Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Bill [HL] Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Lloyd of Berwick
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(13 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I intend to address the amendments that relate to the final order, and I therefore wish to degroup the amendments that relate to the intermediate order.
It seems that the Bill has attracted little public attention, except from our own Constitution Committee, which was very critical of the Bill, and from bodies such as Liberty and Justice, which are even more critical. Liberty and Justice state in their briefing paper that they have four major concerns. The purpose of my amendments is to meet at least some of those concerns.
The purpose of the Bill is to give effect to Security Council Resolution 1373, following the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ahmed, which quashed the orders made by the Treasury. The Bill was first drafted by the previous Administration, but that does not matter, because the starting point of its drafting should surely have been the decision of the Supreme Court in the Ahmed case and the light that it throws on the meaning and effect of Resolution 1373.
Reading the Bill in July, my immediate impression was that Ahmed had been very largely ignored. The Bill simply puts on a statutory basis, as was required, the provisions of the Terrorism Order 2006, but ignores the very serious criticisms that the Supreme Court made of the order. To make that good in Committee, I referred to a paragraph in the judgment of the president of the Supreme Court, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips. Afterwards, I wrote to the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, to explain the difficulties that I had with the Bill, and he was courteous enough to reply. I make no apology for repeating the words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips, because they are central to what is wrong with the Bill. Having referred to paragraph 1(c) of the critical resolution, he continued:
“Paragraph 1(c) requires the freezing of the assets of those who commit the acts that the Resolution has required should be criminalised and their agents. Thus what the resolution requires is the freezing of the assets of criminals. The natural way of giving effect to this requirement would be by freezing the assets of those convicted of or charged with the offences in question. This would permit the freezing of assets pending trial on criminal charge, but would make the long term freezing of assets dependent upon conviction of the relevant criminal offence to the criminal standard of proof”.
I emphasise those words and the sentence that follows:
“The Resolution nowhere requires, expressly or by implication, the freezing of the assets of those who are merely suspected of the criminal offences in question”.
I turn now to what the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, said in the debate in Committee on 6 October. He said:
“The Government do not support moving to a higher legal threshold than reasonable belief, for example by imposing asset freezing only on those who have been convicted of a terrorist offence. Such a move would undermine the preventive nature of the regime”.
I will come back to that. The noble Lord said that such a move would also,
“be incompatible with international best practice and the aims of the United Nations Security Council resolution”.—[Official Report, 6/10/10; col. 122.]
With great respect, that is simply not correct. To make the commission of a terrorist offence the threshold of a freezing order could not be incompatible with the aims of the resolution, since, as I have just read out, that is what paragraph 1(c) specifically requires. States are required to freeze without delay the assets of persons who commit or attempt to commit terrorist acts—nothing less, nothing more. There is no mention anywhere in the resolution of those suspected of committing terrorist acts.
If it is then said that in the passage that I have read the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips, was, as it were, on a frolic of his own, then what about the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, at page 451 of the judgment? At paragraph 225, he said:
“The relevant wording of Security Council Resolution 1373 … is directed at the prevention and suppression and the criminalisation and prosecution of actual terrorist acts; at the freezing of funds or other financial assets or economic resources of persons ‘who commit”—
again, the same words—
“or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts’”.
A little later, he went on to say that the wording of paragraph 1(c),
“does not suggest that the Security Council had in mind ‘reasonable suspicion’ as a sufficient basis for an indefinite freeze”—
what we here call a final order. I would add that nor is there any suggestion that the Security Council had in mind “reasonable belief”, as opposed to “reasonable suspicion”.
At paragraph 197 of the judgment, the noble and learned Lord said that reasonable suspicion,
“goes well beyond the strict requirements of Resolution 1373”.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, said exactly the same at page 196. I need not refer to his language because it replicates that of the noble and learned Lords, Lord Mance and Lord Phillips.
