Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information Agreement

Lord Lansley Excerpts

Monday 17th January 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, as a member of the International Agreements Committee I am very pleased to have this opportunity to follow our Chair, the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town. I very much look forward to this debate, which will include several expert contributions that will be of particular value to the House, not only now, in the process of scrutinising this agreement, but perhaps more particularly in setting the scene for the engagement between the three parties to this agreement and the agreements to follow.

If I may, I will reinforce the point that our Chair made. The committee’s report essentially welcomes the agreement; we simply make one point that seems to have been taken for granted, as she said, by the Australian treaties committee: that further agreements and amendments to this agreement will be subject to further scrutiny. It literally said: “any action will be subject to further scrutiny”. If that is the case for the Australian Parliament, clearly, it should also be the case for this Parliament, and I hope that my noble friend the Minister will be able to make that simple and straight- forward commitment.

There is intended to be considerable follow-up activity on the agreement, so the substance of it is not so great that we can debate many details now. It is intended to initiate a wider co-operation not only on nuclear-powered propulsion systems for submarines but on areas of cyberwarfare, AI, quantum technologies and undersea technologies generally. I hope that today, we will hear a bit more about what the scope of that collaboration may look like.

May I say to my noble friend that I thought the agreement immensely encouraging in several respects? First, at the simple, mundane, practical level, it is encouraging that Governments in this day and age were able to negotiate something of a strategic and significant character, for several months and with deep engagement, with nobody leaking it. That is fantastic. We arrived at 15 September, and everybody was surprised, including the French. It is to the Government’s credit that they were able to do that.

Secondly, there seems to have been a particular skill on the part of the British Government in being right at the heart of this strategic negotiation, yet the French Government blamed Washington and Canberra and seemed not to blame London to the same extent and did not withdraw their ambassadors. The UK strategic engagement was central. Unless I am very much mistaken, the report suggests that the initial conversations were between the Royal Australian Navy and the Royal Navy, so in a sense, the initiation of this agreement may have rested in the hands of the British Government rather than necessarily with the Australian Government —but that is only what I have read in reports.

However it came about—this is the most important point on which to applaud the Government’s agreement—we often hear about an Indo-Pacific tilt and the necessity of taking realistic and tough measures to counter the longer-term risks associated with Chinese aggrandisement and, here, for once, we are actually seeing something happening that is concrete, substantial and potentially of great significance. Certainly, it is a step change in the Australian defence capability, as a former Australian Defence Minister said. It also seems that it has not only important defence implications but very strong and positive geopolitical implications.

In our committee, we considered questions relating to the arguments about the nuclear proliferation treaty. It is clear that this is not a breach of any of the treaty obligations on the part of any of the participants in the agreement; nor can one realistically—as some have attempted to do—suggest that it somehow opens the door to the transfer of nuclear-powered propulsion technology to other countries. Other countries, such as South Korea, may wish to acquire it, but it has taken several decades for the Americans to agree to any further sharing beyond Great Britain. The White House briefing on the day of the launch was perfectly clear that they saw this as a one-off and they would not regard it as offering any precedent for any other country to be able to ask for the same thing. So, to that extent, we felt sure that we saw no need to express any reservations in that territory.

I should declare an interest as the UK chair of the UK-Japan 21st Century Group. It is interesting that, not only do we now have the Quad—which the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, may wish to say a bit more about, including on the progress that has been made in mutual understanding and assistance—but shortly after this agreement the Japanese Government entered into a reciprocal assistance agreement with the Government of Australia, which is only their second such agreement. The Japanese Government have made it clear that they would view positively the prospect of a further agreement of a similar character with the United Kingdom.

I know it is probably not within my noble friend’s brief to respond on that point today, but if she were able to write to me about it, I would be very interested to read it, following the increase in mutual assistance with Japan—not only literally troops on the ground and aircraft deployed for training purposes in Japan, but the visit of the “Queen Elizabeth” and other vessels. There are a lot of possibilities for extending our UK/Japanese defence collaboration to the form of an agreement such as that entered into with Australia.

Finally, I wish to reinforce a particular point that our chair made about the industrial and economic benefits in the United Kingdom. It was reported shortly after this agreement was signed that the British Government entered into a contract for early design work on a new nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarine for the Royal Navy with BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce. Can my noble friend say any more about that and how it might position the United Kingdom’s defence industry in relation to work on the Australian submarine fleet, in circumstances where it is reported that the American defence capability is fully occupied in meeting its own requirements?

