Nuclear Safeguards Bill

Lord Judd Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 7th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judd (Lab)]

My Lords, I should declare a couple of interests. I am a member of the Cumbria Trust, which has considerable concerns about some of the issues being discussed today. I also live 12 miles north-east of Sellafield, which always reminds me that at school I was taught that the prevailing winds were south-west.

The Minister was very firm at the briefing meeting that he kindly arranged before the Bill was under consideration here—and that meeting really was very much appreciated—that the Bill was about safeguards, not safety. The Minister has a style about him, and he was at his firmest in saying that. I have a great affection and considerable regard for the Minister. I have more respect for him perhaps in the sphere of marmalade than in political matters.

It just will not wash. There are no dividing lines: civil, military, safeguards and safety all overlap. They all have implications for each other. To think that one can take part of this and put it in a watertight compartment is, if the Minister will forgive me, nonsense.

We are all pretty disturbed—that has come across clearly in the debate—that we are dealing with a situation that is apparently an incidental consequence of deciding to leave the European Union. We are dealing with the utmost grave issues here—issues which affect not only current society but will affect men, women and children for thousands of years to come. They are profoundly grave and significant issues. To think that we can somehow rush this thing through in legislation is a betrayal of future generations. We must put it under very firm scrutiny, and we must be satisfied.

As if that were not enough, the fact that we are a nuclear power with our own nuclear deterrent again puts a heavy responsibility on us. When the non-proliferation treaty was secured, we gave the most solemn undertakings about our responsibilities in these spheres. We therefore have a duty to fulfil them.

I share with those who have spoken deep anxiety about the belief that national arrangements for inspection can in any way be a convincing substitute for international arrangements. It is crucial for the world—and for our own people—to see the independent judgments and assessments that come from international arrangements. It will become a cosy, closed circle in which things may tend to slip. So we must do our best to ensure that whatever is put in place is not open to any kind of doubt. Personally, I do not see how we can do that, but we must try.

It is also clear from what has been said in the debate that, because of what I just said and for other reasons, we should remain as close to Euratom as possible. We should not be defeatist about associate membership of Euratom, and I would like to think that the best legal brains available to the Government are working on how we do this, as distinct from why we cannot. In my experience of responsibility in organisations, it is crucial to find the lawyers who can help you to do what you want to, as distinct from those who tell you why it cannot be done.

The time available is clearly ludicrous, and some special arrangements will have to be made. But, if we are to have special arrangements with IAEA and voluntary agreements, as has been mentioned, we need to be clear about how they will be effective in this transitional phase, because I do not believe that the deadlines we have been asked to accept are feasible.

At the moment, there are eight professional safeguarding staff employed by ONR, compared with 40 at Euratom, focused on UK issues. We are asking for this to be undertaken with our British arrangements at a time when there has been a 70% cut in government grants to ONR from 2015-16 to 2019-20. There is also the issue of whether we have the necessary expertise. I recall that, some time back, when we were considering new legislation on nuclear power, the Government’s argument was that one of the reasons we needed to have foreign interests coming into the process was that we simply did not have the expertise that was available to those foreign experts. If that is real—it is a very worrying thought—and if it applies to the generation of nuclear energy, how much more real does that argument become to monitor effectively what we are ourselves doing? Parliament simply has to be satisfied that arrangements involving the IAEA, voluntary agreements and the additional protocol are as fool-proof as they can be—although I remain sceptical as to whether that is possible.

The noble Lord, Lord Fox, spoke about the costs and consequences of taking over the ownership of Euratom facilities and the subsequent costs of decommissioning. We really will need very convincing arguments from the Minister on all that. I particularly appreciated the speech of my noble friend Lord O’Neill of Clackmannan. In this context, I am interested that the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy has itself produced a number of—intended to be, I think—helpful factsheets. They have been produced in the context of our deliberations. I see that one on transport and waste states:

“The UK will continue to uphold its responsibilities in respect of spent fuel and radioactive waste. Appropriate arrangements will need to be agreed between the UK and the EU in relation to the status of radioactive waste and spent fuel generated by the UK but currently situated on EU 27 territory and spent fuel and radioactive waste generated by the EU 27 but currently situated on UK territory. UK legislation and standards in this area will continue to be informed by recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection, the Joint Convention on Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste, and the safety standards of the International Atomic Energy Authority”.


These are vital considerations. But, in dealing with waste, let us please remember that there are two categories of waste at least. There is the existing waste, which is a time-bomb ticking away, and there is future waste, which has implications for thousands of years ahead. We are involved in a situation that is not only grave but is of immense, incalculable historical significance for the future. We cannot rush it or botch it, and it will need a great deal of careful scrutiny by this House.

Nuclear Safeguards Bill

Lord Judd Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Thursday 22nd February 2018 Lords Chamber

I welcome the Government’s commitment to undertake three-monthly reports to Parliament on the critical pathway to put all the necessary provisions in place. Your Lordships’ House will then be in a position to monitor progress, and we have already discussed amendments to give effect to that this morning. This amendment would make sure that there was no drop in standards and that the UK safeguards regime will be to the high standard set by Euratom. The amendment would enable the Government and Minister to fulfil their commitments. I beg to move.

