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Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Hope of Craighead
Main Page: Lord Hope of Craighead (Crossbench - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Hope of Craighead's debates with the Ministry of Defence
(3 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, there are indeed various reasons to be concerned about the Bill but I should like to concentrate on two of them: the omission of torture from the list of offences which are excluded from the restrictions on prosecution in Part 1, and the duty to consider derogation from the convention in Clause 12. In doing so, I am drawing on my experience when I was sitting as a member of the Appellate Committee of this House in the cases of Pinochet in 1999, which was brought under the torture convention, and A v the Secretary of State in 2004, in which we held that a derogation order allowing for indefinite detention should be quashed.
Prohibition of the crime of torture has been recognised for many decades as one of the most fundamental obligations of the international community. It cannot be derogated from in any circumstances and all nations have an equal interest in the apprehension and prosecution of the offenders. In 1987 the UN Convention against Torture, which the United Kingdom did much to promote, came into force. One of its achievements is to prevent evasion of punishment by the torturer moving from one state to another. This is because article 5 requires each state party not only to establish its jurisdiction over torture when the alleged offender is a national of that state, but to take jurisdiction over any alleged offender who is found within its territory. This is an international crime against which there is no safe haven.
For us to apply the measures listed in Part 1 of the Bill, the practical effect of which would, at the least, risk conferring immunity on the torturer after five years, would run counter to everything that the convention stands for. For that to happen would be a manifest breach of international law. As for the offender, such immunity as he may obtain in this country would be no protection against his being brought to justice elsewhere, as Senator Pinochet was to discover. It is not only the risk of having to face the International Criminal Court; it is the risk of being prosecuted for his crime in any other state that is a party to the convention to which he may go. The damage to our reputation, if that humiliating situation were to occur, would be incalculable. How could we be taken seriously in our attempts to promote the rule of law in those countries that least respect it? Torture should be on the list of exclusions.
Article 15 of the convention on human rights allows the state to
“take measures derogating from its obligations … In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation”
but only to the extent that this is “strictly required”. The words
“threatening the life of the nation”
are understood to mean an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to the organised life of the community. The standard that these words set is very high. Furthermore, derogation from protection of the right to life, for which we should note our own Armed Services personnel may also benefit, is permitted only for lawful acts of war, and no derogation at all is permitted from the prohibition of torture or inhuman or degrading punishment. This leaves the right to liberty, derogation from which would allow indefinite detention without charge, as the Secretary of State looked for in the case of A.
We are concerned in this Bill only with overseas operations, in which members of the Armed Forces come under attack or face the threat of attack or violent resistance. It seems that the need to conduct operations overseas, however significant, is very unlikely on its own to meet the test for derogation. Could it be said in these circumstances that the Secretary of State was facing a crisis or emergency which affects the whole population of this country and constitutes a threat to the organised life of the community? If not, prompting him nevertheless to consider derogation from the convention would be pointless, as the attempt would fail. In any event, do we really think that the Secretary of State would need to be reminded of this provision if the extreme situation that really does justify derogation were to occur? This clause looks like mere window-dressing. I suggest that it should be removed from the Bill.
Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Hope of Craighead
Main Page: Lord Hope of Craighead (Crossbench - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Hope of Craighead's debates with the Ministry of Defence
(3 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberLord Boyce, we will come back to you later. I now call the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead.
My Lords, I spent four years at an earlier stage in my career as a prosecutor in Scotland. I was one of the Lord Advocate’s relatively small team of Crown counsel, known as his advocate deputes. For much of that time, the Lord Advocate was the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern. It is a real pleasure to see him taking part in our proceedings this afternoon. It was part of my job to take decisions under his authority as to whether or not a prosecution should be brought, and to conduct the prosecution if it was decided that it should proceed. I therefore have some insight into how these decisions are taken.
Of course, there are differences between my job then and what we are contemplating now. I was working in Scotland, under its own system of criminal law, about 40 years ago. While nothing much was actually written down then, there were some well-understood principles to guide us. Much of this was based on the fact that we were acting in the public interest. We had to balance the interests of justice against the accused’s right to a fair trial. Within those broad concepts, there was room for a variety of other factors that we would take into account, guided by common sense and what we had learned by experience.
That having been said, I acknowledge that in today’s world there is the need for a more formalised system of rules. That helps to achieve consistency in decision-making, and it helps to reassure the public that these important decisions are soundly based. In the context of this Bill, I acknowledge that “the public” must include service personnel serving or who have served in operations overseas. After all, reassurance to them is what this Bill is all about.
