(6 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it was an application about the rights of certain UK citizens resident in Holland having rights post Brexit in Holland. The objective of the case was clearly to secure a reference to the CJEU for the interpretation of certain treaty matters. When that proceeded, it is my understanding that the Dutch Government then intervened in the proceedings and they were the subject of a hearing before the Court of Appeal in Amsterdam. That matter is not yet advised, so that is where it stands. I am afraid I cannot give further details of the case but I understand that it was partly funded by lawyers in the UK. I hope that assists the noble Lord.
As I say, at present we, the EU and the Commission are quite clear on what the concept of EU citizenship means, that the source is the EU treaties, and that there is no provision at present for associate citizenship. If during the course of negotiation the Commission or other bodies in the EU come forward with such proposals, we will of course listen to them. At this stage, though, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to everyone who has taken part in this debate: the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, the noble Lords, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, Lord Dykes and Lord Green, the noble Baronesses, Lady Hayter and Lady Ludford, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. It has been a short but worthwhile debate. Some of those participating in it have seen weaknesses in the amendment, and I accept that there is room for criticism in that direction and that it is a challenge with regard to the status quo within which we are operating.
None the less, I feel that some benefit has come out of the debate, in that the Minister has indicated that the Government would be in listening mode, both in terms of the negotiations that are going on and in terms of what may or may not come forward from the European Parliament itself on this matter, bearing in mind that Mr Verhofstadt has indicated fairly strong feelings in that direction. If it were possible for some form of associate citizenship to develop out of this—if indeed we leave the EU, which I would regret but is likely to happen—that could retain our links for the period while we are outside the EU directly, I am sure that would be of interest to a large number of people, particularly to young people, as has been mentioned in this debate, because they identify with the European dream. The European dimension is part of their identity and they would like to have some access to it in a more formal way. On the basis of the comments made by the Minister, which I welcome as far as he was able to go, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(6 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberBut I will not. If the noble Lord wishes me to elaborate on the operation of the sunset clauses, I would be quite content to write to him. At this stage, perhaps I can continue—with the encouragement of the noble Lord, Lord Griffiths—to address the question of the Scottish Government.
We are extremely grateful that we have achieved consensus with the Welsh Government and will be able to take this forward with their wholehearted agreement. I will come on to one or two points raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris, in a moment. As far as we are concerned, the door is still open for the Scottish Government, and we would be anxious to see them come through it so that we can take this forward with the agreement of all the Administrations in the United Kingdom. However, we are where we are at the present time. As regards their proposed amendments, they would, by different routes, result in a situation in which one of the devolved Administrations would effectively hold a veto over the implementation of UK-wide legislation for the maintenance of the UK internal market. That, I respectfully suggest, could not and would not be appropriate.
The exit from the EU raises complex questions with regard to the construction and application of the Scotland Act 1998 because, in 1998, such an exit was never contemplated. Reference has been made to Schedules 4 and 5 to the Scotland Act 1998 and the mechanisms for their amendment, but, as we were reminded by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, those are not the only mechanisms that impact upon the competence of the Scottish Parliament. We have to look at the terms of Section 29 of the 1998 Act, which as the noble and learned Lords, Lord Wallace and Lord Mackay, observed raises issues with regard to territoriality in respect of the competence of the Scottish Parliament. I do not want to go into the detail of that at present, but one notices that its competence is limited in that respect, and by reference to EU law as well. Therefore, we do not consider that, at the end of the day, we can appropriately accept a situation in which the devolved Administration can exercise a veto over the exercise of power by the United Kingdom Parliament in situations where it is being exercised for the benefit of the UK as a whole. I hope that that goes some way to explaining, without looking at the complexities of the 1998 Act, why we do not feel we are in a position to accept the position expressed by the Scottish Government on this point.
We simply regret the fact that, despite the very significant efforts—I underline “significant”—of the representatives of the Welsh Government and the Scottish Government in producing an outline agreement, it has not been possible to persuade the Scottish Government to join us on that point.
The noble Lord, Lord Wigley, suggested that this might reflect a lack of trust. As I have observed on previous occasions, this is not an issue of trust. This is an issue of constitutional propriety. Whatever view one takes of the devolved settlement and of where we are with regard to the legislation on that, at the end of the day it is not appropriate to accept that one of the devolved Administrations could effectively exercise a veto over legislation for the benefit of the other members of the Union—namely England, Wales and Northern Ireland.
