English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill

Lord Lansley Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 9th February 2026 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord Lansley]

180A: Schedule 24, page 263, line 14, leave out “(whenever passed or made)” and insert “passed before, or in the same Session as, this Act”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to limit the Secretary of State's power to amend future Acts of Parliament using secondary legislation, in line with the DPRRC's recommendation. The 'Henry VIII power' could only be used prospectively for Acts passed in this session, rather than any future Act of Parliament. It is connected to three other amendments in the name of Lord Lansley.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, we turn now to a group of amendments that all relate to the exercise of delegated powers to amend future legislation—Henry VIII powers. They are powers by way of statutory instrument to amend primary legislation in the future. The relevant document—if noble Lords are interested to read it in detail—is the 45th report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which reported on this Bill and drew the attention of the House to the Henry VIII powers.

Before I turn to precisely what it said, it did not note, but I have, that in Clause 88 there is a general power for making consequential and incidental provision relating to future legislation. Clause 88 says:

“Regulations … may amend or repeal provision made by an Act of Parliament passed before, or in the same Session as, this Act”.


My amendments do not affect that.

My Amendments 180A, 184A, 196F and 235DA in this group relate to Henry VIII powers to amend future legislation, which was the subject of the Delegated Powers Committee’s report. It said:

“It is reasonably common for Henry VIII powers to allow for consequential amendments to amend future Acts of Parliament passed in the same session as the Bill in which they appear … the Government and Parliament are capable of passing Bills in future sessions consistent with preceding legislation”.


It says in the next paragraph that in November last year the parliamentary counsel noted to the Constitution Committee that

“the power to amend consequentially Acts in future sessions is rare and normally specifically justified in the delegated powers [memorandum] … The Bill includes numerous instances of this type of power and the Memorandum”—

that is, the Government’s delegated powers memorandum—

“does not provide justification for any of them”.

It says, in the recommendations in paragraph 23 of the report:

“In the light of the Government’s failure to justify the ability of these Henry VIII powers to change the effect of Acts of Parliament to be passed in future sessions, we recommend to the House that the delegated powers in clauses 54 and 71 … Schedule 24 and … Schedule 26 are amended to remove that ability”.


I have tabled four amendments to do precisely that. In each case, they would take out the words “whenever passed”, meaning whenever passed in the future, and insert precisely the same words as those the Government themselves used in the drafting of Clause 88—that is, that they would amend or repeal provision made by an Act of Parliament

“passed before, or in the same Session as, this Act”.

I think there is a small, technical problem with my amendment in relation to Schedule 26. Since it relates to an insertion to the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007, the reference to “this Act” might be inaccurate. However, we will not worry about that, because we can deal with it on Report as necessary.

The purpose of these four amendments relates to a number of places. It relates to Clause 54, which we are dealing with presently, which modifies the functions of mayors and strategic authorities; Clause 71, which concerns the licensing of taxis and private hire vehicles; Schedule 24, which we have just been discussing, which concerns licensing powers for the Mayor of London; and Schedule 26, which relates to local government reorganisation powers. The subject matter of those powers is almost unimportant; the point is that, in each case, the Government have used the same language to give themselves the power, by statutory instrument, to amend future Acts of Parliament beyond this Session. In the same way as Clause 88, each of my amendments would limit that power to amend Acts passed or made up to the end of this parliamentary Session.

The noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville, has tabled Amendment 184. As I say, I have tabled Amendment 184A, because it does the same thing as the others, whereas Amendment 184 would remove the regulation-making power entirely. I submit that that would go too far, since there is often a need to make consequential or incidental provision.

The essential point that I come back to is that there is no basis for justifying taking a power to amend future Acts of Parliament in future Sessions, because those Bills, when they are introduced to this place, can take account of, and make their own provision for, what the future shape of legislation should look like. It is not a question of saving parliamentary time; they can be dealt with in those Acts when the time comes. I beg to move.

[Baroness Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville (LD)]

My Lords, I apologise for not having spoken in the previous debates on this Bill due to the pressure of work. The noble Lord, Lord Lansley, has spoken eloquently to his amendments, and I agree with nearly everything he has said. I will speak to Amendment 184 in my name, as I am extremely concerned about the long-term implications of Clause 54(3).

Clause 54 begins with subsection (1):

“The Secretary of State may by regulations make incidental, consequential, transitional, transitory or supplementary provision for the purposes of”—


it then it goes into the detail. My concern is with subsection (3), which, for the benefit of the doubt, I will read:

“Regulations under this section may (in particular) amend any Act of Parliament (whenever passed), including by amending this Act”.


This is an amazing power to hand to the Secretary of State in the future, whoever he or she might be. The ability to amend any Act of Parliament, which may not even be a twinkle in the eye of any future government at this stage, is breathtaking.

Until the end of January, I had the privilege to sit on the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. The council that advises the DPRRC was extremely concerned about the number of delegated powers in the Bill that we are currently debating. There are 92 delegated powers, and a further 42 not covered in the memorandum, due to the fact that the Bill is likely to interact with existing enactments.