That brings me to Amendment 3, and afterwards to Amendments 5, 6 and 28. The wording of Amendment 3 does not come as any surprise to me. It relates to the ability to conduct a fair trial, and makes a proposition that hardly needs to be said. As the noble Lord, Lord Lancaster of Kimbolton, said, this principle applies as a matter of course. I cannot imagine that the proposition would have escaped my attention had I been responsible for taking these decisions, but of course the real point of Amendment 3 is to challenge the presumption and replace it with something else which has equivalent force, removing the hard edge of presumption.
On the whole, I am uneasy about a presumption that applies after a particular time limit. Cases vary and the facts differ from case to case; what might be absolutely right in one case could be very unfortunate in another. There is a real difference, however, between the presumption in Clause 3, which uses the word “exceptional”, and the word “materially”, which is the key word in the amendment. It is a much softer alternative. I am uneasy as to whether it really is an adequate replacement for the presumption if the aim is to get rid of the presumption and replace it with something of equal force.
My Lords, I support Amendment 14 for all the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, has given. But I also wish to speak to Amendment 36 in my name, which would add torture to the list of statutory offences in Schedule 1, and to Amendments 37 to 45 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, which broaden the list of exceptions to include genocide and crimes in breach of the Geneva conventions.
In effect, what we are seeking to do is to provide the Government with an alternative to the approach taken by Amendment 14, which would place these exclusions in the body of the Bill—and in that way be more secure—and not in the schedule. For what it is worth, I should explain that I got in first with my Amendment 36, but I certainly do not claim primacy for my approach. I was seeking to fit in with the structure of the Bill, and it did not occur to me to deal with these issues in the rather more skilful way proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Robertson.
My particular interest, for the reasons mentioned at Second Reading, is to ensure that torture is not a relevant offence for the purposes of the Bill. It is all very well—if I may say so with great respect—for the Minister to say that the Government take that offence very seriously. But the case for excluding it is compelling—as indeed it is for the other offences on this list. The risk, if this is not done, of our armed personnel being prosecuted in the ICC has been addressed by others, including the noble Lord, Lord Robertson. However, I wish to emphasise the nature and strength of our international obligations and the importance of adhering to them and of our being seen to do so.
The torture convention stands out as an instrument which places torture carried out by public officials or others acting in an official capacity, such as those in our armed services, at the very top of crimes abhorred by the international community. Of course, the same could be said of genocide, although the rather primitive genocide convention lacks the teeth that the torture convention provides. Lord Bingham of Cornhill, as the senior Law Lord presiding over the Appellate Committee of this House, said in one of his judgments that the nature of the prohibition of torture requires the states that are parties to the convention, as we are,
“to do more than just eschew the practice of torture.”
Condemnation carries with it the obligation to punish acts of torture wherever and whenever the perpetrator is found within our territory. There is no time limit on this obligation. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, said earlier today, there is no exemption for this offence.
The idea that there should be a presumption against prosecution, making it exceptional for proceedings to be brought, as Clause 2 provides, simply cannot be reconciled with our obligations under Articles 4 and 5 of the convention to establish jurisdiction over and punish the torturer. These obligations are not qualified. They are not in any way reduced or softened by the passage of time. The plain and simple breach of the convention, which that provision amounts to unless torture is excluded from its reach, would be very regrettable, to say the least. It is certainly not the example we should be setting for other signatories of the convention which may be less concerned to uphold it than we are or have legal systems less strong than ours. We should uphold the convention, not undermine it, as the Bill seeks to do. I am sorry to put it that way, but, quite frankly, that is what is happening here.
There is another point, mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Dubs. One of the innovations in the torture convention was the concept of universal jurisdiction. All states that signed that convention have a duty to establish jurisdiction over an offender. We recognised our obligation to do this in the case of Senator Pinochet. We will be doing members of our armed services a great disservice if, by declining to prosecute them here by applying this presumption, we expose them to the risk of being prosecuted by other contracting states anywhere in the world that are more alert to their obligations under the convention than we would be. Let us avoid that risk, as the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, seeks to do.
Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Hope of Craighead
Main Page: Lord Hope of Craighead (Crossbench - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Hope of Craighead's debates with the Ministry of Defence
(3 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. Before I say a word or two in the light of what he just said, I should explain that I put my name to Amendment 26 and support what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, said about it, but I also have my name to the Motion to oppose Clause 12—in other words, to propose that it should not stand part of the Bill.