I thank the Minister for the detail in which he is responding to this debate and the work that he has undertaken. None the less, there may be issues such as the sheep meat regime, which we have used in a number of circumstances as an example where the differential impact of policies in one area such as Wales may be much greater than the impact in other areas. To that extent, the wishes of the Welsh Government in that context should have a greater weight, in the same way as when Welsh Ministers represent the UK in the Council of Ministers to discuss the sheep meat regime. Is it not possible to fine-tune the Government’s proposals to enable that happen?
With respect, I must say that it is our clear intention, which is reflected in the memorandum of understanding in the agreement, that we will engage with the devolved Administrations in the consideration of these framework agreements and their application. Of course, these matters will be taken into account at that stage. But I do not consider it appropriate to bring that sort of granular detail into this Bill, which is designed for a very specific purpose. I hear what the noble Lord says and, clearly, we wish to proceed on the basis of mutual respect and understanding with the other devolved Administrations.
In that context, I underline the point in response to a query raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, speaking, I understand, on behalf of the Scottish Government who are not otherwise represented in this House. There is no question of this process under Clause 11 being somehow the thin end of the wedge so far as the devolution settlement is concerned. The devolution settlement is a reality of our constitutional situation and one that we extended under the 2016 Act, really quite recently, in light of the Smith review. We continue to respect, understand and wish to apply the devolution settlement. But it is a devolution settlement that has to work for everyone in the United Kingdom. I return to the point that it cannot work for everyone in the United Kingdom if one devolved Assembly or Government assume that they have the ability to exercise what amounts to a veto over legislation that is relevant, pertinent and important to the entirety of the United Kingdom.
I move on to address one or two additional points raised by noble Lords in respect of these matters. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, referred to finance and whether the Welsh Government had missed a trick. I do not believe that they did for a moment. Indeed, they put themselves one step ahead by embracing this agreement and the amendment. But the noble and learned Lord raised a point about funding. He is right to point out that our agreement for the Welsh Government does not speak to funding but that is not to say that funding has been forgotten or put to one side. Clearly, it is a matter that will be addressed. We recognise the importance, for example, of the Barnett formula. We understand why there is concern, particularly about agricultural funding under CAP Pillar 1 under the current EU budget that runs to 2020. We have provided a degree of certainty by promising to continue to commit the same total cash funds for farm support across the UK until 2022. At present, the Secretary of State for the Environment is in close discussion with his counterparts in the Welsh and Scottish Governments on exactly how our agricultural systems should work outside of the EU. I stress that that is not a matter for this Bill. This is the Bill that provides for our exit and our exit alone, so I hope that the noble and learned Lord will accept that. He raised the question of public procurement—again, these issues are not for this Bill but we are clearly conscious of them and they will have to be addressed.
The noble Lord, Lord Griffiths, also raised the question of whether further areas might be the subject of reservation under the freezing provisions of the amendment. We have identified 24 areas for frameworks but a number of other areas that could be the subject of regulations going forward are still subject to discussion. I acknowledge that. Noble Lords may recollect that we published the list of frameworks and included not only the 24 areas I have referred to, but a further 12 where there is ongoing discussion about how they will be addressed and resolved.
I am conscious that I have not answered every question that has been posed. If noble Lords are concerned that I have not addressed a point that still concerns them about Clause 11, as amended, I would be content to receive their queries and write to them. In the event that I write to any noble Lords on this issue or any issue relating to this clause, I will place a copy in the Library. I seek to reassure noble Lords on that point. With that, I will formally move each amendment. I am sorry—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, has to reply.
I ask for one point of clarification from the Minister. Does he not accept that there is a real danger of confusion in the public mind between allowing a consent order and actually getting consent? In other words, the process can be one where consent is given, is not given or is refused, but whichever of those three outcomes it is, the process can still go on for a parliamentary resolution here by order; and we know that orders, in the House of Commons and here, go through on the nod most of the time. Is that not a deception, giving the impression that there is a consent mechanism when, in fact, it is a pretty meaningless one?
