Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate debates involving the Home Office during the 2019-2024 Parliament

Mon 28th Sep 2020
Mon 21st Sep 2020
Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill
Lords Chamber

2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords & 2nd reading

Asylum System

Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate Excerpts
Monday 28th September 2020

(4 years ago)

Lords Chamber
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Asked by
Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate Portrait Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate
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To ask Her Majesty’s Government what steps they are taking to reform the asylum system.

Baroness Williams of Trafford Portrait The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)
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My Lords, the Home Office is working to improve asylum decision-making processes. The work will simplify, streamline and digitise processes, ensuring that asylum claimants are treated quickly and fairly and that claims which do not qualify are rapidly identified and prepared for return.

Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate Portrait Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate (Con) [V]
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I thank my noble friend for that reply; clearly, she agrees that it is only fair that applications for asylum be considered as speedily as possible and that those who fail to meet our conditions are removed from the country, also as quickly as possible. But in this context, will she confirm that the Government still adhere to the important criteria set down in the United Nations refugee convention of 1951 in determining our cases?

Baroness Williams of Trafford Portrait Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)
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I can certainly confirm that. Clearly, it is in everybody’s interests, including somebody who is coming here to claim asylum, that we process cases quickly and expedite them through the system.

Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill

Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate Excerpts
Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate Portrait Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate (Con) [V]
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My Lords, I draw attention to my entry in the register of interests.

As noble Lords will know, the most important duty of legislators when considering measures such as the ones in the Bill is to protect the public from those who might harm them and to keep our hard-fought freedoms safe. I suggest that the Bill responds to that obligation in a suitable and proportionate way. I believe that, unlike some legislation, this has been thoroughly prepared and that the Government have responded to advice, as well as learning from the experience of law enforcers, law professionals and those who have been appointed to review terrorism legislation, including Jonathan Hall QC, the current holder of the role, and the previous reviewer, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, who I am sure will give us the benefit of his wisdom and experience in the debate today. It has also benefited from careful and responsible scrutiny in the other place. Nevertheless, there are a few items in the proposals that I want to touch on today.

Terrorism is not some distant threat that can be ignored as a non-urgent matter in the consideration of security. In the last three years alone we have succeeded in preventing more than 25 potential attacks by extremists taking place in the UK, many with the direct assistance of our EU neighbours’ police and intelligence agencies. As noble Lords know, there are a large number of data-sharing arrangements in place with other EU countries that allow us to benefit in real time to stop attacks. These have included ECRIS, SIS II, Prüm and others. As rapporteur, I had the privilege shortly before I left the European Parliament to take the EU passenger name records measure through its various stages, with the strong support of the UK Government and the other European Governments. I sincerely hope that we will never allow such helpful provisions, which have proved so valuable, to be lost to the people of this country, since if we do it will inevitably put us in greater danger. I would be most grateful if my noble friend the Minister could give us some reassurances on that today.

On other points, I want to mention the changes to the terrorism prevention and investigation measure—TPIM. Of course we know that it is always better to be able to prosecute and, if necessary, deport terrorists than to resort to TPIMs. I know they are not used much and they are not preferred, but the lower standard of proof required for their deployment may well result in them becoming more common in wider circumstances and producing more questions. The removal of the present time limit, while sensible in some cases, raises further questions because, as I am sure we all agree, their use must always be proportionate.

The standard to be followed—that the Secretary of State has reasonable grounds for suspecting that an individual of being involved in terrorist-related activity—has been available since the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, introduced then for making control orders, but it is a considerable watering-down of the current test. Can my noble friend tell us more about why this standard of proof is enough?

I want to refer briefly to the proposals for polygraph testing, both for adult terrorist offenders subject to the release provisions of Section 247A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and as a TPIM requirement. I realise that their use is believed to be of help as a risk-management tool but I understand that they have only just entered pilot testing for domestic abuse offenders from March this year. My noble friend seems confident of their efficacy but I wonder whether he has plans to introduce a pilot programme similar to the one for domestic abuse and, if so, when that might start. Would that not be a good idea, especially before a comprehensive rollout?

My final remarks are to inquire about resources. I know we all greatly admire the work of our police and security services, especially the probation services, but does my noble friend believe that these new responsibilities can be adequately performed by the probation services and do not require more investment?

Any provision that helps us match the current and perceived future threat from terrorism is to be welcomed, and I am pleased to welcome that. Once the legislation is through, I just hope that the sentencing guidelines that must accompany it are not unduly delayed.

Port Examination Codes of Practice and National Security Determinations Guidance Regulations 2020

Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate Excerpts
Friday 10th July 2020

(4 years, 2 months ago)

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Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate Portrait Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate (Con) [V]
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My Lords, I speak as a former Home Office Minister responsible for UK borders. In general, of course, I support any measure that helps us to fight terrorism and major criminality and denies opportunities to threaten our citizens. This is a piece of secondary legislation providing codes of practice for our officials. I was one of those who was involved in the drafting of many EU directives in the field, and we ensured that certain principles were always enshrined in the retention of data, including biometric data. In the GDPR, for instance, retention of data should be for no longer than is necessary. That principle, together with the generally accepted requirements for holding and using data of necessity and proportionality, has been the basis of all EU and UK measures for some years. I hope that my noble friend concurs with those principles.

I note the new guidance on obtaining national security determinations which is, of course, subject to safeguards and guidance under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, but I still have concerns. Under the PNR directive, for which I was directly responsible, data held should be deleted after five years and depersonalised after six months. We have evidence that, on that basis alone, many attacks on our own country have been deterred. In pursuing these new timescales for retaining data and preparing new guidance, is my noble friend the Minister taking into account the comparable provisions, limits and protections which are enshrined in EU directives, to which we are still party? Is she confident that this measure will not impede the necessary co-operation and real-time operability with our European neighbours once the transition period ends, nor provide an unnecessary complication in our current negotiations for a comprehensive security agreement with the EU?

I am sure my noble friend will agree that we certainly should not be introducing measures or standards which further distance us in areas where future joint efforts with our immediate neighbours to defeat and deter terrorism and major criminality are so vital to UK interests.

Lord Duncan of Springbank Portrait The Deputy Speaker (Lord Duncan of Springbank) (Con)
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I call the noble Lord, Lord Snape. No? Then I call the noble Lord, Lord Chidgey.

Child Sex Predators

Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate Excerpts
Thursday 4th June 2020

(4 years, 4 months ago)

Lords Chamber
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Baroness Williams of Trafford Portrait Baroness Williams of Trafford
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My Lords, efforts to combat CSA come from a number of funding sources, from the Home Office and elsewhere, and various NGOs. We will base our funding decisions on the best needs of children in this country and how to keep them safe.

Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate Portrait Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate (Con)
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My Lords, I also declare my interest as a long-term champion of the Internet Watch Foundation. There is clear evidence that the chat functions of popular online games and apps are often used by sexual predators to gain access to their victims. Is enough being done by the Government to ensure that parents and those providing these apps and games are aware of the threat?

Baroness Williams of Trafford Portrait Baroness Williams of Trafford
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We are very concerned about some of these games and apps, particularly those with end-to-end encryption, which means that the CSPs themselves cannot see inside them. Therefore, they and law enforcement may not be able to see evidence of child sexual abuse. The Five Eyes are working very hard to this end.