European Union Bill

Lord Howell of Guildford Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd March 2011 Lords Chamber

Moved By

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

That the Bill be read a second time.

[The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Lord Howell of Guildford)]

My Lords, I have it in command from Her Majesty the Queen to acquaint the House that she has been informed of the purport of the European Union Bill and has consented to place her prerogative and interests, so far as they are affected by the Bill, at the disposal of Parliament, for the purposes of the Bill.

In bringing this Bill before the House for Second Reading, I begin by outlining the Government’s approach to the European Union. When the coalition Government took office, we set out in our programme for government that we would pursue an “activist approach” to our engagement with the European Union. Since taking office, we can lay claim to a number of positive achievements in driving forward EU action. We led calls to set up free-trade arrangements in Pakistan, following the terrible floods there last year, and we have supported the free-trade agreement with South Korea. We have been at the forefront of the group of 25 member states that are keen to pursue enhanced co-operation in the field of intellectual property and, like the previous Government, we continue to be a prominent supporter of further enlargement.

My right honourable friend the Prime Minister has been vocal in calling for effective EU action in the neighbourhood. Recent attention, as we all know, has focused on the countries of north Africa, but we also want to ensure positive action with the eastern partnership countries—in both cases, supporting the EU’s work to foster security, democracy and good governance.

Looking ahead, there are clearly great challenges for the European Union—for example, in growth and global competitiveness. Action on better regulation and widening further markets in services, energy and the digital economy could do much to help to lift our own economic prospects at this time. The EU should also perform more efficiently—for example, in connection with its budget.

However, we also need to tackle the clear evidence, accepted on all sides of the political debate, of a growing disconnection between the people of this country and the European Union. This disconnection exists in our understanding of, and engagement with, the European Union and in popular consent for the decisions taken on behalf of the people of this country by successive Governments.

I see the Bill as strengthening our position, role and effectiveness as a member state of the European Union and as contributing to the wider aim of helping the European Union to modernise and to rest its authority more solidly on public and popular consent. With this legislation, we are plainly acting here in the spirit of the Laeken declaration in seeking to bring the EU closer to its peoples. That seems to be a timely and appropriate aim for the era in which we live. There is no doubt that British people feel shut out and isolated from the business of the European Union. Although they can vote to keep their favourite competitor in a reality TV show or on whether to have a directly elected mayor in their town or city, they have not been able to have a say on whether the Government should agree to confer on the EU further powers to act.

Therefore, in accordance with this Government’s wider agenda to shift power from Whitehall and Westminster to the people, and in accordance with the broader aspiration with our other EU partners to bring the EU closer to the people, we propose to shift power from the centre to the British people for decisions on whether powers should be transferred to the European Union. That is the primary objective of the legislation before us today.

Parliament’s ability to hold the Executive to account on EU decisions has also been limited and there have been many criticisms that there has not been enough examination of, or control over, significant decisions taken by the Government. Therefore, the Bill makes provision on the following issues. First, where a treaty change is deemed to transfer competence or power from the UK to the EU, it will in principle require the approval of the British people in a referendum, in addition to approval by Parliament. Secondly, parliamentary approval of treaty changes in all cases will mean by Act of Parliament, even those changes agreed under the so-called simplified revision procedure. Thirdly, any agreement to use certain of the so-called self-amending or passerelle clauses of the treaties will also require a referendum as well as an Act of Parliament in cases where there would be a transfer of power from the UK to the EU. Of course, that assumes that the Government of the day wish to support the use of a passerelle. Fourthly, any proposal to use other passerelle clauses that do not transfer power or competence from the UK to the EU will still require enhanced parliamentary approval, by an Act of Parliament or a positive resolution of both Houses of Parliament.

The Constitution Committee of this House published its report on the Bill last Thursday. I thank the committee for its careful consideration of the Bill in advance of today’s debate. I welcome a number of the report’s conclusions, in particular those welcoming the provisions seeking to enhance parliamentary control over key decisions. That is very valuable. Another of the—

[Lord Richard]

It is very kind of the Minister to give way so early in his speech and in the debate. Perhaps he may be able to help us. When dealing with subjects for a referendum under Clause 4, he said that “in principle” certain subjects would attract a referendum. I do not know what those words mean. Do they mean that some discretion is left in relation to Clause 4 cases? Could the Government say, “We’re not going to have a referendum”? Or does it mean what it appears to mean—namely, that there is an automaticity in the process and that, if the issue falls within the terms of the clause, there must be a referendum?