I add just a word to what the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said about the al-Skeini decision. As he will appreciate, if the decision of the Appellate Committee over which Lord Bingham presided had remained without further recourse to Strasbourg, we would not be discussing Clause 12 at all. I did not sit on al-Skeini, but I sat on a later case called Smith, which I know the noble Lord is aware of, where we had to consider a decision by the Strasbourg court in effect to reverse Lord Bingham’s decision. Indeed, the noble Lord referred to it. It was a very difficult decision for us because we had to analyse exactly what the Strasbourg court was talking about. One thing that emerged from our study of that decision was that it did not really believe that the whole of the convention rights could apply in a situation such as arose in Iraq. There were rights there that simply have no point whatever. It talked about it being a slightly tailored approach to the convention for the particular situation in which our Armed Forces were placed.
We considered the matter very carefully, and one of the features of Smith is that, although we were divided on the issue as to the application of the Human Rights Act invoked by relatives of deceased servicemen, we were unanimous in the view that we could not escape the decision of the Strasbourg court. The current state of play, which the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, very rightly calls in question, is that, for the moment, there is a decision by the Supreme Court that we must follow the al-Skeini decision in Strasbourg and the Human Rights Act—the convention rights, in effect—so far as relevant, applies in the case of operations offshore.
I cannot escape from the fact that in the other part of the Smith decision, we, by a majority, declined to strike out the claims of the servicemen, one of which was referred to earlier this afternoon by the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, and, eventually, those claims were settled. Had we struck them out, we probably would not be as troubled by Clause 12 as we are now, but Clause 12 is there, so we must address it.
That brings me to my real point. I find it hard to know what to make of Clause 12. At first sight it is simply unnecessary. As has been mentioned, the power to derogate from our obligations under the European convention by means of a derogation order under Section 14(1) and (6) of the Human Rights Act 1998 already exists. It has been exercised from time to time, notably in 2001, by an order which would have allowed the indefinite detention of non-national suspected terrorists who could not be deported.
I use the words “would have allowed” because that order was set aside on an appeal to this House. That was because it unjustifiably discriminated against non-nationals on nationality grounds in comparison with UK nationals who were suspected of terrorism. We did not think it right in any way to interfere with the Secretary of State’s decision that the overall test of a state of an emergency affecting the life of the nation was set aside, but we did think that it was a disproportionate exercise of the power.
Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Hope of Craighead
Main Page: Lord Hope of Craighead (Crossbench - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Hope of Craighead's debates with the Ministry of Defence
(3 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I wish to offer whole-hearted support to Amendments 1 and 6 which were tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, and my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer of Thoroton. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, also put his name to Amendment 1, and the noble and gallant Lords, Lord Boyce and Lord Dannatt, put their names to Amendment 6.
First, I wish to say something about the statement to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, has referred. I was going to comment on it later in the context of the new duty of care in Amendment 14, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Dannatt, but as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, has taken the trouble to read the statement in full, and it is therefore no doubt fresh in the minds of noble Lords, perhaps this is a convenient moment to express two considerable concerns that I have in relation to the statement by the Secretary for Defence. The first is in relation to legal aid and the second is in relation to mental health support.
In relation to legal aid, there is a very serious ambiguity—perhaps not even an ambiguity, perhaps a straightforward gap—in the support that is being offered to service personnel in relation to legal aid. I refer your Lordships to the part of the passage that reads,
“where the chain of command accepts funding responsibility, this is means-test exempt and therefore no personal contribution will be required. The Armed Forces Criminal Legal Aid Authority will act as a conduit for the provision of publicly funded legal representation on behalf of the chain of command including all aspects of the financial and case management, however”—
I emphasise “however”—
“if available evidence suggests the individual was doing something clearly outside the scope of their duty then it would not be appropriate for that person to receive this chain-of-command funding.”
So this non-means-tested automatic funding that does not require a personal contribution is not available to personnel and veterans facing the gravest peril from investigation and prosecution. This is hardly comfort to those to whom this Bill is supposed to be addressed. It is those who face the gravest allegations who principle suggests should have the greatest legal support, for it is those who are facing charges that they were doing something clearly outside the scope of their duty who are losing sleep at night as they may face dishonourable discharge and very serious criminality and consequence. This is the very group who are being let down and denied automatic non-means-tested legal provision. I have to disagree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, about the Defence Secretary’s statement offering very much comfort at all to serving Armed Forces personnel or indeed veterans for the reason I set out: those in greatest jeopardy are left with least protection by way of legal aid.
