Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Monday 14th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ramsbotham (CB)]

My Lords, perhaps I may add a word to what the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, has said in amplification of his noble friend Lord Beecham. In addition to saying that £3 million would be made available, the Minister has been quoted as saying that a number of changes are to be introduced to ease the pressure on the Parole Board. In addition to the possibility of lay magistrates being used, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, can the Minister outline exactly what those changes are? I am quite certain that the Supreme Court introduced the Parole Board in oral hearings because it was satisfied that the board gave a fair hearing to people, and that was how it operated. I would hate to think of some of the parole decisions being reduced to bureaucratic decisions taken by officials.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I shall add a word based on my own experience. It is quite difficults to visualise the work of the Parole Board members unless one has seen them at work. One thing that struck me some years ago when I attended Parole Board hearings from time to time was the huge volume of paperwork generated by individual cases. Of course, the longer a prisoner remains in custody, the bigger the volume becomes. The technique which the Parole Board member has to apply to each case is to work his or her way through the file, which takes a great deal of time, then explain whatever views he or she has reached, based on the information in the file. It is immensely time consuming. My experience was that Parole Board members were extremely conscientious; the people who know best what the effect was of the diminution of resources on their ability to do their job are the Parole Board members themselves, which is the strength of the point that the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, made. I suggest that his amendment deserves a great deal of consideration.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, the amendments relate to four clauses, which will have the effect of increasing the involvement of the Parole Board in certain areas. The clauses we are considering are: Clause 3, which adds a number of terrorism-related offences to the enhanced dangerous offenders sentencing regime; Clause 4, which will require all prisoners serving an extended determinate sentence to be referred to the Parole Board before early release can be authorised; Clause 5, which creates a new determinate sentence for serious child sex and terrorist offenders, under which prisoners will be referred to the Parole Board before early release can be authorised; and Clause 7, which introduces a new test for determining whether offenders receive fixed-term or standard recall, and to inform re-release decisions.

Our impact assessment acknowledges that Clauses 4 and 5 will add to the Parole Board’s workload. However, Clause 3 should not give rise to more than negligible impacts, since very few offenders are convicted of the offences in question. In any event, it should not impact on the Parole Board over and above the estimated impact of Clause 4 because, following the changes in Clause 4, all those serving extended determinate sentences will be referred to the Parole Board for early release in any event. We also think that Clause 7 will not have significant effects, because we estimate it will add a very small percentage to the total number of standard recalls that the board currently deals with.

We have looked at the likely impact of these provisions and the time over which the impacts will make themselves felt, and are confident that the additional work that will be created will be manageable. Most of the increase in Parole Board workload will arise from the new determinate sentence created by Clause 5 and Schedule 1, which will apply only to offenders who are sentenced after the new sentence is implemented. Those who commit these offences very often receive substantial prison sentences; under the new sentence, they will serve half their custodial term in prison before they are referred to the Parole Board for consideration for release. All this means that there will be a substantial time lag before these cases start to come through to the board. Our estimate is that the board will see the full impact of changes to early release between 2020 and 2030. We are also supporting the board in dealing with the consequences of the Osborn, Booth and Reilly judgment, referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, in his helpful remarks.

The Parole Board has established a programme of work to equip itself for dealing with the challenge of providing an increased number of oral hearings. The first phase of that work, which involved scoping the challenge and setting up immediate plans to deal with the increased demand, is now complete. The second phase, which involves developing a new case management model for the future, is under way.

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[Lord Ramsbotham]

My Lords, I support the amendment and in particular the intervention made by the noble Lord, Lord Marks. In doing so, I remind the Committee of one group of people whom I mentioned during the debate to which my noble and learned friend Lord Lloyd referred. I refer to prison staff. I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, mentioned the word “hope”, because when I inspected prisons in which full life tariff prisoners were held, their governors made the point to me that the fact that those cases could be reviewed, which was not necessarily the same as that they might be released, gave the prisoners hope and therefore enabled them to conform with the prison regime. That was vital for the purposes of the prison staff who had to maintain the regime. It is important in considering this that the role of the staff should not be forgotten.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I want to add a footnote to the points made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, based on my own experience. I became the Lord Justice General of Scotland about 25 years ago. At that time, one of the sentences that was available to a trial judge was a discretionary sentence that a person would be detained without limit of time. It was not a sentence of life imprisonment, but was in effect, as it was put in the case of young offenders, detention at Her Majesty’s pleasure; that is, at the discretion of the Secretary of State.

While I was holding that office, Strasbourg began to pronounce on the compatibility with Article 3 of that kind of system. It was decided in Scotland that the system was no longer maintainable, and what was required of me as Lord Justice General was to examine the cases of all those who had been given that kind of sentence to provide them with a tariff—or, in the Scottish terminology, a punishment part—which would set the date as from which their cases might be considered by the Parole Board. Until that was done, it had been entirely at the discretion of the Secretary of State, and it was thought that that was improper. The system that was devised was to require a judge to review such cases, recognising, as others have suggested today, that it would be incompatible with the convention for the decision to be left with the Secretary of State.

It was a very unpleasant exercise for me as the people who had received those sentences had committed the most appalling crimes. In comparison with life sentences, which sometimes were relatively simple, these people deserved the most condign punishment. Nevertheless, it was decided that they required some kind of certainty, removed from the discretion of the Secretary of State, so that they could plan their time in prison and there could be some method for review. It was not of course for them to be automatically released; that was not the point of it. It was so that their time in prison could be subject to a regime which would give them, as was said by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, some reason for hope that, possibly, in the very long term and in exceptional circumstances, they might be released.

The system being put forward in this amendment is therefore very similar in principle to one which was introduced about 20 years ago in Scotland to cure a similar problem about leaving the matter to the discretion of the Secretary of State. For that reason, I, too, support the amendment as being sound in principle.

[Lord Elystan-Morgan (CB)]

My Lords, seldom can there have been such an array of distinguished supporters for any amendment, and all I seek to add is some very short footnotes.

There are principles of immense worth and significance that are associated with this issue, one of them being, as so many speakers have pointed out, that there is no such thing as an irredeemable prisoner. I remember the very first day that I came here, which was about 33 years ago. A very distinguished judge had said that, in his vast experience, he had not thought that prison had reformed anybody at all. I remember thinking then about the exact wording of Rule 1 of the Prison Rules 1964. The wording was that the prime purpose of punishment should be the reform and rehabilitation of the prisoner. That is not now placed quite as high—it is now third on the list—but it still occupies a prominent place. To deny the prospect, remote though it might be, of redemption and the even more remote prospect of release—this will operate only in a very few circumstances—would be to deny one of the basic tenets of our concept of justice and punishment.