Lord Harris of Haringey
Main Page: Lord Harris of Haringey (Labour - Life peer)Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill
Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts“( ) Each police and crime commissioner shall appoint a non-executive board of between four and seven members.
( ) Such non-executive boards shall work with the police and crime commissioners to ensure good governance of—
(a) financial,(b) staff, and(c) equality,matters, and to support the police and crime commissioners in respect of their functions.
( ) Police and crime commissioners may make such arrangements as they see necessary to remunerate and reimburse expenses incurred by members of such non-executive boards.
( ) Appointments to and remuneration and expenses arrangements for such non-executive boards shall be subject to approval by the relevant police and crime panel.”
Lord Harris of Haringey
My Lords, I will speak also to Amendment 58. I begin by saying that I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington, for his support for the amendment. I understand that he is still abroad. The rapid pace with which we have gone through the first two days of Committee has confounded our original expectation that this amendment might not be dealt with until the third or fourth day. That is why he is not here to speak to the amendment.
Amendment 24 deals with police and crime commissioners, police and crime commissions or whatever else we might have. Amendment 58 is a parallel amendment that deals with the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime. The principle behind both amendments is to ensure that arrangements are written into the Bill that will ensure that there is good governance. The amendments follow the principle that we should use the best practice that we know exists in other sectors for the appointment of non-executive directors to support the general direction that is being set.
Amendment 24—and Amendment 58, which is exactly parallel but applies to the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime—requires each police and crime commissioner to appoint a non-executive board of between four and seven members. In the context in which we are operating, in which we are talking about police and crime commissions, a duty would still be placed on the police and crime commissioner, as constituted under Amendment 31, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, to appoint these non-executive board members. The task placed on those board members would be to work with the police and crime commissioners to ensure that there was good governance.
In the amendment, three areas are set out in which it is important that there is a very clear and transparent mechanism to support good governance in respect of the work of the police and crime commissioners or commissions, or of the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime in London. The first area is that of financial decision-making. Again, this will depend on the ultimate balance that is struck in each case between the commission or commissioner, or the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, and the chief officer of police. I am working on the basis that the police and crime commission or commissioner, or the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, will be corporation sole and will have responsibility for major decisions such as the placement of contracts, financial allocation and a number of other serious financial matters. They will also be responsible for receiving audit reports and will carry out the functions that in a private sector company and on many public boards would be fulfilled by audit committees. In a series of areas where financial decisions are made, it is important that they are seen to be made not by an individual but in a good governance context in which other people are involved.
The issue of staffing is similar. Again, there will be appointments to the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime or to the commission office where it will be important that the approach taken will be one of best practice and that there will be no question—as my noble friend Lord Hunt described—of someone appointing his or her chum to an office where they could end up setting the precept for a particular area. Again, it is important that there is a transparent and clear process with good governance. I suspect that there are many other staffing and human resources issues where the existence of non-executive board members who can deal with grievances, appeals and so on will be extremely valuable.
The third area that I identified in the amendment relates to the equality responsibilities that would be placed on the police and crime commission or commissioner, or on the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime. I refer to equal opportunities responsibilities and diversity. Again, this responsibility obviously could be exercised by an individual, but would be much better exercised with the opportunity for challenge by others, including non-executive board members. Some equality issues would involve looking inwards within the organisation of the commission or commissioner's office, or within the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, but some would be external and would involve looking at how the police service operates in that area.
In this respect, there are a number of ethical questions where having non-executive board members would be extremely valuable. The Human Rights Act places obligations on all public bodies to act in a way that is proportionate, appropriate and so on. Again, if this is left solely to an individual, the only outcome if there is a dispute is recourse to the courts. Having an ethical challenge mechanism built into the structure is important and helpful. The amendment also states that non-executive directors would be responsible not only for good governance, but could support the police and crime commission or commissioners, or the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, in their functions. That is deliberately phrased in a wide way, not in a way that requires things to be done in a particular fashion. It would enable certain functions or responsibilities to be delegated to support the work of the policing and crime commissioner or commission. It would enable individuals to be asked, for example, to investigate particular matters, issues or concerns from local communities, or perhaps to take an overview of particular concerns affecting those communities. An individual might be delegated on behalf of the commission or commissioner to oversee the way that stop and search is being used by the police force; or one or more non-executive board members might be tasked with looking at other specific issues. It is a way of ensuring that the workload of the person charged with this responsibility, whether the commission, commissioners or mayor’s office, could be spread and managed effectively. For that reason it is extremely important.