Secondly, in relation to mental health provision, we know and the statement makes clear that to put someone in harm’s way in these circumstances is almost automatically to expose them to great jeopardy in relation to their mental health. Here is an ambiguity rather than a clear gap because at various points in the passages of the statement referring to mental health provision there are caveats about “where needed” “pathways in the community”, “best practice” and “local population needs”. I do not know what these words mean and no doubt the Minister will be able to clarify them in a moment, but to me it looks as if, subject to signposting and pathways, these people are being left, broadly speaking, to take their chances in a Cinderella part of the NHS. It does not seem clear from this statement that all serving personnel and veterans are given automatic mental health support. It is all “subject to clinical needs” or “subject to local population needs” and all of those caveats. That is what I would have said later about the need for the duty of care in the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Dannatt.
Returning to Amendments 1 and 6, Amendment 6 and the proposed new clause seem to me to address exactly what the Bill was supposed to: the problem of delayed, shoddy and, therefore, repeated investigations, which cause so much concern to members of the Armed Forces and veterans. Tackling this head-on, with some comprehensive statutory provision to push investigations to be timely and adequate, is a very good idea. Of course, the amendment has very distinguished and gallant supporters.
In relation to Amendment 1, respectfully, I could not disagree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, more than I do. It replaces the presumption against prosecution with a very common-sense consideration of fair trials and whether they have been compromised by the passage of time. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, says that you cannot expect a prosecutor to make those determinations and that it is not appropriate, but this is what prosecutors up and down the land do every day. It is completely within, and absolutely core to, a prosecutor’s duty to consider whether it is possible, in light of the passage of time and the possible deterioration of evidence, for the accused to have a fair trial. This would be crucial to both the evidential test and, indeed, the public interest test, which all prosecutors have to consider. If that is the case—if these are normal prosecutorial factors—this might lead some noble Lords to ask why they should be put in the Bill. They should be because we have been told repeatedly during the passage of the Bill to date that a lot of what is required is comfort—clear statutory comfort to personnel and veterans that they will not be let down by the system and that they will be protected.
Putting this fair trial consideration, and including the passage of time, alongside the new provisions offered on investigations is a very good idea. As others—the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, in particular—have said, the five-year rebuttable presumption is rebuttable. Perhaps with the triple lock it is very difficult to rebut that presumption, but it will still leave concerns in the minds of personnel and veterans that a lengthy or late investigation may lead to a prosecution. It is so much better to protect people in the way offered by those who tabled these amendments. It is a far greater protection against late, shoddy and repeated investigations than the so-called triple lock that is causing so much concern. Normally, when employers and people seek to protect those who have been under especial pressure at work and in their service, it is support, not immunity, that is offered. That is the common-sense approach offered in these amendments.
My Lords, I add my support to Amendment 1, to which I have put my name. As a former prosecutor, I do not think that the task it sets the prosecutor is likely to be all that difficult, given that it must proceed on the information available to the prosecutor at the time the decision has to be taken. It may be that the information is relatively slender at the very beginning, when he is considering whether to bring proceedings, but such as it may be, it is the information that he should take into account. If one considers the stage at which proceedings are continuing, which this clause also covers, he is likely to be in possession of a good deal more information. So I do not think that there is anything wrong in the wording of Amendment 1. The essence of it lies more in what it takes out than the simple wording of what it seeks to put in. What it takes out is the presumption. I have no difficulty with the way in which the presumption is expressed in Clause 2, but I do object to it in principle.
My Lords, Amendments 7 and 8 are, in effect, wrecking amendments, while Amendment 13 seeks to distinguish the position of service personnel and other potential claimants. I expressed the view in Committee that I was not convinced that the provisions in Part 2 would make all that much practical difference. The primary limitation period for personal injuries is three years, as the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, has just pointed out, except in so-called delayed date of knowledge cases, as provided by Sections 11 and 14 of the Limitation Act 1980. There is a discretion to disapply the limitation period under Section 33 of the 1980 Act. As he also pointed out, claims under the Human Rights Act have to be brought within one year, with a discretion to extend in rather limited circumstances.