The only justice to have expressed a contrary view was the noble and learned Lord, Lord Rodger, at paragraph 170, but none of the other six judges agreed with him. Therefore, in my submission there is no doubt at all about what the Supreme Court decided. That is put very well in the rather lengthy head note, of which I should perhaps refer to a very small part. It said that the appeals would be allowed because Resolution 1373 was not phrased in terms of reasonable suspicion, so by introducing such a test the terrorism order went beyond what was necessary or expedient to comply with the relevant requirements of the resolution and that accordingly the terrorism order was ultra vires the powers conferred. Therefore, again, there is no doubt about what the court decided. However, when this Bill was being drafted, those responsible for the drafting must have read the speech of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Rodger, but overlooked the speeches of the three noble and learned Lords to whom I have referred and what, on any view, was the actual decision of the court. I hope that, when he comes to reply to this amendment, the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, will accept that my amendments are not in any way incompatible with Resolution 1373—indeed, quite the opposite. They give meaning and effect to the resolution in precisely the way that the Supreme Court indicated.
As a result of the Second Reading debate, and in particular the speech of my noble friend Lord Pannick, the Government now accept that “reasonable suspicion” is not good enough and instead they have substituted “reasonable belief”. The noble Lord, Lord Rodger, said that it is very difficult to say how much difference there actually is in practice between those two. I think he describes suspicion as being “only a little less stringent than belief”, or words to that effect. Whatever the precise difference between those two, surely it is clear that exactly the same argument, which has led the Government to accept that suspicion is not good enough, must also apply to what they have now substituted; namely, belief.
It is true that belief will catch fewer innocent people than suspicion, which I assume to be the reason for the change, but I doubt whether it will make much difference. The point remains the same: that belief, like suspicion, casts the net too wide; it is far wider than the resolution requires, so that more innocent people will inevitably be caught. That is why it is so important to keep to the words of the resolution and not to change the essential nature and target of the resolution. I put it to your Lordships that that means the final order must be confined to those who have been arrested and charged with a terrorist offence and that is what will be achieved by my amendments, if they are accepted. I beg to move.
My Lords, to my surprise, I shall be speaking early in these proceedings but I enter the fray at a rather late stage of the Bill because my noble and learned friend Lord Davidson of Glen Cova cannot be here today. However, on this Bill I am not to be allowed gently to put my toe in the water. The House is dealing with important amendments tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, to whom I want to pay tribute. He has a deserved reputation for knowledge and expertise, particularly in this area, going back many years. I have also had the experience of debating with the noble and learned Lord on a number of occasions when sitting on the other side of the Chamber. Although he is always a model of courtesy, good manners and, of course, persuasion, I have no doubt that those who have succeeded me will find his arguments as difficult to deal with as I did. However, I say with the greatest respect, that does not always mean he is right.
Today, we on this side believe that the noble and learned Lord is wrong in limiting final determinations only to those cases where a person has been charged with a criminal offence under Clause 2(2). Why do we think that? In essence, we think that such a step would be impractical and would not work in the real world. Reading through the Committee stage debates, I was impressed by the arguments employed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, in dealing with this issue. It seems to us that his arguments are powerful. On 6 October, he said:
“Unlike control orders, asset freezing is not only used against people in the United Kingdom who cannot be prosecuted or deported. In fact, only around 10 per cent of asset-freezing cases involve people who are in the UK or hold funds here and are not being prosecuted for terrorist offences”.
The noble and learned Lord went on to say:
“The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, indicated that he thought that those who were subject to designation should also be prosecuted. I asked how many people who have been subject to asset freezes have been prosecuted”.—[Official Report, 6/10/10; col. 150.]
He was advised that 21 individuals in the UK had been convicted for terrorism offences, and that six people within the UK have not been prosecuted. He went on to say that he had asked his officials how many persons outside the UK had been subject to designation for asset freezing, and that the answer was 36, of which 22 were entities and 14 were individuals. He said that it would just not be possible to prosecute them. That is, in essence, what the noble and learned Lord said at the Committee stage of these proceedings.
The trouble is that if one had to charge before making a final designation order, many of those whose assets one would want to make an order against might not be in the jurisdiction, might not be likely to be in this jurisdiction, or might have skipped the jurisdiction as fast as they possibly could. Why should they escape the making of a valuable order if it would assist in the fight against terrorism? That is why we think that in the real world, where a considerable number of the people who one would want to make an asset order against are abroad and not within the jurisdiction, there should be power to make such an order, because if there were not, there would be a serious lacuna in the law.
