Combined Authorities (Mayoral Elections) (Amendment) Order 2026

Lord Jamieson Excerpts

Tuesday 16th June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

My Lords, before I speak—although I am not sure it is a conflict in this issue— I need to declare that I am a councillor in Central Bedfordshire. I thank noble Lords for speaking in this debate. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock, who I think at the end of her speech said she is in favour of the single transferrable minute from one speaker to the next to allow her to speak longer. I thank my noble friends Lord Hayward, who raised the very important question of why now—I will come to that later—and Lord Jackson, who gave an excellent exposition of the shortcomings of the transferable vote or supplementary vote system

This is, in essence, a reversal. Within a relatively short period of time, we have moved from supplementary vote to first past the post, and now back to supplementary votes for mayoral elections. Whatever view one takes of the respective systems, that degree of oscillation is not a strength of constitutional design. I ask the very simple question: what problem is this change actually seeking to solve? The Government’s answer appears to be the claim that the supplementary vote system produces a mayor with broader support and therefore greater legitimacy. It is also said to allow voters to express preferences more fully and to ensure that votes are not wasted—although, as my noble friend Lord Jackson pointed out, in the previous London mayoral election there seemed to be an awful lot of wasted supplementary votes.

These arguments are familiar; they have been advanced in favour of preferential systems for many years. But repetition is not justification. The reality is that this draft does not demonstrate a failure in the existing arrangements of first past the post; nor does it set out evidence that voter confidence in mayoral elections has been undermined by the current system. Instead, it simply asserts that the alternative system is preferable. That is not sufficient when what is at issue are the rules by which democratic office is secured. First past the post has one defining virtue, and that is clarity. The candidate with the most votes wins. There is no second count, no transfer of preferences, and no recalculation. The result is immediate and intelligible. As my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough pointed out, the public have previously demonstrated that they have a preference for the first past the post system.

That matters more than Members may realise, because the electoral system does not exist just in theory. It exists in the mind of the voter at the ballot box. If the voter does not really understand how their vote translates into outcome, we risk something important being lost. The supplementary vote system is not incomprehensible, but it is more complex. It does introduce a second stage of allocation, where preferences are redistributed. That may be administratively manageable, but it is not straightforward and it is not intuitive. We must remember that confidence in our elections is essential.

The Government also argue that the system produces a more legitimate mandate, because it takes account of second preferences. That is a fundamentally different conception of legitimacy, and it is not a neutral change. Under first past the post, legitimacy comes from a clear view expressed at the ballot box. Under supplementary vote, it comes from aggregated preferences after elimination and redistribution. Those are different constitutional logics. First past the post is well understood: it is tried, tested and clear. The question for this House is which is more appropriate for mayoral elections in England today. We are not persuaded that the Government have made a strong enough case that change is required.

There is also the wider concern of uncertainty caused by frequent changes. That cannot be ignored. Electoral arrangements should not shift back and forth with such frequency. Voters, candidates and administrators require stability. They need to know that the rules they are voting under today will be same at the next election. At present, that confidence is weakened by repeated changes.

I should therefore be grateful if the Minister could address a straightforward point. What is the Government’s principle here? Is it that electoral systems should be treated as settled constitutional arrangements unless there is clear and compelling evidence of failure, or is it that they may be altered whenever the Government take a different view? Those are very different approaches.

There is also the question of practice. The instrument requires changes to ballot papers, guidance to returning officers, counting procedures, voter information, and administrative systems across combined authorities. All of that is manageable, but it is not without its cost, its friction, and its implications for time. As my noble friend Loyd Hayward has raised, I also ask the question: why now? Why the urgency? Putting this in place will take some time for electoral returning officers, yet there is a risk we shall very shortly have a mayoral by-election. Would it not be better to delay to ensure a smoother implementation and also to include those other potential future changes? My noble friend asked: why now? I also ask: why now?

What assessment has been made of the costs to local authorities of implementing this change? What additional burdens will fall on electoral administrators? What steps will be taken to ensure consistency of understanding across different areas in the run-up to elections? More importantly, what assessment has been made of voter understanding? It is often assumed in this debate that voters are closely engaged with the mechanics of electoral systems, but my personal experience is that they are not. In fact, sometimes they are not that closely engaged in the detailed minutiae of politics, so I think that is a stretch assumption. What matters to voters is that the process is clear at the point of voting and that the outcome is trusted. Trust depends on simplicity and familiarity; both are weakened when this system changes repeatedly.

None of this requires us to resolve, once and for all, the philosophical debate between electoral systems. Reasonable people will differ on that question. But what the House is being asked to approve is not an abstract principle; it is a concrete change to the machinery of elections, justified on the basis of asserted improvements in legitimacy. We on this side of the House are not persuaded that the case has been made. We are not convinced that the benefits outweigh the cost to clarity, stability and confidence. We are concerned about the wider pattern of repeated alterations to electoral arrangements. We are also concerned about “why now?”

For those reasons, while I look forward to the Minister’s response, I must indicate that we remain unconvinced by the necessity or wisdom of this statutory instrument.