Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

Monday 2nd December 2013 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

56A: After Clause 85, insert the following new Clause—
“Crime and disorder reduction: development control
(1) The Secretary of State shall designate a body representative of chief officers of police for the purposes of this section.
(2) A body designated under this section shall publish guidelines that specify for a particular type of development the measures that should be included in that development to promote—
(a) crime and disorder reduction, and(b) the prevention of anti-social behaviour.(3) Guidelines under this section shall only be produced following consultation with organisations that represent—
(a) local authorities, and(b) persons engaged in the design and construction of developments requiring planning permission.(4) A planning authority may, in respect of any application that it receives for planning permission, specify as a condition for the approval of that planning permission that the development concerned must follow guidelines published under this section.
(5) A planning authority may only specify a condition under subsection (4) if it is satisfied that to do so would promote—
(a) crime and disorder reduction, or(b) the prevention of anti-social behaviour.”

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, the problem with this Bill and the discussions that we have had in Committee is that, throughout, it has not always been clear who wants the changes that are proposed in it. Most of the proposals made by the Government are not evidence-based and many of them are ill thought through. Furthermore, there is a serious danger that the Bill will be irrelevant. Overall, levels of crime have declined over the past 15 or so years, and the trend in burglary is particularly marked. However, there is no cause for complacency there. A report on the front page of today’s Times talks about a, “Sudden surge in property crime”. Therefore, the stability with which we have seen crime figures move downwards is not something that we can take for granted.

However, unmentioned in the Bill is the fact that the Government are seeking to do something that would have the effect of undermining all their objectives in this legislation. Indeed, they are seeking to undermine the progress that has been made over the past 20 or so years in reducing crime levels. Certainly, over the past 20 years those building new developments—new-build homes, refurbished homes and so on, schools, play areas, hospitals and many others—have increasingly been informed by or have adopted the principles of Secured by Design.

What was achieved over that 20-year period under this initiative carried out under the auspices of the Association of Chief Police Officers and adopted by many local authorities? First, Secured by Design developments—those using the approved products and materials—are now half as likely to be burgled, and show a reduction of 25% in criminal damage. That is evidence that these measures make a difference. Secondly, the additional cost of using Secured by Design standards in the average home is modest, estimated at only around £170 per property, yet, as I have already indicated, these are changes that make a real difference to the risk of burglary and criminal damage.

Thirdly, it is estimated that in one year alone, some 700,000 burglaries have the potential to be thwarted if appropriate security devices are installed—representing an annual saving of more than £1.97 billion. Fourthly, the Association of British Insurers has estimated that the introduction of Secured by Design standards across the UK would bring more than £3.2 billion-worth of savings to the economy over 20 years. Finally, householders who are not offered security recommendations after a burglary are 69% more likely to suffer a repeat incident than those who are offered advice. Therefore, the lesson is that the Secured by Design initiative has made a real difference. This is a success story that is widely copied and cited internationally, and it is the subject of many academic studies testifying to its efficacy.

What is the Government’s approach to something that clearly makes a difference and clearly works? It is the old, traditional approach of, “If it ain’t broke, take it to pieces anyway”. I appreciate that the Minister is not responsible for the activities of the Department for Communities and Local Government, but we are always assured that government is a seamless whole, working together in the interests of the people of this country.

The Department for Communities and Local Government issued a consultation document seeking views on its recent review of building regulations and housing standards. The proposals put forward by the department suggested a two-tiered standard of security: a basic minimum level that would be generally required and a so-called “enhanced” standard. The basic standard is demonstrably inadequate and has been shown to have little security benefit. Yes, that basic standard might specify stronger locks; but if it does not say anything about the flimsiness of the doors, you may have a nice, firm lock, but the door will burst open with one firm kick while the lock remains in place. That does not do much for security, though it may please the lock-makers.