My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, I hope that he will deal with that point a little more fully as it is quite important. Is he arguing that Clause 1 has extraterritorial effect? If so, that is not stated in the Bill. Indeed, the Bill specifically provides that the offences provision in Chapter 2 is to have extraterritorial effect, but there is nothing in the Bill to suggest that we can serve persons abroad. It applies only to our own nationals and to people within this country in the ordinary way.
I have to admit that I do not know the answer to the noble and learned Lord’s question. However, I am concerned about the position of a UK citizen who goes abroad and who therefore cannot be interviewed and perhaps afterwards charged with an offence, and who because of that fact cannot have an order made against his assets. As I understand it, having read the letter from the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, in response to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, that actually happens in real life.
I will not take up the noble Lord’s time further, but I shall obviously need to deal with that matter with the Minister who no doubt has given consideration to this important point.
My Lords, I support the arguments and the amendment tabled by my noble and learned friend Lord Lloyd—not that he needs my feeble assistance in this matter. It seems to me that there are two flaws in the provision before us. Those flaws still remain, even with the amendment suggested by the Government.
The first stage might be called the “trigger” stage: the point at which the authorities have some jurisdiction in this matter. In the original Bill, it was at a point when there was reasonable suspicion, but in the amendment it is when there is reasonable belief. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, has said, those are two separate categories, but they are very close to each other.
Perhaps I may trouble the House a moment or two with this illustration. Let us think of Section 22 of the Theft Act and the provision dealing with the receiving of stolen goods knowing or believing them to be stolen. A judge will tell the jury very simply that even if the defendant is shown to be in possession of suspicion, that counts for nothing at all: there has to be actual knowledge or belief. But the same judge will normally say to the jury that of course there is a point where suspicion becomes so strong and convincing as to amount virtually to belief. I make that point as an illustration of the fact that the two estates practically merge at that point. That flaw remains even if the amendment were to be carried.
The other point is what might be called the boundary point. There are two stages: first, that you trigger the mechanism by way of a belief; secondly, that it must be belief as to some state of affairs. That, it seems to me, can be one of two things. It can either be a belief that a criminal act is in the course of being committed or has been committed; or that there is involvement within the accepted degrees of criminality in that act relevant to the provision. If one is concentrating on what is or is not a criminal act, that is a fairly simple matter to decide. Is the person you suspect or believe to be involved a person who would be a principal in the first or second degree, an aider and an abetter, et cetera, or is he beyond that pale?
If you draw the line at the point of criminality, it is perfectly simple, because you have a defined boundary. You can say, “That is the ne plus ultra of the law's authority in this matter”. If you extend that pale, where are you? Where is the boundary? I remember the very strong argument of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, some weeks ago in this matter. There may very well be a case for extending the boundary beyond that of actual criminality, but there has to be a boundary. That is my point about Clause 2. If you leave the boundary of actual criminality and assume any other boundary, with the greatest respect, you have to define it very closely.
My Lords, if noble Lords will permit me, I will speak to this entire group of amendments, although there has not been any significant discussion on some of them. It is perhaps worth summarising what these amendments would do. They would limit final designations to those charged with a terrorist offence of a description within Clause 2(2). They would require any final designation to cease if the charges are dropped or the person is acquitted and require the Treasury to apply to the court to make an interim designation.
Amendments 1 and 3 relate to the Treasury’s power to make a final designation. They require the Treasury to make final designations against only those people who have been charged with a criminal offence falling within the description of terrorist activity in Clause 2(2) for the purposes of the Bill.
Amendments 4, 5 and 6 require a final designation automatically to expire when a person charged is acquitted or charges are dropped before the ordinary one-year expiry. This goes to the heart of what this regime is intended to be about. Although I echo the words of the noble Lord, Lord Bach, in recognising the contribution of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, and the great wisdom he brings to this, I think he does not go to the complete heart of the rationale of UNSCR 1373, which is indeed preventive. It requires states to take steps to prevent terrorist acts. I should quote further from the resolution. Its paragraph 1(c) states that one of the means of achieving this requires states to:
“Freeze without delay funds and other financial assets or economic resources of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts”.