My experience of personal injury claims as a barrister is that courts need considerable persuasion before they extend the three-year period and that the burden rests on a claimant to persuade a court that that primary limitation period should not apply. Limitation periods exist to reflect the difficult balance that has to be struck between allowing everyone to put a line under actual or potential claims and the fact that some claimants will have good reason for delay.
The provisions in Part 2 provide a long-stop, subject to a delayed date of knowledge provision. It seems that claims arising out of overseas operations present particular difficulties for all those involved, and I respectfully differ from the comment made by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, about Salisbury Plain, particularly in overseas operations where the theatre of operations has moved on or changed its location and it may be extremely difficult to investigate, on either side, the basis of any such claim.
As I said, the provisions are not likely to have much practical effect, but they will nevertheless have some indirect effect in encouraging appropriate claims to be brought with as much speed as is practical. They will also provide a degree of reassurance to our service personnel that a time will come when they will be involved in one way or another in so-called late claims. The noble Lord, Lord Thomas, referred to some uncertainty over what the date of knowledge might be which would defer claims. Subject to what the Minister says, I understand it to be concerned with cases where, for example, there is latent disease that could not be reasonably known about by a claimant at the time; for example, somebody who sustains mesothelioma as a result of exposure to asbestos dust or who has some other illness or injury that becomes manifest only some years after the event in question.
I am not attracted to Amendment 13 either. In Committee, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, suggested that I was concerned only with claims brought by the military and not with those brought by the non-military or civilians in, say, Iraq or Afghanistan. That was not in fact what I said or thought. It is therefore something of an irony that this amendment would make that very distinction. I am unaware of any such provision in any other area of the law of limitation of actions—that is, a provision that distinguishes between classes of claimant. There are of course provisions distinguishing the position of a claimant who has not attained his or her majority or who lacks mental capacity. However, it would set a most unfortunate precedent somehow to elevate a particular claimant to have a special status.
The provisions in Part 2 ought to apply in precisely the same way across the board to whomsoever is involved in claims arising out of overseas operations and provide equal protection for all of them. This amendment is discriminatory and should not be included in the Bill. Surely our service personnel want to be treated fairly, rather than to be given some special privileged litigation status. I will listen with great interest to what the noble and gallant Lords who are to follow in this debate have to say about the matter, but for the moment I am unconvinced that any of these amendments should be made to the Bill.
My Lords, I will add just a few words to what the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, said in support of Amendment 13. The provisions to which it is addressed which are of particular interest to me are in Schedule 3, which seeks to amend the legislation that applies in Scotland to the same extent to that in Schedules 2 and 4, which apply to the other jurisdictions. The crucial point is the imposition—for such it is—of an absolute prescription of six years.
As we know, the three-year limitation period that applies at present is accompanied by protections that enable the court to extend the limitation period if it is justified by the circumstances—the date of knowledge exception. It seems that the Bill applies a hard-edged cut-off that makes no allowance whatever for extenuating circumstances. I could understand it if this proposal had been accompanied by a carefully conducted research programme into how the three-year limitation has worked in practice over the years, identifying on how many occasions the period has been extended for more than three years, and why and at what point the extensions have been sought and justified. We are, of course, in this case, and indeed throughout the Bill, dealing with the consequences of operations that have been conducted overseas, maybe under very difficult circumstances. Gathering together enough information to determine whether a claim would be justified, let alone to bring together all the information needed to justify bringing the claim before the court out of time, may take much more time and effort than is needed in the more benign domestic cases. That is the reason for seeking the discrimination to which the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, referred.
My Lords, I understand that this may be quite a short debate, but I should like to say a few words by way of introduction, to explain again why I am unhappy with Clause 12. I still find it hard to know what to make of it. As I said in Committee, at first sight the clause is simply unnecessary. The power to derogate from our obligations under the European Convention by means of a derogation order under Section 14 of the Human Rights Act 1998 already exists. Of course, we must remember, as we were reminded last time, that derogation orders are open to judicial review, so derogation is not something to be undertaken lightly. Nevertheless, once again I question the need for this clause. Where there is a power, as there is here, there is already a duty to consider whether, should circumstances require, it should be exercised. This clause adds nothing to the existing law.
However, there is a much more troubling aspect to this issue than that. Is the clause there simply to send a message? If so, to whom, why, and what is the message? We must remember that there is a threshold that must be crossed if the order is to meet the criteria in Article 15 of the convention. Clause 12 says that this is where the operations
“are or would be significant”.