Even the so-called “enhanced” standard would be lower than the existing Secured by Design standards. It is most significant that that could be required by local authorities only where what is described as a “compelling” case exists for the higher standard to be the norm. In legal terms, “compelling” is a strong test to meet. To make a compelling case, a local authority would have to demonstrate that the development would be subject to an elevated rate of burglary—you will be expected to be able to demonstrate that before the building is even built. Moreover, you will have to determine that there will be a higher than normal impact of burglary on tenants even before a property is let.

That is nonsense. It goes without saying that this test will be almost impossible to pass in respect of a new development. As the test has to be applied site by site, it is not even clear that it will simplify matters for developers; it is likely to produce confusion and added uncertainties for them, because when they submit a proposal they will not know whether the authority will attempt to apply the enhanced standard.

As I said, the enhanced standard will not be as beneficial as the proven Secured by Design guidelines. It will not be open to a local authority to require the proven Secured by Design guidelines, even if it wishes to do so; and to apply even the so-called “enhanced” standards, it will have to go through a complicated process to demonstrate the compelling case required by the Department for Communities and Local Government, with all the implicit threats of legal action that that entails.

This is the antithesis of localism. In my naivety, I assumed that the Department for Communities and Local Government was supposed to promote localism. If this is promoting localism, it is a very strange way of doing it, because it removes from local authorities the power to set what they regard as the most appropriate standards in their area. In practice, it is a centrally driven dumbing down of standards: the Department for Communities and Local Government is dumbing down the standards of security that must be met by new developments. That is putting communities and householders at greater risk; it is putting at risk progress in reducing crime, especially burglary.

When the Minister responds, will he tell me where the demand is for this dumbing down? Who is it—apart from the burgling fraternity, obviously—saying, “We want lesser security”? I am not aware of this great demand. What representations were received by the Department for Communities and Local Government before it made these proposals? Did it consult the Home Office? If it did, what did the Home Office say? Did it say, “Yes, please, Department for Communities and Local Government; undermine all the work we have been doing to reduce crime for the past 20 years by removing these requirements for better security in the home”? Did it listen to local authorities? Did it listen to the communities affected and those who would have to live in ill-secured properties?

This has all been put forward as a simplification of the planning process. It has been suggested that, somehow, Secured by Design standards have been the cause of stalled developments. Could we be given an example of a development that has stalled because of the requirement to have Secured by Design standards? I rather suspect that no such development exists.

If there has been any communication centrally to say that these standards ought to be lessened or lifted, it has probably been produced by some intern working for one of the groups of housebuilders, who has drawn up a list of all the regulatory requirements that they are subject to and said, “We don’t like them”. Where is the evidence that there is a real problem? What world do the officials and Ministers who support this measure live in? Have any of them had to live in an area blighted by excessive crime that is facilitated by poor design and inadequate security standards? These things make a real difference to people’s lives. They are the sort of thing that the rest of the Bill is about.

If we believe in localism, local authorities should be able to choose the level of security standards that they consider appropriate for the communities that they represent. That is the whole principle. Local residents elect their local councillors to protect their local interests and to make local determinations of policy. So what is the problem that Ministers think that they will solve by preventing that local, democratic discretion? What this risks is that progress made over the past two decades in designing out crime, reducing burglary and making anti-social behaviour harder will be put into reverse. This is, in short, an act of vandalism—anti-social behaviour of the worst sort.

The measure also risks adding to the costs of the criminal justice system. Indeed, if we throw away the advantage that designing out crime has given us, how will our communities cope in the future, with a diminished police force and neighbourhood policing no more than a distant memory, while the threat of crime, as the Times reports today, rises again? Who benefits from this short-sighted policy? Obviously burglars do, and maybe developers who will see a modest increase in their profits. But yet again we seem to have a Government who neglect the many in favour of a privileged few—in this case, burglars.

That is why I tabled this amendment. It requires the Home Secretary to ask the Association of Chief Police Officers or a successor body to draw up Secured by Design guidelines. It requires that those guidelines are produced following consultation with local authorities, builders and developers, and it gives local planning authorities the option of making the following of these guidelines a condition of any planning permission that they make. It is a localist and permissive power.

