Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
Main Page: Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames's debates with the Wales Office
(13 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the amendment addresses two issues. I do not propose to deal with the question of possible weekend voting because we have discussed that already.
The first issue is that the Bill as drawn omits to provide for a timetable for an election to take place after a vote for a Dissolution or a vote of no confidence. The existing provision in the Bill is for an election to be held on the day appointed by Her Majesty, by proclamation, on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. The Bill therefore leaves it to the defeated Prime Minister to decide on the advice he gives to the Queen as to how long should elapse before a general election is held in the event of a vote of no confidence. To leave the date of the election as open as that would be unsatisfactory and open to abuse.
Secondly, the timescale suggested in the amendment—that an election should be held no earlier than four weeks after the Speaker’s certificate and no later than eight weeks after the certificate—is intended to strike a sensible balance. On the one hand, it is important to avoid an unholy rush to judgment, with a squeezed timetable for candidate selection, for nominations and for postal votes; on the other hand, it should not be possible to delay an election under either of the provisions for an early Dissolution for too long. It is also important not to permit an unduly long campaign to enable a Prime Minister to bolster an unpopular Government’s position. Keeping the period reasonably short is particularly important when there is a vote of no confidence because the Government who have just been rejected by the elected House would remain in power following that vote until replaced after the election.
However, the period allowed also has to be long enough to make it possible for a reasonably full campaign to take place, even where the Speaker’s certificate comes just before a holiday period. The timing of any early Dissolution may be unpredictable and inconvenient and that may happen. For this reason, while it might at first blush seem desirable to opt for a shorter period of six or seven weeks as the longest period permissible, we feel that eight weeks is about right.
It will be interesting to hear what other noble Lords think about the appropriate period, but it would not be sensible for the Bill to be enacted with no timetable at all. I beg to move.
My Lords, this is a characteristic of trying to solve a problem that has never existed. The only occasion on which this system has been tested—we keep going over the same ground and I do not need to repeat it—was when Jim Callaghan lost a vote of no confidence. I can remember absolutely no dispute, argument, difficulty or sense of abuse about the period between the defeat of the Government and the general election being held. However, now, as with fixed-term Parliaments and a number of other provisions in the Bill, we seem to need to write into statute law what has historically always operated perfectly satisfactorily.
In particular I am concerned that, unless we can improve the Bill, in addition to the two-week period when the Government are being formed, there is now to be up to eight weeks—10 weeks in all—between the defeat of the Government in a motion of no confidence and the general election. The longest election period in the time that I was fighting elections was six weeks, in 1997. I think that there was universal agreement that that was at least two weeks too long. The public get bored—I do not blame them—pretty rapidly. I shall not go over those arguments again because they are conclusive. I simply say that this is yet another example of an attempt to impose a straitjacketed legal constraint on something which has worked perfectly well and requires no change whatever. At its worst, it could lead to a general election campaign effectively lasting for 10 weeks, which is at least six weeks too long.
It is not what the Government envisage. However, if a vote of confidence had been on 10 December 2012, holding an election on 1 May 2013, which the noble and learned Lord mentioned, might well be considered to be an abuse of the statutory power. Under judicial reviews, the court would not necessarily substitute its own date, but the Prime Minister would be required to nominate or recommend a date to Her Majesty that would be consistent with a proper exercise of the statutory power. It is highly hypothetical and unlikely, but it would not be unreasonable; if there had been a vote of no confidence and 10 days had elapsed in December 2012, setting an election date for 1 May 2013 would be an abuse of power. That would be widely recognised.
However, the point that I am making is that we do not believe that there should be the kind of restrictions set out in my noble friend’s amendment. They could run into practical problems for the very reasons that he illustrated, but, in practical political terms, it is not likely that a date would be set that would be seen to be an abuse by taking it too far.
My Lords, I am grateful for the consideration that has been given by noble Lords and my noble and learned friend to the amendment. The problem that it sought to address was simply the question of the lack of a timetable. I am bound to say that the exchange we have just heard between the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, and my noble and learned friend illustrates that there is—in theory, at least—scope for an abuse of power by a Prime Minister that could, perhaps in extreme and unlikely circumstances, lead to a challenge, because executive action of this sort might be justiciable and there is room for an abuse of power. The amendment simply seeks to address that.
Of course we are open to consideration of that time, but the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, talked of James Callaghan; it does not follow that because James Callaghan behaved well on that occasion everyone else necessarily would do so. As regards the number of weeks, it is right that there is a window of only a month, and that could involve a holiday period. However, the corresponding argument is that it may be undesirable for a vote of confidence in June to lead to an election being deferred until September or October, on the basis that holidays would intervene. We took the view that is worthy of consideration that it is more important to have an election than it is to avoid the holiday periods and allow them to be an excuse for not holding an election. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.