I simply do not accept the noble Lord’s characterisation of the matter. It is clearly the case that where consent, for example, was sought and not obtained, it would be necessary for the Minister of the Crown to address that, very clearly and specifically. There would be the opportunity, as there always is, for the devolved Administration to make their own views clear as to why they had declined consent. I do not believe that this is in any sense deceptive, misleading or a mirage. These are constitutional requirements that are adhered to and that will be adhered to. It would not be appropriate to introduce the sort of amendment moved by the noble Lord that would, in effect, tie the hands of this sovereign Parliament, so far as this exit process is concerned. Whatever view one might take about the merits of exit, that is neither here nor there. This is a constitutional principle with regard to the sovereign Parliament of the United Kingdom when it comes to legislate for the benefit of the entirety of the United Kingdom. I therefore urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment, and indicate that I would not expect to return to this matter at Third Reading.
I am very grateful to the Minister. I have heard that form of words from his colleagues in the past. Clearly, this is a matter on which there may be a difference of opinion. I realise the need for there to be coherence on a UK scale but there are matters which have a specific effect in Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland where their interests need to be taken into account. Clearly, we are not going to make progress on this tonight. Therefore, on the basis of the discussion we have had, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberI shall just finish the sentence, so will the noble Lord please sit down? It would effectively prevent the present Bill getting on to the statute book and achieving its intended purpose: to ensure legal certainty at the point at which we leave the European Union.
I am very sorry to hear that this would prevent the Bill reaching the statute book. Notwithstanding those feelings, I ask the noble and learned Lord to address the point I raised in my earlier comment about the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties that that convention,
“will be binding on all remaining Member States, the UK, and the EU itself post Brexit”.
Does he accept that the convention,
“ensures that the status and rights of those EU citizens resident in the territory of the Union and those resident in the UK will continue”,
after Brexit?
I hope the noble Lord did not pay good money for that opinion. He will perhaps elaborate on the position in due course, but I do not accept that proposition.
I will not come back after this intervention, but has he read the document to which I referred, or have experts in his department done so?
I have not read the opinion in question, but I am not unfamiliar with the terms of the Vienna convention on treaties.
If between now and Report he or his advisers have an opportunity to read that opinion and, having done so, feel that what has been said in a Chamber does not fully reflect the situation, will he be prepared to come back at a later stage?
The reality is that if Brexit takes place we will not continue to be EU citizens.
My Lords, I am very grateful to everyone who has participated in this short debate, particularly to the noble Earl, Lord Clancarty, who I am sorry I relegated in my earlier reference. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, with whom I usually fully agree on these matters, although it was encouraging to hear that there may be alternatives by not pursuing this Bill. I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Smith, Lady McIntosh and Lady Hayter, and the noble Lords, Lord Davies, Lord Kerr and Lord Roberts of Llandudno, for their comments. I think I have got as far as I am likely to get on this. I was grateful to the Minister for saying that he is prepared to look at the opinion to which I have been referring. I can ask no more than that, and on that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(6 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberWith respect to the noble Baroness, I do not believe that any responsible Government would contemplate abusing powers given to them by Parliament. Indeed, if they did, they would be brought up very short by a sovereign Parliament.
Could I press the Minister further on the point that I raised? Will he clarify whether the powers that are being accorded in this clause will enable a Minister at Westminster to overrule powers normally exercisable by Ministers in Cardiff or Edinburgh?
I do not believe that they would be employed to overrule powers that are legitimately being exercised under the devolved arrangements. That is not their purpose. Their purpose is to make consequential amendments that will bring the statute book into line with our departure from the EU.
I am sorry, but those consequential amendments may well include the need to change an instrument that is being exercised in Scotland or Wales. If that does not happen, does it give the power for a Minister in London to exercise those powers?
Ultimately, the UK Parliament would have the power to ensure that the statute book in the devolved Administrations also reflects our departure from the EU.
(6 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberNo, perhaps I can finish this point. I am just trying to explain why in these 24 areas it has been identified as very material that we should retain and then develop frameworks.
I just wanted to intervene on this very point about pesticides. The Minister will be aware that the Welsh Government did in fact legislate on the question of genetically modified crops, and it was forecast that the roof would fall in. It did not; it was quite possible to have a different regime in Wales from that in England. As he addresses the rest of the points that have been raised, will he tell us how the regime will be allowed or not allowed to work in the context of agricultural support? Sheep farmers may well want and be entitled to get support from the Welsh Government. The Welsh Government may want to give them that support but, if it is argued that that distorts the UK market, they would not be able to do so. That is the sort of issue that causes concern.
