Budget Responsibility and National Audit Bill [HL]

Lord Higgins Excerpts

Monday 31st January 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Newby]

These government amendments are welcome because they recognise the discussions held in Committee. The Minister has a gone a long way towards responding to the concerns that were expressed.

I am particularly pleased with Amendment 11 because we spent a lot of time on this issue. Clearly, the original drafting was inadequate. Pride of authorship means that I am unhappy that the words that I suggested in Committee are not being used, but the wording in Amendment 11 will do exactly the same job, so I welcome that.

I also welcome Amendment 13 for the reasons suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell. I have some sympathy with his last point. I cannot see why the charter cannot be presented in its final form before the Bill goes through another place. I cannot believe that there will be much to change—the charter is not a very long document—so, for the reasons given by the noble Lord, that would be an improvement on what is currently proposed.

I want to make a final comment on what the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, said about the Treasury retaining its own forecasting ability and what would happen if there was a dispute with the OBR. We discussed at some length in Committee why it was essential that the Treasury should retain it own forecasting abilities While it would clearly be a major source of embarrassment if the Treasury disagreed with the OBR forecast, the one good thing about the new system is that, presumably, any such disagreement would be transparent because the Treasury would have to explain that it has disagreed with the OBR and give reasons why, and there would no doubt be a huge row about it. Although that might be uncomfortable for the Government, that will at least expose all the issues that are in dispute. In the interests of transparency, surely that is a good thing.

[Lord Higgins]

My Lords, I intervene briefly to express appreciation to my noble friend for the way in which he has kept us in touch during the period between Grand Committee and now with the way in which his thoughts have been developing. Certainly this is a non-controversial Bill, but the House is succeeding in improving it still further and that is a good thing.

[Lord Barnett]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, for his amendments. He referred again to the independence of the OBR but, as he knows, I have all along been concerned with both its relevance and independence.

On relevance, there are dozens of truly independent forecasting bodies all over the country, including the Institute for Fiscal Studies, which used to be chaired by the present chairman of the OBR. The issue concerns itself with the expense of a body such as this when we have not only the forecasts of the independent outside bodies but the Treasury forecasts, the Bank of England forecasts and the OBR forecasts, most of which probably will be broadly in line with the current situation.

We will never know—I have tried to find out on many different occasions—the Government’s view on what should happen when they have the forecasts. The Minister has found all kinds of different ways of not answering my questions about what the Government’s policy is and whether they agree with the Bank of England on keeping interest rates at 0.5 per cent, given the growing pressure—wrongly in many quarters—on the need to increase interest rates. He will not say whether he disagrees—I appreciate that he cannot disagree with or say anything different to what the Chancellor has said—but it would be nice if, at some time or another, he could answer the question of what the Government’s policy is, as opposed to accepting the forecasts, which he has done on numerous occasions.

On the question of independence, I am worried by the constant references in the media to “the Government’s in-house forecasting body, the OBR”. This does not lend itself very well to the independence that we would all like to see in the OBR. I am sure Robert Chote will do his best to ensure that it is truly independent but, if it is no more independent than the dozens of existing bodies, why do we need the OBR at all? That is the question I put to the noble Lord while thanking him for the amendments he has brought forward.

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[Lord Eatwell]

My Lords, I first moved this amendment in Grand Committee in which, of course, there are no votes, and the matter was simply left on the table. I regret that the Government have not seen fit to bring forward some proposals whereby the OBR’s budget would be formally exposed to independent scrutiny. My argument then was the same as my argument now. Given that our fundamental objective is to ensure the OBR’s independence to the greatest degree possible, one of the key means of controlling any independent organisation that is limiting its budget relative to its responsibilities must be constrained. In this amendment we have proposed that it be constrained by the requirement to publish the annual budget and make it available for scrutiny and assessment by the Treasury Committee in another place.