Similar powers were brought forward in 2015, at which point the committee felt that the powers were too broad. However, we now have a new Government and a new philosophy. I can understand that the Government want to be able to change past and current legislation in future, but they are asking for the power to change legislation that is yet to be drafted—a power that bypasses the role of Parliament completely.

The noble Lord, Lord Lansley, spoke at length on his amendments, which relate to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee’s concerns about the Bill. He set out his arguments extremely clearly and referred to the committee’s 45th report, which was published on 16 January. That report details the committee’s concerns; it is extensive and raises significant issues around the way in which the Henry VIII powers will be executed. The noble Lord, Lord Lansley, has already ready out the committee’s recommendation concerning this particular power, which is as follows:

“In the light of the Government’s failure to justify the ability of these Henry VIII powers to change the effect of Acts of Parliament to be passed in future sessions, we recommend to the House that the delegated powers in clauses 54 and 71, and those in paragraph 5(3) of Schedule 24 and paragraph 1(8) of Schedule 26 are amended to remove that ability”.


I apologise for repeating what the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, said word for word, but it is really important to stress this point.

Considering this strong recommendation from the Delegated Powers Committee, as well as the concerns raised by me and the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, I hope that the Minister will be able to tell the Committee that the Government are prepared to accept this amendment and amend the Bill accordingly. This is an unjustifiable abuse of power, bypassing Parliament to seek to amend future Acts of Parliament and legislation that is not even in the initial stages of being drafted.

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Again, I welcome the spirit in which the noble Lord has brought forward his amendment and I will reflect on whether the Secretary of State requires this power to apply to future primary legislation ahead of Report. With these reassurances, I hope that the noble Lord will be able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville, not only for her supportive comments on all these amendments but for her participation in the Committee’s scrutiny. We are grateful to the Delegated Powers Committee for the time and trouble that it takes in drawing these things carefully to our attention.

I will not dwell on this. I entirely understand many of the things that the Minister was saying. No part of these amendments is seeking to frustrate the Government’s intentions through these four separate parts of the Bill. The point is technical but simple. At any future stage, future primary legislation can take account in that primary legislation of whether it may be necessary for the powers in this Act to, for example, change the functions of mayors and strategic authorities or to revise the local government reorganisation arrangements in the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act. It can take account of those and extend those powers to make statutory instruments to amend them in that primary legislation itself. However, we should not, before that legislation has even come here, give a power to amend it. That would significantly restrict our ability in future legislation to anticipate how that legislation can be used and to scrutinise it in the proper way at the time.

I will of course withdraw my amendment but I hope that the Government will come back, not only having responded to the Committee but in order to change this language on each of these occasions to the same as that in Clause 88. However, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 180A.

Amendment 180A withdrawn.

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[Lord Lansley (Con)]

I, too, support what my noble friend Lady Scott of Bybrook was saying. I recall that she was responsible for Sections 18, 19 and 20 of LURA, on the conferral of functions on county combined authorities—as they were at that time—so she has been down this track.

I have three quick points. First, and I think my noble friend touched on this, the existing legislation, by which the Secretary of State can confer functions on combined authorities or combined county authorities, operates on the basis of a proposal from those authorities to the Secretary of State for the functions to be conferred. After consultation, the Secretary of State requires the consent of those authorities for the functions to be conferred. I cannot find that in Schedule 25, so the conclusion that one reaches is that, in this devolution Bill, the authorities do not even have the power to decide whether the functions are theirs or not. They will just be given to them or modified without anything beyond consultation; it does not require a proposal or consent. That is a very odd way of proceeding.

Secondly, we had a discussion in an earlier group about the structure of the voting arrangements in Clause 6, but we suddenly find in Schedule 25 that the Government want a power to change them on potentially quite important issues. I cannot for the life of me understand why that is necessary here, because the individual strategic authorities can change their constitutional arrangements anyway, if they really wanted to. I think that we established that in the earlier group. So why do the Government want to be able to change the voting arrangements?

Thirdly, on the pilots, there is a requirement in paragraph 21 for the pilot schemes to produce an impact report but, as far as I can see, it has to be given to the Secretary of State. It does not appear to have to be given to anybody else and it certainly does not have to be published. The Government should come back and make it clear that, when produced and given to the Secretary of State, the impact report should then be published.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, for probing whether Schedule 25 should stand part of the Bill. Schedule 25 is central to the objectives of the Bill and the Government’s ambitions for devolution in England. We have been clear that the devolution framework delivered by this Bill is the floor not the ceiling of our ambitions for devolving powers to our communities. Schedule 25 provides the Secretary of State with the power to confer new functions on strategic authorities and to modify these functions. This will ensure that strategic authorities and mayors have the powers that they need to deliver for local people.

I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, wanted to question which functions could be conferred using these powers. As outlined in paragraph 4 of Schedule 25, a function can be conferred if it

“is a function of a public authority, and … relates to any aspect of any area of competence”.

It might help if I go into a little more detail on that. The current list reflects the areas under which the Government believe strategic authorities should hold powers and functions. Functions and powers held under these areas will best empower mayors to act strategically, to drive growth and to help shape public services for their local communities. The current list of thematic policy areas is deliberately broad and allows for a wide range of activities to fall within the areas of competence. The Government remain open to considering whether the list could be expanded in future.

