Nuclear Safeguards Bill

Lord Hunt of Kings Heath Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 1st March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

My Lords, I commend the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, for this amendment. I also commend his sub-committee, which has done excellent work.

I looked with great interest at some pieces of evidence submitted to the committee, particularly that from Energy UK, which made the point that,

“Overall, the energy industry’s workforce is made of between one and five percent of EU/EEA employees”.


That is not a huge percentage, but Energy UK makes the point that,

“Although there are not a proportionately large number of non-UK nationals employed within the energy industry, the majority are employed in skilled roles which are difficult to fill from the UK resident workforce”.


The noble Lord, Lord Teverson, has already cited the evidence of EDF and referred to steel fixers. Interestingly, EDF examined the impact of restrictions on freedom of movement on its current workforce when thinking about what challenges might arise in the future. EDF said:

“For EDF Energy direct employees, … the majority of our current employees would meet the existing UK Points Based System requirements. The same cannot be said for our supply chain workforce, most of whom would not meet the current entrance criteria”.


This is a very important issue because, if freedom of movement is restricted, there is currently no route of entry for semi-skilled workers, such as construction workers, to enter the UK under the existing points system. I find it surprising that steel fixers are not classed as skilled workers, but the fact is they are not, so they would not be able to come in under the points-based system. Yet we have heard from EDF that we simply cannot meet the demands of constructing Hinkley C nuclear power station and other civil engineering demands with the number of steel fixers that we have.

The noble Lord, Lord Teverson, ended his remarks with an interesting question about the backbone of the Minister’s department. I do not think it has had a particularly easy ride. I know that it has done its best on visas for overseas students but has come up against an obdurate brick wall in the shape of the Prime Minister. But can we hope that there will be a positive response on this issue, as it is so crucial to our future industrial strategy?

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Moved by

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

11: After Clause 1, insert the following new Clause—
“The ONR to become a Non-Ministerial Government Department
(1) The Energy Act 2013 is amended as follows.(2) In section 74, omit subsection (3)(a).(3) In section 77, after subsection (2) insert—“(2A) The functions of the ONR are performed on behalf of the Crown.(2B) In the exercise of its functions the ONR is not subject to the direction or control of any Minister of the Crown or of another government department.(2C) But subsection (2B) does not affect—(a) any provision made by or under any enactment; or(b) any administrative controls exercised over the ONR’s expenditure by the Treasury.”(4) In section 85—(a) in subsection (1), omit “with the consent of the Secretary of State”; and(b) omit subsection (3).(5) In section 86, omit subsection (6).(6) In section 89, omit subsection (6).(7) In section 92—(a) omit subsections (1) and (2); and(b) in subsection (5) omit “(1) or”.(8) In section 93—(a) omit subsection (2)(d); and(b) omit subsections (3) to (5).”

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, in moving this amendment, I want to explore the status and independence of the ONR. I have great respect for the ONR and its work, and I wish to enhance its status.

In this crucial area of nuclear safeguards, the ONR will replace Euratom in overseeing the UK’s obligations to meet international nuclear safeguard standards, ensuring that civil nuclear material is not diverted into military or weapons use. This is a distinct responsibility and is separate from the ONR’s current role in relation to nuclear safety. Essentially, the ONR will be policing the UK in respect of its international commitments, and on that basis its independent status needs to be enhanced.

A Cabinet Office memorandum of 2014 made the situation clear:

“Non-ministerial departments do not have direct ministerial accountability. Their need for independence from ministers is … greater than for NDPBs, and includes regulators and tax authorities”.


They are government departments in their own right. The memorandum continued:

“There will be a ‘sponsor minister’ who has residual policy responsibility for the continued existence of the non-ministerial department, the overall policy and statutory framework within which it operates, and represents the non-ministerial department in Parliament. However, a non-ministerial department operates independently of ministers, generally receiving funding directly from Parliament”,


negotiating with Her Majesty’s Treasury,

“and is accountable directly to Parliament”.

My argument is that the ONR should be established as a non-ministerial government department to recognise the important new responsibilities that it has been given. Some of the bodies that have that status—the Competition and Markets Authority, the Crown Prosecution Service, the Food Standards Agency, HMRC, Ofsted and Ofgem—have been considered by one Government or another to have needed that status to show that they are robustly independent. Looking at nuclear safeguard responsibilities, there is a very strong case for enhancing the status of the ONR in that way, and I hope that the Minister will be sympathetic. I beg to move.

[Baroness Featherstone]

I support Amendment 11. Part of Amendment 7 said something similar. It is very important that we are satisfied on this point so that we know for sure that there can be no interference and no misdoings—if that is the right word.

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, knows, I am always sympathetic, particularly to his amendments. On this occasion, what he wants are some reassurances, as does the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, about the genuine independence of the ONR and, importantly, that the IAEA sees it as an independent body and accepts it as such. I hope that, quite briefly, I will be able to provide those reassurances.

We have international obligations to ensure that the regulator is effectively independent. The provisions of the 2013 Act, which created the ONR and which I am sure the noble Lord knows well, were specifically designed to ensure that the ONR had appropriate independence. Those measures to guarantee its independence include providing it with independent public corporation status; significant restrictions on the Government’s ability to direct the ONR in the exercise of its functions; constraints on the conditions for dismissing senior ONR members; and transparency obligations that act as a safeguard against powers—which are already constrained—being used in an improper manner.

Noble Lords will be aware that as a public corporation the ONR is able to set its own employment terms and conditions, affording it greater freedom and flexibility than if it were a non-ministerial government department. If it were such a department, ONR employees would be civil servants, the organisation would be part of government and the level of its independence would arguably be more limited than it is now. The noble Lord, however, obviously takes another view.

In the factsheet we published on 19 February, we made it clear that the ONR is independent from government in its regulatory functions and decisions. The most important point to stress—this deals with the entire matter and goes to the core of the amendment—is that the International Atomic Energy Agency reported in 2013 that the Energy Act 2013 would,

“provide de jure independence, which will reinforce the de facto independence that ONR (and its predecessors) have enjoyed for many years”.

It is important that we listen to what the IAEA said; I cannot stress how important this is. The amendment the Committee is considering attempts to unpick the arrangements that the IAEA—the international body responsible for nuclear safeguards worldwide—considers provide the independence necessary for an effective regulatory safeguarding regime.

Having established that the ONR is independent, I would also like to note that, as well as fulfilling international obligations and best practice, this independence is crucial for the industry. It is important that the industry has recourse to appeal ONR decisions. Attempting to fundamentally change the ONR’s relationship with the Government by explicitly providing that the ONR acts on behalf of the Crown—the effect of the amendment—risks moving away from an approach deemed appropriate by the IAEA and would undermine the industry’s ability to hold the regulator to account.

I do not think I need to go any further than that. In the interests of time, it is probably best that I end there and ask the noble Lord whether he wants at this stage to withdraw his amendment. I hope that I have given him the appropriate guarantees.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

That has been a very helpful response and I am grateful to the Minister. However, I disagree with him: it is clear from the Cabinet Office guidance that a non-ministerial government department has more independence, whatever the status of officials. But he has given me considerable reassurance, for which I am most grateful, and I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 11 withdrawn.