Trade Bill

Lord Hendy Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 6th October 2020 Grand Committee

[Lord Hendy (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to speak to Amendment 17 and open the batting on a group of amendments on dispute resolution. Put shortly: Amendment 17 opposes investor-state dispute settlement arrangements —ISDS; Amendments 43, 44 and 52 seek to constrain it; Amendment 91 deals with tax matters; and Amendment 94 deals with disputes between state parties.

Amendment 17 is intended to prevent regulations permitting ISDS in the agreements, envisaged by Clause 2, which the Government are negotiating to replace existing EU agreements. Existing EU agreements are listed in the Library briefing. Some of them include ISDS; others do not.

The new agreements will differ from the existing EU agreements, not least by making the UK a party. There will be other modifications too, as explained in paragraphs 37 and 38 of the Explanatory Notes. The Bill envisages modifications. It does not require replication of the content of EU agreements—contrary to the Minister’s comment last Tuesday. Amendment 17 seeks, in the new UK agreements, modification of the content of existing EU agreements by the exclusion of ISDS where those agreements provided for it and its non-inclusion where EU agreements did not.

ISDS is often found in international trade agreements. Where it exists, it is wholly objectionable. ISDS has the power to override the supremacy of Parliament, to defeat the rule of domestic law, and it discriminates on grounds of nationality. Far from taking back control, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, pointed out in our last sitting, ISDS is the surrender of control.

The inclusion of ISDS in the then proposed EU-US trade deal, TTIP, was the principal reason for 3 million signatures—half a million of them in the UK—on the petition against it. The legitimacy of ISDS in EU agreements is now in doubt. The judgment of the Court of Justice of the EU in Slovak Republic v Achmea on the Netherlands/Slovakia trade agreement, held that ISDS has an adverse effect on the autonomy of EU law and is therefore incompatible with EU law. This is an EU judgment we should follow.

ISDS is a mechanism whereby a corporation of one state party to the FTA can bring a claim for compensation against the other state. That sounds fine, until one appreciates that such claims are not brought in the courts of either state, nor under the laws of either state. ISDS is a system of arbitration usually conducted in secret. The usual basis for claims is that the accused state has failed to ensure “fair and equitable treatment” or has expropriated some asset of the investing corporation. Such claims are not open to any but foreign corporations. The claim is not that the host state has breached the law of the land but usually the converse: that domestic law has caused the foreign corporation loss of hoped-for profits.

Take the Philip Morris case, referred to by the noble Earl, Lord Caithness—

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord McNicol of West Kilbride) (Lab)]

My Lords, we are having some technical difficulties online. A number of our colleagues who are participating remotely cannot hear you as well as we can in the Room. If we cannot resolve it in the next minute or two, I will adjourn the Grand Committee for five minutes, until 2.42 pm. I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, but it is more important that people online hear his comments.

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[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord McNicol of West Kilbride) (Lab)]

My Lords, the Grand Committee is resumed. We now resume debate on Amendment 17. I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, for having to call on him to start again from the beginning. We have now resolved the technical difficulties so, from the top, the noble Lord, Lord Hendy.

[Lord Hendy (Lab)]

No apologies are needed. It is a pleasure to speak to Amendment 17 and open the batting on a group of amendments on dispute resolution. Put shortly: Amendment 17 opposes investor-state dispute settlement arrangements—ISDS; Amendments 43, 44 and 52 seek to constrain them; Amendment 91 deals with tax matters; and Amendment 94 deals with disputes between state parties.

Amendment 17 is intended to prevent regulations permitting ISDS in the agreements, envisaged by Clause 2, which the Government are negotiating to replace existing EU agreements. Existing EU agreements are listed in the Library briefing. Some of them include ISDS; others do not. The new agreements will differ from the existing EU agreements, not least by making the UK a party. There will be other modifications too, as explained in paragraphs 37 and 38 of the Explanatory Notes.

The Bill envisages modifications. It does not require replication of the content of EU agreements—contrary to the Minister’s comment last Tuesday. Amendment 17 seeks, in the new UK agreements, modification of the content of existing EU agreements by the exclusion of ISDS where those agreements provided for it and its non-inclusion where EU agreements did not.

ISDS is often found in international trade agreements. Where it exists, it is wholly objectionable. ISDS has the power to override the supremacy of Parliament and to defeat the rule of domestic law, and it discriminates on grounds of nationality. Far from taking back control, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, pointed out, ISDS is the surrender of control.

The inclusion of ISDS in the then-proposed EU-US trade deal, TTIP, was the principal reason for 3 million signatures—half a million of them in the UK—on the petition against it. The legitimacy of ISDS in EU agreements is now in doubt. The judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Slovak Republic v Achmea on the Netherlands/Slovakia trade agreement held that ISDS has an adverse effect on the autonomy of EU law and is therefore incompatible with EU law. This is an EU judgment that we should follow.

