Houses in Multiple Occupation

Lord Lancaster of Kimbolton Excerpts

Thursday 18th November 2010 Westminster Hall

[Mark Lancaster (Milton Keynes North) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to participate in the debate and I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Loughborough (Nicky Morgan) on securing it. She articulated well many of the concerns of local authorities up and down the country, in particular on article 4 directions and the potential for compensation—certainly something my own local authority in Milton Keynes is concerned about. I will not dwell on those points, since she spoke so well, I simply ask the Minister one question on behalf of Milton Keynes council, which, he is aware, is seeking a legal review at the moment. The council is keen to continue negotiations with the Government, but I understand that the Government would rather wait until the legal challenge has finished before they communicate again. It would be helpful to me, and to the council, if the Minister could confirm that.

I am sorry to say that the debate is particularly relevant to my constituency. I have long pushed for tougher measures on HMOs, given the various problems that they have caused in Milton Keynes. I even secured an Adjournment debate on the matter back in 2007. However, two months ago, two people died in an HMO fire—deaths that might have been prevented—which brought into sharp focus why fire safety is paramount in such properties, of which we have many in Milton Keynes. I want to summarise the chain of events that led to the tragedy and propose how lessons might be learnt.

In the early hours of Sunday 5 September, the emergency services were called to 200 Fishermead boulevard, where a fire had broken out on the first floor. It was clear to crews on arrival that this was an HMO: a three-storey, three-bedroom terrace property converted into five bedsits. Firefighters rescued one woman, and a firefighter was injured when the floor collapsed beneath him.

In the morning, friends were still searching for 29-year-old Bola Ejifunmilayo and her three-year-old daughter Fiyin. It was not until the next day, when the friends reported the two missing, that the property was searched again. Their bodies were discovered in a top-floor bedsit, 30 hours after the blaze. Why the search was discontinued and why it took so long to discover the bodies are the subjects of separate police and fire investigations. I would not want to pre-empt the outcome of either investigation. My focus is simply that this was an undeclared, unlicensed HMO.

Since the incident, I have met the Buckinghamshire fire and rescue service. It is clear that the outcome of the tragedy could have been very different with only a few simple fire precautions. The crucial point is that, because the landlord declared that the house was not an HMO, there was no local authority inspection, which would have ensured fire precautions, such as fire alarms, being put in place. As a result, the fire was burning for approximately 45 minutes before 999 was called. There were no self-closing doors but, for example, the door to the room where the blaze started was open, and fire doors could have contained the blaze for at least 30 minutes.

On Monday, I joined officers during an HMO inspection. Their checks included ensuring that the landlord provided means of escape, as well as fire extinguishers, blankets and doors with in-built keys to unlock them. The unregulated conversion of some HMOs—such as the addition of extra rooms or the removal of wall and floor linings—can also pose structural risks, and creating ducting or openings between floors can assist the spread of fire and cause a chimney-like effect for the flames.

It is widely accepted that HMOs are more susceptible to fire than other types of properties. That is borne out by the figures. In 2007, around 2% of houses in the UK were HMOs, but around 33% of fire deaths happened in multiple-occupancy properties. In Milton Keynes, HMOs suffer a disproportionate number of house fires.

Apart from overcrowding, HMOs put five times as much demand on the electrical supply. In these properties, kitchen appliances such as fridges are common in bedrooms; electric extension cables abound; and several people often cook meals at the same time. There is also an element of anonymity among the people who live in HMOs. That can heighten the risk of fire. The population in some HMO communities can be very transient, and it unlikely that residents will know who is living in the next room, let alone the next house.

On the tragic morning of 5 September, it appears that there was confusion in Fishermead about who lived in which bedsit. Firefighters find it harder to evacuate places if there is no awareness among those who live there and no interdependency. Given the nature of HMOs and their tenants, will the Minister acknowledge that they are more hazardous and that they therefore warrant more stringent fire regulations? Despite fire safety being paramount in HMOs, 200 Fishermead boulevard was not licensed or identified as an HMO, and was therefore not subject to safety checks. As far as the council was concerned, it was a single family dwelling. The authority had been assured of that through an e-mail from the landlord in January 2009.

I emphasise how important it is for the authorities to know when a house is an HMO. Not only can the information help prevent fires, as I have explained, but when the fire service takes a 999 call the crew is able to prepare for such an incident en route. Given that fire safety can be assured only when an HMO is declared as such, registering these properties should be made a priority.

Even for registered HMOs, risks surround inspection. Dual legislation means that although local authorities are responsible for inspecting bedrooms and private areas, the fire service inspects communal areas such as kitchens, landings and stairways. The fire authority acts under the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005, but the council has to adhere to the provisions of the Housing Act 2004. However, Milton Keynes operates a Local Authorities Co-ordinators of Regulatory Services or LACORS agreement. The council enforces it on behalf of both authorities, and it is supported by the fire service out of hours when required.

Apparently the LACORS method works better than when responsibilities remain divided. Even then, however, fire safety is not as rigorous as it could be. Councils have to give 24 hours’ notice before inspections, but fire authorities can enter immediately. As a result, the deputy chief fire officer has written to the leader of Milton Keynes council, offering the authority the fire service’s more dynamic powers.

It is no wonder that the fire service is so keen to help. It is the fire service that has to deal with the consequences. Officers would rather visit homes and install fire safety precautions than tackle a fire. They even have the power to prosecute. Meanwhile, the council is overstretched. Milton Keynes has five council staff responsible for overseeing the city’s 90,000 properties. Will the Minister consider streamlining this dual legislation? Though the LACORS agreement works well in Milton Keynes, will he consider allowing the fire service to take the lead in HMO fire safety?

I acknowledge that HMOs fulfil a necessary role, and that they are here to stay. However, our current legislative approach underestimates the magnitude of risk that they pose to residents—as proved at Fishermead. I would like to see a more robust approach to fire safety for HMOs. To that end, will the Minister acknowledge the risk, prioritise their registration and perhaps put the fire services back in the driving seat?