In all those respects, this seems to me to be a very positive agreement. It is very useful for us at this stage to note some of the potential and to encourage the Government in directions in which they seem very willing and able to go.

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[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Baroness Goldie) (Con)]

My Lords, I first thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and her committee for their report and for calling this debate. I also thank all noble Lords for their genuinely interesting and very well-informed contributions.

Let me just reprise the salient features of the AUKUS information-sharing agreement. I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, who referred to it as being an agreement of strategic significance. My noble friend Lord Lansley made positive comments about the process and the agreement itself and the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, offered a very insightful and reflective commentary. This agreement is based on existing information-sharing practices in place between the United Kingdom and the United States. It will remain in force for only a limited period, and it is necessary in order to enable this key piece of work on submarine nuclear propulsion to move forward.

It is a binding international agreement in law. The noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, raised the important question of what happens if there is a change of Government. None of us has the capacity to predict or control what properly elected Governments in other states do, but this is a binding international agreement. I think that everyone understands the significance and strategic importance of this agreement to Australia, and I therefore very much hope that the arrangement is secure. If there is a change of Administration in any of the three countries—I do not anticipate that happening in this country; let me make that clear—I would hope that the binding legal dimensions of this agreement would obtain.

In so far as the procedure within the United Kingdom is concerned, we laid the agreement before Parliament in November 2021 for scrutiny in the usual way, and I thank the committee for its role in that process. I thought that the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, was rather disparaging about the agreement. He thinks it is fragile. With respect, I disagree: I think it is robust and focused. There is very detailed work under the agreement now proceeding. He was unduly pessimistic in saying that he is certain it will go wrong. I disagree. I have every confidence, with the structures in place, that this is an important piece of work, not just for our international interests but also for our domestic interests. It is an exciting prospect, and I do not share his pessimism.

I thank the committee for its scrutiny of the agreement and for the report that it has produced. My noble friend Lady McIntosh asked when we expect it to be ratified, and the answer is by the end of January. For future agreements, the Government would of course comply with any applicable requirements of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. The committee drew specific attention to amendments and whether they would be subject to parliamentary scrutiny. Understandably, a number of your Lordships raised this issue and sought clarification. As I have said, the agreement is based on existing information-sharing practices in place between the United Kingdom and the United States, and it will remain in force only for a limited period, enabling the initial programme of work. In these circumstances, the Government consider it unlikely that it will need to be amended during its time in force.

The terms of a binding international agreement, including those on the method of consent to be bound—for example, ratification—are subject to negotiation on a case-by-case basis with international partners. The noble Baronesses, Lady Hayter and Lady Smith, focused particularly on this point, as did my noble friend Lord Lansley. The nature of what happens in the course of the discharge of the functions under the agreement dictates, to some extent, how these matters are approached. Certainly, they would have to be approached with trilateral agreement, and we cannot anticipate what might arise that would need adjustment. We cannot anticipate whether they would raise, for example, issues of commercial confidentiality or national security. The same applies to the nature and form of any follow-on agreement, but I make clear to the Committee that the Government have previously indicated their intention that the majority of important treaty amendments be subject to ratification and submitted to Parliament for scrutiny in accordance with CRaG. I hope that provides an appropriate level of reassurance to Members of the Committee.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

Is it reasonable to infer, from what my noble friend has said, that if a follow-on agreement is subject to examination by the treaties committee in the Australian Parliament, it will also be subject to scrutiny through CRaG in this Parliament?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I wish to reassure my noble friend and the Committee that the spirit and intention of the Government is that scrutiny is important; it is at the heart of what they wish to see Parliament do, and it would be exceptional if scrutiny were denied. I hope that reassures my noble friend to some extent.

Moving on to the substance of AUKUS itself, it is a security and defence partnership between three like-minded, democratic allies to enhance security and stability in the Indo-Pacific region and globally. AUKUS is not a new treaty, it is not a mutual defence agreement, and it does not replace nor cut across other alliances, such as NATO or Five Eyes; it complements them and supports their aims.

As your Lordships will be aware, the main effort under AUKUS is the delivery of a nuclear-powered submarine capability to Australia. In September last year, an 18-month programme of work commenced to understand how we can best achieve this goal. I want to be clear that Australia asked for our help in acquiring a nuclear-powered submarine; we are meeting the request of a close partner with whom we have a long history of co-operation, including on submarines. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, spoke with authority on our long-standing United Kingdom/Australia relationship.