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

Yes, I will be able to help the noble Lord on the meaning of “in principle”. He is quite right to spot that those words indicate that there are exceptions. I will explain exactly what those exceptions are. Briefly, they cover treaty changes that might not pass the significance test, which I shall explain later and help him on, and treaty changes that do not affect this country at all. I shall come to those in great detail and will be able to help him in a way that will satisfy him completely.

Another of the committee’s conclusions, consistent with its earlier inquiry, is that referendums in the United Kingdom should be reserved for matters of significant constitutional importance and that some of the matters subject to a referendum under the Bill could lead to numerous and costly referendums on small issues. I am not sure that I agree with that. First, the coalition Government have made a clear commitment that we will not agree to any treaty changes that transfer power or competence from the UK to the EU for the duration of this Parliament. Secondly, and more importantly, any treaty change is very unlikely to focus on single or individual transfers of power, for the simple reason that it must take into account the arduousness of ratifying treaty changes across all member states, of which we have vivid experience. The Lisbon treaty took 23 months to ratify in all 27 states and we expect a similarly lengthy process with the current treaty change on the eurozone’s stability mechanism and with future accession treaties. We do not believe that there is an appetite in the EU or in the member states for a further round of treaty changes that would transfer further powers, particularly on individual issues. That is our view on the matter.

Clauses 2 to 5 make provision for the process to be undertaken in the event of future treaty changes. I want to explain this and many other aspects in some detail and I hope that your Lordships will be patient with me. Clauses 2 and 3 are broadly similar but concern treaty changes agreed under the ordinary revision procedure and the simplified revision procedure respectively. Both clauses provide that all future treaty changes require parliamentary approval by Act of Parliament. At present, changes under the simplified procedure require only a positive resolution of both Houses of Parliament. Therefore, the first change that the Bill introduces straightaway is an enhancement of control in the case of so-called Article 48(6) decisions. Both clauses also provide that, where a treaty change of either type would also transfer power or competence from the United Kingdom to the EU, such a change should also be approved by the British people in a referendum. There is one exception to this—the so-called “significance condition” in Clause 3, which, as I indicated, I shall come to in detail in a moment.

Clause 4 sets out the detailed criteria that the Government of the day would have to apply to determine whether a transfer of competence or power would occur under a future treaty change. The Government make no apology for the complexity of the provisions. We want to make it clear for Parliament, the British people and, indeed, our EU partners and the EU as a whole where a referendum would be required under the Bill. We feel that a short, vague statement would leave any future decisions more open to challenge in Parliament and the courts. It would do little to increase the transparency of decision-making in the EU, which forms a fundamental part of the disconnection of the British people to these decisions—a matter about which the whole House is rightly concerned.

Whereas the principle of competence is fairly well defined in the EU treaties, the principle of power is not. Therefore, for the purposes of this legislation, I shall set out what we mean by a transfer of power. First, it means the giving up of a UK veto in a significant area of policy, because that would mean that the UK would lose the ability to block a future measure under that treaty article. Some of the vetoes in the treaties are in areas that all sides of the House consider important and sensitive—for example, foreign policy, tax, justice and home affairs. It is, and must be, right that any treaty change that would transfer from unanimity to qualified majority voting the way in which decisions were taken in those key areas of policy should require the consent of the British people before the Government could agree to such a change. These are set out in Schedule 1 to the Bill. We do not propose to hold a referendum over more minor or technical vetoes, such as any future agreement to change the number of representatives in the Committee of the Regions. The Government have therefore taken a balanced approach in deciding which vetoes should be subject to a referendum.