The amendment also makes arrangements that would ensure that these appointments, and the arrangements for remuneration of expenses, are subject to approval by the relevant police and crime panel. That could also apply in the Government's original model of the Bill. It would ensure that the other members of the policing and crime commission in the model envisaged in Amendment 31 would have responsibility for the oversight of the mechanisms by which these non-executive directors were appointed.
The reasoning behind the amendment is a desire to ensure that individuals do not act on their own. Clearly, if we have the model envisaged by Amendment 31, the policing and crime commissioner will act in accordance with a policing and crime panel and together they will form the commission. However, that does not remove the desirability of a requirement to have a non-executive presence in that structure. It would ensure that the elected members who are part of the policing and crime panel are leavened with other individuals who would act in a non-executive capacity. In circumstances in which a single individual fulfils this role—the Government’s preferred model—the amendment will ensure that that individual does not act alone and is not in a position where they can act capriciously. It does not undermine the principle that that individual is elected to fulfil a particular role in the Government’s model. However, it does address some of the concerns expressed by Members of your Lordships' House in this Committee and at Second Reading about ensuring that there is a structure around that individual which ensures that they cannot act capriciously. If you like, it is a bit like the Roman emperors who had around them someone to remind them that they were mortal. There is the danger that individuals who have this huge responsibility for perhaps very substantial areas of the country may lose sight of what is or is not reasonable. This is part of a structure of ensuring that they act reasonably, appropriately, proportionately and with the widest interests of the public at large.
That is not to say that I believe that if there was a directly elected policing and crime commissioner, they would automatically act capriciously; nor am I suggesting that the mere fact of being directly elected prevents it, or that your judgment automatically disappears because you are directly elected. I have been elected too often in the past to various bodies not to have that view. However, if you are a single individual whose checks and balances are remote and in arrears, you need that governance structure around you. If I were in that position, I would want to have it. I know of individuals who may find themselves in this position in future who would want to have that arrangement around them simply to ensure that there can be no question about the nature and quality of the decisions that they take, and that there is a structure around them that good governance follows.
That is the process that is envisaged in this amendment. The purpose is to make this work better and to avoid the concerns about the single individual. Even in the context of Amendment 31 and a police and crime commission, this is designed to ensure that that system works better. We all know of examples of organisations with executive members where the value of the non-executives who sit with them is extremely important in making sure that decisions are taken properly and that the right degree of external challenge takes place before those decisions are finalised. My noble friend Lord Hunt is very experienced in the health service—as am I at a slightly greater distance—and there are plenty of other examples. Even government departments these days have non-executive directors supporting the management board of the department concerned. Indeed, I believe that that was made a priority by the new Government, who perhaps wanted a different style of non-executive director from those which existed before, and who brought in some leading figures from the business community to fulfil the role. It is a concept with which the Government are familiar.
Again, the amendment is put forward to try to assist the Government to make whatever system emerges at the end of the strange sausage-making process that is our legislative system in this country work better. I hope that the Committee will support me in my belief that the presence of non-executive directors in this context will be extremely helpful. I beg to move.
Lord Soley
I rise briefly to support my noble friend who has brought forward a thoughtful amendment. I like this approach which is very much about good governance. He has picked the right numbers of between four and seven, and the right topics, those of finance, staff and equality issues. The only thing I am a little uncertain about, and which we might need to flesh out if the amendment is accepted, is how these non-executives would be appointed. I have some reservations about the commissioner being able to appoint all of them and I am not sure how the process would work.
At this stage I want simply to say that my noble friend, who has a lot of experience, has also thought carefully about the good governance issue. On these topics, non-executive directors can be very good at blowing the whistle and spotting problems as they come up. They are also good at taking some of the pressure off the commissioner, particularly on staff and financing. In that role, non-executive directors can be very productive. I wish to support my noble friend.
Lord Wallace of Saltaire
I apologise—I had that in my notes. We envisage this as a full-time appointment.
Lord Harris of Haringey
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, for replying on behalf of the Government and telling us that they continue in listening mode. That is always reassuring and I am grateful to the broadly positive response that he has given my amendment. In particular, he talked about making sure that there are adequate checks and balances. That is one of the themes that emerged at Second Reading and in the discussions of the Committee last week.
I acknowledge straightaway that I do not consider this to be a perfect piece of drafting. It is heavily influenced by me, although the Public Bill Office tried to remove some of the roughest edges. I am sure it could be improved. For that reason, it might not assist the Committee if it were agreed in precisely this form, but there are some important principles here. First, on the issue of “shall” versus “may”, I suspect that the need for robust governance arrangements would arise in precisely those circumstances in which a single commissioner in particular decided that they did not need some non-executive support. I am sure that a sensible individual in that role would want that support and that “may” would be absolutely adequate, but what of the very unlikely circumstance in which someone was elected or emerged in this office who was perhaps not as sensible as that? That is precisely why “shall” would help good governance.