The noble Lord, Lord Greaves, is—thankfully—not in his place today. He put forward an amendment that I assume will not be moved, which is a wrecking amendment. It would render the guidelines voluntary for the developers. I am not sure what purpose he had, although no doubt he would have explained it to us at some length had he been given the opportunity. But my amendment gives the Government the opportunity to think again. It allows them to put prevention first. Surely protecting people against crime is an investment—better than facing the spiralling costs of enforcement while waiting for the unproven measures envisaged in the Bill. It allows the Government to put localism first. If local elected councillors choose to prioritise Secured by Design, they will be able to with the amendment. If they choose not to, that, too, is their prerogative. If local people want higher security standards, they will elect local councillors accordingly. My amendment is all about localism, crime prevention and better security for communities. I beg to move.

Amendment 56AZA (to Amendment 56A) not moved.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Earl of Lytton]

My Lords, perhaps I could seek some clarification from the noble Baroness. As I understood it, the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, moved this amendment in the context of new-build—that was certainly the sense I got. A number of the examples that the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, has outlined appear to relate to the retrofit of existing buildings. The two are not the same. We have 23 million to 24 million houses in the country, of which new-build is a tiny proportion at any given moment. If we are talking about the application of Secured by Design to existing buildings—in other words, retrofit—how is that going to be affected by this amendment?

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

Perhaps for the convenience of the Committee, I could respond very quickly. My amendment is couched in respect of planning permissions. If it is simply an alteration to an existing building that does not have a planning impact, obviously it does not apply. The purpose of this amendment—if I get really irritated by the Minister of course I will put it to a vote—is to try to get clarity as to why the Government are making this change and why they are doing something that is so potentially retrograde.

The point that the noble Earl has just made highlights why this is so dangerous. Most of the changes have happened in new buildings or major refurbishments. It is a slow burn. It has taken 20 years for the impact of these changes to be seen and felt. If you stop the higher standards, it will take another five, 10, 15 or 20 years before we see the consequences and the sorts of problems that used to exist in many estates and developments 20 or 30 years ago, which I am sure many of your Lordships will remember. That is why it is so important. Making the change now will not have an immediate effect in three months’, six months’ or 12 months’ time but it will have an effect over the next five, 10 or 20 years. That is why this change is so short-sighted.

[Baroness Smith of Basildon]

My Lords, to answer the point that the noble Earl made, I gave examples of both retrofit and new-build because it is only through retrofit that we can look at the before and after figures.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Harris, whom I do not want to annoy because we have a lot to do today, has brought back something that he raised at Second Reading. If I was unable to respond to him then, I think he will understand that there are no proposals in the Bill about any changes to planning procedures. He is seeking to introduce a new measure which, I hope to demonstrate, rather presumes the consultation.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, should know, that consultation finished on 31 October and the Government are considering their response to it. I suggest that the noble Lord, Lord Harris, is rather jumping the gun in seeking to impose on the Bill a particular predetermination of that consultation in advance of the Government coming back on it. However, we can all agree on the important role that design and security measures can play in helping to prevent crime—I agree with my noble friend Lord Deben on that—and I am grateful for the opportunity that this debate gives me to explain how the Government are going about it.

In England, the police have for many years successfully worked to prevent crime and anti-social behaviour through their close engagement with developers and builders, and local planning authorities. Working alongside them from the very earliest stages of the design process, they offer specialist advice on the measures which can prevent crime and anti-social behaviour. The guidance on which they base their advice is shaped by the central police crime prevention management service—the Association of Chief Police Officers’ Crime Prevention Initiatives Ltd—and promoted under the corporate title Secured by Design. As the noble Lord, Lord Harris, says, Secured by Design is a well respected brand that, among other things, provides guidance on the layout and design of developments, and on security standards. I agree with him that involving the police in shaping places and setting standards for secure buildings has been worthwhile and has undoubtedly served to prevent many crimes.

