Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Lord Kamall Excerpts

Friday 12th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Kamall (Con)]

As I set out last week and will repeat if noble Lords will forgive me, I completely agree with what the Government Chief Whip said about noble Lords ensuring that they speak to the amendments and do not give Second Reading speeches, but, at the same time, I think it is important that all noble Lords who want to speak to an amendment are given the opportunity to do so.

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, for her amendment in this group. It seeks to ensure that someone who currently is or has recently been deprived of their liberty will not be eligible under the Act. This amendment refers to the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which is also the Act underpinning capacity for the purposes of this Bill. I appreciate the underlying logic behind the amendment, which has opened up a valuable discussion of who exactly should have access to assisted dying services. I am sure that all noble Lords would agree, whatever their position, that there should be robust provisions and safeguards in the Bill and that it should be available only to those who are suffering from terminal illnesses who are of sound mind, so that we do not inadvertently open it up to those with issues related to their capacity.

I am also grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Berger, for her contribution in place of the noble Baroness, Lady Keeley. It is very important that, given the backlog in the system, not just those who have DoLS but those who have made an application for DoLS are deemed not to have capacity when seeking to end their lives. It would be very interesting to hear the Government’s perspective on this and that of the noble and learned Lord.

These questions all fundamentally ask whether the Bill is right to use the Mental Capacity Act 2005 as the basis for defining capacity. I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, for offering to meet those who have tabled these amendments. That is very constructive and helpful and should be acknowledged. I also look forward to hearing the noble and learned Lord’s responses to some of the issues that have been raised.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Baroness Merron) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords for their contributions on this group. To echo the comments of my noble friend the Chief Whip, the Government remain neutral on the principle of assisted dying and on the passage of this Bill. Whether the law in this area should change is a matter for Parliament. As before, any comments that I make will focus on amendments where the Government have major legal, technical or operational workability concerns.

This group relates to deprivation of liberty and eligibility for seeking an assisted death. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and my noble friend Baroness Keeley for tabling the amendments in this group. Amendments 16 and 114, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, seek to prevent individuals who have been deprived of their liberty within the last 12 months under the Mental Capacity Act being eligible for an assisted death. In the case of Amendments 16A and 114A, tabled by my noble friend Lady Keeley, someone would be ineligible as a result of an application for deprivation of liberty having been made, irrespective of the outcome of that application.

Noble Lords may wish to consider that the amendments would introduce a departure from the Mental Capacity Act framework by linking a lack of capacity in one area—capacity to consent to care and treatment arrangements that amount to confinement—to lack of capacity in another area, that being capacity to make the decision to end one’s life. Amendments 16A and 114A go further and would make a person ineligible on the basis that only an application for deprivation of liberty had been made. This may result in a situation where the application was unwarranted, but that person would still be ineligible for assisted death.

Regarding the European Convention on Human Rights—

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[Lord Kamall (Con)]

The question that a number of noble Lords are concerned about, when discussing this amendment, is that the Mental Capacity Act was passed in 2005. Of course, the guidance has been updated, but it might be helpful to those in the Committee who are concerned that this Act is 20 years out of date to talk about any guidance that has been updated, so that it is not seen as out of date—if that makes sense. This is just to clarify that we are not dealing with an Act that was set in stone in 2005, as things have changed since then.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord and feel that this would probably be a very appropriate point to move on to my noble and learned friend.

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[Noble Lords]

Front Bench!

[Lord Kamall (Con)]

I have never been so popular; it will not last, I know.

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, for her amendments. I pay tribute to her for her sincere and long-standing commitment to protecting the most vulnerable in society. If we cast our minds back to Second Reading, many of the contributions made and concerns raised were regarding those who are the most vulnerable in our society. I remember at Second Reading being particularly touched by the words of the noble Lord, Lord Rees—he is not in his place now—who raised concerns about the vulnerability of some ethnic-minority communities, particularly those from disadvantaged communities as well.

Let us quickly rush through some of the points. On Amendment 22, which would make prisoners ineligible for end-of-life services as envisaged by the Bill, I completely understand the underlying principle. Many have spoken, rightly, about the vulnerability of prisoners. While for some it might seem wrong, as the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, has suggested, that a prisoner who has a terminal illness may have a way of cutting short their sentence by means of this Bill, as my noble friend Lady Coffey alluded to, others may say “Good riddance”. I also recognise the argument that prisoners with a terminal illness should be treated with the same compassion and care at the end of their lives as other terminally ill people subject to the Bill, as my noble friend Lord Markham recognised.

We also have to recognise some of the concerns over moral hazard. I do not know how large the incidence of this would be. Would it really encourage those who are terminally ill to commit crime? No studies have been done, but I am open to that concern. There is also the idea about higher levels of suicidal ideation, as raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. These are really important points that we have to take account of.