The rationale of paragraph 1(c) is to prevent funds, financial assets and other economic resources being used or diverted for terrorist purposes, and the Government absolutely believe that it would not accord with the preventive rationale of the UN resolution if a final designation could be made only in respect of those charged or convicted of terrorism-related offences.
If that were the threshold, the Treasury would not be able to freeze the assets of those in respect of whom there was evidence that was insufficient to bring such a charge, but sufficient to give rise to a reasonable belief on the Treasury’s part that the person represented a terrorist risk—for example, where an interim designation has been made in respect of a person on the basis of a reasonable suspicion and insufficient evidence has come to light during the 30-day period of that interim freeze that would allow charges to be brought, but the Treasury has nevertheless come to a reasonable belief that the person is or has been involved in terrorism and considers it necessary for public protection that the final designation be made. If the Treasury were not able to make a final designation in those circumstances, that would give rise to a risk of terrorism that the requirements of the UN resolution are meant to prevent.
I remind the House that in making these designations, it is necessary that the dual test is met. The other half of the test, which has not been mentioned this afternoon, is a public protection leg. It is the Government’s continued firm belief that a reasonable belief threshold for a final designation would allow the Government to implement effectively the requirements of the resolution.
Does the noble Lord accept that reasonable belief goes beyond what Resolution 1373 requires? That is the critical question. It is also the question, which, as I have explained, has been decided by the Supreme Court.
My Lords, the interpretation of UNSCR 1373 can be construed partly on a recommendation of the resolution itself and partly on the interpretation which the Financial Action Task Force has made. It is clear from its guidance that asset freezes should not be limited only to cases where people have been charged or convicted. If we were to accept this amendment, which the Government do not intend to do, it would certainly put the UK outside what is considered by all leading countries through the FATF guidance to be best practice in implementing Resolution 1373. What we are proposing is consistent with the approach taken by other authorities, such as in Canada and New Zealand, of which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, approved in the case of Ahmed.
I agree with the interpretation of the noble Lord, Lord Bach, of the situation. Asset freezing is implemented against individuals and groups in the UK and overseas. At the moment, 22 entities and 14 individuals overseas are the subject of asset freezing. Nothing in Clause 1 limits this. Asset freezing certainly is not limited to people in the UK. People anywhere in the world can be designated, but the prohibitions apply only within UK jurisdictions; that is, to assets that are either held in the UK or by UK persons such as banks overseas. I hope that that clarifies the question of territorial scope.
Is the Minister saying, in effect, that Clause 1 has extra-territorial effect? If so, what is his authority for saying that in the light of the fact that the Bill makes specific provision for extra-territorial effect for offences under Clause 11 but no such provision in relation to Clause 1?
Under Clause 1, people anywhere in the world can be designated. To repeat myself again, the prohibitions, on the other hand, apply only within UK jurisdictions; that is, to assets either held in the UK or held by UK persons such as banks overseas. That is about as clear as I can be on the Government’s understanding of the scope of Clause 1. The people overseas who are subject to asset freezes are operating in environments where it is not possible to charge or to convict them clearly of terrorist offences, but where it is necessary in order to disrupt their actual or potential—
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Oldham. I hope that the majority of us are clear about the intended scope of Clause 1, so I shall move on to deal with some of the other aspects. However, it is quite clear that the scope of Clause 1 is as intended and required by our obligations under UN Resolution 1373, which is the relevant resolution.
It is worth noting that while the majority of asset-freezing cases in the UK are against those who are charged or convicted of terrorist offences, at the moment there are six cases where it has been necessary, in order to protect the public from terrorism, to act upon the intelligence picture which, for reasons of national security or admissibility of evidence, cannot be used as the basis for criminal charges. However, that does not, of course, mean that those people do not continue to pose a serious risk to national security. Therefore, to limit final designations only to those subject to a criminal charge would exclude such groups and individuals as I have described. This would fatally undermine the preventive and disruptive nature of the asset-freezing regime as well as impact significantly on its operational effectiveness.