Our work to deliver this capability for Australia reflects the unique level of trust and co-operation between our three countries, and we can rightly be proud of that. This will help Australia to fulfil its defence and security responsibilities and to promote stability and security in the region, which this Government strongly support. As your Lordships will be aware, we have built and operated a world-class nuclear-powered submarine capability for more than 60 years. We bring deep expertise and experience to this partnership, as indeed do our American allies. AUKUS showcases the UK’s competitive and innovative defence industry and our role as a global leader in science and technology.

I emphasise, because a number of your Lordships alluded to this, that the programme of work will be fully in line with our international obligations. Australia has impeccable non-proliferation credentials, and it does not, and will not, seek nuclear weapons. It is important to reiterate that the proposed submarines will use a nuclear reactor uniquely as a power source. All three partners take their obligations under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty extremely seriously and have been in regular close contact with the International Atomic Energy Agency as this agreement moves forward into the next stage.

Let me try to deal with some specific points that arose during the debate. My noble friend Lord Lansley raised the Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement. We enjoy a close and growing bilateral security relationship with Japan. AUKUS does not replace or reduce the importance of any other strands of our relationship with Japan. Instead, through AUKUS, we intend to deepen, not limit, co-operation in the Indo-Pacific region. The Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement is for these Governments to comment on, but is a sign of their developing strategic partnership.

The noble Baronesses, Lady Liddell and Lady Smith, raised the transfer of intellectual property. The agreement provides protection for the originating parties under Article VIII. As part of the ongoing programme of work, we will further consider how to deal with the exchange of intellectual property.

The noble Baronesses, Lady Hayter and Lady Smith, the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, and my noble friend Lady McIntosh raised the important issue of international relations, not least with France, Europe and China. We fully recognise the French disappointment. We are keen to move forward and are keeping channels of communication open. As the Prime Minister said to President Macron, we are committed to the United Kingdom-France relationship and we believe in the powerful role we can play together.

France is an important partner to the United Kingdom. We have a long-standing security and defence relationship with France that is underpinned by the Lancaster House treaties and by us being close NATO allies. We continue to consult each other daily on international defence and security matters, and that defence relationship remains strong. As was recently illustrated, our close collaboration on Afghanistan and our military deployments in the Sahel to tackle terrorism indicate that we are working together and consulting each other, just as we are working together to tackle global challenges such as climate change.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, focused particularly on China. I make clear that AUKUS is not aimed at a specific country; it is about supporting our allies and promoting stability in the Indo-Pacific region. AUKUS will work to protect our people and support a peaceful and rules-based international order. It is about the long-standing and deepening defence and security relationship between the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States.

The noble Baronesses, Lady Hayter, Lady Liddell and Lady Smith, and the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, specifically raised Five Eyes. That remains a unique and highly valued partnership. We have been sharing intelligence to address global threats and support international security and stability for over 60 years. We noted that Prime Minister Ardern of New Zealand welcomed the increased engagement of the United Kingdom and United States in the region. We compare notes and work together as five like-minded countries on a range of issues and in a variety of formats. Of course, each of us also has its independent foreign policy and works with different partners and in different groupings, according to context and need.

My noble friend Lady McIntosh asked about devolution. In this context, defence and foreign affairs are matters reserved for the Westminster Government, so there is no specific devolved locus on this matter. When the MoD receives inquiries from representatives of constituencies in the devolved nations or from the devolved Governments, we respond and always do our best to co-operate and be helpful.

The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, particularly raised the nuclear aspect to this and the responsibilities of the United Kingdom, United States and Australia. I give the reassurance that we want to reinforce the global non-proliferation architecture and set a precedent for the future that retains confidence in the fulfilment of our NPT obligations. We regularly update the International Atomic Energy Agency and are fully engaging with it throughout the 18-month feasibility study. We will continue to be transparent and consultative, especially on issues regarding nuclear materials, facilities and activities relevant to the IAEA.

The noble Lords, Lord Hannay and Lord Bilimoria, were interested in the inherent character of this new security partnership. That is what it is. I think they were seeking clarification and reassurance. This is a partnership focused on joint capability development and technology sharing. It reflects the unique level of trust and co-operation between the UK, the United States and Australia. It is about nuclear propulsion, not nuclear weapons and, very specifically, it does not include any obligation to consider an attack upon one as an attack against all participating states. That is not the character of this agreement.

The noble Lord, Lord West, sought detail about specific representation on various groups within the UK, the United States and Australia. I do not have specific information to that level, but I shall investigate, and if I am able to share information with him, I shall do so.