Article 15 of the convention, on the other hand, says that derogation may be resorted to only in time of war or other public emergency
“threatening the life of the nation”.
It is hard to see how conducting operations overseas in themselves, if that is all we were doing, could satisfy that test, even if they are or would be significant.
The fact that the clause shrinks from using the words of Article 15 makes me wonder whether the meaning and effect of Article 15 has been properly analysed. I wonder whether the clause is really facing up to what would be needed to justify derogation in this kind of case where we are operating overseas. There is a real danger that it will lead those who may be encouraged by this clause to resort to a derogation order when its use could not be justified. The message, if there is one, seems to be offering something that the Government cannot deliver.
There is no sign either that the Government have appreciated the other limitations in Article 15.2 of the convention. That provision states that no derogation from Article 2, the right to life, can be made except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war; or from Article 3, the prohibition of torture; or from Article 4.1, the prohibition of slavery; or from Article 7, no punishment without law. There remains Article 5, the right to liberty and security, which is what the 2001 order case, which pointed to the way that derogation orders are subject to judicial review, was about. Is this the purpose of the clause? Is it simply so that our Armed Forces can lock up any person they detain during their operations without trial indefinitely? If so, why does the clause not come out into the open and confine its scope to that article, for that is really all it could achieve?
I suspect that the Minister is unable to give clear and convincing answers to these questions, as she has chosen to make a statement immediately after me. I look forward to that statement and I very much hope that she will be able to give me an undertaking that this clause will be removed from the Bill. That, I think, is the only way that the real danger to which I have referred can be avoided. I beg to move.
To all noble Lords who have contributed, I am pleased that this gesture has been received positively. I have listened carefully to the other observations, and these will be relayed to my colleagues in the MoD.
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this short debate, and especially to the Minister for her kind words and generous concession, which has solved my problem.
I would like to take a moment to refer to the remarks made by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, who has kindly supported me all the way through my attempt to deal with Clause 12. He has raised again a concern among certain people, which I entirely recognise, that the ability to bring claims under the Human Rights Act risks undermining operations on the ground because decisions taken by the people engaged in them are exposed to the risk of being said to be in breach of the convention rights.
I delivered the leading judgment in the case of Smith v The Ministry of Defence, which the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, referred to earlier this afternoon. One of his clients was the mother of a solider who was, unfortunately, killed by friendly fire from a tank operating in the same battlefield. I spent considerable energy, in delivering my leading speech, to make it clear that the ratio that had driven me to reach the conclusions I did was concerned with actions by the MoD far removed by the battlefield. I made it clear that decisions made in the circumstances of combat by people usually under great stress and pressure was not what the Human Rights Act claim was about. It was about decisions taken, as the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, explained, long before the operations began which could legitimately be criticised as breaching the convention right.
The decision that I led has been misunderstood because of a dissenting judgment, which has received more weight than it should have since it was only a dissent. So, I would encourage those who still have a lingering doubt to look carefully at my judgment, which was a majority judgment. They will see that it contains the reassurance I think the noble and gallant Lord, Lord of Craig of Radley, is seeking.
That said, I come back to the Minister. I am well aware that a speech of the kind she has made this afternoon cannot be made without discussion behind the scenes. She listened carefully to what I said last time, and we owe her a great debt for taking up the points I made, understanding them and putting them across to others to achieve the result we have achieved this afternoon. We owe her a considerable debt and are fortunate to have her in the House as a Minister. I commend Amendment 11, the effect of which is that Clause 12 should not stand part of the Bill.
My Lords, in opening this short debate on Amendment 14, I first thank the noble Baroness the Minister and the Minister for Defence People and Veterans for meeting me and other noble Lords on matters pertaining to this and other amendments. Indeed, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for meeting me twice on these matters.
It is perhaps no surprise that I am of the view that we share common objectives for the Bill, which I hope will become an Act within this parliamentary Session. These common objectives include the better protection of serving and veteran soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines from repeated and extended investigations and unjustified prosecutions arising from their service on behalf of the nation on overseas operations.
We also share the common objective of properly supporting such personnel while they are going through an investigation and prosecution process—after all, when a soldier lays their life on the line at the behest of their employer, I am sure that we can agree that he or she has a right to expect that employer to exercise a proper duty of care towards him or her as they go through any investigative or judicial process.
