Queen’s Speech

Debate between Lord Lamont of Lerwick and Lord Elystan-Morgan

Monday 14th May 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

Some of the jury is on this side of the House.

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

I am sorry. However, it seems to me that I am surrounded by many people who subscribe to the same ideas as me. That may very well be the choice. Although the noble Lord, Lord Ashdown, and others may argue that there is no great significance in a written constitution, I believe that it makes all the difference. I would put it, very humbly, in this way: if you have a written constitution dealing with two elected Houses, it is very much like having two rail tracks running parallel with each other. With luck, no great disaster will ever occur. If you do not have a written constitution, with two elected Houses you have an open highway where each of those heavy, dangerous vehicles is competing with the other for road space and where there is, in the long term, the certainty of disaster. That is the situation.

If I am right that those are the stark choices now confronting our community, then we have gone about it the wrong way altogether. We have sought to deal with this matter in a piecemeal, tunnel-vision manner. That is a fair criticism. The 1911 and 1949 Parliament Acts dealt solely with powers. Since 1949, virtually all the discussion has been about membership. How can you possibly deal with membership save in apposition to powers or with powers save in apposition to membership? How can you possibly deal with a tripartite entity, such as parliamentary government—the House of Commons, the House of Lords and the devolved Assemblies—through totally changing the character and the constitution of one of them?

I believe that one of the most unwholesome proposals in the draft Bill is the 15-year term. I can well understand, and have sympathy with, the motives behind it. I came to this House 31 years ago, although I am sorry that I have not been here for the entire intervening time, having very improperly played truant for a period. I can well understand why a modern legislator should feel that they should have the independence to be able to deal with an issue as they see it on merit without having to look over their shoulder to the next election or to dictate into the columns of the local rag. It is a perfectly understandable and decent motivation, but I think it is a very wrong one. Democratic representation means two things: it means being elected in a democratic way and being answerable in a democratic way. It is not the fact of election that is so important but the fact of facing re-election: that is the mandate that has sovereign value, if you look in a purely tunnelled way at popular election.

I end with this: I believe that the most sensible answer to this situation has come from the alternative report. It states that, bearing in mind all these issues and more, there is only one place to start, and that is with a constitutional convention to examine all these matters in depth with maturity, common sense and statesmanship. To start anywhere else would be wholly unthinkable.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Lamont of Lerwick and Lord Elystan-Morgan

Wednesday 16th February 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, speaks from the very heart of reason and common sense when he says that the real role of this House, in a situation such as this, is to invite the House of Commons to think again. That, however, does not mean that that should happen only once. In the circumstances of this case, as has been so clearly shown by the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, the House of Commons has thought twice about the matter and come to totally different conclusions—although in both cases it happened to reject the proposition that we are discussing. In the first instance, the other place voted by 540 votes against and 31 votes for a threshold in the referendum. Last night, the vote against was carried by about 65 per cent to 70 per cent. The curve is clearly pointing in one direction. But be that as it may, one cannot say that the other place is expressing a consistent and monolithic view on the matter. That does not in any way defeat what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, is saying, but to some extent it qualifies it in the special circumstances of this case.

One can summarise the issue in this way. We are dealing here, I think, with a balance of risks. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, is perfectly correct to say that when you invite the public to partake directly in a decision such as this, there is a risk that Parliament could be seen—in some way or other, without intending it—to be spurning that decision. That is a real risk. No one spoke very much about that risk in 1975 when the referendum was indicative or consultative. I have read the Act and there is clearly no suggestion that that referendum would have been mandatory in any way at all.

I urge noble Lords to consider another risk. A derisory turnout would deprive this vote of any sovereignty or realism as an arbitrement of the people. That is a massive risk. It is very unlikely to happen. It does not matter a great deal which of these proposals one chooses; I tabled one myself which might not have been quite as meritorious as the one now before the House. They are insurances against a failure that is unlikely to happen, but which could happen. A person insures his house against fire not because he knows that it is going to be destroyed—unless he has criminal intentions—or because he believes that it is likely to be destroyed. He does so because he considers that there is a slight chance that it could be destroyed. The more one thinks about something, the less likely one is to be prepared to take even the slightest risk. I am sure that that is our attitude to the families we love. Here the risk is small, but it can be covered by a small, modest and reasonable premium.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

My Lords, I voted for the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, the first time, and I intend to vote for it again today. It is true that there was a significant majority in the Commons yesterday, but the result disguised the fact that 20 Conservatives voted for the amendment and 25 abstained. The large majority was accounted for to a considerable extent by the nationalists voting in support of the Government.

I was shocked by the brevity and paucity of the debate. Very few Back-Benchers were able to get in. One point that was made—as it was in this House—was that we have not had thresholds in referendums before, with the exception of the first referendum on Scottish devolution. Of course, we have had very few referendums in this country. Although the first was as long ago as the first referendum on Scottish devolution, they are still something of an innovation. I was struck by the argument made by one Conservative Back-Bencher yesterday that perhaps there should always be a threshold in constitutional referendums, as there is in so many countries of the world. My noble friend Lord Strathclyde mentioned that France does not have this threshold, but it is about the only country in Europe that does not. All other major countries do and, as my noble friend Lord Lawson said, the United States has a different sort of threshold via representatives and state legislatures.

The Minister in the Commons—and my noble and learned friend today—said that a threshold would give people an incentive to vote no. First, that cannot be asserted with absolute clarity. One can argue it both ways. A threshold gives a very positive incentive for people to vote yes if they are worried about the turnout. Secondly, somebody who is really against the proposition would have to worry that the threshold might be met; he would have to know what the turnout would have to be if he was really certain about the situation.

Leaving that aside, it is not unjustified or unfair that if there is great apathy, the proposition should fall. That seems common sense and reasonable. The proposition has been put a number of times that there might be a 38:1 vote that falls just short of the 40 per cent threshold. In Germany, there was a referendum with a majority of 10:1, but because the turnout was only 10 per cent the proposition was rejected—and quite right, too. Constitutional change affects us all; it lays down the rules of the game by which politics is conducted and by which we representatives live; and it should be made only when it is clearly the wish of the people that it should happen. There are great dangers in making major constitutional changes which have uncertain consequences. People who are in favour of AV argue that its effects would be this or that, but the truth is that what would happen is highly unpredictable. I do not believe that we should take this leap into the dark unless there is a proven desire for change supported by the British people giving it their full-hearted consent.