Detainee Issues

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 18th July 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Young of Cookham]

Perhaps it would help my noble friend if I refer to the specific paragraph in Sir Adrian’s letter. He said:

“It was argued in number of responses to the consultation that there should be a post-notification process for individuals who have been mistreated following a failure properly to apply any new guidance or principles. This would enable them to seek redress. Reprieve and Freedom from Torture, in a joint submission, made substantive representations regarding the UK’s international obligations in this regard”.


I will write to my noble friend when I have discovered the other part of Sir Adrian’s recommendations, which builds on the current position, but makes more explicit that there is now an obligation, if people come across mistreatment, to pass it up the chain. I recognise that the paragraph I just read out was not directly relevant to my noble friend’s question.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

The Minister has revealed the Government’s recent steep learning curve on extraordinary rendition, helped along the path by the activity of my noble friend Lord Tyrie. Do the Government now take the view that extraordinary rendition and what happens to people so rendered could bring anyone complicit in it within the scope of the International Criminal Court? That seems the common-sense conclusion from what they have found.

[Lord Young of Cookham]

The noble Lord may be right. If it were an offence under the law just referred to, as Ministers are obliged by the Ministerial Code to abide by national and international law, they would be precluded from taking action that ran the risk of that breach.

G20 Summit

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Monday 8th July 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, this debate could and perhaps should have taken place a little earlier—ahead of the G20 meeting—but at least we now have the benefit of knowing the outcome of the meeting, and can make some assessment of it. It has been most excellently introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Howell, whose rotation off the chairmanship of the International Relations Committee is deeply regretted by all its members, myself included.

Our letter to the Prime Minister noted that the G20 was falling short of its earlier promise when it helped to handle the aftermath of the world financial crisis in 2007-09. Has the Osaka meeting changed that judgment? I do not think it has. It is still falling short of its ability to deal with a whole range of issues which are crying out for effective collective action—including, most prominently, trade policy and climate change—but that does not mean that we could do without the G20. To coin a phrase, if it did not exist, we would need to invent it, bringing together as it does the countries with 80% of the global economy, and bridging the divide between fully industrialised countries and those that are still developing. The G7, which has only industrialised countries, is not a substitute for that.

We should have no illusions about how alarming the situation on trade policy currently is. A whole range of unilateral, illegal protectionist measures initiated by the Trump Administration are shaking to its foundations our open-trading system, which has brought such benefits over the past 70 years. This is the most immediate and most fundamental challenge to what we frequently refer to as the rules-based international system, which it is in our national interest to support and strengthen. The Trump/Xi meeting dealt with some trade issues, but let us not kid ourselves. It was not a ceasefire, as it has been described by rather gullible journalists. It merely avoided making a bad situation a lot worse. What action are the Government taking to reverse that trend towards protectionism? What will be done to ensure that the World Trade Organization’s dispute settlement procedure does not collapse in a few months’ time as a result of the US refusal to appoint new adjudicators or panel members?

On climate change too, the result was certainly sub- optimal, but the commitment of 19 of the 20 participants to the Paris accords was, in my view, better than accepting the weasel words that the US would have preferred. The great challenge that lies ahead is in implementing and strengthening those Paris accords, inadequate as they certainly are, and that lies ahead, but I would like to know what strategy the Government have for doing better when the UN Secretary-General calls together a summit meeting on climate change this autumn.

I have two final points. Others have made the point that it is necessary to find some way of monitoring progress in fulfilling commitments in the periods between these annual meetings. I would like to hear what the Government think can be done about that. Suggestions have been made about the IMF or the OECD doing it; there are perfectly good ways in which participants could be brought up to the fact that they are not actually doing very much to fulfil the warm words they agreed at the last meeting. Secondly, I give three cheers for the successful conclusion of the EU-Mercosur agreement, which was announced during the summit, even though that achievement looks set to become yet another piece of Brexit-related collateral damage if the two aspirants to the Prime Minister’s post get their way and take us out of the European Union by 31 October.

Brexit: Stability of the Union

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 17th January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, future generations of historians mulling over and analysing the dysfunction and muddle of the Brexit negotiations will, I suspect, have particular difficulty understanding and explaining how the charge was led by a party that still calls itself the Conservative and Unionist Party and by the Democratic Unionist Party of Northern Ireland, the hardest and purest of Brexit supporters, despite the risk, I would say with some confidence, of actual damage to the United Kingdom’s own union and very possibly its unity. No amount of prime ministerial labelling of the union, metronomically, as “precious” will conceal that reality. So all credit to the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, for shedding some light on this rather neglected aspect of Brexit before it is too late to do anything about it except bemoan it.

At the time, were we warned about these risks that would be incurred, especially in Northern Ireland, if the UK voted to leave? Of course we were. A few days before the vote, the two Prime Ministers who did most to build the Good Friday agreement, John Major and Tony Blair, jointly gave a stark warning. Since then, precursors of the damage to come—discord over the role of the devolved Administrations in the Brexit process, failure to constitute an Administration in Belfast and the turmoil over the Irish backstop—have multiplied.