However, I disagree with his call to legislate to designate a body of police leaders and then to charge it with publishing guidelines about the measures to be included in each type of development. On a practical level, the police are already doing this and will continue to do so. It is right that they are reviewing the standards for building security. Over the years these have grown considerably in number, making a review sensible, but the police do not need a statutory duty to do this. In addition, Crime Prevention Initiatives Ltd, through Secured by Design, already works closely with standards test houses, manufacturers and, increasingly, with building developers. I am not persuaded that we should seek to prescribe its working model in legislation, as subsection (3) of the proposed new clause seeks to do.

Subsection (4) of the proposed new clause seeks to define the way in which the police guidance is used by local planning authorities. The reforms we in Parliament have made to the planning system continue to place safety and crime prevention as a key part of sustainable development. The National Planning Policy Framework—your Lordships have been in this Chamber when listening to discussions on that document—promotes the design of places that are safe and where crime and disorder, and the fear of crime, do not undermine the quality of life or community cohesion, so I am at one with the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, on this issue.

The recently published draft planning practice guidance, which supports national planning policy, covers safety, crime, anti-social behaviour and counterterrorism. It continues to highlight the importance of engagement with crime prevention design advisers and counterterrorism security advisers at local level.

Both the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Harris, asked what discussions there have been between DCLG and the Home Office. The noble Lord will be fully aware—that is why I am confident about replying on behalf of the Government even though my department is the Home Office and not DCLG—of the principle of collective responsibility. While DCLG takes the lead in consulting on changes to planning guidelines, these are government proposals and of course the Home Office has had discussions with DCLG on this and other issues. Councils will continue to be able to consider the locations and layouts of sites and proposals when drawing up local plans and deciding on individual applications. They do not need a further statutory duty to do this.

Turning to perhaps the most complex area—the review of housing standards, to which the noble Lord referred at Second Reading and again today—the review process is holistic, taking into account all standards applying to housing. The review is intended to make it simpler for local authorities to apply the right standards. Security is seen as one of those core standards; we want it to be an integral part of development at the right level where local authorities believe that this is necessary. That is the way we have consulted on proposals for national standards and we continue to work with ACPO—and Secured by Design, for that matter—to evaluate the best way forward.

The Government are currently working through the recent housing standards review to simplify the way in which technical standards such as those in Section 2 of the Secured by Design standards are used in new housing developments. Proposals on the recent consultation—about which I recently made a mistake: I said 31 October but it was actually 27 October and I apologise to the Committee for that error—explored how a national security standard could be introduced for the first time. The proposed standard includes two possible levels of specification, with the higher level intended to mirror the current standards in Section 2 of Secured by Design. The intention is not to weaken these standards but to ensure that households adopting the higher specification will benefit from the same level of protection as they do now.

A range of options for implementation have been proposed, including possible integration of these standards into the building regulations or allowing local authorities to retain discretion in requiring higher standards of security—as they do now—providing that there is suitable evidence of need, and that the viability of development is not unduly affected by such a requirement. These are matters on which the consultation sought views and which we are now analysing.

The fact that security is one of only four areas in which the Government are considering national standards amply demonstrates the importance of this issue, and underlines our continuing commitment to ensure that new homes are built from the outset with measures in place that we know will significantly reduce households’ vulnerability to burglary in particular.

However, moving from the current position to one where national standards are adopted brings with it some complexity. By necessity, this includes reassessing the way in which compliance can be most effectively delivered. The Government will be looking at responses to the consultation over coming weeks in deciding how to proceed; officials remain in regular dialogue with those supporting the national policing lead for crime prevention and representatives of Secured by Design. However, it would be wrong for me to pre-empt the outcome of the review at this time. I believe it would be wrong for this Committee to seek to pre-empt the outcome of that review at this time. For the reasons that I have outlined, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Harris, to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

My Lords, I am particularly grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Blair of Boughton and Lord Deben, and my noble friend Lady Smith for their support for the intention of this amendment. The point that the noble Lord, Lord Deben, made—that this is what sensible developers ought to do—is absolutely right. The problem is whether in circumstances where there is pressure on costs all developers will be so sensible.

