Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Lamont of Lerwick Excerpts

Monday 21st March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I might be missing something somewhere. The coalition agreement referred to the 55 per cent that the noble and learned Lord has described. At the same time, he gave a plug to my right honourable friend’s book, for which I am sure he is very grateful. However, that is not in the Bill; I am describing what is in the Bill. Of course it is a product of the coalition. It is a coalition Bill that is before your Lordships’ House.

I recall sitting in this House during Questions and listening to many noble Lords on all sides of the House criticise that 55 per cent provision. The noble and learned Lord nods his head in agreement. It was a provision that received considerable criticism. There was a criticism that it meant a vote that could lead to a Dissolution. People asked about votes of no confidence. At the same time, there was the issue of whether there ought to be a higher majority to trigger a Dissolution automatically. The two mechanisms that provide the trigger in the Bill as it stands address the criticisms that were made. I make no apology for saying that the Government listened to the criticisms that were made, tried to take them on board and came forward with what is proposed here. It may be unique to the United Kingdom but it addresses some of the concerns.

We will come later to the issue of no-confidence votes but at present this House and—it is fair to say —other commentators and people in the other place said that there was an important point about the vote of no confidence on a simple majority having a consequence. The Government listened to that. Historically, there have been two possible outcomes. In 1924, when there was a vote of no confidence in Mr Baldwin’s Government, Mr Baldwin resigned and a new Government was formed under Ramsay MacDonald. In 1979, as has often been mentioned in our debates on this Bill, when Mr James Callaghan’s Government lost a vote of no confidence, he then proceeded to seek a Dissolution and an election was held.

When we come to the next part of this clause, that is what we will be discussing. We will no doubt debate what constitutes a no-confidence vote. We seek to reflect what has been the constitutional position of the outcome of a no-confidence vote on a simple majority. Equally, we took the view that there were circumstances in which it would be more appropriate, if there was a consensus that a Parliament should be brought to an end, to have a trigger mechanism that was more than a simple majority, such as a two-thirds majority.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

I apologise for not having been here earlier but I have heard everything since my noble friend Lord Norton spoke. The Minister referred to 1979. Would he describe for the benefit of the Committee how the provisions of this legislation would apply to the conditions of 1979? If there had been a vote of no confidence in Mr Callaghan’s Government under the provisions of this Bill, would he have been able to wait a fortnight, give jobs to the Irish nationalists and re-form his Government, thereby avoiding an election?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

Hypothetically, if he was able to do that, it could have happened. In a Parliament with less than six months to go, it is highly unlikely that that would have happened. There has to be a political reality. It was quite clear that that Government had run their course and there was a general view that an election was needed. Therefore, I think it highly unlikely that a new Government would have been formed, and no new Government having received a vote of confidence within 14 days there would have been a Dissolution. That is one set of circumstances. However, there ought not to be a vote of no confidence if that is not the reason behind the consensus that Parliament needs to come to an end and for there to be a general election. Rather than contrive a vote of no confidence, one should have it as a solution but with the threshold set at such a level that it cannot easily be obtained by a single party for political advantage.

In much of the noble and learned Lord’s speech at Second Reading, his main agony about this Bill was that it would be possible for a Government to abuse the procedure and seek a Dissolution, which would defeat the whole purpose of having fixed-term Parliaments. Therefore, we believe that it is appropriate that the Dissolution should be set at a level which has not been achieved by any governing party since the Second World War. I fully accept that we departed from the 55 per cent figure because that was clearly not going anywhere. It was roundly criticised in this House and, indeed, in other places. As I say, I make no apology for having listened to that criticism, reflected on it and come forward with a proposal which still maintains that there should be a vote which could trigger a Dissolution, but one where the percentage figure is much higher to the extent that it would not be achieved by one party alone. That is why that first trigger mechanism—the subject matter of this amendment—is there. The two-thirds majority that is proposed is the same majority required for a Dissolution vote in the devolved legislatures, as set out in the relevant legislation.