Nevertheless, the Government recognise that the Bill as it was introduced raised civil liberties concerns, and it was to address those that we amended the Bill so that a higher final designation threshold of reasonable belief, rather than the previous reasonable suspicion threshold, is being introduced. However, again I stress that there is a twin test, as the test of necessity for public protection also needs to be met. I do not think that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, drew attention to that.
The noble and learned Lord referred to a final order as giving an indefinite freeze. However, it is important to recognise that freezing orders have to be relooked at whenever the evidence changes or after 12 months. While “final order” is the term in the Bill, we should remember that a final order or a final designation will expire after 12 months unless it is renewed. We have also provided that the legal challenge to any designation should be by way of appeal. The Government continue to believe that the Bill strikes the right balance between safeguarding a person’s rights and protecting the public.
Amendments 9 and 11 require the Treasury to apply to the court to make an interim designation.
I have not addressed those amendments yet. I believe they have been degrouped and appear in the next group. I specifically asked before I addressed the House that those amendments, which relate to an entirely separate subject matter—namely, the interim order, not the final order—should be degrouped. If the Minister did not hear that, he can answer what I have to say in due course.
My Lords, the last grouping I have seen from the Printed Paper Office suggested that everything was grouped together. Perhaps I should break off here and ask the noble and learned Lord whether he is prepared to withdraw Amendment 1 and not to move Amendments 3 to 6.
I am not aware of anything in the resolution that prevents legislation going further. The Bill does what is required to properly implement Resolution 1373 but, if it did go further, that would not be precluded by the terms of the resolution.
My Lords, the Minister has not fully dealt with the point that what is now proposed goes well beyond what is required by Resolution 1373. He argued that that resolution was intended to be preventive and that what is now proposed is preventive. The resolution states, in paragraph 1(a), that it is intended to be preventive, but it then goes on to say how it is to be preventive by requiring all member countries affected by the resolution to pass legislation to freeze the assets of those who have been charged or convicted of a terrorist offence. That is clear from the language of the resolution. Simply to say that the resolution is intended to be preventive and that the Bill is preventive is not an answer to that point.
The only real answer that has been given was that given by the noble Lord, Lord Bach, when he repeated what was said by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, in Committee. In particular, he said:
“I also asked how many persons outwith the UK have been subject to designation for asset freezing; the answer is 36, of which 22 are entities and 14 are individuals”.—[Official Report, 6/10/10; col. 150.]
How can that be so under the terrorist orders unless they were intended to be extra-territorial?
That brings us back to the question whether Clause 1 is extra-territorial. The fact that something has happened is by no means proof that it was justified, as indeed is the case with the whole history of this part of the law, which has had to be corrected by the Supreme Court in its most recent decision. Those figures do not convince me at all. We return to the question whether Clause 1 on this particular point is intended to be extra-territorial. It is clear to my mind that it is not, for the reasons that I have already given—namely, that other provisions in this Bill are said to be extra-territorial and this is not included among those provisions. That merely confirms the ordinary rule that we apply all the time that legislation is not extra-territorial unless it is stated to be so.
There is a further question relating to the figures given by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness. If those persons were outside the jurisdiction, how were they notified? Under Clause 3, it is the obligation of the Treasury to notify a person immediately when the final order or an interim order is made. How can we be sure that that is being done when the person is outside the jurisdiction, wherever he may be? The argument that my amendment would in some way cut down a valuable power that the Treasury now has and would not have if my amendment were passed is simply not, with respect, borne out. I am not willing to withdraw the amendment and will take the opinion of the House.
My Lords, the purpose of the amendment is to provide for a High Court judge to make the interim designation, not a Treasury Minister. The Minister makes the application for an order, but it is the judge who should make the order. That is the normal course of events when a person’s assets are being frozen, for whatever reason, and it is right, given that the freezing of a person’s assets has all the dire consequences described by the Supreme Court in the case of Ahmed. What is proposed makes the defendant, in effect, a prisoner of the state, as Lord Justice Sedley said in the Court of Appeal and as was repeated in the Supreme Court.