The noble Earl, Lord Lytton, raised the legal status of ACPO, which I know is a matter of concern in a number of quarters, including the Home Office. This amendment does not specifically refer to Secured by Design or to the Association of Chief Police Officers. I did as shorthand, but I am aware that there are a lot of discussions going on at the moment about the future of ACPO and, going forward, whether any agglomeration of chief police officers should be in the form of a limited company will have to be revisited. The fact that it is a commercial initiative, as the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, rather disparagingly called it, does not alter the principle. The principle is that there needs to be a system of best practice that is duly recognised and takes note of the policing experience in reducing crime in a particular area.

This amendment does not refer just to housing. It also refers to developments such as schools, play areas and so on. It is about building security in at the earliest stage. I remember the very early involvement of the police in the discussions that took place about the building of Wembley Stadium and security in terms not only of counterterrorism but of the safety and everything else of the people using it.

I am grateful to the Minister for responding at length. He pointed out that this is still at consultation stage. I hope your Lordships will forgive me if I am not entirely uncynical about many consultations. Many government consultations now have the tone of, “We have decided what we are going to do. We will now allow a minimum period for you to comment on it, and then we will go ahead with it anyway”. However, let me be positive and assume that this is a genuine consultation—a genuine invitation with an open mind, which I think is the phraseology used in legal cases about consultation—to seek advice.

The advice that I am giving and that many others have given is that these proposals do not work. The Minister said that this is a new clause and is not in the Bill. That is exactly my problem with the Bill. It talks about anti-social behaviour and reducing crime. Here is something that is potentially going to make crime worse, and it is not in the Bill. That is why I have tried to introduce it into the Bill. The timing is extremely beneficial in that, assuming that the Government genuinely have an open mind on these matters, they have the opportunity of reading what is said in Committee today and considering further. I hope that the Minister will take it across to his counterparts in the Department for Communities and Local Government who might not otherwise be studying the Hansard of this debate quite so avidly.

The Minister said that he agrees about the importance of involving the police at an earlier stage. My understanding of the DCLG document—which is albeit just out for consultation at the moment, although the Government have had more than four weeks to consider the results of that consultation—is that the effect of the Government’s proposals is that it would not be open to a local authority to specify standards that go beyond the minimum or enhanced standards specified. You can have a local authority, locally elected, that says, “We would really like to go along with the Secured by Design standards, but we are not allowed to because we have to go along with either the basic level or the enhanced level”. The enhanced level is not the equivalent of the Secured by Design standard; it is a lower standard in practice.

Will the Minister tell us whether or not we will know the outcome of the Government’s consideration on this point before we come back to the Bill on Report? If this is not going to be possible, will we know the outcome of the consultation before Third Reading? If the Government go ahead with these changes, will Parliament have any right to intervene before they are made?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

The timing of the legislative programme is not in my hands, so I cannot give the noble Lord a clear response on that. Parliament seems to have a way of raising these issues, even if the Bill does not include a proposal from the Government in this context. Noble Lords are quite capable of raising issues at any point and the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, gives a perfect example of how Parliament can be used.

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

I am grateful to the Minister for addressing the question, but I am not sure that he answered the question, which was whether we would know the outcome of the consultation by the time the Bill reaches Report and Third Reading. If he is saying that the usual channels may decide either to accelerate the Bill—they have done very well so far—or that it is going off into the distant future, then that is a different matter. If he were to give an indication of the date when the consultation will be responded to by Government and government policy becomes clear, that would help us understand whether or not we will be able to return to it in the course of the Bill.

I suspect the Minister’s silence suggests that he does not have the information to hand. Perhaps he could write to me so that I am aware of the timetable for this. If security is a core standard, why will local authorities not be able to go to the higher standard? It would be helpful if the Minister could give us an assurance that they will be able to choose their standard and are not obliged to follow either the basic or so-called enhanced rate. In the hope that the Minister will enlighten us on some of these points between now and Report, I withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 56A withdrawn.