Special Immigration Appeals Commission (Procedure) (Amendment) Rules 2018

Debate between Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts and Lord Beecham

Wednesday 23rd May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

I have one brief question, about the role of the special advocates. When we discussed the Justice and Security Act, one of the drawbacks of the special advocate procedure, very good though it was, was the inability to re-interview the client after an initial briefing. Does that proviso still work in these cases? In the case of an immigration appeal, are special advocates still unable to re-interview their client to find out their views on the information that has been put before them?

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for a very clear explanation of the provisions of this statutory instrument. I note that in the House of Commons Delegated Legislation Committee, all of 11 minutes were spent on this matter. The Minister has provided us with somewhat more information than was provided on that occasion. Is he in a position to indicate the number of cases expected? The noble Lord, Lord Marks, referred to a very limited number, but is it anticipated that it will remain at a low level, or is there likely to be any growth?

Can the Minister also make some reference to the condition of the asylum centres where, presumably, some of these applicants will be held pending the outcome of their cases? Of course, great concern has been voiced about the management of some of these establishments. I confess that this issue is not directly related to the statutory instrument, but it is a matter of concern and I would be pleased if the Minister could say that the Government are looking seriously at the management of these places, whatever the outcome of the applications by the individuals involved.

Civil Liability Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts and Lord Beecham

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard continued): House of Lords
Thursday 10th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, at this stage in proceedings on the Bill most of the ground has been pretty extensively ploughed, and I shall endeavour not to till it longer than I have to. We had a long discussion about the setting of the rate on the group taken with Amendment 11, and the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, got even closer to the matters I have in mind with his Amendment 38. However, Amendment 35 is concerned with the provisions of Clause 3, which, as the title suggests, permits uplift in exceptional circumstances.

The question I wish to discuss is whether there should be any limit on the amount by which these exceptional awards can exceed the basic tariff, and if so, whether that limit should be in the Bill. I think there is a strong argument for limiting the exceptional awards, and for putting that into the Bill; the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, was kind enough to take my intervention in an earlier debate. I wish to see judicial discretion limited because I think this is a political matter, not a matter for judicial discussion and discretion. Therefore the limit should appear in the Bill—as a percentage, not as an absolute amount, because if the tariff goes up, obviously the amount of an exceptional award should also eventually increase.

My noble and learned friend referred to this matter in the letter he sent to those of us who participated in the Second Reading debate about the need for a degree of judicial discretion. He suggested that the uplift should be capped at 20% and he has already referred to that this afternoon. I do not disagree with any aspect of his remarks, except that I think it is important that the percentage should appear in the Bill. This is in the interests of stability and clarity—stability because if the exceptional amount could be increased by the court without limit the temptation for claimants to game the system would be greatly increased, and clarity because such a limit would facilitate the setting of the rates of motor insurance and reduce the volatility in the amount of such rates year by year. That is an important distinction to remove absolute discretion from the courts, to bring it into the political arena and to set that percentage in the Bill so it is clearly a political, parliamentary decision. I beg to move.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I am a little concerned at the degree to which political considerations are supposed override our system of justice. This is not the first time it has been mentioned. However, the latest case is perhaps the least acceptable of the recommendations of this kind. Why on earth should Parliament decide on the so-called exceptional circumstances—undefined, of course, for the purposes this debate—on what are already constrained sums to be awarded in damages? It is trespassing too much on the rights of the citizen and the role of the judiciary. I hope that the Minister will concur with that, given his enormous experience of these matters, and, I apprehend, a real interest in justice being effective and available. With all due respect, the amendment moved by the noble Lord undermines both.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am obliged to my noble friend Lord Hodgson for his amendment. I understand the intent when we are seeking to address a very particular problem. However, I cannot concur with the proposal that we should set in the Bill some limit to the judicial discretion that will be exercised in exceptional circumstances. We have yet to see how exceptional circumstances will develop once the Bill comes into effect. We therefore consider it more appropriate that the percentage increase in tariff should be determined by regulation by the Lord Chancellor in order that he may, from time to time, have regard to developments once the Act is in force. We do not consider it appropriate to constrain that exercise by setting a ceiling in the Bill. For these reasons, I invite my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.

Damages (Personal Injury) Order 2017

Debate between Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts and Lord Beecham

Tuesday 18th July 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, the regret Motion I have tabled may appear dry, complicated and technical. It is technical and complicated but it is not dry. It will have practical, everyday consequences for every taxpayer, for everybody who has an insurance policy, especially if they drive a motor car, and for every person who receives a long-term award of damages following an accident.