In Scotland and Northern Ireland, as others have said, there were clear majorities in favour of remaining in the EU. The democratic legitimacy of those votes is indisputable, but you do not often hear that recognised by supporters of Brexit—and you never hear it recognised by the DUP. Overriding that legitimacy with the leave votes in England and Wales is precisely the sort of majoritarian supremacy that fuels the cause of Scottish independence and of the union of the two parts of Ireland. Will that be different if Brexit goes ahead on the basis of leaving with the Prime Minister’s deal, or without a deal at all? I doubt that. The contrary is far more likely—and I would include Wales, even though its voters opted to leave.

The Government’s own studies indicate a considerable and continuing loss of economic growth as a result of Brexit, and the less prosperous parts of the country, among which Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland undoubtedly rank, are likely to suffer disproportionately. The much-trumpeted prize for the UK of having its own trade policy is likely to result in concessions to trade partners such as the US, Australia, New Zealand, Brazil and Argentina that will damage sheep and beef farmers in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales. Even fishermen, among the strongest supporters of Brexit, are likely to be disappointed as the cruel deception of the Government’s claim that access to markets and access to waters are totally different things is shipwrecked on the rocks of the EU’s interests in the post-Brexit negotiations.

Then there will be the discord that is likely to reign over the exercise of the UK’s miserably diminished influence on the shaping of EU policies post Brexit. Are there not likely to be differences between Edinburgh, Cardiff, and Belfast and Westminster and Whitehall over trying to influence trade and regulatory measures in Brussels? Will Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales not fight their corners in Brussels, thus further weakening the influence of the UK? Of course they will—and each setback in the unequal relationship between the UK and the EU will foster the sense of separation.

If even a part of these admittedly gloomy predictions is borne out, our union is in for a rough ride in a post-Brexit world. Would it not be more sensible and honest to recognise now that continued membership of the EU is far more likely to consolidate the unity of the UK than its leaving the EU, and then to give all four nations that make up the United Kingdom a say on whether to accept the deal that the Prime Minister has negotiated or whether to remain in the EU? Of course, that could result in an outcome similar to that in 2016, in which case it would have to be accepted, but we would at least have demonstrated that we had paid some attention to the attitudes and opinions of all parts of the union and that we regarded the stability of the union, which today’s debate has so usefully brought to the fore, as something that we not only paid lip service to but really meant.

European Union Referendum: Alleged Russian Interference

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Tuesday 19th June 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Young of Cookham]

If I may focus on the first part of the noble Lord’s question, which is about Russian involvement in covert activities, he may know that the Intelligence and Security Committee, on which two noble Lords sit, is currently investigating Russian involvement in the 2016 referendum and the 2017 general election. It makes sense to allow that important inquiry to be completed, and then we will have a clearer view of the impact, if any, of Russian involvement in the election, which is the subject of this Question. So far as Galileo is concerned, I commend the noble Lord’s ingenuity but I have listened to fellow Ministers give very adequate answers on Galileo and I will not attempt to rise to that level.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, will the Minister say whether the Government are satisfied that the Electoral Commission has access to all the rather complex means—obviously, I do not want to go into intelligence matters in this House—that foreign Governments have to interfere in our affairs? Is the Electoral Commission really equipped to carry out that inquiry in all its aspects?

[Lord Young of Cookham]

The noble Lord makes a very good point in that, obviously, it makes sense for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, not the Electoral Commission, to have overall responsibility for our relationship with Russia. It makes sense for the DCMS to have overall responsibility for “fake news” and for the Information Commissioner. It makes sense for the Cabinet Office to have overall responsibility for electoral law and a dialogue with the Electoral Commission. Where all these things come together, which I think is the noble Lord’s point, clearly, we need a collective view. It makes sense to await the outcome of the ISC inquiry that I mentioned a few moments ago, the DCMS inquiry into fake news that is currently under way, and the Electoral Commission inquiries into the referendum campaigns. When we have all that, we can stand back and see whether we have the right resources and the right information in the right place and come up with a collective view on the serious issue raised in the original Question.

Immigration Statistics

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Monday 12th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Young of Cookham]

The noble Lord will recall that this issue was debated extensively by your Lordships when the then Higher Education and Research Bill went through this House. When the Bill left this House an amendment was carried to delete overseas students from the migration figures. When that legislation hit the statute book, that bit was omitted. In the meantime, the ONS will continue to follow the UN standard, which is to count anyone who is here for more than a year as a long-term migrant. That practice is followed by the USA, New Zealand, Canada and Australia. There is an impact on services if people stay here for longer than a year, and the ONS, which is independent, has decided to continue to use the United Nations definition.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

Does the Minister recognise that his description of the Bill that left this House was not entirely accurate? It required the Government to change not the statistics but the policy; and to stop treating students as economic migrants, not to stop counting them. Would he further recognise that defective statistical methods have been used to count students leaving after the end of their student visas—one of the false reasons the Government have used to justify their policy?