[Lord Judd (Lab)]

My Lords, I strongly support my noble friend and the amendment that he has moved. As I said in our deliberations last night, we must never forget that the issues with which we are dealing have implications not just for us, our children and immediate future generations, but for hundreds and perhaps thousands of years ahead. We have to get it right. There can be no confusion or compromise; there has to be fool-proof action right through, with continuity. There can be no gaps. We must have from the Minister categorical assurances that the Government have in place arrangements that will ensure that continuity when we leave. If we cannot have those assurances, the situation is impossibly grave, because anything can happen in even a short time if the adequate provisions are not there.

One very specific issue on this is that we know, from the Government’s own statements, that for our next generation of nuclear energy we are highly dependent upon expertise from outside the UK, because we do not have the expertise ourselves. What I do not understand is how we can have adequate—indeed, fool-proof—inspection teams working, and how we can have the quality and experience necessary for those teams, if we do not have that quality and experience available to develop our own energy. There seems to be an illogicality here. This is why it is crucial that the Government again have absolutely watertight arrangements about which they can tell the House to cover what happens if we foolishly come out of Euratom.

I have not heard those absolute, categorical assurances, or even begun to hear what the real arrangements will be. This matter is deeply grave. I have great respect for the Minister; I know he is a thoughtful man who will take on board the point being made. It is therefore crucial that this afternoon we have cast-iron evidence that the Government really have the situation under control.

[Lord Warner (CB)]

My Lords, I rise to support this amendment and congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, on his drafting skill in producing words that will not inflame the Government or, in particular, the—misnamed—European Research Group and its red lines. The amendment in no way implies that we, the UK, will go back into Euratom, however much most people in this Chamber wish we would. The noble Lord has kept clear of that dangerous territory and I congratulate him on that.

Indeed, there is nothing in the amendment that goes against government policy. The Government say that they aspire to achieving the safeguarding standards of Euratom but by another method than the current set of arrangements. That is all that the amendment tries to do. Indeed, it may help the Government in securing accreditation by the IAEA when it comes to the ONR being recognised as up to snuff in its standards. That accreditation is essential, as many people have said today, for us as a country to secure nuclear co-operation agreements. This is a helpful and well-constructed amendment, which the Government would be well advised to accept.

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[Lord Judd]

My Lords—

[Lord Henley]

Can I just complete a sentence before the noble Lord intervenes? The important point is that it will be able to deliver the standards that are broadly equivalent to the Euratom regime as quickly and effectively as possible. I give way now.

[Lord Judd]

I am very grateful. The Minister used the word “broadly”, which is very significant. Can he tell us a little more about what he means by that?

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[Lord Henley]

I will try to get it right. We will meet those without any problem at all. Those are the same as the commitments that the United States and other weapon states—an expression that the noble Lord probably does not like—have to meet, and we will meet them. Euratom’s commitments are slightly different, and so that applies to ourselves and the French as the two weapon states within Euratom. They are marginally different. We will get to those in due course, but we will meet the appropriate standards under the IAEA by next year, just as we do now.

[Lord Judd]

Again, I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. Can he clarify one point? He said that he is not sure that I have grasped the difference between safety and safeguards. He is quite correct because I simply do not understand how there is a dividing line between the two. I just do not accept that that is the situation—the two are intimately related.

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I could go back but I think that I would try the patience of the Committee if I repeated a great deal of what I said at Second Reading and at other points about safety. The ONR has been dealing with safety for many years and it will continue to do so. Safeguards are another matter. In effect, they relate to the transference of certain things, ensuring that they cannot be used for nuclear warheads or whatever. Safeguards are different from safety. This Bill relates to safeguards and that is what we are trying to get over to the noble Lord. We will meet our IAEA standards on safeguards under this Bill once we have the powers so to do.

I hope that that provides noble Lords—with the possible exception of the noble Lord, Lord Judd—with the appropriate assurances. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, will feel that the information I have provided is sufficient in stressing that we will have a domestic nuclear safeguards regime equivalent in effectiveness and coverage to that currently provided by Euratom. That is what the Bill is intended to do. We are leaving Euratom. We have to make sure that we have the appropriate safeguards regime in place, and that is what the Bill tries to do.

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[Lord Henley]

I know that Liberal Democrats live and die for Excel spreadsheets. They find them enormously exciting, although I do not understand that. However, the noble Lord makes a very good and serious point. This is not just about the appropriate individuals to be trained; it is also about equipment. Yes, again, the ONR is happy that it will have the appropriate equipment and IT systems in place for 29 March. The ONR has given a commitment that it will be ready to provide the right service, so that we can meet those IAEA commitments next year. It is very easy just to talk in shorthand about the number of people on the ground, but as the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, says, spreadsheets, which Liberals find very exciting, and other equipment are probably also involved. Yes, all of that will be ready—I can give those commitments.

[Lord Judd]

There is one other matter. Of course, one of the results of what has been in place, very successfully, under Euratom is the international nature of the inspection. We have to recognise that the implications of something going seriously wrong are not confined to British frontiers; there are implications for people—men, women and children—beyond our frontiers. How are we going to ensure that in the arrangements we make, we retain international confidence that we are taking, and are seen to be taking, that responsibility seriously, and are not judges in our own courts?

[Lord Henley]

The noble Lord talks about international obligations. The important thing to remember about the initials IAEA is that the first letter stands for “International”. It is an international body, we have been signed up to it since 1957 and we continue to be so. It will offer those guarantees.