European Convention on Human Rights

Lord Hart of Chilton Excerpts

Thursday 19th May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hart of Chilton]

My Lords, I am extremely happy to join other noble Lords not just in congratulating the noble and learned Lord, Lord Irvine of Lairg, on securing this topical debate today, but in paying tribute to his work on human rights. The Act that we are discussing will constitute a permanent monument to him far better than any statue we may later think it right to erect.

The Human Rights Act has enabled British judges to make their own distinctive contribution to the development of human rights law in Europe. It has also achieved major improvements in our domestic law when the state overreaches itself. Let me cite just a few examples: the right to attend peaceful demonstrations without interference from the police; a duty on local authorities not to house vulnerable people in insanitary and dangerous accommodation; a requirement for the DPP to clarify his position on prosecuting in cases of assisted suicide; and an end to discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation.

A constructive dialogue has also developed between the British courts and the Strasbourg court, which has benefited the development of European human rights jurisprudence. Sometimes we have had to accept a correction from Strasbourg. A good example concerns the extensive and previously unchallengeable DNA database, as in the case of Marper in 2009.

Far more common have been situations in which the Strasbourg court has followed the British courts in rejecting a human rights complaint, having had the benefit of the reasoned judgments of our own Supreme Court. A good example of the interplay between our courts and Strasbourg is provided by the decision in the case of Horncastle, which has been mentioned twice in this debate. Our Supreme Court held that where Strasbourg decided a case with insufficient understanding of our domestic law, it could decline to follow Strasbourg. The Supreme Court felt that Strasbourg had failed in a previous decision to take proper account of our carefully crafted statutory code for the admission of hearsay evidence in criminal cases. Thus, the Supreme Court declined to follow Strasbourg and held that the defendant’s convictions should be upheld. Effectively, the Supreme Court was asking Strasbourg to think again. This is precisely how a constructive dialogue should develop.

Finally, a major triumph of the Act has been to change the culture of Whitehall. As your Lordships know, every Bill that comes before Parliament must be accompanied by a ministerial statement of its compatibility with convention rights. I know that Whitehall takes this very seriously. Much effort goes into the preparation of legislation to ensure that this statement can be made properly. This is a cultural change that does not hit the headlines but is a huge gain from the Human Rights Act.