Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Bill [HL] Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
Main Page: Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames's debates with the Scotland Office
(4 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, as the House has heard, the present law on the grounds for divorce dates from the Divorce Reform Act 1969, which was then reflected in Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. Parliament legislated for no-fault divorce in the Family Law Act 1996, as the noble and learned Lords, Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, and the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries of Pentregarth, have explained, but, partly because of its complexity, the change was never implemented, so the present law has persisted for 50 years.
From these Benches, and in concert with a substantial majority of family lawyers and judges—in that context, I welcome the important longer historical perspective of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Walker—we have consistently campaigned for no-fault divorce, and so, subject to one or two qualifications to which I will turn, we warmly welcome the Bill, which makes a change that is seriously overdue. The noble Baroness, Lady Shackleton, spoke in the gap from all her experience of practising divorce law.
Before turning to the detail of the arguments on the Bill, I will just say how impressive I found the thoughtful and persuasive maiden speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Hunt of Bethnal Green. I greatly look forward to her future contributions to the work of this House on areas that are sadly not as well understood by us as they should be.
Under the present law, to end a failed marriage without waiting two years, one party has to claim that the other party is to blame for the breakdown so, unsurprisingly, most divorces—57% in England and Wales—are based on unreasonable behaviour or adultery, when human experience tells us that most marriage breakdowns result not just from the conduct of one spouse but from failures of both.
I agree with the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Portsmouth that divorce should be an overall process of securing a collaborative resolution of the difficult issues facing the couple and their family—their children in particular—including financial issues and issues concerning children, but I part company with the right reverend Prelate in his view that the Bill stands in the way of kinder divorce, and I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, on the effect of the Bill. Under the present law, the divorce process is kicked off with a hostile and unproductive blame game, one in which the children are often caught in the middle, which sharply aggravates the strain and anxiety of coping with their parents’ divorce, a point well made by my noble friend Lady Burt of Solihull.
The approach of family lawyers in this jurisdiction to the management of securing a divorce decree has largely been conciliatory. Resolution, formerly the Solicitors Family Law Association, has developed a collaborative culture in which allegations of unreasonable behaviour in petitions are reduced in number and often limited to relatively trivial conduct—certainly that was true before the Owens case, as the noble Baroness, Lady Shackleton, said. Then the allegations are, or were, agreed with the other side and the divorce proceeds on that basis. Resolution is to be commended for that approach, which is also pursued by the Family Law Bar Association, but it has gone nowhere near addressing the fundamental objections to a fault-based system, some of which were canvassed in today’s debate.
First, the present system is dishonest. It is based on the fiction that the conduct of one party alone is to blame for the breakdown, and the allegations set out in the petition are the true reason for the breakdown, when both propositions are generally false. To base divorce proceedings—legal proceedings in a court—on falsehood brings the law into disrepute and alienates the parties. As Sir James Munby, former President of the Family Division put it:
“The hypocrisy and lack of intellectual honesty which is so characteristic a feature of the current law and procedure differs only in magnitude from the hypocrisy and lack of intellectual honesty which characterised the ‘hotel divorce’ under the old law”—
a process mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope.
Secondly, in the Owens case, the courts at every level held that the behaviour proved against the husband was insufficiently serious to establish unreasonable behaviour. Mrs Owens was denied a divorce when her marriage had clearly long ago broken down. She had to sit out the balance of five years’ separation before she could secure a decree. That was clearly intolerable but, frankly, the judges were right in their application of the present law and their understandable reluctance to usurp our role as parliamentarians by changing it. It is now up to us to make the change required. It follows from what I have said that I cannot accept the view expressed by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Carlisle, the noble Lords, Lord Farmer and Lord Morrow, and others, that one party to a marriage should be able to contest a divorce so as to tie the other into a marriage against his or her will. That point was ably made by the noble Baroness, Lady Shackleton.
There is no persuasive evidence that the Bill would increase the divorce rate, except in the very short term by advancing the date of divorce in the case of parties who are already separated and waiting out the two or five-year periods under the present law; this is the spike acknowledged by the noble Baroness, Lady Eaton. I stress that there is no credible evidence either that no-fault divorce undermines or weakens marriage or the respect in which it is held. I believe that the evidence supports the contrary view: making divorce honest and improving our support for marriage, family stability and relationship support are, as the noble Baroness, Lady Wyld, and the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries, argued, the best ways of expressing society’s commitment to marriage.