The setting of the discount rate to be applied to lump-sum damage awards is a critical decision. On the one hand, the situation cannot be allowed where, because the discount rate has been set too high, someone who suffers a catastrophic injury, maybe as the result of a road accident or an NHS operation going awry, finds that the lump sum runs out too soon. On the other hand, setting the rate too low means that the accident victim is overcompensated, which has a knock-on effect on motor and other insurance premiums, and on the overall operating costs of the NHS.

While the power for the Lord Chancellor to set the discount rate is to be found in the Damages Act 1996, the process by which the rate is set is based on case law, in particular on the 1998 House of Lords judgment in Wells v Wells, which reached two important conclusions. First, any lump sum awarded should neither overcompensate nor undercompensate the unfortunate victim. Who could possibly disagree with that conclusion? Secondly, the legal judgment was that the appropriate benchmark for setting the discount rate should be the yield on index-linked government stocks—that is, index-linked gilts or ILGs. I understand that the court concluded that the sums paid in compensation should be invested only in what the court saw as risk-free assets. The court appeared to anticipate that 100% of every amount paid in compensation would or should be invested in index-linked gilts. In such circumstances, it is not surprising that the conclusion was drawn that the benchmark for setting the discount rate should be that on index-linked gilts.

That second conclusion, 20 years on from the Wells v Wells judgment, is a good deal more controversial than the first, for the following reasons. First, the supply of index-linked gilts is limited. They offer particular attractions to those insurance companies and other financial institutions that seek perfect risk-matching. As a consequence, index-linked gilts tend to be fully priced—some may say overpriced—and arithmetically, as a result, the running yields are driven down. Many index-linked gilts are today traded above par so that a capital loss on redemption is inevitable. Further, if portfolio theory teaches us one thing, it is that diversification is the best way to offset risk. Any proposal that suggests investing in only one asset class needs to be approached with care. It is the all-your-eggs-in-one-basket belief. A more conventional approach might suggest, in addition to index-linked and other gilts, investing in some prime corporate bonds and some blue chip UK or overseas equities.

This rate setting is such a sensitive issue that successive Governments have shied away from changing the rate. Until earlier this year, the discount rate was set at 2.5% and had not been changed since 2001. That is patently unfair. The shape of the yield curve has altered dramatically as a result of the 2008 financial crisis and interest rates remain at historic lows. I am afraid that, as a result of the failure by successive Governments to address this issue, victims may prove to have been undercompensated in recent years.

Then suddenly, essentially out of nowhere, in February the then Lord Chancellor took action. And my goodness, it was draconian. At a stroke, she changed the discount rate from plus 2.5% to minus 0.75%. What is the effect of this rather arcane statement? A simple example may help clarity. Let us assume that you are a 25 year-old young man who has, sadly, been catastrophically injured in a motorcycle accident. The court must consider what sum is needed to look after you for the rest of your life—that is, probably more than 40 years. If the court concluded that on the old rate a sum of £2 million was sufficient, under the new rate that sum would arithmetically need to be £7.3 million. That is an increase of more than £5 million, or more than triple the original sum. Of course, the award assumes that interest rates will stay at the present low—historically, very low—level for the rest of your life. If they begin to rise, you will have been overcompensated at the expense of the taxpayer and other insured people.

Specifically, the Lord Chancellor’s decision had a direct and substantial effect on the public finances. Box 4.2 in the spring Budget policy costings paper indicates that as a result of this decision, the Chancellor of the Exchequer will have to find an additional £1.2 billion every year for the next five years as a guard against future claims. On page 35 of the same report, the suggestion is that the Lord Chancellor’s decision will result in an increase of 0.1% on CPI, or 0.2% on RPI.

The Times of 28 February this year, while pointing out the importance of not undercompensating victims, said:

“But basing the so-called Ogden formula on just three years’ history of index-linked gilts is crazy, as insurers point out. No accident victim in their right mind would invest their entire lump sum in inflation-protected gilts in this era of superlax monetary policy. One-third now opt for ‘periodic payment orders’, which guarantee a return of at least zero in real terms. Most others invest in a mix that includes higher yielding corporate bonds and equities”.


It went on to say:

“Either way, assuming that the best a prudent investor can achieve is a long-run real return of -0.75 per cent displays an Eeyorish level of pessimism. If this is really the government’s official thinking on likely future investment returns then its policies to encourage pension saving amount to mis-selling on a gigantic scale”.


More recently, on 24 June, the same paper highlighted that drivers now face a rate of increase in the cost of their motor insurance that is five times that of inflation. Not all of the increase can be attributed to the change in the discount rate but its impact will be felt particularly by younger drivers, those under 25, who have seen an increase of 13.1%, and—this may be of more interest to Members of your Lordships’ House—to older drivers, those over 50, who have seen an increase of 17.9%. Of course, this rate of increase will continue as reinsurance contracts run off—they last for only 12 months before they have to be renewed, and will have to be replaced at the higher rate.