[Lord Young of Cookham]

It is not the case that the Government’s policy has deterred international students from coming to this country. According to the latest figures, study-related visas were up by 8% in 2017 to more than 220,000. The Government have made it absolutely clear that there is no cap on the number of genuine international students coming to this country—they are welcome. We are the second most popular destination after the United States for such students and roughly 40% of our overseas students now come from China, in a competitive market.

Brexit: European Arrest Warrant (European Union Committee)

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 8th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, this House is no stranger to debates about the European arrest warrant. It is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, because when, as the then chair of the Sub-Committee on Home Affairs, I worked with the noble Lord, Lord Bowness, on the issue of protocol 36 and the opt-out and opt-in, in which the European arrest warrant was the jewel in the crown, she gave me a lot of helpful advice from her then position on the Justice Committee of the European Parliament.

This House has been much involved. I believe it was the report produced by the Joint Committee that the noble Lord, Lord Bowness, and I chaired, endorsed by the EU Select Committee, which marshalled the evidence that showed just how crucial the European arrest warrant is to law enforcement in this country and thus to our internal security, and which gradually helped to convince an initially sceptical Home Secretary in the coalition Government, one Theresa May, that it was in the national interest to retain the European arrest warrant in operation here even if one had, as we then did, the right to opt out of it. Apparently, that remains the view of the present Government, faced with the prospect of Brexit, and that is welcome indeed. Late converts are often the most convincing of advocates.

Today’s debate on the report of the EU Select Committee on judicial oversight of the arrest warrant, should Brexit take place, has been excellently introduced by my noble friend Lord Jay. It is remarkably timely, as negotiations are about to get under way in Brussels tomorrow, as I understand it, which will require this issue to be addressed. It is also timely because judicial oversight is one of the most sensitive and knotty issues that we will have to resolve if the operation of the arrest warrant is to survive Brexit at all. It is sensitive, above all, as several noble Lords have said, because it will involve not only disputes between Governments but the rights of individuals to have recourse to a judicial procedure if they wish to contest a warrant.

Behind and underlying today’s debate, it is important to remember, as has been stated, that if we leave without a deal, the European arrest warrant will simply cease to exist on that day. There is no plan B available here, as there is, for example, for trade in goods where, as we all know, there is the fallback of World Trade Organization rules. There is nothing for extradition other than a long, agonising effort to negotiate bilateral extradition rules that would, as the evidence we took in 2013-14 showed, replace an effective and rapid system with one that was slower, more costly and less effective.

Remember the years it took us to extradite from this country the terrorist who bombed the Paris Metro. Remember the fugitives from our justice system who lived in the style to which they were accustomed in the south of Spain, and the deeply politicised procedures that occurred when any attempt had to be made to bring terrorists in Ireland to justice. My noble friend Lord Jay spoke at some length about that so I will not go into detail, but it is a very important aspect of this issue. When the Banquo’s ghost of no deal flits through this Chamber, as it will, probably quite a few times, during 2018, I hope that those who are talking about it will just remember some of these facts.

The Government’s response to this report seems reasonably satisfactory as far as it goes, but frankly it does not go terribly far. One point on which I would be grateful if the Minister would speak is the following. On the standstill arrangements that the Government are about to start negotiating, which will follow immediately after our exit and will fill about two years after we leave, they seem to assume that this will automatically preserve the arrest warrant during that period. Will the Minister say whether that view is shared by the Commission? The many years it has taken to extend the European arrest warrant to Norway and Iceland, both third countries, seems to cast some doubt on that because, after March 2019, we too will be a third country.

The criticism of the Government’s response for not going very far relates, above all, to the lack of specificity on the dispute settlement procedures that we could contemplate. There are a lot of words but not much substance, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, brought out. Why are the Government not prepared to say straightaway some of the approaches they may be prepared to contemplate? We have heard about the EFTA Court with a British judge sitting in that court. Could that be an acceptable route to follow? Perhaps the Minister can say whether there are acceptable routes, and if so, what they are. The excuse that we do not want to reveal our hand is really wearing a little thin, as the clock ticks on. In this context, I have to say that I suspect very strongly that the Government are more concerned to conceal their hand from their own supporters, nurtured for many months on a diet of the demonisation of the European Court of Justice than they are to conceal it from their negotiating partners in Brussels. That cannot continue much longer.

Complex this issue may be, but there are matters of major importance at stake. I wish the Government well in their negotiations in this area. It is in all our interests that they succeed in preserving the European arrest warrant system from damage or impairment. Only those who believe in Brexit at any cost, as an article of faith, not a matter of choice, can think otherwise. The disappearance of the European arrest warrant system will be to lose control, not to take it back.