Victims and Witnesses (Scotland) Act 2014 (Consequential Modification) Order 2019

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Wednesday 26th June 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, looking at the matter from the point of view of a sheriff sitting in a court in Scotland, I think that the order is much to be welcomed. The fact is that people move about, and some offenders coming to Scotland from England or Wales disappear back to England or Wales after they have been sentenced. It is necessary that this measure be passed so that the order that the sheriff would like to make can be properly put into effect.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness (LD)]

My Lords, we also support the order, but I have one or two questions for the Minister. We heard in the previous debate about legislation that came into effect in 2012 and we were only now getting around to considering the order. My understanding is that the Victims and Witnesses (Scotland) Act was passed by the Scottish Parliament in late 2013 and received Royal Assent in January 2014. Here we are, more than five years after Royal Assent, considering this order.

Paragraph 7.1 of the Explanatory Memorandum states: “Included in these measures”—that is, the measures in the 2014 Act—

“is the victim surcharge, a new financial penalty to be imposed on offenders in certain cases as will be set out in the Victim Surcharge (Scotland) Regulations 2019”.

Is it right that we do not yet have these regulations, so we do not know what will be in them, what the circumstances would be nor the measure of the penalties? I think that there is reference somewhere to a sliding scale, but has the Minister seen any draft regulations? In inviting the House to approve this measure, it might have been reasonable to give us some idea as to what precisely the Scottish Government had in mind. I know the Scottish Parliament will be able to look at this order, but it would have been helpful to have had a bit of colour: if he has that information, it will be very welcome.

I emphasise that it has been a very long journey to get here. On a visit to Victim Support Scotland in August 2014, the then Justice Secretary in the Scottish Government, Mr Kenny MacAskill, met victims who had been helped by the existing fund, run by that very important organisation. Mr MacAskill indicated that they were the kind of victims who would be helped by the victim surcharge fund. Indeed, the Scottish Government’s press release accompanying Mr MacAskill’s visit said:

“A new fund providing more than a million pounds a year of practical help for victims of crime is set to be introduced in the coming months as part of the Scottish Government’s package of measures to improve the support for victims and witnesses in Scotland … The Victim Surcharge Fund will be established in the next few months and is likely to be administered by Victim Support Scotland”.


That press release was dated 13 August 2014.

A series of questions have been asked in the Scottish Parliament about when we are actually going to get these regulations. My Liberal Democrat colleague Alison McInnes, then Member for North East Scotland, asked in July 2015,

“what (a) criminal offences, (b) circumstances and (c) descriptions of offender can cause a victim surcharge to be imposed”.

She was told by Mr Michael Matheson, who by that time had taken over from Mr MacAskill as Scottish Justice Secretary:

“The victim surcharge is not yet operational, nor have the relevant provisions in the Victims and Witnesses (Scotland) Act 2014 been brought into force. Therefore, no surcharges have been imposed or payments made. The victim surcharge is due to be introduced later in 2015, ensuring that offenders contribute towards a fund specifically to support victims of crime. Preparatory work for the establishment and administration of the fund is ongoing … details of how it will operate, including the circumstances in which a surcharge is to be imposed, will be set out in subordinate legislation and will be subject to parliamentary approval in due course”.


Fast forward—or not-so-fast forward—to February 2016, when Ms McInnes was given a further answer from Michael Matheson:

“Preparatory work for the establishment and administration of the victim surcharge fund is on-going. The timetable for the introduction of the fund has been influenced by a number of factors, including further detailed consideration of viable options for delivery and the potential role of third sector or other organisations in this process”.


Then we get to an answer given to my colleague, Member of the Scottish Parliament for Orkney, Mr Liam McArthur, who asked in December 2016 what progress had been made in establishing the victim surcharge fund and when it was expected to be operational and issue its first payments. To this, he got the reply:

“It is the Scottish Government’s intention to establish the fund in 2017 and to initially impose the surcharge on offenders given a court fine. Further details of how the fund will operate will be set out in subordinate legislation, which will be subject to parliamentary approval in due course”.


So here we are at the beginning of 2017, three years after Royal Assent, and we are still talking about it being done “in due course”.