I stress, however, that I share the Government’s view that the Bill should be kept within its present compass—making the securing of a divorce order more honest and kinder to the parties—and that improvements to arrangements for financial provision, children’s arrangements and relationship support should be the subject of a fresh consultation, to which I hope the Government will commit, and possible future legislation.
Thirdly, since the decision in the Owens case, we hear of district judges rejecting petitions where they find the allegations made too insubstantial or anodyne to sustain a finding of unreasonable behaviour; so, harsher and more contentious petitions now have to be—and regularly are—filed.
Fourthly, while blame may not matter to the lawyers, because conduct or fault is generally irrelevant to financial proceedings or any issues affecting children, it does matter to the parties. They do not want to be seen as responsible for the breakdown, by the law, the other party, their children, their friends or the world at large. Yet, in most divorces, the present law pins responsibility on the respondent, regardless of reality and truth, and even though many respondents deny the truth of the allegations against them. On the basis of the research carried out by Professor Trinder, only 29% of respondents believe that the facts alleged in the divorce petitions against them represent the real reason for divorce.
To avoid the allocation of blame, we get cross-petitions, even where a marriage is clearly over, whereby each party digs out incidents, often long-forgotten, to try to prove the other at fault. So, we have the absurd position where two adults who once chose to marry each other and now both seek the same remedy and outcome—divorce—but nevertheless poison the early stages of the process in a pointless battle over blame. This depletes their scarce financial resources, aggravates their emotional fragility and severely distresses their children, all for no practical purpose, until one of them is persuaded to give up or they run out of time and can proceed on the basis of two years’ separation and consent to divorce.
Fifthly, the need to make allegations of conduct against a violent or abusive spouse scares many victims of domestic violence or coercive behaviour out of proceeding with a divorce, trapping them in obviously failed marriages. Worse still, abusive spouses often insist that the price of a divorce will be that the victim of the violence allows the abuser to present the petition, while the victim must accept the blame. That is one reason why Women’s Aid and other women’s charities strongly support the Bill.
I move to one improvement to the Bill that we wish to see. With the Bill as it stands, under new Section 1(5)(a) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, the court may make a conditional order after 20 weeks from the start of proceedings by the applicant. However, there is nothing to stop a court making a conditional order once the 20 weeks have passed, even though the applicant has not established that the respondent has been served with or knows of the proceedings, or that the court has sanctioned an order being made without proof of service. It is simply unfair that a respondent may be hit with a divorce when he or she has known nothing about the proceedings before the making of the conditional order or before the 20-week period has run, or nearly run, its course. This is a point that the Law Society, in its helpful briefing, and others, including the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, and the noble Baroness, Lady Howe of Idlicote, have made today.
We have discussed this point with the Minister, to whom I am very grateful for arranging an all-Peers’ drop-in meeting last week, and he has assured us that the Government will consider it. I would like to see a proviso that the court may not make a conditional order unless it is satisfied either that the respondent has been served at least 12 weeks before the making of the order or that deemed or substituted service has been approved by the court in an appropriate case and effected. I pick on 12 weeks because the 20-week period is intended to allow time for reflection and discussion prior to the making of an order, and it seems right that the respondent should have the benefit of the majority of that time to consider his or her position and for any discussions. I have suggested that 60% of that time is an appropriate proportion of the overall period, but of course we are not dogmatic about that.
There will be cases where a respondent evades service and generally will not co-operate with the applicant or the court. However, I suggest that such cases can be dealt with by making provision for deemed or substituted service and ensuring that the rules provide for an extension of the 26-week period to final order where necessary, where service has been effected late. That would require changes to proposed new Sections 1(5) to 1(8) and 17 of the Matrimonial Causes Act set out in Clauses 1 and 2 of this Bill and corresponding changes to the proposed new provisions of the Civil Partnership Act.
We have considered the proposal by the Law Society that there should be a bar to litigation during the first three months of the 20-week period, during which time the parties would not be able to commence any applications for financial provision without agreement. We look forward to further discussion on this suggestion. As yet I am not yet persuaded that delaying proceedings for financial provision is always a good idea, though sometimes it may be.
I agree with my noble friend Lady Burt that the fee for obtaining a divorce, at £550, is far too high. A fee set at that level might generally require savings before proceedings can be commenced. That is unfair to less well-off applicants.
There is a great deal in the Bill that deserves discussion. We have had a very good debate today, and I look forward to meeting the Minister and others and discussing the Bill further during the rest of its passage.