The right reverend Prelate and my noble friend Lord Deben spoke about the pressure of reducing the prison population, while the noble Lord, Lord Carter, spoke about the higher rate of suicide among male prisoners. These are all reflections that should give us cause for concern, and things we should take account of as we consider what we will do between Committee and Report.

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, for raising the issue of those who are pregnant. As the noble Baroness said, this was not debated in the other place, so I am grateful that the noble Baroness was able to give us the opportunity to debate it. I am also grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Berger, for sharing statistics about expectant mothers. It was important that we heard those stats. I cannot begin to imagine the difficulty an individual in those circumstances may face. I understand the concern that it does not seem right that the safety of an unborn child may be endangered under the provisions in the Bill. I also understand that there might be precedence in other legislation. I wonder what the noble and learned Lord’s reflections on that are, given his expertise.

I note the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, on access to this for those who are awaiting trial. Once again, I would be very interested in the noble and learned Lord’s legal experience on whether that seems relevant and should be within this Bill. During the debates on the Mental Health Bill, my noble friend Lady Berridge was assiduous in spotting gaps in legislation or inconsistencies between different Acts. My noble friend has done the same thing here by raising concerns over the vulnerability of those with education, health and care plans. I think this needs further consideration.

I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, for her amendments relating to those who are homeless or who live in insecure and temporary accommodation. I welcome the experience of the noble Baroness, Lady Gray. I still remember a conversation I had with one homeless charity that we are all one or two unlucky events or bad decisions away from homelessness. I heard from homeless people who told me that they had a great job and a great family life and that everything was going their way. They lost their job, which then led to them losing their marriage. After incidents of sofa surfing and testing the patience of their friends, they ended up homeless. It could happen to anyone. It is important that we do not dismiss the homeless as people who cannot be bothered or are idle. It could happen to anyone. Any noble Lords who have met those in homeless communities will know that some people had been incredibly successful but, after two or three bad decisions or unlucky things that happened in their life, they suddenly found themselves homeless. They are also judged by the way they look when they are homeless.

I remind all noble Lords that the Bill relates only to those who are suffering from a terminal illness and those who have been given an expectation that they will not live for longer than six months. We have to be very careful that, although we have sympathy for the homeless and prisoners, the Bill relates only to those who have a terminal illness. I know there are concerns that the Bill may be widened beyond that, but that is the debate at this stage. We should be quite clear that we are focusing on those with a terminal illness. So, much like on the question of prisoners and others, I recognise the arguments on all sides, but this is an opportune moment, not only because of time but because of the noble and learned Lord’s legal experience, to hear his reflections—after the Minister, obviously.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

I am most grateful.

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to the debate on this group. As is my consistent introduction, my remarks will focus only on issues where the Government have major legal, technical or operational workability concerns. Many of the points that follow relate to the European Convention on Human Rights. These are risks that I am raising to inform noble Lords’ decision-making, as I said on the first group. I wish to be clear that the underlying policies are a matter for Parliament. I say to noble Lords who referred to my ministerial colleagues in the other place that it is the role of Ministers, whether in your Lordships’ House or in the other place, to flag the risks to the Bill, including potential legal challenges. As I said, policy decisions remain a matter for the sponsors. Decisions in this regard rest with Parliament.

I begin with Amendment 22, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, and Amendment 30C, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Farmer. These amendments would make prisoners, a defendant on remand, a defendant on bail or those detained by a hospital order ineligible for assisted dying services, even if they have a terminal illness and meet all other criteria. Aside from the right to liberty—Article 5—the ECHR requires that prisoners, a defendant on remand or a defendant on bail should have the same rights as those who are not. The rights engaged by this amendment are Article 8 on the right to respect for private and family life and Article 14 on prohibition of discrimination. Noble Lords may wish to note the risk that making these groups ineligible for assisted dying would, on the face of it, lead to a difference in treatment, which would need to be objectively and reasonably justified in order to comply with ECHR obligations.

Likewise, making ineligible hospital in-patients who are under a hospital order would lead to a difference in treatment. Without sufficient justification for the discriminatory treatment, this may be a breach of the ECHR, which could lead the courts to issue a declaration of incompatibility.

The noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, has also tabled Amendments 24, 458, 308 and 347. The purpose of Amendments 24 and 458 is to exclude those who are pregnant from accessing assisted dying, while that of Amendments 308 and 347 is to make persons who are homeless, or living in supported or temporary accommodation, ineligible for assisted dying services. As I have previously noted, the reasons for this difference in treatment would need to be adequately justified to avoid the risk of a successful challenge under the ECHR.