If we are broadly agreed on the common objective, where we are not yet fully agreed is on the scheme of manoeuvre—the campaign plan, if you like—to reach that common objective, but we are making progress, and many of the constituent parts of a successful plan are beginning to emerge. Amendment 6, which we earlier debated and voted to stand part of the Bill, for the time being at least, is an important and welcome addition to the provision of safeguards into the investigation of allegations relating to overseas operations. Moreover, the Minister has today released a Written Ministerial Statement asserting that the purpose of the Bill is to provide better legal protection to Armed Forces personnel and veterans serving on military operations overseas. The Statement references and underlines a defence instruction and notice whose basic principle is that the department
“is committed to standing behind its people who act reasonably and in good faith in the course of their duties”.
If we are agreed that a good employer will discharge a proper duty of care towards its people, then the pieces of this jigsaw—this campaign plan—are beginning to come together. Amendment 14 would join those parts of the jigsaw into one picture, to bring these hard-fought battles and engagements into line in a comprehensive campaign plan for the benefit of our people in uniform and for those who have worn a uniform in the past.
Defence priorities change; the fortunes of military charities fluctuate; Ministers come and go; but the law does not change. Amendment 14 would bring into law the good ideas and intentions of well-meaning Ministers and officials with whom we are currently united in common cause but who are strangely reluctant to enshrine the fruits of their endeavours in a Bill which will become an Act of Parliament and thus part of our law—a law to protect our people for all time from vexatious investigations and prosecutions.
I have heard an argument that says that if we enshrine a duty of care in law it will present the possibility of creating grounds whereby disaffected parties could take the MoD to court if in their opinion the terms of the legally binding duty of care had not been adhered to, but is that really an honourable or credible argument against creating a duty of care in the first place? Surely in any walk of life, rules and regulations setting out what is and what is not acceptable are a commonplace occurrence. If you act within the rules, all is fine, but if you step outside, then sanctions follow. I am no lawyer, but I am sufficiently aware of the way our civilised society is organised to know that if I step outside the law, whether it is in a transaction on the high street or in my behaviour on a rugby field, I will be sanctioned. Is the Ministry of Defence so frightened that if it establishes a duty of care that passes into law and then it acts outside that law some of its employees might sue it? Surely the correct approach is for the Ministry of Defence to lay down a duty of care within the next six months, as Amendment 14 suggests, and then commit to live within that legally based statement of the duty of care for the benefit and transparency of both the employer and employees. Is that too much to ask? I beg to move.
My Lords, I offer my support for this amendment for all the reasons given by my noble friend Lord Dannatt. I thought that it would be right for me as a lawyer to ask myself whether the amendment was asking the Secretary of State to do something that our legal system would find hard to recognise or put into effect. It is a long amendment, full of what no doubt was thought to be necessary detail; but the key words to which I have directed my attention are to be found in proposed new subsection (1), read together with the definition in proposed new subsection (7). They are the words “duty of care”, which are used to define the obligation that is already owed to service personnel, both moral and legal, to ensure their well-being.
There are a number of things that need to be said to explain why the amendment has my support. First, this is a duty of care, not an absolute duty. It sets a standard that the amendment is talking about at the right level. An absolute duty is a duty that must be complied with irrespective of the circumstances. What has been talked about here is a duty to take reasonable care to achieve that standard. It is not driving the Secretary of State to achieve something that cannot be achieved with the exercise of ordinary care.
Secondly, the concept of setting a standard to be applied in addressing the needs of a particular group within our community is not new. It is familiar in the context of healthcare, for example, with regard to the care of the elderly.
Thirdly, and most importantly in view of the point made by my noble friend some moments ago, the method used should not be seen as encouraging a resort to litigation any more than the setting of standards does in healthcare. What is sought is to set a standard of behaviour, not a set of statuary rules. If litigation has to be resorted to, the complaint would be of a failure in a duty to take reasonable care, using the standard simply as setting out the criteria for what that duty required. There is nothing novel in that approach.
The Ministerial Statement that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, very helpfully read out to us when speaking on amendments in the first group this afternoon is, of course, to be welcomed. I do not for a moment doubt its sincerity, but Ministers come and go, and Ministerial Statements are, I fear, a bit like the Cheshire Cat. This amendment seeks to bring it up to a higher level of formality. Added to that, it seeks to ensure that the matter is kept under continuous review and public scrutiny. All that seems to me to be for the good. Therefore, if the amendment is put to a vote, I will support it.