Lord Lucas
Main Page: Lord Lucas (Conservative - Excepted Hereditary)Department Debates - View all Lord Lucas's debates with the Home Office
(12 years, 8 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, if I may start off with a general remark, let me say that I suspect that I will end up preferring the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, to mine. My purpose in tabling these amendments is to give us a good chance to discuss this part of the Bill, which I think has gone too far in trying to apply to schools special arrangements for dealing with biometric data that are neither required nor sensible.
In the wider world, letting one’s biometric data go is perhaps frightening. What Facebook is up to at the moment—for example, allowing people to tag photographs, such that I can be identified from photographs on other people’s websites because they are tagged with my name and details and the way in which that allows information about me to spread around the world—is worrying enough in our society but would be extremely worrying in, say, Syria. One should be aware of the dangers posed by the widespread ability to identify people remotely. If it became possible at a distance to pick up people’s identity as they passed shop-fronts and gazed into window displays and to have information on fingerprints widely available so that, for example, as soon as I touched a door-handle the store would know who I was, that would, to my mind, be a fairly nightmarish world to be part of. I am very grateful that our Government show no inclination to go down that road and, indeed, at an early stage abandoned identity cards, which would have been a step in that direction.
However, to my mind, in a closed community like a school, those worries do not apply. The school is supposed to know where each kid is all the time. I remember getting terribly upset when a friend of mine had their child knock on the door, having walked a mile home from school without the school having known that the child was absent. You expect a school to know where the children are, you expect it to know what they are doing and you expect it to be in control of them. Within a closed arrangement like a school, having one’s biometric information available is not such a big thing. Within this community of the House of Lords, the place is full of people—thank goodness—who know who we are. That is a biometric recognition system. One of the reasons why this place is secure is that it is full of doorkeepers who would recognise someone who did not belong. Within a school, an automatic system does no more than that, and it is fundamentally no more frightening than that.
A school has a lot of information on the pupils under its charge. A lot of that information is much more sensitive than a hash of some fingerprint—something that would take a great deal of ingenuity to make any real use of if it escaped. A school has information on what children have done in terms of their academic endeavours, what special needs they have, what mischiefs they have committed and people’s opinions of them, which could be extremely sensitive if they appeared in later life. Schools are used to guarding a lot of data about their charges. Whether they do that as perfectly as possible, I do not know, but one very rarely comes across occasions when this information has escaped to people’s embarrassment—when it does, it has usually been released by their mothers who are so proud of the reports that their children have received at school.
This is the context within which we must think about the sort of information which will be available as a result of a biometric recognition system. All that it is doing is scanning the proportions of a face or taking a few data points from the ridges of a fingerprint—but not as many as you would take if you were doing a proper security scan because you want something that works fast rather than completely accurately. There is no common storage format or easy way of that data being made use of by outside people even if they did discover it.
In these circumstances, as I say, you are supposed to know everything that is going on—knowing whether a child is in a classroom is something that a school is supposed to know. By and large, it is quite rare that these systems are used even to that extent. Mostly, they are used just for tagging library books to see who takes them out and to see who is entitled to free school lunches in order to avoid the use of cash and people being labelled as free school-meal kids. There is no identification—they are in a way disguising someone’s identity and protecting their information when used as meal systems. Fundamentally, though, biometric systems are used because they enable a school to do what it should be doing more efficiently and more cheaply than it could without them.
I agree that there is some basis for asking for parental consent. I probably do not naturally start out from that position, but I am convinced of it by what the Government have said, and by things that have been said to me in a long e-mail correspondence with some of the people promoting this side of the Bill. There are a lot of things that parents are asked to consent to, and it is quite reasonable that a school should explain why it wishes to use these systems and get general parental consent for it. If a parent wishes to say no, the school should make arrangements for that particular child to be excepted. I go along with that.
However, I really want the systems and rules that we put in place for schools to fit in with all the other rules that are there for asking parental consent for this, that and the other—whether it be religious observance, sex education or whatever else. These are taken seriously by schools and there are ordinary systems for them, the basis for which is single-parent consent. If two parents are involved and one objects, that nullifies the consent, but if you are seeking consent all you need is the consent of one parent. With a lot of schools, for parental arrangements it is really hard enough to get that; to go beyond that, in what seems to be an entirely ordinary matter for schools, does not seem sensible.