As regards agricultural support, that is another subspecies of agriculture. I am dealing with those matters that fall within the 24 identified areas where we find it necessary to retain and operate the single internal market. Not all areas within those 24 competencies are going to have to be retained for the purposes of that market. There are areas which we will devolve.
Does the Minister not realise that the Labour Government in Cardiff feel as strongly as the SNP Government in Scotland about this matter? This is not a matter of party politics; it is a question of where power lies. That is why the term “power grab” has arisen. When he says how outrageous it would be if Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland had a veto, does he not realise that the structure that he is advocating gives England a veto? It gives Westminster a veto; that is what is causing so much trouble.
(6 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am grateful to the noble and learned Lord and I am following what he is saying. Is he in fact confirming that there will be two classes of citizen in Northern Ireland: those who hold Irish citizenship as well and will be able, if there is a border, to cross it totally freely and thus into the rest of Europe, and a second class of UK citizens in Northern Ireland who will not be able to do so?
No, my Lords, there will not be two classes of citizens. Let us take a simple example. If I hold USA citizenship and UK citizenship, I can pass between the UK and the USA because I am a citizen of both countries. If I am a citizen of the UK and a citizen of the Republic of Ireland, I can pass between the two countries because I am a citizen of each state. It is not a case of classification; it is simply a matter of status.
(6 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberThere is no legal basis for doing so. With great respect to my noble friend, her amendment would not actually provide one; that is perhaps an aside. The point is more central than that: directives that have been adopted but not implemented by the exit date, and which have a transition period that goes beyond the exit date, are not part of domestic law, and for the purposes of the Bill they will not become part of domestic law or EU retained law. Therefore, we will not be taking them into our domestic law by way of an implementation that takes place after the exit date.
Following this is fairly complicated, is it not? To add to that complication, what will be the position on devolved matters—such as environmental matters, which are to a very large extent devolved—where the implementation may be on different dates in different devolved regimes?
We have to be clear here about the distinction between implementation and application. Essentially, there is only one date for implementation. That is when we implement the directive into our domestic law. There may be situations—and if I misunderstand the noble Lord’s question, I am sure he will tell me—in which there is a directive, or indeed a regulation, that is adopted into domestic law but which applies only at a date after the exit date. There are examples of regulations as well, where we accept that the regulation has come into domestic law but its actual operation is deferred, perhaps until 2020. That regulation or that provision will form part of our domestic law at the exit date, even though the operative provisions come into force only after the exit date.
I do not want to overlabour this point, and perhaps it is one that the Minister could look at between now and Report in case there is any validity in what I am raising, but since it is by instruments that are passed in the National Assembly for Wales or in the Scottish Parliament that some of these will be put into force, there will quite likely be different dates for those purposes, and that could have a material effect. Some may fall one side and others the other side of 29 March 2019.
If I understand the noble Lord’s point, he is suggesting that we may have a situation in which a directive that has been adopted is implemented in England or in Wales or in Scotland but on different dates.
Yes, indeed, or it may have failed to have been implemented within the timeframe in one area and therefore does not get implemented but does get implemented in another area.
In that event, it will be by reference to the exit date that we determine whether or not it forms part of the domestic law.
(7 years ago)
Grand CommitteeI am obliged to noble Lords and to the noble Baroness for their contributions. I begin with the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. I entirely agree with his observations about the importance of maintaining the independence of the judiciary and, equally, of defending the judiciary from inappropriate attack. There is an important distinction to be made between what can be regarded as justified criticism and what is tantamount to abuse. We have to underline that distinction if we are properly to defend the judiciary. Of that there can be no doubt.
On the question of whether these powers should be used, I again entirely agree with the noble Lord. This is the alternative mechanism to be employed, but it is contemplated that it will be employed only in circumstances where there is a breakdown in agreement between various parties. It is not something that is contemplated, but because the Act makes provision for this alternative mechanism it is only appropriate that we should have regulations in place so that, if necessary, it can be employed.