When we discussed this in Grand Committee, the Minister made the following points. First, he argued that the Treasury was incentivised to fund the OBR adequately, since the OBR performed important tasks for the Treasury. What worries me is that this argument is indicative of a failure by the Government to understand fully the need to ensure the independence of the OBR. Of course the Treasury is incentivised to fund what it wants done, but it is not incentivised to fund what it does not want done. Truly independent studies by the OBR that ruffle Treasury feathers will not attract enthusiastic funding from the Treasury. Therefore the incentivised argument really does not carry any weight.

Secondly, the Minister argued that the current funding agreement, outlined in a letter from Sir Nicholas Macpherson to Robert Chote, provided adequate funds to the OBR through to 2014, but what about after 2014? The creation of the OBR is not just for the next three or four years. We on this side of the House hope that it will become and remain for many years a valuable instrument in UK economic policy-making—valuable because it is independent—just as the Monetary Policy Committee has become a valuable instrument in UK economic policy-making. To argue simply that things are okay now is a quite inadequate way of providing confidence for the future. Therefore, the second argument does not stack up.

Thirdly, the Minister argued that there were other means of informing the Treasury Committee of another place of the OBR’s budgetary position, for example via the OBR annual report. Once again, he fails to grasp the substance of independence. It is not for the OBR to fight its budgetary corner, which is what it is being asked to do. It is for Parliament to ensure that its independence is protected. That is what we on this side seek to do in this amendment.

Finally, the Minister suggested—extraordinarily—that paragraph 15 to Schedule 1 provided protection for the OBR’s budget, whereas in fact it does exactly theopposite, leaving power with the Treasury to keep the OBR on as tight a budgetary leash as it wishes. Therefore, the arguments deployed in Grand Committee did not answer the case that was made. They were not simply unconvincing but disturbing, in that they betrayed a lack of understanding of, and commitment to, the concept of the independence of the OBR.

I have been working on this issue and my concerns deepened when I investigated what had happened to similar organisations in comparable jurisdictions. In Canada, the incoming Conservative Government established the Parliamentary Budget Office in 2008. Toronto’s Globe and Mail reported that a year later, after the Parliamentary Budget Office had produced two reports that were critical of the Government, the office’s annual budget was frozen despite earlier promises to boost it by a third. This was Canada's Macpherson moment, when the letter and the promise were withdrawn.

In Sweden, the Fiscal Policy Council was set up in 2007, once again by an incoming Conservative Government—there is a pattern here. On 18 November last year, the council wrote an open letter to the Government pointing to the discrepancy between its remit and its resources. What was the reaction? The Swedish Minister of Finance is reported to have reacted negatively to the letter and suggested—you guessed it—that the council's budget should be cut in response. Thus in Canada and Sweden—two jurisdictions for which we have great respect—critical reports have resulted in budgets being frozen or cut.

On 6 December last year, a letter appeared in the Financial Times in support of the independence of the Hungarian Fiscal Council—the Hungarian version of the OBR. One author of that letter was Mr Robert Chote, the chairman of our OBR. As well as making the case for the independence of the Hungarian organisation, Mr Chote and his fellow signatories argued that:

“Developments in Hungary are also of a more general interest for the viability of independent fiscal monitoring. It is easy for a government to be in favour of this in principle. It is more difficult to stand criticism when it is actually delivered”.

How true that is—and how important, therefore, is the amendment before us, the purpose of which is to support the independence and the financial integrity of the OBR.

If the OBR behaved in a manner that did not suit the Government, for example by undertaking extra studies that cast government policies in an unfortunate light, the easiest way to discipline those independent-minded souls would be to cut their budget, forcing them back to their core function and thereby diminishing their independence. Control of the budget is an important means of controlling any organisation, as the Swedish Minister of Finance made clear.

The amendment seeks to provide the OBR with the protection of independent scrutiny of its budget. The budget must be published and made available for scrutiny by the Treasury Committee of another place. The OBR would not have to fight its corner; Parliament would fight its corner for it. This would give the Treasury Committee the opportunity to have its say on whether any inappropriate limitations were being placed on the OBR’s operations by budgetary means. If you like, the amendment provides scope for the Treasury Committee to act as the financial champion and protector of the independence of the OBR.