It is also worth thinking about why this role is different from that of the panels. In the context of the Government’s original model, the panels in essence fulfilled a scrutiny role. They would also be party political bodies because they would all be local authority members. My experience of such arrangements, in four years serving as a member of the London Assembly, is that they are very political forums. I suspect that they would be so in respect of the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, and I cannot believe that they would be different anywhere else in the country. An elected politician would come to meetings to be confronted by other elected politicians, many of whom would be opponents or from the same party. As we all know, your relationships with colleagues from the same party are often as fraught as your relationships with the opposition. In that circumstance, we would get a degree of what I hesitate to call slapstick or knockabout politics. Serious issues would of course be pursued seriously, but there would be a political context and the pursuit of political issues—and by and large it would be in arrears.
That is a different sort of role from the one that is envisaged in this amendment, with non-executives who would approach this not necessarily from a political perspective but from the perspective of achieving good governance. They would take part in that process before decisions are taken, rather than after. That is why there is a distinction between the work of the panels and the work of non-executives. Clearly, if we are in the mode of Amendment 31, as opposed to the Government’s original mode, you have a slightly different relationship between the commissioner and the panel because they are all part of the policing and crime commission. I suspect that some of the same principles apply. In any event, good experience exists both in police authorities and in other areas with non-executives. They can bring a non-political or a separate expertise to the fore and can challenge in a way that is not seen as being political. That is potentially extremely important. It is unlikely that the panels are going to fulfil some of these requirements—they would of course question poor governance, but only after the event. This ensures good governance before decisions are taken.
For the last four or five years, I have chaired, in essence, the audit committee for the Metropolitan Police Authority. I am not clear, under the arrangements that we have here, certainly in terms of the Government’s original model, where audit matters would be considered, particularly if they are difficult audit matters. I can certainly remember—I will not go into them tonight—a number of difficult audit matters that came before my committee. Where will they be considered, particularly if they challenge a decision taken by a directly elected police and crime commissioner? The context, under the structure envisaged by Amendment 31, would be different, but where would audit issues be considered and received?
In the structure that I am used to we have a separation. People who are part of the finance committee and who take part in those decisions are not part of the audit panel. Again, that is quite common on public boards and private company boards. That distinction is important. One of the questions I would like the Minister to answer—before I perhaps get round to withdrawing my amendment—is where, under the Government’s preferred model, or indeed thinking ahead, as I am sure they are doing, under the Amendment 31 model, they envisage audit being considered, and how they envisage it being considered.
The Minister talked about the significant role of the chief financial officer and the chief executive in ensuring good governance. Of course they would be dedicated public servants who would be committed to good governance. If someone or an organisation is not convinced about the need for good governance, where would they report? In local authorities the chief financial officer, the monitoring officer and the head of paid service have specific legal responsibilities that ultimately mean making a public report to a full meeting of the local authority. What is the equivalent in the Government’s preferred model for how the chief financial officer and the chief executive supporting a police and crime commissioner would respond to governance issues? The principle also still has to apply in the context of the Amendment 31 mode that the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, will no doubt encourage us to support later on.
The question of how these individuals are appointed has been raised. I would expect these appointments to be made under Nolan principles. That could be specified in the Bill. I look forward to the advice of the Home Office Bill team as to how exactly this might look. That is certainly anticipated. The check and balance that was originally written into this amendment was that those appointments would have to be approved by the police and crime panel. In the case of the London Assembly it would be approved by the London Assembly panel—the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime. With an Amendment 31-type policing and crime commission, again we would have to decide whether the police and crime panel approving the recommendation was an adequate arrangement. Again, that is something that could be looked at when we come back to it, if and when we discover that the police and crime commission has become the Government’s preferred model. If it has not, we have to have that clarity written into this.
The point has been made about the dangers of alternative bureaucracy and the size of the offices. We need to pursue those issues and, if there is an issue about a potential alternative bureaucracy, that is precisely the circumstance in which you need a non-executive challenge. Before I decide whether to withdraw this amendment, I would be grateful for the Minister’s response particularly on the question of whom the chief financial officer and chief executive report to when there are issues about good governance, as well as on the other matters that I raised.
Lord Wallace of Saltaire
My clear understanding is that the chief financial officer would be responsible for producing accounts, which would be published each year. I will have to take advice on the exact external audit procedures, and I will come back to the noble Lord with that as soon as I can.
