Constitutional Change: Constitution Committee Report Debate

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Department: Cabinet Office

Constitutional Change: Constitution Committee Report

Lord Maclennan of Rogart Excerpts
Wednesday 7th December 2011

(12 years, 5 months ago)

Grand Committee
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Lord Maclennan of Rogart Portrait Lord Maclennan of Rogart
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I begin by expressing my admiration for the report of the Constitution Committee. I believe that, in quite a short compass, it defines many of the current problems of our legislative process for dealing with constitutional issues and suggests a system that I think has a great deal of merit. I really hope that the Government will reconsider because, to put it as kindly as I can, I regard their response to this committee’s report as deeply disappointing.

In the past, I, with Robin Cook, engaged in a process of consultation with parties, government and the public about how to implement constitutional reform, and what I drew from that experience was the importance of proper deliberation and of seeking agreement across as broad a spectrum of politics as possible. The committee was right to say that constitutional reform could not possibly be based on consensus, but the widest agreement is very desirable. I thought that the Government’s suggestion in their response that legislation for constitutional reform is no different from other legislation was misconceived. In the first place, it is not a measure of relative importance in the eyes of the public that distinguishes, say, the health Bill currently before Parliament from a Bill to determine how frequently parliamentary boundaries will be changed. Different people will have very different views about that. It is important to recognise that public trust in our democracy depends upon our constitutional arrangements, and we should not take them as a lesser matter. When countries are suffering economic difficulties—and there are very acute difficulties at the moment—the tendency is not to feel confidence in the political system that has brought them to that place. It is very important that people have confidence in the decision-making process, the checks and balances, how leaders emerge, how they represent the public and how they can be got at by the public. Consequently, I very much agreed with the general evidence given by Professor Sir Jeffrey Jowell to the committee that,

“the constitution provides the rules of the game, the framework for all official decisions. If these decisions are to be accepted as legitimate, even though you may not agree with them, then the framework of decision-making must command respect and general acquiescence”.

The process that has been described by the committee is one that would make it more likely that acquiescence and respect are obtained for these measures of constitutional change.

I would contrast the measures that were introduced at the beginning of the Labour Government in 1997—including freedom of information; an initial step towards reform of this House; devolution—with the measures that were brought before Parliament at the very end of the last Labour Government, which had not been subject, with the exception of the Civil Service proposals, to any kind of extensive reform and were causing quite a considerable degree of difference between different groups which are interested in the subject.

It does appear to me that the committee has given us serious suggestions as to how the prelegislative process should be conducted. All the steps—seven steps are recommended in this process, including a post-legislative review—are indispensable if we are to evoke the trust of the public. I am concerned that this short and dismissive response will confine this report to the archives. I do not believe that that would be a satisfactory outcome. I hope that the Constitution Committee will consider whether some of these matters might be put, with the agreement of the House, to the various committees that consider procedure, including the Liaison Committee. The incoherence of our constitutional reform is beginning to become not just a sign of flexibility, but something that baffles the public; it does not operate to bring about more sensible changes in the way we reach our governmental decisions.

I hope that this will not be end of the debate and that there will be a systematic series of suggestions put forward for the House to deliberate upon.