I suspect—perhaps I should say I hope—that the Lord Chancellor did not understand or was not properly briefed or advised on the likely full impact of her decision. Certainly, having made this dramatic decision on Monday 27 February, which led to a storm of controversy, she then announced that there would be a further consultation. As my regret Motion makes clear, this appears to be putting the cart before the horse. I understand that the consultation is now closed and the MoJ has to report back by 3 August.

A regret Motion is probably not the place to discuss a remedy in detail but perhaps three brief conclusions can be drawn. First, it is critical that accident victims are properly compensated but in future the discount rate needs to be renewed more frequently to minimise the risk of overcompensation or undercompensation. This will also avoid the massive jerks on the tiller which have so disconcerted the insurance industry this year. Secondly, any new system should recognise that an assumption that all the compensation sums will be invested in the same asset class fails to account for the different circumstances of the various injured parties, so that the Wells v Wells conclusion that investments should be ILGs only is no longer appropriate. Thirdly and finally, those parties that are very risk-averse should place increased reliance on periodic payment orders as a better means of offering security to the injured party while avoiding overcompensation or undercompensation.

While tonight the House cannot discuss any remedies in detail, there is a need for action quickly to right the costly inequities of the present system. Following the recent consultation, the Government now have a wealth of information at their disposal. They also have a legislative vehicle on the stocks in the shape of the civil liability Bill announced in the Queen’s Speech. When the Lord Chancellor herself said, as she did on 7 March, that,

“the system needs to be reformed, because I do not think it is right that a discount rate is set on an ad hoc basis by the Lord Chancellor”—[Official Report, Commons, 7/3/17; col. 657]—

we can surely all agree that action is needed, and quickly. When he comes to reply, I hope that my noble and learned friend will be able to reassure me and the House that the Government recognise the significance of this issue and intend to take remedial action shortly. I beg to move.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Lord has done the House a service in raising this issue. I should refer to my interests as an unpaid consultant in my old firm of solicitors, which specialises in personal injury claims.

The changes effected by the order we are debating have been a long time in the making. As the Explanatory Memorandum to the order makes clear, the procedure was prescribed in the Damages Act 1996, which vested in the Lord Chancellor the power to prescribe a discount rate which the courts must consider—though not necessarily apply—when determining compensation in personal injury cases in the form of a lump sum. Until that time, the rate had been determined by the courts.

This is only the second occasion since 1996 when a change has been made. As we have heard, the rate has been reduced from 2.5% to minus 0.75%. The purpose of the order is to reflect in relation to awards of lump-sum damages in cases of significant monetary loss—for example, long-term loss of earnings or the cost of round-the-clock care—the average yield of index-linked gilts, as the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, explained. Thus the damages awarded will reflect a rate of return which is designed to ensure that the claimant does not make a profit from the compensation but is adequately provided for.

In 2010 the then Lord Chancellor, Kenneth Clarke, initiated the process of a review and a consultation was launched in 2012 that was inconclusive. It was followed in 2015 by the report of an expert panel commissioned by Chris Grayling. A further 16 months elapsed before Mr Grayling’s successor but one consulted the Treasury and the Government Actuary, and the relevant order was finally made. Over time it became apparent that the 2.5% discount did not reflect the realities of a changing investment market, such that the compensation could run out or the injured party have to invest in higher-risk products.

Needless to say, the insurance industry has opposed the changes and claims that they will lead to higher premiums. This is par for the course for an industry that in recent years has done so much to increase its profits, not least by persuading the Government to effect changes in the realm of personal injury claims while making little, if any, reduction in premiums. APIL, the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers, reports that Admiral Insurance stated that motor insurance profits after the change would still be of the order of £336 million. APIL commended the statement in the Government’s consultation that they could be influenced by the effect of the change in the rate on defendants.

Another organisation, Hastings, said that the reduction,

“is not expected to have a material impact on the Group’s financial outlook for 2017”—

so that is one insurer not apparently overconcerned at the change. Even more illuminating is the figure which Thompsons Solicitors calculated as the saving to motor insurers during the last 10 years of the 2.5% rate—a staggering £30 billion. There is little or no evidence that this has been reflected in reduced insurance premiums.

Given the nature of the claims in question, where long-term losses of income can occur alongside a need for special care, home or vehicle adaptations and the like, periodical payment orders—rather than one-off lump-sum payments—may well feature increasingly in the award of damages or the terms of settlement of claims. The noble Lord alluded to that desirable move.