The other aspect that I want to look at is where facial recognition systems in particular, and other forms of ID, are going to be built into the systems that kids are using. If they are accessing Facebook from school—as many will be, because it is a common way of finding out information and communicating with other children who are collaborating on a project—there will be biometric information systems built into that software that will not be within the school’s power to disable. That will be within the individual child’s power to deal with, and the school will not have responsibility for it. If the school is using Windows 8—not yet out, but in beta form—there will be facial recognition systems built into that, so that when you sit down, your computer knows that it is you; if someone else sits down at your computer, it does not turn on. That, again, is a personally activated system. A school can disable that on school computers, but if the school is allowing children to access laptops and to take them home, as many secondary schools now do, then you would expect the child to be in control of the system and it would not be reasonable to require the school to impose or be responsible for the way in which biometric recognition systems are used without the school’s own systems. Some of the wording that we have at the moment crosses those boundaries.
On my individual amendments, Amendment 85 is completely garbled and I have no idea what it means. It may be that my noble friend’s officials have been able to decipher it, but I think it must have been my handwriting and I cannot now work out what the amendment means. I apologise to him and to the Committee for that.
Amendment 87 is a version of the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. It is really saying that you must have single-parent consent and that an objection by the other parent nullifies that, but otherwise you only need one parent’s consent. Amendment 88 is another way of saying that, while the second part of Amendment 87 deals with the point that I made about some bits of biometric recognition being outwith the school’s control. Amendment 90 covers that same point, as does Amendment 92.
Amendment 94 is a worry about the wording in that part of the Bill. There are a lot of schools with these systems in place—several thousand of them, probably including the large majority of secondary schools and quite a lot of primaries. The wording of that part of the Bill might be used to allow a school not to go for retrospective parental consent. My view is that, if we are to have parental consent, all those schools that have the system should write to parents asking for their consent, rather than that consent being assumed or being taken to be too difficult—an exception being claimed under this subsection.
Amendment 97 reduces the age limit to 16, which I think is the common age within schools at which pupils should be allowed to take responsibility, while Amendment 98 questions the width of “equipment”, which in common parlance has animate as well as inanimate means. I beg to move.
I have to tell your Lordships that, if Amendment 85 is agreed, I cannot call Amendments 86 to 88 because of pre-emption.
My Lords, I have Amendment 91 in this group, which is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Walmsley. The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, has obviously not been subject to Black Rod’s little talk about security in this place, which urges us all to wear our passes at all times—which I acknowledge I am not at this moment—rather than rely on people knowing who we are.
My Lords, I know that we are all supposed to do that, but I am sure that the noble Baroness has seen, as I have, groups of guests wandering around with unidentifiable passes and noble Lords with their passes on back to front so that you cannot see even whether they are a Lord let alone who they are. Eyeball recognition by the doorkeepers is much more reliable and efficient, and is probably cheaper at the end of the day.
Perhaps I had better not continue down this route—I could, but it would take more time than the Committee might like to devote to it.
Another point on which I am perhaps not with the noble Lord is that every school knows what every child is up to all the time—I wish that were so. I am sure that we are going to hear from the Minister about the balance between privacy rights and sensible use of technology—I hope that we are not going to hear about feed-in tariffs, which seemed to stretch the analogy a bit far.
The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, did not know, on reflection, what his Amendment 85 was about. I have been in that situation as well, but that is not so on this amendment, against which I wrote “silence equals assent”—I think that it is the difference between opt-in and opt-out.
Before I come to the detail of my amendment, I wish to pick up on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, about the technology being used in schools not being as sophisticated, if I can use that term, as technology used in other contexts. Can the Minister say how reliable the equipment is? That was the immediate question I had in response to the noble Lord’s comment.
My amendment does not contradict any of the other amendments that have been spoken to and is not inconsistent with the Bill. It provides that the relevant authorities, schools, academies and FE colleges should tell parents and children of their rights to refuse consent at least once in every academic year—in other words, it is about informed consent. The suggestion comes from the Children’s Rights Alliance for England, which supports the provisions in the Bill for ensuring that the institutions cannot process biometric data if consent is refused. I know that my noble friend will say a word about the convention rights.
I have been told by the Children’s Rights Alliance about research which shows that most children using these systems have not considered how long their fingerprints would be held for and they generally were not concerned. My response to that is that of course they would not—they are children and they do not necessarily think through all the implications of what they are being asked to agree to. Therefore explaining exactly what the subject matter is, both to them and their parents, is important. Other research—again, I am not surprised about this—shows that when schools have introduced a biometric system they have emphasised the benefits and not talked about the problems. All of this is natural human reaction.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, referred to the report of the Information Commissioner in 2008. The Information Commissioner made it clear that schools which collect data must be aware that children are data subjects and that they,
“should in the first instance be informed and consulted about the use of their personal data”.