There were further questions of a similar kind. Mr Humza Yousaf, who had by this time taken over from Mr Michael Matheson, said on 17 July last year:

“Our intention is to announce further details on the VSF, following the summer Parliamentary recess”.


The then Conservative Member for North East Scotland, Liam Kerr, asked in October 2018 on what date the fund would become operational. Mr Yousaf, replying on 7 November 2018 said:

“In order to ensure effective operation of the victim surcharge in Scotland, an Order under section 104 of the Scotland Act 1998 … is required to amend section 24 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 … which is reserved”.


That is the very point we are debating in relation to this order, but one notes that not until November 2018 did the Scottish Government ever say that there was any issue about trying to get a Section 104 order. Will the Minister tell us when the Scotland Office was first approached by the Scottish Government with regard to identifying the necessity for such an order? Mr Yousaf went on to describe the order and said:

“The UK Government have agreed in principle to this Order and have estimated that, once all the necessary steps are completed, it will come into force in summer 2019, subject to UK Parliamentary timescales. The Victim Surcharge (Scotland) Regulations, which will implement the surcharge, will be laid before the Scottish Parliament, as soon as practicable after the section 104 Order comes into force”.


In all fairness to the United Kingdom Government, they have held to summer 2019 reasonably well. In a reply to a parliamentary question from Liam McArthur last month, that timescale was repeated by Mr Yousaf in very similar terms.

It is widely agreed that this is an important provision. It is one that will actually give support to victims from the fund created, and it is a matter of considerable regret that it has taken the Scottish Government five years after legislating to even come up with a proposal on how their flagship policy might work. That is not a responsibility of the United Kingdom Government, but it would be very helpful for us to have some colour as to the detail of the proposal. For example, while it is important that we look at the position of victims, we also need to consider those who might have this sanction applied to them. What are the guidelines to ensure that they do not have so much taken out of their benefits that they then struggle to make ends meet, which might actually drive them, in some circumstances, to further crime? That is a detail we do not know and if the Minister has any information on that, it would be very welcome.

As I say, my Liberal Democrat colleagues in the Scottish Parliament have been pushing the Scottish Government hard to make progress on this and it is important that we have this order tonight. We very much welcome it and will certainly give it our support.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 16th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 9 in my name. The Bill was substantially amended on Report with regard to the devolution dimension. Among other things, what one might describe as confidence-building measures were put in to ensure that Ministers, having given certain undertakings with regard to how they would exercise their powers to make regulations, would do that and would regularly report to Parliament to ensure that it was being done in good faith.

The reports have to be done on a three-monthly basis: the first report certainly has to be done three months after the date when the Act is passed and:

“Each successive period of three months after the first reporting period is a reporting period”.


That report must explain how,

“principles …agreed between Her Majesty’s Government and any of the appropriate authorities, and … relating to implementing any arrangements which are to replace any relevant powers or retained EU law restrictions, have been taken into account during the reporting period”.

That is fair enough as far as it goes, but it does not give much colour or substance as to what these principles are.

My concern, which I raised on Report, was that there was insufficient detail as to the principles. However, I asked whether the principles referred to were those agreed at the Joint Ministerial Committee,

“back in October or November, which have certainly been discussed before. However, it is slightly odd to have reference to ‘principles’ which, as far as I can see, will not actually appear in the Bill. Because we have debated this often enough, we perhaps know what the principles are, or at least know where they can be found, but to anyone coming to this fresh it would not necessarily indicate where these principles are”.—[Official Report, 2/5/18; col. 2141.]

I asked the Minister if he would confirm that the principles were indeed those agreed in the communique of the Joint Ministerial Committee.

The noble and learned Lord the Advocate-General for Scotland said in his response:

“Noble Lords will recollect that, at the Joint Ministerial Committee in October last year, the principles to be applied were agreed by all those attending: the Welsh Government, the Scottish Government and the United Kingdom Government. I just add in response to a point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, that where he finds reference in the amendments to ‘principles’, that refers to the principles that were agreed at that stage and are carried over in the agreements”.—[Official Report, 2/5/18; col. 2164.]


