European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Liddle Excerpts

Committee: 10th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 26th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, I strongly support the call by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, that primary legislation should be used to form the necessary frameworks. I made that point at Second Reading when I suggested that Clause 11 and all devolved matters should be taken out of the Bill altogether. It might then not have required any consent from the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly, the whole matter would have been considerably simplified and the focus could have been put on the very difficult issues that arise with devolution. The original architecture which the Government put forward, which of course they have changed now, was that the powers that were to come back from Brussels—or, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, said, the restraints upon the devolved Administration, which is a simpler way of looking at it—should go to the UK Government and then be parcelled out and conferred upon the devolved Administrations. Which powers and when—the timing and the nature of those powers—would be virtually at the whim of the Minister who would decide what was appropriate. It would be done by secondary legislation, either statutory instruments or Orders in Council. We have had debates about that.

The conferred powers model has never been used in relation to the Scottish Parliament. It has always been reserved powers. That is to say that in specific cases of policy, all those powers go to the Scottish Parliament, save those that are named, enumerated and held back— reserved—by the UK Government. Precisely that reserve powers model is about to be employed in Wales under last year’s Wales Act. It is to commence in April. To come forward with a scheme in which, in effect, powers are conferred not by the UK Parliament but by a Minister merely by statutory instruments, which cannot be amended, or by Orders in Council, was clearly inadequate and has given rise to a great deal of difficulty and angst, certainly in Wales.

I shall quote from the evidence that appears in the report of the Committee on the Constitution. It was given by Professor Richard Rawlings of University College London, who has given very valuable advice, in Wales in particular, on devolution issues. What he said about the original architecture was that,

“this process does not establish positive duties on the part of the UK Government to devolve. Legally-speaking, suggested ‘transitional’ elements could so easily become permanent features”.

That is the which and the when. He continued:

“Nor need one be an expert in game theory to appreciate the way in which clause 11 stacks the cards in favour of the centre when negotiating the different design choices with common frameworks”.


If the devolution of powers is simply within the control of the Minister of the UK Government, then the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly have lost their bargaining power in the creation of frameworks. The point was made that while UK-wide frameworks will be necessary in a number of policies, they should be agreed on a parity-of-esteem basis between the Governments and legislatures of the United Kingdom, not imposed by the UK Government even on a time-limited basis.

I hope that indicates what the real, critical matter is. It is not just Welsh, Scottish and possibly Northern Irish people whingeing or seeking to stand up for their own individuality—it is nothing like that. It is that they should have equal bargaining power with the UK Government in the construction of the UK frameworks, which everyone agrees are necessary. I wholly support the amendment.

[Lord Liddle (Lab)]

I have listened with great attention to these debates on devolution and found them extremely interesting. However, I have to say that the longer I have listened, the more concerned I have become about the threat that Brexit poses to the unity of the UK. There is a lot of glib talk about processes, agreement and consent, but in fact we are dealing here with some highly political issues that were not greatly controversial as long as we were members of the EU, but could become of considerable controversy between the nations of the UK, given the different political balance in each of those nations.

I shall make three points to illustrate what I think the threat is. First, the European single market is not a complete single market; it is the deepest single market in the world but it is not complete. One of the differences is that tax rates vary between member states. There has never been a completely harmonised tax system; customs vary, as do business taxes. Once we start talking about a UK single market, the debate will be raised to a new level: about whether tax rates can differ in areas where they presently do not between the nations of the UK. That raises fundamental political choices—between those who believe in higher taxes and higher public spending, and those who do not—and you get people going in different directions.

Secondly, issues such as competition, state aid and public procurement will become highly political and divisive, and it is quite likely that the Welsh and Scottish Governments will wish to take a different approach to these issues from a Conservative-led UK Government. That would lead to a lot of tension. Thirdly, in the area of trade, the beef farmers in the north-east of Scotland and Welsh hill farmers who export their sheep, for example, will be greatly alarmed that the UK Government are prepared to sacrifice these interests in order to complete trade agreements with the rest of the world, and they would have no say whatsoever in those agreements. So on all those grounds I believe we are dealing here not just with processes but, potentially, with highly difficult political questions. Consent is absolutely fundamental. The idea that the solution to these problems could be imposed by a UK Government runs the risk of leading ultimately to the break-up of the UK.

My final point is that a lot of these problems—some 90% of them—would not exist if we stayed in the European single market. That is what many of us on these Benches want to do. The simplest way to prevent these divisive issues that threaten the unity of the United Kingdom is to stay in the single market, where we all stick with a set of common rules.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Adonis]

My Lords, the noble Baroness needs to be very cautious about taking on the noble Duke, of Wellington in a debate. I hope that she will be able to agree with her ducal colleague. There are two key points here: one is fundamental, the other pragmatic. The noble Duke made the pragmatic one, which is compelling. There could be reasons, perhaps to do with the final ratification processes, why it is in the public interest to delay and we should not put obstacles in the path of that. There is also a reason of fundamental constitutional principle why we should not agree to this. We are being asked to agree to a date for leaving the European Union, and to put it in statute, before we know what we will be doing after we leave. Until we have the withdrawal treaty, we will not be aware of what the terms of withdrawal are—

[Lord Liddle]

I do not think we are going to know what the terms of withdrawal are even when we get that treaty. All we are going to get is a political declaration. It is clear that everyone in Brussels thinks that the British Government want to fudge that as much as possible because that is the only way the Prime Minister, Mrs May, can get an agreement through the House of Commons and her own party.

[Lord Adonis]

My noble friend makes very good points, which will be a subject for discussion when we see the proposed withdrawal treaty. However, this is all the more reason why Parliament should not commit itself now to a date in advance of knowing the basis on which we are going to withdraw. The arguments for taking the date out of the Bill are compelling. It is not sufficient that only a Minister has the power to change the date. It is crucial for Parliament itself to be in charge of setting the date, once it has agreed the terms of departure.

I am always an optimist in these matters. The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, did the noble Baroness on the Front Bench a great disservice when he said that he knew in advance what she was going to say. We know that the noble Baroness is highly emollient and listens to debates in the House. She is not her noble friend Lord Callanan, who just reads from the script and is totally unresponsive to the mood of the House. We have great confidence that the noble Baroness will say that she has listened to the compelling arguments which have been put to her, particularly from her ducal colleague; that she is going to depart from the words in her script; that Her Majesty’s Government will consider this matter on the basis of the overwhelming weight of arguments which have been put in this Committee and that she will be delighted to accept the amendments on the Order Paper this afternoon.