Higher Education and Research Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Young of Cookham

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 8th March 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Young of Cookham]

My Lords, looking at the names on this amendment, it is certainly a gold star amendment, to use the language of the OfS. When I looked at it, I was relieved to see that the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay was not on it. Therefore, I was somewhat disappointed when he rose to his feet to lend his formidable support to the amendment.

I can see that these amendments stem from concerns that there need to be appropriate safeguards and checks on the OfS’s powers under Clauses 43, 44 and 54. We fully agree and have listened to the concerns expressed in Committee. As a result, we have tabled two sets of amendments. First, there is Amendment 116 after Clause 44 and related amendments, which we have just discussed in an earlier debate. These ensure that the OfS must seek expert advice before granting degree-awarding powers or varying or revoking them on quality grounds. Secondly, there are amendments to Clauses 43, 44 and 54, which we have just debated in the group with Amendment 107. These amendments clearly set out the limited set of circumstances where the powers of revocation can be used, such as in cases of serious quality concerns. These further strengthen already very robust safeguards, including statutory processes guaranteeing providers the opportunity to make representations and a right of appeal. By the way, there is nothing in the Bill to prevent further appeals to higher courts.

Noble Lords also suggested in Committee an annual report on how the OfS exercises its powers of revocation under Clauses 43, 44 and 54. I accept that this is a good idea and would contribute to greater transparency. I can therefore tell noble Lords that in respect of each year where the OfS has made use of its powers to revoke degree-awarding powers or university title, we will ensure that a report be laid before Parliament that includes information on how the powers have been used.

Turning turn specifically to the amendment, the grounds for appeal in Clauses 46 and 56 have been carefully chosen and are largely based on what a judicial review would take into account. Despite the noble and learned Lord’s disparaging remarks about judicial review, it is the way in which public bodies are held accountable. These are sensible and appropriate grounds which balance the need for a regulator to make robust and confident decisions using its unique expertise with the need to hold that regulator to account where it makes decisions that are not within the reasonable scope of its powers. The Bill as drafted achieves that balance.

An appeal can be brought on three grounds, as the noble and learned Lord outlined. The first is that the decision was based on an error of fact. This means that if the OfS based its decision on wrong or incomplete facts, it can be overturned by the tribunal. The second ground is that a decision was wrong in law. We have specified in our amendments, to which I referred a moment ago, exactly when the OfS can revoke degree-awarding powers and/or university title, and how it has to go about it. For example, if the OfS decided to take the step of revocation outside the circumstances we have now specified in the Bill, its decision could be overturned by the First-tier Tribunal. Likewise, Clauses 45 and 55 provide that the OfS must have regard to representations made. If it did not do so, this could amount to being wrong in law and would therefore be grounds for appeal. Lastly, an appeal can be brought on the grounds that the decision was unreasonable. A provider could appeal against the OfS on the basis that its decision was unreasonable, having regard to the facts of its case.

Those grounds for appeal are complemented by strong procedural safeguards, which, again, are clearly set out in the Bill. These ensure that any decision made by the OfS must be legally correct and factually accurate and reflect a reasonable judgment, the OfS having carefully considered the available facts and applied its expertise according to the law. That is a very high standard to which the Bill holds the OfS to account.

By contrast, there are real risks in taking the route mapped by these amendments. They propose a more general and much less clean-cut ground of appeal—namely, that an appeal may be brought when the decision of the OfS is “wrong”, as explained by the noble and learned Lord. That is far less certain for the provider, for the regulator and indeed for the tribunal. It would also expand the range of cases that could go to appeal. What is “right” from one angle might always be seen as “wrong” from another. For example, will a provider that has its degree-awarding powers revoked on entirely justifiable grounds ever see that as anything other than “wrong”? Surely that provider should not have an automatic right of appeal, with all the delay, uncertainty and cost that that involves. The amendment would appear to allow that, as the balanced limitations of factual and legal accuracy and reasonableness would have been dispensed with.

Furthermore, the amendment would require the court to decide whether it agreed with the expert judgment reached by the OfS. Such an exercise would allow—indeed, it would require—a tribunal to put itself in the regulator’s shoes and then substitute its judgment for that of the OfS. I have to ask whether that is really the right place for the tribunal to be—asserting expertise in higher education rather than, in a more focused way, looking at lawfulness, factual accuracy and reasonableness. I respectfully suggest that it is not. Changing the grounds of appeal in this way would risk creating a process whereby the tribunals, rather than the OfS, regulated the HE sector. That is a powerful argument which noble Lords have so far not addressed.

I do not believe that the amendments are the right way to go—although they are well meant, I do not think they will take us in the right direction. Therefore, with respect, I ask the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

Is the noble Lord able, with the resources at his disposal, to give any examples of this formula being used in the case of other regulators? We are contemplating a process that challenges a decision taken by a regulator, so it would be helpful to know whether this is the normal pattern or whether the suggestion of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, is the normal pattern.

[Lord Young of Cookham]

The noble and learned Lord qualified his question with the remark “with the resources at my disposal”. The answer is that I do not have that answer at my disposal, but I will of course make inquiries and write to him.