committed by a family member and which, as the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the Law Society point out, may not be of a very serious nature. Further, the legal aid ban is not just for proceedings connected with terrorism but any civil legal aid to which they might be entitled for any purpose, thus largely putting them outside the protection of the law.

Although the general tenor of the Bill and its purpose are understood and accepted, at the later stages of this Bill we will be trying to make sure that it properly reflects the concerns that we have.