This being the first principle of the Data Protection Act, he went on to say that,
“Fairness requires that schools ensure that pupils are informed about and understand the purpose for which their personal data is being processed”.
Our amendment would require that they are in a position to give consent—or, indeed, withhold it—but on an informed basis.
Parents and children, to the extent appropriate for the child’s age, must be informed in the appropriate manner, and we want to get that right. We just do not think it needs to happen every year. If, as my noble friend Lady Walmsley said, there were substantive changes to what was being proposed, then further consent would be required, but we do not have to do that each and every year. Once should be enough for the duration of that child’s journey through that school.
My Lords, I am very sad indeed to learn that my noble friend’s equipment is entirely inanimate, but if for the purpose of legislation that is the meaning of the word, I am sure that having it in Hansard will suffice.
I am not at all sure that I understood the scope of “reasonable” as he expressed it. He said that the biometric system had to be run by or for the school, if I remember his wording exactly. I do not see where the boundaries of that are. If a bit of software provided by the school is being used on the school’s computers, why should that fall outside the prohibitions in this Bill just because it is a built-in component of a commonly available system? I would be very grateful if I could sit down with officials between now and Report to go through that.
I would also like to explore the scope of electronic means where we are looking at this consent. What forms of registering consent will be acceptable? This occurs as a general question. How is a school to know that a parent has given consent? How is it to know that it is the parent who has given consent? Schools do not have a stock of signatures to compare signatures against. If it is hard enough with something in conventional writing, how they are going to do it in electronic form I am not at all sure.
My Lords, I have listened carefully to this debate. My experience is that electronic means are needed to be used by parents because an awful lot of messages from school end up in the washing machine.
Yes, my Lords, and in the ordinary way where something is not, as it were, being mandated by law in the way that is occurring in the Bill, that would seem sufficient. I would like to be sure that that ordinary common-or-garden communication that the noble Baroness describes will be acceptable under the Bill. Clearly, there is the matter of a verifiable electronic signature. When we came to introduce electronic means into the definition of writing it was with the concept of an electronic signature that was verifiable so that you could complete documents by electronic means, but that is not what is being talked about here. What we are talking about is getting an email that says, “Yes, I’m happy and so is Fred”. Is that consent by both parents, or is there some greater degree of identification required for electronic communications to be acceptable under this thing? Or is it just the reasonable best efforts of the school? I am not asking the noble Lord to respond now if he has prepared—
If I may, I will just briefly respond to the noble Lord. Obviously, on the question of what is reasonable, great tomes have been written about reasonability in legal terms for years and years, and it is something that we want to discuss. In regards to, as he said, what forms of consent will be required I think he was quite right to take the intervention from the noble Baroness, Lady Farrington, who as a mother and a grandmother speaks with great experience as to what happens to these messages and where they end up. However, if my noble friend would like to discuss this with myself and officials, that would probably be very useful, just to make sure that we can get it right between now and Report. I will certainly be more than happy to offer a meeting.
If it was a matter of getting in and out of the school, there would have to be some other provision—as with school meals and libraries and so on—by which they could get in and out. It would not just be by biometric data; it might be by a PIN or a smart card or whatever. But I will certainly look at the point made by the noble Baroness, who speaks, as I said, with such great experience in these matters.
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for offering a meeting. There are clearly also other subjects to discuss: what form of records schools commonly have about parenting and guardianship arrangements; whether those are sufficient to deal with the requirements of the Bill; whether the Bill allows sufficient flexibility to deal with occasions when parents should not be communicated with; and how commencement is proposed. The Bill will introduce a considerable process of adjustment even if it is taken carefully. As the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, said, it threatens effectively to make these systems inoperable and therefore to require schools at considerable expense and in a great hurry to put other systems in place and make alternative arrangements. The way in which this section of the Bill is to be commenced is quite important.
I would be delighted to have a meeting; I would be delighted if the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, wanted to join me, because it is clear that we have common concerns about how this will work in practice and a common suspicion that what the Government are about is trying to ban these systems all together. However, for now and particularly with regard to Amendment 85, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, the amendments in this group are intended to ask a short trio of questions about how line 36, which is about the admissibility of evidence, will work. First, I want to be sure that it covers civil as well as criminal proceedings because an awful lot of surveillance camera evidence is used in, for instance, parking ticket or traffic enforcement, which are civil proceedings. It is important that if there are rules and regulations being passed about how these cameras should be used, they and the guidance should be equally effective in dealing with traffic enforcement as in dealing with a mugging.