I hope we have established common ground that the principles referred to are indeed those agreed and set out in the communique of 16 October 2017 from the Joint Ministerial Committee on European Negotiations. I am very grateful that the Printed Paper Office has made available copies of that communique for noble Lords to read.

I will not read it all out ad longum but it is worth noting that they are principles that relate to where common frameworks need to be established. They have to do so to,

“enable the functioning of the UK internal market, while acknowledging policy divergence … ensure compliance with international obligations … ensure the UK can negotiate, enter into and implement new trade agreements and international treaties … enable the management of common resources … administer and provide access to justice in cases with a cross-border element”,

and

“safeguard the security of the UK”.

It also says that when frameworks are to be established they,

“will respect the devolution settlements and the democratic accountability of the devolved legislatures, and will therefore … be based on established conventions and practices … maintain as a minimum, equivalent flexibility for tailoring policies to the specific needs of each territory as is afforded by current EU rules … lead to a significant increase in decision-making powers for the devolved administrations”.

In addition, and this has occupied many hours of debate in your Lordships’ House as this Bill has gone through:

“Frameworks will ensure recognition of the economic and social linkages between Northern Ireland and Ireland and that Northern Ireland will be the only part of the UK that shares a land frontier with the EU. They will also adhere to the Belfast Agreement”.


These are not insignificant principles. In fact, I think they are very important. If the Bill is going to be complete —people coming to the Bill should not necessarily have to try to work out where these principles are to be found—in the interests of having a tidy statute book these principles should at least be there by reference. I cannot readily see an objection to that, given that there is an understanding what these principles are. They are not to the exclusion of other things that might be agreed by the UK Government and the devolved Governments but at least they are a starting point. I hope the amendment will commend itself to the Government because it is entirely consistent with their policy.

In passing, I refer to the amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford and wonder if that were accepted for Wales, it would help find an agreement in Scotland, if it was also applied to Scotland. I suspect it might not go as far as the Scottish Government want because it does not give them the requirement for consent. It says:

“A Minister of the Crown will not normally lay a draft,”


unless such consent had been given. Perhaps the noble and learned Lord will respond to this. Unlike Section 28(8) of the Scotland Act 1998 and the equivalent provision in the Government of Wales Act which says that Parliament will not normally legislate in primary legislation, here we are dealing with Ministers. I assume that if Ministers are laying regulations, they could be subject to judicial review in a way in which a decision of Parliament would not be. That might give further encouragement to the Scottish Parliament that its concerns have been listened to. In responding, the Minister might also just take the opportunity to indicate the Government’s position in relation to the vote of the Scottish Parliament yesterday.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, to follow what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, has just said, the Minister may remember that I raised how to deal with the Sewel convention in relation to delegated legislation on several occasions in Committee, in dealing with what is now to be found in Clauses 9 and 11 of the Bill as it is printed for this stage of the proceedings. My recollection is that my points were dealt with by assurances from Ministers that the Sewel convention principles would apply to the making of delegated legislation in the context of both Clauses 9 and 11.

I do not have down an amendment in the same terms as that proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, in relation to Wales because I can assume, I think, that the same principle would apply to the corresponding provision for Scotland earlier in the same clause, and no doubt to Northern Ireland as well. For my part, I would be content if an assurance could be given specifically in relation to the mechanism in this clause that means the Sewel convention would be respected in the way the amendment describes. That would be consistent with the assurances I have had in relation to the earlier provisions and would avoid writing the Sewel convention into the Bill, which I understand Ministers are anxious not to do because, in the case of Miller, it was described as merely a convention—important though it may be. I would be grateful if the Minister, when he comes to reply, would give an assurance in relation to both Wales—which has been sought—and Scotland, and no doubt to Northern Ireland as well, although it is not represented here today.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Committee: 9th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 21st March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, Amendment 266, which is in my name, is in a series of groups dealing with devolution. It is in the first of five groups dealing with rather technical points arising out of Schedules 2 and 8. They precede a lot of government amendments which are in the group following my groups. I suggest that the main discussion about devolution and its consequences is best reserved for the government amendments which are focused on Clause 11 and other clauses. I am afraid my groups are rather boring, because I am dealing with a whole series of little technical points which need adjustment to some extent in the light of progress that is being made in discussions with the devolved authorities, among other points.