The second way in which power, which we are now talking about, would be transferred would be by granting an EU institution or body, through treaty change, a new ability to impose further obligations or sanctions on the UK or on individuals and organisations within the UK. It is this particular point on which, in the case of the simplified revision procedure, a Minister can determine that a future treaty may not be significant enough to require a referendum and instead rely on the requirement for parliamentary approval by Act. This is what is known in Clause 3 as the significance condition. We have provided for this test as we obviously recognise the need to be able to distinguish between important and minor changes. Therefore, we are providing a workable, sustainable solution to prevent referendums from being held on matters that we could not justify to the British public as having such significance as to merit a referendum—for instance, on giving an EU institution the power to require special statistics from a UK body or something of that nature.

[Lord Higgins]

I am sorry to interrupt my noble friend. We have recently had a great many debates on referendums and, for the first time ever, we have created a precedent whereby a referendum—that in relation to the AV Bill—will be mandatory. All previous referendums have been advisory, rather than mandatory. We also had a long debate on what the turnout needed to be, and so on. Could my noble friend tell us, in regard to this Bill, whether it is proposed that the referendum should be mandatory or advisory?

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

These referendums are mandatory. The Bill requires that these transfers of competence away from this nation to the European Union in these very important and fundamental areas cannot take place without the approval of a referendum. I hope that that clarifies the matter.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

Will the noble Lord reflect on his use of the words “competence” and “power”? He seems to be talking about cases where there is already a competence and a power to the European Union but where the decisions have to be taken by unanimity, and that that might be changed to qualified majority. I readily understand that that is a significant change, but it is not the granting of a power or competence to the European Union; it is already there. I am sorry, but I think I am right in saying that he is misusing those words all the time, as he is with the word “veto”, which is not a word known to European legislation. One either takes decisions by unanimity, in which case all member states have to agree, or by qualified majority.

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

I do not think I agree with the noble Lord and I shall try to explain why in my remaining remarks. The word “competence” is of course very clearly defined in the treaties. There is no need to try to unravel that because it is defined in the treaties themselves. I agree that the word “power” is more difficult and I have been dealing with that. On removing the ability to veto, it may be that those precise words are not those to be found in the treaties but the action is clear enough. The removal of the ability of this country to veto certain proposals, so that they do not go to QMV, is a very clear adjustment or in some cases a surrender of power. I would not have thought that there was any difficulty about that.

Perhaps I may proceed with the explanation. I was saying that a prime example of a treaty change where we are not affected is the eurozone stability mechanism. The third is a treaty change which merely sought to codify EU practice in relation to the previous exercise of an existing competence.

In all cases, any future treaty change will need to be considered according to a set process, provided for by this legislation. In accordance with Clause 5, a Minister of the Crown would be required to make a statement within two months of a treaty change being agreed at EU level. That ministerial statement will have to give reasons why the treaty change does or does not require a referendum, by reference to the criteria set out in Clause 4 of the Bill. Like any ministerial decision, it will be open to any member of the public to challenge the Minister's judgment in that statement through judicial review. An Act of Parliament would then be required in all cases of future treaty change. So the possibility of judicial review by the courts does not displace the role of Parliament, but offers an additional safeguard for the people to hold the Executive to account.

The EU Bill would also give Parliament greater control over whether the Government can agree to use of the self-amending provisions of the Lisbon treaty, which those of us who were here a few years ago will recall very well. Those decisions, known as passerelles or ratchet clauses, allow for modifications to the EU treaties without recourse to formal treaty change. Because of the lack of a universal definition of what constitutes a passerelle, and because the Government's aim is to ensure that our proposals are as clear as possible to Parliament and the public, we have set out explicitly which treaty articles would require additional levels of control.

As I made clear earlier, Clause 6 provides that any proposal to use passerelles which would entail a transfer of power or competence from the UK to the EU would require a referendum as well as parliamentary approval by Act. There are two broad categories of provision in Clause 6. The first is the passerelles, which enable the European Council to decide to remove a veto in an area we consider to be significant and where we have made equivalent provision in Schedule 1: for example, social policy, the environment, common foreign and security policy and EU finance. Secondly, there are five specific decisions involving a transfer of power or competence, for example, a common European defence or participating in a European public prosecutor's office.