On the matter of who will be the president of the Welsh tribunals and his role so far as defence of tribunal members is concerned, remembering that some of those tribunal members are lay members, it is doubly important there is somebody there who can advise and defend their interests. One of the responsibilities of the President of Welsh Tribunals will be not only the training and guidance of members of the tribunals, but consideration of their welfare. That again is important.
On the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, on the Welsh language, of course we recognise the importance of the Welsh language in the context of proceedings in Wales, but we have to remember that we are making an appointment to the judiciary of England and Wales. While the proceedings of those tribunals may take place in Welsh as distinct from English, it is not considered appropriate that we should extend the criteria for the appointment of this post to include the Welsh language itself.
I hear what the noble and learned Lord says. There are numerous bodies that have responsibilities that go beyond the borders of Wales where the status of the Welsh language is recognised. I would not have been surprised if there had been no provision at all for equality here on the basis that other legislation covers it, but if we are writing the equality of men and women and racial equality into this, surely it is not unreasonable to write the language in because some of the work will be undertaken in Wales, if not all of it.
With respect to the noble Lord’s observations, language is not an equality issue in that context in the same way as the other criteria he alluded to. It is a matter of context. Of course it is important we recognise that the use of English and Welsh have equal demands on any tribunal process in Wales, but that is quite distinct from how you go about the appointment criteria.
I am sorry; I do not want to labour this unduly. The language question has, to a large extent, been put to rest in Wales over recent decades after there was a lot of strong feeling about it on the basis that there was recognition of language being an equality criterion. I do not know whether it is technically so in the legal framework here but, surely in terms of the spirit of what is being done here, it should be accommodated.
With respect, there is no issue about whether an individual applicant would be prejudiced whether he spoke only Welsh or only English or both. That is why I say, in this context, it does not arise for the purposes of this schedule. If an applicant came forward who did not speak English but spoke only Welsh, there would be no issue about that applying to the suitability of his appointment.
May I help the Minister? I do not want to see issues like this boiling up to become another bullet in a language war, as it were. It is the sort of thing that we need a harmonious approach towards. Equality is regarded as being relevant in a language context, as in other contexts, and therefore, if it is necessary to write it into the terms as they are here, I cannot see why they are not broad enough to encapsulate language, but I have made my point.
If I can make one short addition, it is that these regulations are concerned with the technical operation of judicial appointments and therefore, again, our view is that the question does not arise in this context.
I turn to territorial application. My understanding is that technically, in the context of tribunal appointments, we are looking across the UK and not just at England and Wales, which is why the regulation extends as it does. There are circumstances in which tribunal membership can move between the various jurisdictions.
On the consultation process and diversity in particular, diversity is of course taken extremely seriously. I believe that we have some figures with regard to tribunal membership. I am not sure that I have figures with regard to the chairmanship of tribunals. As regards male and female membership, about 40% of tribunal members are female. In the senior courts, the figures are of course different but, for tribunals, the figure is as high as it is anywhere. As far as BAME in tribunals is concerned, the number is about 10%. Interestingly, perhaps, we even have a figure for those who are of a non-barrister background. I am not quite sure what a non-barrister background amounts to, but 66% of tribunal judges come from a non-barrister background. On whether that is regarded as a good thing or a bad thing, I will not comment. If the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, wishes to have figures about the chairmanship of tribunals, and their gender mix, I can undertake to write to him, if those figures are available. I do not know if they are; I know that the overall figures are there, as I have just mentioned. That, I hope, addresses the points that noble Lords have raised.
(7 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberWith respect to the observations made, I first make this point: the licence period is actually for life, but the licensee can apply to have it limited to 10 years. That is the present position. More pertinently, let me draw this to the attention of the House: over 30% of those released under licence as IPP prisoners are in breach of their licence conditions within 12 months of release. They do not wait 10 years; they do not wait five years. Where there is a problem with regard to release under licence, it emerges very swiftly after release.
My Lords, does the Minister accept that in the case of IPP prisoners who are way beyond their tariff and for whom training courses for rehabilitation may not be available, it is little surprise that many of them have their attitude to society aggravated by that experience? Can he give an assurance that every IPP prisoner now has access to the courses necessary for those purposes?
IPP prisoners have access to the appropriate programmes and matters have improved considerably over the past few years so far as that is concerned, but it is not always necessary that an IPP prisoner should undergo a specific programme to satisfy the Parole Board as to their suitability for release. There are other means by which this can be achieved.