Myanmar

Lord Houghton of Richmond Excerpts

Thursday 10th May 2018 Grand Committee

[Lord Houghton of Richmond (CB)]

My Lords, I declare a personal interest in Myanmar. I have visited three times over the past three years, once as Chief of the Defence Staff and twice in an advisory capacity, assisting in efforts to bring about a resolution of Myanmar’s multiple internal conflicts through reconciliation.

On my visits, my status has permitted me exceptional access to Aung San Suu Kyi, to wider government, to the leadership of the Tatmadaw and to representatives of several of the armed ethnic opposition groups. My visits have left me with a varied set of impressions about the complexity, scale and diversity of the challenges that Myanmar faces. They have left me, on balance, with as much sympathy for those who face those challenges on the ground as for those who sit in often emotional judgment from afar.

I would never be an apologist for those who perpetrate atrocity, utilise sexual violence as an instrument of policy or proclaim impotence as a defence against inactivity. But nor can I unreservedly join the ranks of those—not today’s speakers—whose condemnations lack informed judgment and whose aspirations for action are simply not anchored in reality.

The place is a dreadful mess. The Government lack professional capacity; they are in power but not in control. The armed forces lack sophistication and enlightened leadership—an understatement. The army is internally fractured between an old guard who retain power and an emerging generation who cannot navigate a path to a desired position of civilian control and societal support. Society is riven with deep ethnic enmity and suspicion, united only by a populist hatred of the Rohingya, whose persecution is the one residual thing that keeps the army remotely popular.

Is the situation hopeless? Yes, if your aspiration is for instant remedy, for a civilian Government in control, for a country unified, for a secular state, for a depoliticised army that enjoys the widespread support of society and for a resettled Rohingya living in peaceful harmony. But the country is not without hope if the international community offers structured, long-term assistance. There are enough enlightened people on whom to build a better future; there is a society that wishes to be led to a better place; and there is an army that wants to rid itself of the burden of politics and unpopularity. I hope that government policy reflects this view. I fear it is not widely shared, but it is one that I hold.

United States: Foreign Policy

Lord Houghton of Richmond Excerpts

Thursday 18th January 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Houghton of Richmond (CB) (Maiden Speech)]

My Lords, I am hugely grateful for the opportunity to speak in this debate. It is only a couple of weeks since my introduction, so I hope that my desire to speak is not judged impetuous. In truth, I did not want to perpetuate the frustration of not being able to contribute, nor submit to the folly of awaiting a debate on which I had a special interest or strong views, only to be bound by the protocol of remaining uncontentious. So I thought I would speak softly in this debate, at least in part then to be eligible for bolder things to come.

I start by offering a general thank you to all those who have offered me such a warm welcome to the House. Even a number of noble and gallant Lords whose very proximity in a previous life I used to fear have been remarkably friendly. I single out for special thanks my two supporters: the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, and the noble Lord, Lord Hague—both selected carefully to emphasise both my Yorkshire and my soft power credentials. I most warmly thank all those members of staff who have been so courteous and helpful.

I think I am a rarity among recent defence chiefs in having a son who is a professional comedian. Comedians know little about American foreign policy, but comedic sons are good sounding-boards for maiden speeches and common sense. Tom, my son, likened this event to a “new material night”—defined as an occasion when a non-paying, often small audience, largely composed of friends, gathers to hear you try out some new ideas, in the knowledge that they are not yet perfectly formed, nor necessarily that funny.

So here is my contribution to this debate—a contribution to an understanding of the gravity of its context from the view of a military mind. When I stood down as Chief of the Defence Staff 18 months ago, I privately offered a personal view to the staff on the state of the world. I recalled that I had spent much of my adult life rather simplistically hoping that the natural evolution of mankind was towards greater mutual tolerance, greater civilisation and a greater equality of opportunity and social condition—ultimately, a more inclusive global polity that was representative of commonly shared ideals and morality.

I had a parallel sense that this natural evolution would be accompanied by relative stability among nations: a sense that cataclysmic war, as witnessed in the last century, was a watershed in human awakening, and that our evolution towards collective civilisation would occur within an agreed international rules-based system to which all nations subscribed. My views were bolstered by ample academic evidence and bestselling books which irresistibly demonstrated that the fundamentals of human existence in respect of disease, famine and violence had never been better. There was a sustained revolution going on in human fortune. But then I qualified this euphoria. My more recent experience had rather dented my confidence in this somewhat idealised human journey. Indeed, increasingly, most of the evidence seemed to support a very different narrative.

First, as has been mentioned, a number of countries—Russia, Iran, North Korea and China—variously tended to the view, perhaps understandably, that the current rules-based order denied them the historic entitlement they sensed was theirs. They were not content with the status quo, nor with the stewardship of those who control it. Separately, demographics and economics were becoming, in combination, increasingly dangerous sources of global instability, either through a rebalancing of global economic power, as in Asia, or through the continuing maldistribution of wealth and opportunity within and between countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Then there was the widespread growth in violent religious extremism, a phenomenon that threatens international security and the integrity of various nation states, most obviously Iraq, Syria and Libya. The world suddenly seemed a significantly less stable and certain—and a more dangerous—place.

As I finished my time as CDS, therefore, my historical judgment was that inevitable change, often accompanied by violence, looked a far better descriptor of mankind’s future, and my philosophical judgment was that human nature still tends to the Hobbesian: driven by selfish concerns, primarily those relating to individual survival, achieved if necessary by brutal means.

Even if these judgments seem overstated, noble Lords might at least allow the conclusion that competition is a more natural human condition than peaceful coexistence, and that stability and a rules-based global order do not occur naturally. Indeed, stability, peaceful coexistence and a rules-based order need to be imposed, primarily consensually through alliances of interested parties, and occasionally through the willingness of those parties to threaten to use, or to use, force—but always in the context of mature leadership and wise policy.

This, to me, is the context of this debate. The grand strategic challenge of this age is how we accommodate the change that is inevitable while sustaining the stability on which the continued betterment of the human condition depends. The strategy needed to meet this challenge will be achieved only through a combination of wise policy, strong capability and thoughtful leadership. The absence of such a combination—or, worse still, its replacement by policy and leadership that is antagonistic or self-serving—runs the grave risk that change will be violent, stability will fail and the journey of human betterment will suffer badly. So while we look to the United States of America to lead, the United Kingdom should also look in the mirror at our ability to discharge a supporting role.

A better definition of this role forms the context of our national ambition, our place in the world and, for me—dare I say it?—a far clearer understanding of the sort of Armed Forces we actually need. I risk, however, straying into a separate debate—one to which I hope I will now be permitted to contribute.