Lord Harris of Haringey
I am grateful to the noble Lord for his undertaking to come back on that, but it is not simply a question of the audit. It is a question, too, of the powers that exist for the chief financial officer or a monitoring officer in circumstances in which a decision has been taken of which they are questioning the legality, either in financial or other terms, where they report what that process is. As far as I can tell, the Bill is silent on that matter, and in the Government’s preferred model that becomes a particularly difficult issue because you are talking about a single individual and, effectively, those officers are questioning the probity of the person who employs them. If it is a single person who employs them, there is no safety belt. Those very important issues must be clarified in any event, whatever happens to the rest of the Bill; if this is going forward, that must be clear. In a local authority context it is clear and there is a process, but it is not clear in this context.
I am grateful for the fact that the noble Lord has indicated that he is still in listening mode and for his assurance that he will come back to me on some of these points. For the time being, therefore, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
“( ) The police and crime commissioner must meet representatives of each local authority in the relevant police area at least twice a year to discuss the policing needs of those authorities.”
Lord Harris of Haringey
My Lords, the purpose of my two amendments in this group, which are Amendments 25 and 59, is to place a requirement—a must requirement—on the police and crime commissioner, or in the model of Amendment 31 the police and crime commission, and in respect of Amendment 59 the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, to meet representatives of each local authority in their particular police area,
“at least twice a year to discuss the policing needs of those authorities”.
The purpose of the amendment is to add to what is already envisaged on public engagement, while talking about the specific relationship with the local authority. Ever since the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 was passed, and in many instances before, there has been a recognition of the importance of the police service working with local government to deliver more effective policies in the local area against crime and disorder. We are all well aware that partnership on these issues works better than one service simply operating in isolation.
I have fond memories of my time as a local authority leader when I led the London Borough of Haringey, which covered Tottenham and in particular the Broadwater Farm estate. I become leader two years after the riots on that estate. I remember that there was a ritual when every summer the police commander for the local area would come and see me and say, “We are very concerned about what is going on on the Broadwater Farm estate”. I would say, “Well, we as the local authority are very concerned about what is going on in the Broadwater Farm estate”. Both parties—or both agencies, as this is not a party-political point—covered their backs in the event of something terrible happening in future. The police had raised it with the local authority and we had raised it with the police. What of course was necessary, which was where we got to even before the requirements of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, was to have a proper dialogue. There was collaboration between the local authority and the police to identify what needed to be done to resolve particular issues. Some crime and disorder issues can be very serious, like some of the issues around the Broadwater Farm estate, but sometimes they are much more mundane—they are about the quality of street lighting or about recognising that there is a particular issue on a particular street corner, where the local authority and the police can make a contribution to reducing the risk or fear of crime in that area. It is about partnership and working together. I know that is implicit in what this contains but we are in a slightly different environment, particularly if the Government’s preferred mode of operation goes ahead where we have a single individual.
My noble friend Lady Farrington of Ribbleton talked in far more detail than I possibly could about the arrangements in Burnley, Blackburn and Blackpool and the conflicts that might arise, and how one would not necessarily assume that the interests of those communities would coincide. I simply recall, from my time as chair of the Metropolitan Police Authority, instituting a process of what we called borough visits to meet with each local authority’s leader and chief executive to talk about the policing needs of those areas. That has been carried on by my successors as police authority chairs. The current incarnations are called JEMs, or joint engagement meetings, but the principle is the same. It is about the importance of meeting the local authorities, not collectively but individually, to address the policing needs of those local areas.
I particularly recall the interesting experience when I attempted to do two of those borough visits on the same day. One was in a borough which was very much inner-city and faced all sorts of major inner-London problems. The other was in what I would regard as a quieter, less pressured area of London—very much a suburban area. In the morning, we spent a lot of time dealing with knife crime, gang-related violence and all the issues that were uppermost in the local authority world as well as in the policing world. In the afternoon, I was told that the biggest issue affecting that area was shed crime, with people breaking into garden sheds. I suspect that if you were in the inner-city part of London, you would be considered completely mad if you put anything of value in a shed at the base of a block of flats or even at the end of a garden, if you had such a thing. However, that was not regarded as the situation in a suburban area. You had very different approaches to what was needed from the local police service and what were considered as local priorities.