Questions were asked about the conferring of functions on to a strategic authority and how that will work.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

I am sorry to interrupt but I have a question. When the Minister talks about extending the list in future, is that the list of functions within areas of competence, or is she talking about the ability to extend the list of areas of competence?

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

I am talking about the functions within the competence.

The Secretary of State will be required to consult relevant parties, including the strategic authority, the constituent councils and any body that currently holds the function. The Secretary of State will then need to determine whether to confer the function, paying regard to the need for the effective exercise of the function concerned. Regulations made under Schedule 25 will be subject to the affirmative procedure, ensuring that appropriate parliamentary scrutiny takes place.

In some instances, it will make sense to pilot functions with a smaller number of strategic authorities for a time-limited period. I will try to answer the questions about piloting, but I will look at Hansard later and come back in writing if I have not answered them all. Where we are piloting, strategic authorities will be required to provide an impact report on the pilot, which the Secretary of State will take into consideration before deciding whether to confer the functions permanently; I will consider whether those reports should be public.

As an example—the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, asked for an example of this—development corporation functions are held by mayors. If we wanted to move those functions to foundation authorities, for example, we could use these powers. What will happen with a pilot is that an area will make a request for a function. Pilots will need to be consented to by both the Secretary of State and the relevant local authorities. When a pilot has been completed, there will be an impact assessment of that pilot.

I will come back to the noble Baroness in writing on her questions about default voting arrangements, balance of power and the safeguards.

The noble Lord, Lord Shipley, asked about a grid setting out the different powers between different layers of local authorities. We have already produced one; it is on GOV.UK. Perhaps the noble Lord might like to have a look at it and, if he has any further questions, to come back to me.

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[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, before we complete this group, I just want to say that what the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, said by way of moving his probing amendment asks not only important questions but questions to which we will have to come back, if not in this Bill then on the NHS reform Bill. As I know the noble Lord will completely understand, in so far as that forthcoming legislation will transfer responsibilities back into the Department of Health and Social Care and, potentially, give specific statutory responsibilities to integrated care boards, neither of those will allow this legislation and the 2016 legislation to operate in the way he intends. We will, therefore, have to come back to that and how it will happen at the time.

As things stand, the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care does not devolve any of his functions to local government. In effect, he devolves the functions that would otherwise be exercised by NHS England in Manchester to the mayoral strategic authority. If we are going to do that in other mayoral strategic authorities when NHS England has disappeared, there will need to be a new structure to see how this works.

In some ways, it is entirely dependent on how the Government intend, in the NHS reform procedures, to re-establish the relationship between the NHS and local government. Nobody—I heard the noble Lord say this quite recently—has satisfactorily created that relationship. In the coalition Government, it was a very complicated process, and it did not work. There have been positive outcomes in relation to public health, but, for local government, there have not been satisfactory outcomes in relation to the management of health services—particularly in so far as they can be combined satisfactorily with social care services. This is something that we will have to return to in the NHS reform Bill.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

My Lords, turning first to Clause 53, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, for his probing stand part notice. As we have said more than once, the devolution of health is a complex matter that raises many important questions—particularly, as we have heard, around the relationship between local authorities and the NHS. I listened to the passion of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, on this issue. I assure him that I felt as passionate as him 15 years ago; I hope that, at the end of all this, he is not as disappointed as I was.

When I was going through this in Wiltshire, the interesting thing was that the staff on the front line—those in the NHS and in local authorities—really understood this issue. They understood the importance of devolution and how they could deliver much more efficient, better services for the people whom they wanted to serve. That pushed me to do this more and more. However, as I have noted previously, many of the determinants of public health sit outside the health system. We must be clear on who is responsible for what. As we have said many times, where additional duties and responsibilities are placed on local authorities, they must be matched with sufficient resources to deliver them properly. In addition, the Government’s approach must be evidence-based and must demonstrate value for money for taxpayers.

On previous groups, the Minister mentioned the mayor’s involvement in integrated care boards, and we all welcome that. But it has to go further than that. In my opinion, being a member of an integrated care board will not deliver what we need to be delivered on the ground with health and local authorities.

This brings me to Amendment 185 in the name of my noble friend Lord Gascoigne. I thank him for making the case so compellingly. This amendment would prevent the duplication of powers between local authorities and central government. In the realm of health, for instance, we cannot risk the lines of accountability being blurred, whereby functions and responsibilities are devolved down to local authorities, yet Whitehall does not equip them to deliver effectively or continues to do the same jobs itself, leading to duplication.

This is precisely the difference between the Government’s current approach to devolution and what genuine community empowerment ought to look like. This amendment aims to correct that by ensuring that, when a function is devolved, it is also relinquished by central government, while still permitting the appropriate oversight where needed.

If the Government truly believe in local community empowerment, there can be no greater vote of confidence than supporting the principles set out here, trusting local authorities to do the jobs devolved to them fully, and giving local people clear, transparent lines of accountability. This is a matter not of meaningful devolution but of efficiencies and effective government. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response on both these important amendments.