The Minister should mark the words of Mr Chote in his letter in the Financial Times, and accept the amendment to ensure that the OBR’s budget is protected, even when it speaks unwelcome truth to those in power. I hope the Minister can give me some reassurance that this issue will be taken seriously and will be considered for government amendment at Third Reading. I beg to move.

[Lord Higgins]

My Lords, given that I was chairman of the Treasury Committee in another place for something like 14 years, I am naturally rather sympathetic to the amendment. However, it does not seem to do what the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, said it does. It does not enable the Treasury Committee to control the budget, but enables it to ensure that the budget is scrutinised after being published. This is something which my noble friend should readily accept, because it would be very surprising if the annual operations budget were not to be published. I should have thought that that was consistent with the whole argument for transparency which we have heard from the Government throughout the debates on this Bill, and that it should be virtually automatic. It is equally likely that the Treasury Committee would wish to scrutinise the budget, once published. My noble friend might of course argue that it is unnecessary for the amendment to be made, but, if it were, some reassurance would be given to those expressing the kind of view expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell. It would certainly be right for the budget to be published and for the appropriate body to look at it to be the Treasury Select Committee in another place.

[Lord Burns]

My Lords, I will disappoint the noble Lord, Lord Barnett, by agreeing with the amendment, or rather with its spirit, because it is important that the funding of the OBR is as transparent as possible. We need an arrangement that will last. We all know that the Treasury has great power and I accept the argument that the OBR needs the protection of a transparent process. Of course, nothing would in the end prevent the OBR from suffering in respect of its budget if the Government wished that to happen and could get the support of Parliament, but it is important that that process should be transparent. I recognise the argument that it is already evident from the public expenditure process that there is nothing to stop the Treasury Committee being involved, but I support the principle of making a specific provision for the funding of the OBR that should be as transparent as possible.

The detail in the amendment that I am not happy with is the suggestion that the committee should investigate the annual budget. It is important that if you are to have a successful operation such as the OBR, it should know what the prospects for its finances are, stretching beyond one year. Subjecting it to an annual budget process might not do the job. The noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, already referred to Sir Nicholas Macpherson’s existing letter talking about a financing process that stretches some way ahead.

I therefore support the principle of the amendment and hope that it is possible to find a way of expressing its intentions that provides reassurance that a transparent process will be in place and will stretch for somewhat longer than the annual budget round.

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Moved by

[Lord Higgins]

8: Clause 4, page 2, line 29, after “it,” insert—
“( ) a comparison of the fiscal and economic forecasts previously prepared by it with the corresponding forecast prepared by the Bank of England together with an analysis of the difference between the two,”

[Lord Higgins]

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 8 in my name, with which it will be convenient to discuss Amendment 9, in the name of the Minister, and Amendment 10, which is my amendment to the Minister’s amendment. In some ways, this grouping is rather too extensive, but several important points are enshrined in the amendments.

I will start with the Minister's amendment, which states:

“Any Report which the Office makes in pursuance of its duty under this section must include … the main assumptions made by the Office, and … the main risks which the Office considered to be relevant”.

We debated both those points at considerable length in Grand Committee, so I certainly welcome the fact that the Minister has tabled the amendment. If we are to be able to appraise the forecasts made by the OBR, it is crucial that we should know on which assumptions they have been made, so I am glad that we shall now be able to do that. Secondly, we should also know the OBR’s assessment of what risks it considered to be relevant—with some indication, I hope, of the probability of this or that risk being realised—so I am strongly in favour of Amendment 9. I believe that the House as a whole will share that view.

I turn to my Amendment 8, which suggests that the OBR should not only assess the accuracy of its reports in a post-mortem assessment, as is already required in the Bill, but make,

“a comparison of the fiscal and economic forecasts previously prepared by it with the corresponding forecast prepared by the Bank of England together with an analysis of the difference between the two”.

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[Lord Higgins]

I am grateful to my noble friend for his interesting comments and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 8 withdrawn.

Amendment 9

Moved by