Clause 7 makes provision to require that any proposal to invoke one of the passerelles that would not involve the transfer of power or competence from the UK to the EU should nevertheless be subject to primary legislation. Clause 8 makes provision for specific parliamentary controls over any future use of the so-called broad enabling clause in Article 352 of the treaty, well known to many of us, on the functioning of the European Union.

Clause 9 makes specific provision for three passerelles in the field of justice and home affairs. The UK enjoys a protocol in respect of this field which allows the Government to decide on a case-by-case basis whether to opt in to a justice and home affairs measure. We have provided that a Motion would need to be approved in both Houses before the Government could opt in to one of those measures. Once the negotiation has then taken place on the proposal, if it is acceptable to the Government, an Act of Parliament would then be required before the Government could agree finally to the proposal in the Council. This provision does not apply to all justice and home affairs opt-ins, only to those passerelle clauses listed in the Bill which, if used, would allow EU powers to expand within the scope of the competence already conferred on the EU in the treaties.

There are some additional proposals which would require parliamentary approval by passing a Motion in both Houses rather than by an Act. These are provided by Clause 10. There are treaty articles which modify the composition or rules of existing institutions and, for the most part, are subject to QMV.

[Lord Clinton-Davis]

Which other members of the EU are prepared to go down the route which the noble Lord recommends?

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

Different member states have different patterns, including, as the noble Lord will know very well, elaborate referenda procedures, all of which take a very long time. The noble Lord will also be familiar with the German constitutional court and with other constitutional provisions in other member countries. This may be too general a comparison, but I think he will agree that most countries have somewhat more elaborate provisions and controls through constitutional courts and referenda requirements than we have had hitherto in this country.

As I was saying, there are some additional proposals which require parliamentary approval by passing a Motion in both Houses. These are provided by Clause 10. A vote in both Houses is therefore a practical solution to enable Parliament to have an appropriate level of control.

I hope not to detain your Lordships very much more, but there are one or two final matters which it is right to put before you.

[Lord Richard]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. He will realise that this is a rather complex Bill, and we need to hear the expert opinions of the Government on it. I want to come back to the point that I made a little earlier, which he has not answered. What did he mean by “in principle”? If he looks at Clauses 3(4) and 4, he will see that the exemption condition or the significance point—they are the same thing—can only apply where,

“the decision falls within section 4 only because of provision of the kind mentioned in subsection (1)(i) or (j)”.

Paragraphs (i) and (j) are perfectly clearly spelt out in Clause 4. What happens if it is not in paragraphs (i) or (j)? Presumably there is no question of significance or government discretion. There is no question of it being a decision for a referendum in principle. At that stage, if it is outside paragraphs (i) or (j) it is mandatory. It is compulsory in those circumstances to have a referendum.

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

Yes, except, of course, where the other exemptions apply, in particular, the one I mentioned that the treaty, such as the one we discussed in this very House last night, does not affect the United Kingdom and there is no competence transfer or power transfer. In those, there is no referendum, but where there is a clear transfer of competence or power and the treaty is being changed to that effect, there is indeed a mandatory requirement for a referendum. It is on the major issues that I have described, which everyone in this House is concerned with. We have mentioned them all many times, so I shall just take one very topical one: should we join the eurozone? We feel it is right that the people should be consulted through a referendum and so do, I think, the majority of people in this country.

We also feel that it is right that at the lower level, where we are talking about matters being handled by an Act of Parliament rather than just a resolution through the House, it is right, and the Constitution Committee agrees with us, that there should be more effective parliamentary control over what is happening and the passing of powers and competences. I think the position is as I described it in considerable detail to my noble friend. If I did not satisfy him, and I suspect I have not, there will, no doubt, be plenty of opportunity in Committee to go through these things in even more minute detail than I am going through them now.

I want to refer to Clause 18 because it will be recalled that the coalition set out in our programme for government that we, the coalition, would examine the case for a United Kingdom parliamentary sovereignty Bill. Following that examination, the Government resolved to include a declaratory provision in this Bill which makes it clear that EU law has effect in the UK legal order for one reason only; namely, that that authority has been conferred upon it by Acts of Parliament and that its authority lasts only for as long as Parliament so decides. This is a principle that to date has been upheld consistently by our courts.