The theme that runs through all my amendments is the need to respect the devolution settlements in Scotland and Wales. I am confident that the Government share that sentiment. It is all a question of how the matter is worked out in points of detail. The basic rule following our withdrawal from the EU, I suggest, is that returned EU competencies in the devolved areas should be distributed among the devolved authorities in accordance with the devolution statutes. That means that what falls within devolved competence should be treated as devolved, with all that that means, and what falls within reserved matters should be treated as reserved, with all that that means.

The statutes that form the foundation for the devolution settlements—the Scotland Act 1998 and Government of Wales Acts, the latest of which was in 2017—were all built on the foundation of our membership of the EU. In each of these statutes, it was taken as accepted that it would not be within the competence of the devolved Administrations to legislate on matters relating to EU law or indeed to take executive action in relation to these matters either.

What we have in the Bill, in place of EU law, is a new creature called “retained” EU law, which is the law that comes back to us either because it is already present in the United Kingdom or is direct EU law that is coming back to us and is not yet built into our laws but requires being built in using the mechanisms described in the Bill. In the original drafting of the Bill, retained EU law is treated as simply a mirror image of EU law, so that in that original drafting—which can be seen in Clauses 11(1) and (2)—the same restriction on competence which applied in relation to EU law is applied to retained EU law. I am delighted to see that, in developing their thinking on this matter, the Government recognise that this really is not acceptable within the devolved arrangements. A much more nuanced approach to that topic can be seen in the government amendments that we will come to later this afternoon.

What I seek to do in the preliminary groups is to draw attention to various other passages in the Bill that need to be corrected in order to be compatible with the devolution settlements. In some of the groups—but not in the first—it is already clear from the government amendments that they are in almost the same position as I am as to what needs to be done.

I turn to Amendment 266, in the first of these groups, and also mention amendments 278 and 292, which raise exactly the same point in relation to different parts of the Bill. Amendment 266 deals with the power to deal by regulation with deficiencies arising from the withdrawal from the EU, which is the subject of Clause 7. It appears in Part 1 of Schedule 2 in the form that is appropriate for the activities of the devolved institutions in carrying out the exercise to which Clause 7 refers.

Amendment 278 deals with the power by regulation to prevent breaches of international obligations, which is the subject of Clause 8. The devolution mechanism for this is dealt with in paragraph 13 of Schedule 2. Amendment 292 relates to the power by regulation to implement the withdrawal agreement and the mechanism for the devolved Administrations is set out in paragraph 21 of Schedule 2.

The point to which these three amendments draw attention is a qualification that is to be found in each of these contexts on the power of the devolved authority to make provision by regulations regarding these three matters. The particular provision that I am concerned about is found in paragraph 1(4) of Schedule 2:

“Regulations under this Part, so far as made by a devolved authority … (b) may not confer a power to legislate (other than a power to make rules of procedure for a court or tribunal)”.


At first sight that qualification cuts across the concept of devolution, the effect of which is that if a matter is within devolved competence, it is for the devolved authority to take its own decisions as to how to deal with that matter, in whatever way it regards as appropriate. Under the devolution statutes, the qualification that we find in this provision and its equivalents in paragraphs 13 and 21 is new: in my experience it has not been encountered before. To an extent, therefore, these three amendments are probing, to enable the Minister to explain why this qualification has been inserted in these paragraphs and, if no reasonable explanation is given, to suggest to her that maybe the qualification should be removed, on the ground that when it comes to exercising powers within the devolved area, it should not be there.

It is right to add that Part 1 of Schedule 2, for perfectly understandable reasons, contains qualifications. For example, paragraph 2 states that:

“No regulations may be made under this Part by a devolved authority unless every provision of them is within the devolved competence of the devolved authority”.