Setting a single set of priorities across the whole of London—I expect this would apply in Thames Valley, Lancashire, Northumbria or wherever else you might choose to be—needs to be informed by the concerns of local communities, and in particular by the contribution that individual local authorities can make where that series of activities is concerned. One debate we have had in this House, both on Second Reading and last week, has been about how to ensure that a single, elected individual, in the Government's preferred model, pays appropriate attention to all the areas for which they are responsible. In any event, whether it is a commission or an absolute paragon elected for a large area but who none the less recognises the importance of listening to every part of their area, that will be facilitated by a requirement to meet regularly with representatives of the local authorities concerned.
In many policing areas, I think we will find that there is a real problem of coherence. People describe London as being somewhere where everybody knows their part of it—as I understand it, there are one or two bits of London which would rather not be part of it; there are other parts which would be perfectly happy if those areas were not part of London, but I do not want to talk about that. The point is that London is enormously diverse; so is the Thames Valley. Even that strange entity, West Mercia, is a diverse area. This requirement to work with each local authority in an area is an important safeguard to ensure both that those communities are not forgotten and that whoever is in charge, whether it is an individual police and crime commissioner, a police and crime commission or, in London’s case, the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, is seen to be not only listening but collaborating and co-operating with all the local authorities in their area. Only through that collaboration and co-operation will you be able to make a real difference to crime and disorder in those areas. I beg to move.
Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton
My Lords, my noble friend has raised an important point. My title in your Lordships’ House is Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton, which is a district—a ward—within the city of Preston. However, in Ribbleton there are not exactly uniform views about what the priorities are. As a county councillor for that division of the county, I had to judge between different issues being raised by different parts of the community. I well remember a heated meeting where those who were aware of where drug dealers were operating were being asked to give the police access to their homes in order to watch and catch people. That applied to residents who did not live in the immediate area, but those who lived in the immediate area were, frankly, quite frightened about getting involved. It is very important that we recognise the local issues in terms of what the priorities are for local communities.
I am so grateful to my noble friend for raising this. It is critical that we allow a mechanism that is not top-down, where someone being elected on a manifesto based on A, B and C precludes people locally from raising issues that are of critical importance to their daily lives.
Lord Harris of Haringey
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who contributed to this important debate. I am particularly grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, who reminded me that while at Second Reading I put on record my policing interest, in this discussion I should have recorded my vice-presidency of the Local Government Association. Indeed, it was the noble Lord in a previous incarnation who invited me to take up this post.
I am grateful to the Minister first for his comments on audit. However, I still do not think that they address the specific point about when something goes wrong. As chair of an audit committee, my function is not just to receive the external audit but also to receive reports from an internal audit and to look at them. Those are often more time-consuming and raise much more difficult issues, particularly in terms of the current administration. That is an issue that needs to be addressed.
The thrust of the noble Lord’s response has been that somehow the panels can fulfil this role. I do not think that quite meets it. I realise that I am in danger of trying to help the Government do their job in trying to make this legislation work, but there are several levels at which, as I understand it, they wish to make the police more accountable and listen more to the people. One of those levels is force-wide, and I am sure the panels will be helpful in that process.
I correct the Minister because I am also speaking to Amendment 59, and local authorities are not represented in the arrangements for Greater London. There is a panel of the London Assembly, so none of the 32 London boroughs is automatically represented in that process. The panel would be operating, perhaps, force-wide, but this is about the relationship at local and community level. Of course there is an obligation in the Bill to listen to communities, but this is about relations with the statutory body that is responsible for that local area and has a full range of responsibilities in terms of education, housing, planning, street lighting and all sorts of issues. It is about dealing with the body that has the statutory responsibility and with which you must have partnership if you are to be effective in dealing with crime and disorder. That is why there is a need for direct contact with the local authorities concerned and why it needs to be with individual local authorities, not collectively, because it is about addressing the needs of individual communities.
In the model where the police and crime panel operates, all local authorities, outside London, may be represented. It will be a forum in which one district is perhaps arguing about the resources given to another district or about the approach. This is about identifying the local issues and how the police can work with the local authority to help resolve them. I do not think that this is covered by a requirement that says they may do this. I think that it is one of the areas where it is a central responsibility in terms of making it happen and making sure that partnership genuinely works right across the area. It is of course possible that in the Government’s preferred model, as opposed to the model that this House is considering, you could get elected as policing and crime commissioner with votes from just one part of the area, or even two-thirds of the area, and decide simply to concentrate on that part of the area as opposed to the other. This provides a mechanism which requires that you must at least listen to and liaise with the voice of the local authorities.
I am sure that the Government will continue in listening mode on this matter. On the assumption that that continues to be the case, and given the lateness of the hour, it would perhaps be otiose to divide the Committee at this stage. I therefore beg leave to withdraw the amendment.