Secondly, if one goes by not general, but certainly frequent, local authority practice, local authorities will rely in civil cases on the fact that most people do not appeal, so the case never comes to court. People pay their fines. Knowing that whenever a particular breach of the code comes to the tribunal the local authorities lose their case, they will none the less continue enforcing because they are losing only 1 or 2 per cent of revenue and the rest of the people are paying up as usual. What the guidance in the code is supposed to do is nullified by the fact that there is no mechanism for spreading the opinion of the tribunal more widely than the individual cases which reach it.
Amendment 104 is intended to propose such a mechanism so that a tribunal can say, “No, you have to stop this. We have seen this five times already and each time we have found for the appellant. You must cease enforcing until you have put this right. We will not allow you to issue any more tickets on the basis of something which we consider to be an unreasonable breach of the code”. The other end of it is that where a tribunal has found a local authority to be in frequent breach of the code and has on each occasion found for the appellant, none the less the local authority will have extracted a very large amount of money out of other people who have not appealed because there is a very substantial disincentive to appeal. If you lose an appeal, you double your fine. There is also a large amount of time taken up in the process of appeal.
I would like to see some mechanism where a tribunal can say to a local authority, in particular, or to other people who are seeking to use camera evidence as the basis of fines, that they must repay not only the appellant but all the other people on whom penalties have been imposed on the basis of the practice that the tribunal disapproves of. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for explaining and introducing his amendments. I recognise that he is focusing on the specific use of surveillance camera technology, particularly in its use for enforcement of parking and traffic regulations. It is probably worth me pointing out for the benefit of the Committee that the surveillance camera code of practice is not intended to include any speed camera technology. I know that my noble friend—
My Lords, I was just about to say to my noble friend that I know that he was not talking about speed camera technology at all. It was just for the benefit of the rest of the Committee. I thought it was an appropriate point for me to make that clear, in case anybody else might not be as clear as my noble friend is on this matter.
I refer first to my noble friend’s Amendment 103, which, as he has explained, seeks to clarify the drafting of Clause 33(3). I believe that the meaning of that subsection is already clear, as “such proceedings” unambiguously refers back to “criminal or civil proceedings” in subsection (2); we simply do not need to repeat those words in subsection (3).
My noble friend’s Amendment 104 suggests that this Bill takes away the right to seek redress where a court has ruled that the code of practice has been breached. We believe this would have significant implications for litigants. In the context of civil proceedings—just to be clear, for example, we might be talking here of someone seeking to enforce the payment of parking charges—a claimant should be able to present all relevant evidence in support of his or her case. Given that the surveillance code of practice will set out guidance rather than rigid requirements for the operation of surveillance camera systems, it would in our view be disproportionate to prevent, as a matter of course, CCTV evidence being presented where a court or tribunal has ruled that there has been a breach of the code.
Clause 33(4) makes it clear that the court should have discretion in taking into account a failure by a relevant authority to have regard to the surveillance camera code in determining a question in any such proceedings. In the context of criminal proceedings, the ramifications of the amendment in terms of the overall fairness of the process are potentially more significant. The effect of the amendment might be to exclude key prosecution evidence or evidence that might exonerate the accused. Our general approach, as I have already explained, should be to leave decisions about the admissibility of CCTV evidence to the court or tribunal in question.
My Lords, I am very grateful to my noble friend for that answer, particularly the sudden inspiration which struck her at the end and which gave me great comfort so far as Amendments 104 and 105 are concerned, which I agree were pushing it a bit. However, I still have concerns on Amendment 103.
I agree that Clause 33(3) refers back to Clause 33(2), but the latter refers to the acts of people who are running surveillance cameras, not to the acts of people who are caught on surveillance cameras. It is not clear to me that the inference that she suggested should be imported into Clause 33(3)—that the civil and criminal proceedings in Clause 33(2) apply—is justifiable, given that they refer to completely different sets of court cases. One is cases taken against people who are using cameras and the other is cases against people who are caught on camera. I should be very grateful if the Minister could write to me to answer that point in detail if she does not have an answer in front of her now.
My Lords, I would be very happy to take away the points that my noble friend has raised and will, of course, write to him in due course.