That is a perfectly sensible provision, and consistent with the devolution scheme. What troubles me is why the qualification that I have mentioned should be there. My question is: should it be there at all? And if it should not be there, should it not be taken out? I beg to move.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness (LD)]

My Lords, the Committee is indebted to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, for his detailed analysis of the Bill as it originally stood, and the points arising. My name is on the amendment, but I would be happy to deal with the important issues of principle that prompted me to sign some of these amendments, in an attempt to honour the spirit of the original devolution settlement, when we deal with the group containing the government amendments. Obviously, however, I support the amendment that the noble and learned Lord has moved.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 7th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I would like to intervene, following what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, has said, and referring to the amendment that was moved by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock. One of the problems I have faced since looking at this Bill, is trying to find hard examples of situations in which the Supreme Court would wish to refer a matter to the European Court of Justice.

There is a very good example reported in Monday’s Times of a case called SM (Algeria) (Appellant) v Entry Clearance Officer. I will take a moment to explain what the case is about, because it is a good example of citizens’ rights. SM was a little girl, who was placed into the legal guardianship of EU citizens, who happened to be in Algeria. The question concerned her position in coming to the United Kingdom as a member of that family under the Immigration (European Economic Area Regulations) 2006. Merely referring to those regulations reminds us that they would become, as I understand the position, retained EU law under Clause 2 of the Bill.

The problem arose because the court saw that the regulation had been transposing wording from a directive, which is the normal way in which these things work, but the transposition was inaccurate. This is a situation I have encountered before—it happens from time to time. The question is how to deal with the inaccuracy. The inaccuracy was that while our regulation talked about “family member”—somebody who was put into the legal guardianship of a couple, would normally be regarded as a member of the family—the directive was talking about “direct descendants”, and she was not a direct descendant, because she was not actually related, in that sense, to the people who had become her guardians. In order to resolve that problem, the court found it necessary to refer the matter to the European Court of Justice—which it did on Monday. That was under the existing position.

In resolving the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, it may help to ask how that matter would be handled after exit day. I may be wrong, but my understanding is that it would be for the Supreme Court to resolve the issue itself. The directive would come into EU retained law under Clause 3, so we would have both pieces of legislation to look at. I think that the court, having regard particularly to the way in which we had translated the directive, would give great weight to our own language and regard this little girl as part of the family and therefore entitled to take the benefit of the regulation.

In explaining the situation, I hope I have not made it too complicated, but it is a good example of citizens’ rights, accorded by our own regulations, giving effect to EU law. There must be very many in the corpus of regulations which forms part of EU law. It comes back to the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern. The Supreme Court looks very carefully at the interests of children and would accord every weight to the normal rules about the priority given to the interests of the child in construing the regulation in a sense that fits with our own language. I should have thought that, after exit day, the question of referring the matter to the European Court of Justice simply would not arise because the court would be capable of resolving the issue itself without being bound by the problem of having to refer something which was not that clear. If I may use the English expression, it was not crystal clear; therefore they were bound to refer. Under the situation after exit day, any superior court will be fully able to resolve the problems of interpretation that arise. Will the Minister confirm that, in this situation, there would be no need for a reference because our courts would be able to deal with it perfectly properly, looking at the language of our own regulations, despite the problem that might have arisen in translating them from the directive into English?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord. The point made by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, in moving this amendment— I referred to it myself—was that, as part of the agreement that was struck between the United Kingdom and the European institutions in December, provision was made to,

“establish a mechanism enabling UK courts or tribunals to decide, having had due regard to whether relevant case-law exists, to ask the CJEU questions of interpretation of those rights where they consider that a CJEU ruling on the question is necessary for the UK court or tribunal to be able to give judgment in a case before it”.

So it is not a case of questioning the ability of the Supreme Court. We have entered into an agreement which says that there must be an opportunity or a mechanism to refer to the Court of Justice of the European Union. How does the noble and learned Lord see the mechanism for giving effect to what the United Kingdom Government have agreed?

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I have listened with great care to what the noble and learned Lord has said but I cannot look into the future. I do not know what is going to happen as a result. We just have to look at the present situation. There are two factors to bear in mind. As far as the UK is concerned, for people looking to come here, an immense amount of citizens’ rights are guaranteed already under the regulations which implement directives. We ought not to lose sight of that. Secondly, problems of interpretation because of conflicts between the wording of the directive and our transposition of it, give rise to some doubt. Under the existing position, there is an obligation to refer which will not be present after exit day. This is a different situation with which I believe our courts will be able to cope perfectly well.