ISDS is a mechanism whereby a corporation of one state party to the international trade agreement can bring a claim for compensation against the other state. That sounds fine until one appreciates that such claims are not brought in the courts of either state, nor under the laws of either state. ISDS is a system of arbitration usually conducted in secret. The usual basis for claims is that the accused state has failed to ensure “fair and equitable treatment” or has expropriated some asset of the investing corporation. Such claims are not open to any but foreign corporations. The claim is not that the host state has breached the law of the land but usually the converse: that domestic law has caused the foreign corporation loss of hoped-for profits.

Let us take the Philip Morris case, referred to by the noble Earl, Lord Caithness, and the noble Lord, Lord Lansley. The Australian Parliament passed legislation requiring plain-paper packaging for cigarettes. Philip Morris challenged the legislation on constitutional grounds. It failed at every level, including in the High Court of Australia. It then transferred ownership of its Australian companies to a subsidiary it had set up in Hong Kong so as to enable an ISDS claim under the Australia-Hong Kong trade agreement. The claim failed, but only because the transfer of ownership of the companies to Hong Kong post-dated the activity giving rise to the claim.

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[Lord Grimstone of Boscobel (Con)]

The noble Lord raises two good points. On the first point, I will, if I may, write to him setting out in more detail the disadvantages and advantages that I see of the negative as opposed to the affirmative process. On the court, I make it clear that we welcome changes in the ISDS mechanism and potentially the formation of an MIC if, once the details are worked out, it seems that nations will sign up to it and it will be workable and in the best interests of the UK. We do not have our head in the sand in these matters. Like the noble Lord, I recognise that, if improvements can be made to the ISDS process, it is incumbent on us to do that. The point that I was trying to get across was that these are still early days in the discussions at the UN on this and it did not seem right to put our weight firmly behind it until we see how the discussions move forward. But I assure the noble Lord that we are open-minded about this and we will see where it gets to.

[Lord Hendy (Lab)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for his response and to my noble friends Lord Hain, Lady Blower and Lady Chakrabarti for supporting Amendment 17. I am also grateful to all noble Lords who made such elegant and persuasive contributions to this debate, which has been wide-ranging and has covered a lot of issues.

I will not presume on the time of the Committee by commenting on particular contributions, save for two. The noble Lord, Lord Lansley, mentioned the fact that the central issue in the Philip Morris case was litigated in the World Trade Organization dispute mechanism, where the case was lost. His knowledge of the WTO is certainly greater than mine, but my understanding is that the rules, and hence the basis of the claim in the WTO, were different from the basis of the claim under the ISDS, not least because the claim in the WTO—as I understand it; I could be wrong—was brought by nation states rather than investing corporations.

The Minister made many points in his summary that I would like to take up, but I must resist. I will make just three points. First, he said that there were great benefits to UK investors overseas. Of course I accept that that is the case, but there appear to me to be four points to bear in mind.

First, this country should not support a mechanism that provides an avenue of challenge to other democratic states, just as it should not support a mechanism that enables a challenge to our democratic state. A remedy under ISDS is not available to citizens of either state except for investing corporations, but many citizens are affected by the matters covered by these trade agreements—food standards, environmental standards and labour standards.

Secondly, the Minister overlooked the globalised economy that we now have. UK corporations can establish almost anywhere in the world, just as foreign corporations can. So UK corporations can take advantage of ISDS arrangements by establishing a subsidiary to bring a case against the United Kingdom. There are dangers there, too.

Thirdly, when overseas investors make their investments, they of course evaluate the risk that things could go wrong or that the state might change the law. That is a matter for them. I do not see why we should put at risk our democratic standards by inviting a mechanism to protect overseas commercial investors.

Fourthly, this country has an admired legal system, as do many other countries. It is wrong in principle to provide a mechanism of legal challenge that is outside the domestic laws of any country.

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[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Finlay of Llandaff) (CB)]

My Lords, we will now resume the Committee. I call on the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, to complete his remarks.

[Lord Hendy (Lab)]

My Lords, I will make two final points in respect of the Minister’s speech. My second point is that he said that ISDS cannot force the privatisation of public services. That is absolutely right, of course, but we cannot overlook the fact that ISDS permits a challenge to taking previously privatised services back into public ownership—something that Governments of all persuasions have done from time to time in the past, especially in times of emergency.

Finally, the Minister said that the Government were considering the merits of a multinational investment tribunal in place of the secret arbitration under ISDS. Of course, one accepts immediately that the EU’s proposal for an MIT gives transparency instead of secrecy, which is very desirable. But it does not resolve the central evil that ISDS challenges, on very broad terms, parliamentary decisions by the chilling effect of a threat of compensation which is measured in billions—a disincentive for any Government.

The issue of ISDS is obviously controversial and the Minister is plainly aware of the concerns of members of the Committee. I hope that those concerns, and those reflected in other amendments, will cause the Government further reflection. In those circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 17 withdrawn.