It is normal for asset-freezing orders to be made by judges. That has been the case since long before Resolution 1373. It was the judges, after all, who invented the Mareva injunction in the middle of the 19th century. I may have meant the 20th century—perhaps I was a century out. Such injunctions enabled a plaintiff with a good arguable case to go before the judge and obtain an order or injunction freezing the defendant’s assets, if it seemed likely that those assets would be dissipated before any judgment against him. This happened often—I have granted many such freezing orders—and the system worked. The defendant, for obvious reasons, was not given notice of the application before it was made, otherwise it might have proved fruitless—he would have dissipated the assets before the order was made. When the order was made, he could come before the judge and seek to have the order set aside or varied. That is a well established system, as any judge or lawyer in the House would know. I cannot understand why that procedure should not be applied here.
The Minister was pressed at some length in Committee to give reasons why it should not work in that way. He said that in the end it came down to speed and complexity. However, there is nothing in either of those grounds. As soon as the Minister has grounds for suspicion, he can go before a judge the very next day and get his order. That is what happens as a matter of course in the commercial court, so I see no difficulty on the ground of speed. Of course, the Treasury Minister, when he makes his application, will have to have formulated his grounds, but he would have to have done so in any event, since the defendant, as soon as he has notice that he has been designated and that his assets have been frozen, will certainly go straight to the judge on appeal, as he will now be entitled to do. Since he can do that, and since the Treasury Minister will have to explain at that stage—perhaps the very next day—why the order has been made, clearly the Minister will have to have his tackle in order before the application is made. I suggest that there is nothing in the ground that this cannot be done quickly enough in the ordinary way.
The ground of complexity is equally without foundation. It is absurd to suppose that judges in the Administrative Court cannot understand these things. They have to understand them as soon as the defendant who has had his assets frozen goes to the judge, as he can do the very next day, so why can they not be made to understand them before the order is made by the Minister?
If there is no objection on either of those grounds to the order being made in the usual way, what is the real objection? It seems that this is the way in which it has always been done by the Treasury. Another reason is that the decision is more suited to the Executive and, indeed, is the proper function of the Executive. I regret to say that I cannot agree. Indeed, I hope never again to hear it said that a decision that takes away a man’s right to deal with his property as he thinks fit is more suited to the Executive than the judiciary.
In Committee, I asked the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, whether he could think of any other order of this type that affected the liberty of the subject in this way. He could think only of a control order, which hardly provides a trouble-free precedent for what is proposed in this case. Let us assume that the result of the review being carried out by the Home Office is that we get rid of control orders, as I profoundly hope that we shall. How then can we justify continuing the regime that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, described as “scarcely less restrictive” than control orders and which he said could be “even more paralysing”? I repeat what I said in Committee: I am in favour of interim orders being made on the basis of suspicion. To that extent, the Government are right. However, I am wholly against the orders being made by the Executive rather than by a judge in the ordinary way. I beg to move.
My Lords, the Minister gave three reasons why he could not accept the amendment, the first of which was that the measures are meant to be preventive. However, they are also rather more than preventive; they are extremely restrictive of the basic right of any individual to deal with his assets as he thinks fit. He also said that we are not concerned here with human rights. Of course we are; we are concerned with Article 1.
Did he not say that? He said that he differentiated this measure from control orders on the ground that we are not concerned here with human rights, but we are, albeit a different provision under the Human Rights Act—Article 1 of Protocol 1, which is that a person’s property cannot be interfered with. We are in exactly the same area as control orders, which is why the judges in the Supreme Court have described asset freezing of this kind by Treasury order as being almost as restrictive as control orders themselves. The noble Lord has not dealt with any of those points. I think that the noble and learned Lord would like to intervene.
My Lords, I would like to be sure that I understand. The noble and learned Lord’s Amendments 9 and 11 seem to allow the Treasury to make an application for leave to make an order. They do not provide for the Treasury making, nor suggest that the Treasury makes, the order in the end.
My Lords, I entirely agree with the noble and learned Lord. That is the normal way in which it is done—let the Treasury make the order, but only with the leave of the judge. I see no reason why that should not flow. It is an even clearer case than that of Mareva injunctions, where it was the judge who made the order. Either way, that is the way in which we should be dealing with this. I am sorry to say that I fear that it is pointless for me to take this any further, so I reluctantly beg leave to withdraw the amendment.