East Coast Main Line Franchise

Lord Mann Excerpts

Thursday 20th June 2013 Commons Chamber

[Hugh Bayley]

My hon. Friend makes a good point.

[John Mann (Bassetlaw) (Lab)]

rose—

[Hugh Bayley]

Our speeches are time limited and we get no injury time for interventions, so I must make some progress.

The good performance that East Coast has achieved is all the more surprising because it has not been given the security of tenure of a 10 to 15-year franchise that the comparator company on the west coast has. In fact, East Coast has not really known from one month to the next where it stands or whether it will continue to run the service or not. Last year, the Department for Transport asked the chief executive of East Coast, Karen Boswell, to prepare a five-year plan for the future of her company. She submitted that plan in January this year. In March, an interview with Karen Boswell by Roger Ford was published in Modern Railways, in which she set out her plans, and there was no hint of privatisation at that point. So what has changed?

Franchising is not a low-cost option. The National Audit Office report on the east coast National Express failure estimated that that had cost the Department for Transport between £330 million and £380 million. The Department had expected to receive that money from the franchisee up to 2012 but had not done so. The funds then had to be recovered from other Department for Transport budgets. The aborted west coast main line franchising exercise cost the taxpayer £55 million. Alan Whitehouse, the former BBC transport correspondent, estimates that each one of those bidding for a major franchise such as these spends between £10 million and £13 million in pursuit of its bid. Those costs ultimately come back to the passengers in the form of higher fares.

Two weeks ago, in the debate in Westminster Hall, I argued that East Coast should continue to run the service, not indefinitely but for the period of a full franchise, so that it could be an effective public sector comparator. We have seen today in The Northern Echo that Lord Adonis, who was Secretary of State in 2009 when East Coast was given the job of rescuing the service, shares that view. It is of course consistent with what he said in 2009, which was that the service should be run by a public sector contractor, East Coast, but not indefinitely. I am not arguing for an indefinite arrangement; I am asking for a period equivalent to a private franchise so that we can compare like with like. That is still my view.

I have been thinking about the matter further, however, and I put it to the Minister that we already have a public sector comparator. By the end of this financial year, East Coast will have run the service for four years, returned about £800 million to the Treasury and provided an improved service. If the Government are hellbent on refranchising, will they commission an independent body—perhaps the National Audit Office—to analyse the bids that they receive and compare them with East Coast’s performance? If none of the bidders that responds to the Minister’s tendering exercise can produce a robust case to show that it can deliver a better and safer service with lower fares and a bigger financial return to the Government than East Coast is currently providing, he should keep the service with East Coast.

The Government seem to be hellbent on refranchising, but we know that refranchising against a short timetable is unwise, to say the least. The Laidlaw inquiry, which looked into the fiasco of the collapsed west coast main line franchising process, came up with this recommendation:

“I recommend that the Department for Transport ensures that a credible timeline, with reference to the complexity of the procurement involved, is assessed and agreed at the inception”,

and he argued that this timeline should provide time for contingencies, and for comprehensive quality and commercial reviews. The Brown report, a rather wider one on the franchising system, which was also commissioned following the west coast collapse, proposed a detailed 24-month timeline for running a franchising process.

Let us look at what happened with the west coast franchising process—the rushed, bungled and failed west coast franchising process. The invitation to tender was put out in May 2011. The franchise was awarded to FirstGroup in August 2012—15 months later—with a view to starting the service in December 2012, 19 months later. Both Laidlaw and Brown said it was too short a timetable.

What, then, are the Government proposing for the east coast main line franchise? They intend to put a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union, which I take as a starting point, in October this year, with an invitation to tender in February 2014 and with the contract being awarded in October 2014—not in 15, 19 or 24 months, as proposed in the Brown review, but in just 12 months. The franchise is intended to start in February 2015, conveniently timed just before the next general election, which would be 16 months after the process started, as opposed to the 19 months from invitation to tender through to the intended start on the west coast franchise.

The Government are proposing to do this east coast franchise not only in a more rushed and hurried way than was done with the west coast franchise—the failed west coast franchise—but in a substantially shorter period than was proposed by each of the two reports they set up to investigate why the west coast franchising process had failed. When will the Minister’s party ever learn? This looks like a fire sale, rushed through before the 2015 general election.

I served on the Bill Committee that scrutinised what is now the Railways Act 1993—the legislation that introduced the privatisation of our railways. I have seen it all before. In Committee, the Government of the day said that they would franchise rail services to train operating companies, but that they had no intention of privatising the railway infrastructure of track and signalling. Then, after the Bill went through, the Government changed their mind and decided to rush through—steamroller through—the privatisation of the rail track by creating a body called Railtrack. We know that this body spectacularly and comprehensively failed. When it collapsed, the Labour Government had to put together a public sector rescue at considerable expense to the taxpayer. They created Network Rail—and we still have it as a not-for-profit company owned by guarantee, which does not have directors and does not pay dividends. We have a public sector body.

Alan Whitehouse had this to say in the Yorkshire Post just over a week ago:

“Until just a few weeks ago, East Coast was to remain in the public sector for as far ahead as anyone could see. Suddenly, it is up for grabs. Can it be a mere coincidence that the Transport Secretary…announces a re-franchising plan that would see East Coast trains returned to the private sector by the time of the next election? Or a piece of blatant electioneering? It all smacks of a similar desperation to that of the Major government’s ‘scorched earth’ policy of making rail privatisation a fait accompli before an election that he knew he would lose.”

The Minister does not have to take it from me. He does not even have to take it from a well-respected transport correspondent like Mr Whitehouse. He need only look at the history—his own party’s history—of what a rushed privatisation on the railways led to last time his party was incumbent at the time of an election. I say to him, “Slow down, even if you believe that reprivatisation is the right thing to do. Do not make the same mistakes that you made with the west coast main line. Take your time. I have no doubt that if you win the next general election you will go ahead with it, but if you do it as a fire sale, it will be a disaster not just for the railway, but for the economies of our regions that are served by it.”