Nevertheless, in recent years, legal and constitutional academics and others have suggested that the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty has been eroded by, among other things, our membership of the European Union. Put another way, European law has now acquired an autonomous status within the UK legal order independent of the will of Parliament through its Acts. This argument was advanced most vigorously by the prosecution in the so-called metric martyr's case—Thoburn v Sunderland City Council—in 2002. On that occasion, the Divisional Court rejected the plea. In order to guard against the risk of any such argument gaining credence in the future, we have decided that it would be beneficial to place it beyond speculation that directly effective and directly applicable EU law owes its status within the UK legal order because statute has provided that this be so. The clause is declaratory, but lays down a firm marker about the sovereignty of this Parliament.

Finally, I reaffirm our firm belief that this legislation would have a positive impact for the people and the democratic governance of this country. We also believe it would help address the democratic deficit across the whole of the European Union today. The Government are clear that this legislation will not have any adverse impact on the influence or the engagement of the United Kingdom in the European Union. On the contrary, colleagues in the EU have agreed that it is for member states to determine how they consider and approve key decisions. The President of the European Council made precisely this point on a recent visit to London. Although they have other constitutional frameworks—this meets the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis—other member states have similar provisions to those in this legislation. Several have referendum provisions in specific circumstances and, as I said earlier, the German Parliament has a series of provisions to approve a similar set of passerelles as those listed in this Bill.

There is no suggestion that those provisions in other member states pose a hindrance to their influence, in particular in the case of Germany, and we do not accept that this will be the case with the United Kingdom either; on the contrary, as I outlined, the Prime Minister continues to lead the Government’s close engagement with our European partners on those areas of policy where the EU can make a positive difference to the people of this country. Nor would this Bill hinder the day-to-day business of the EU. The provisions of this legislation do not extend to those items of legislation that are proposed under the existing competences conferred on the EU under existing treaties save for those proposals involving passerelles listed in the Bill. These decisions remain, of course, within the scope of our existing parliamentary scrutiny arrangements.

This legislation represents a significant step forward in ensuring sufficient parliamentary and public control over the key decisions taken by the Government in the EU.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. He passed rather rapidly over Clause 14, so perhaps I may take him back to it for a second before he sits down. I find it very puzzling. If, as most of us believe, parliamentary sovereignty is absolute, Clause 18 is not necessary. If I am wrong and parliamentary sovereignty is not absolute but could be overruled by another legal order, then nothing that we say in this Bill or this Act could change that. So Clause 18, surely, is either superfluous or ineffective.

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

That is a good try, but it does not quite meet the point that what we are trying to do is put the principle into statute law rather than common law. It is a change in that degree; but, otherwise, I fully concede that it is declaratory and intended to reinforce the point, which is widely but not totally accepted. So it does make some difference. However, if the noble Lord is saying that it is not a decisive, world-shattering, course-altering piece of legislation, I would have to agree with him.

I was saying in conclusion that this legislation represents a significant step forward in ensuring sufficient parliamentary and public control over the key decisions taken by the Government. The Government’s clear aim is that this will become an enduring part of the United Kingdom's constitutional framework. It will serve to re-engage the people with the decisions taken in their name. It will give greater democratic legitimacy to the pursuit of the UK’s objectives as a leading member of the European Union and will play an important part in the necessary increase in the democratic legitimacy of the European Union as a whole, not just among the people of this country but among the people of all the member states of the European Union. This is all part of enabling us, the British, to play an active and activist role in the European Union, which is, we believe, clearly in this country's national interest.

This Bill has received considerable and considered scrutiny from another place. The House will note that during that scrutiny this legislation was unopposed both on Second Reading and on Third Reading and that no amendments were proposed in Committee or on Report which affected the fundamental provisions of the legislation. The EU Bill had the support of all sides of the other place. I am therefore hopeful that this legislation will receive similar support from all sides of your Lordships' House. I therefore commend the Bill to the House and beg to move.