Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
Main Page: Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames's debates with the Home Office
(3 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support the opposition of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and my noble friend Lady Randerson to this clause. The clause as it stands is simply wrong in principle and I agree with the noble and learned Lord that this is not a case where you can simply tinker with the language. The problem is that the clause threatens to penalise the outcome of the offence—that is, serious injury—with imprisonment, yet the mental element of the offence of careless driving is no more than negligence. Careless driving involves no more than a driver falling below the standard of care of a prudent driver. All negligence is careless; a simple mistake or inadvertence will suffice. To make such an offence imprisonable because it results in serious injury is not a step that we have taken before. It offends against the principle that the seriousness of the offence should depend not just upon the act done, but on the state of mind of the offender. That is what distinguishes careless driving from dangerous driving, because dangerous driving involves a very serious departure from the normal standard of a careful and sensible driver.
I make one further point. In the absence of mechanical failure or an unexpected event, almost every accident is the result of negligence on the part of at least one of the drivers involved. Sadly, a large number of accidents involve serious injury. A broken limb is a serious injury for this purpose, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, pointed out.
The vast majority of accidents arising from negligence —whether they cause serious injury or not—do not currently lead to prosecution. I should be grateful to hear whether the Minister regards the establishment of this new offence as likely to lead to more prosecutions. This clause would leave it to the police and prosecuting authorities to pick out the few accidents which they decided should lead to prosecution. This would expose drivers to the risk of imprisonment for a simple mistake. Leaving this decision to the police and prosecuting authorities to implement in a very few selected cases would be arbitrary and unfair. It would introduce an unwelcome element of lottery into our justice system.
It may well be that the noble and learned Lord does not press this to a vote. I hope that, for the reasons I have outlined, we will get a very clear statement from the Minister as to how prosecuting decisions will be taken in these cases and as to what he regards as the likely approach to sentencing. I suggest that imprisonment for inadvertence is a retrograde step.
My Lords, I was pleased to have the opportunity to join the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, on Amendment 60A—whether Clause 67 should stand part of the Bill. I thank the Minister for his time and willingness to try to assist us. I shall listen carefully to what he has to say.
The crux of this is when careless becomes dangerous. My experience in 20 years as a magistrate is that, basically, people are charged with both in the hope that the prosecution manages to make one or the other stick, as they say. I share the concern expressed by my noble friend of exactly what careless means. What should it mean? It should mean exactly what comes into our minds when we use the word. It should not be regarded as just a slightly milder form of dangerous. The thought processes behind it should be significantly different. Careless usually implies without specific intent—often a momentary lack of attention. Most of us sitting here will have suffered from this at some point in our driving careers. Most of us will have been lucky enough not to have caused an accident during that momentary lack of attention. Or, if we did cause an accident, hopefully it did not cause injury. Even the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, has struggled with the definition and hence opted to try to remove the clause.
I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response, because he has assured us that he will be able to elucidate sufficiently for us to feel that there will be a clear distinction. We do not want to face a situation in which, for example, a harassed mother with a child or two in the back who backs out of a parking space and inadvertently hits a pedestrian might go to prison, when she was backing out carefully in terms of her own concentration at that moment, was not going fast and was looking in her mirrors, but there were too many things happening at the same time for her to be able to concentrate fully and she made a terrible mistake.
I think we have all been guilty of that sort of momentary inattention or error of judgment and people should not find themselves being sent to prison for something such as that. It is therefore very important that the Minister is able to reassure us that that is not the kind of thing the Government have in mind.