Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 7th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

I very much support what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, and add that it seems quite astonishingly narrow-minded and short-sighted to want to be rid of the European court in these circumstances. We heard at length last week about the effect on electricity, but there is a wider effect.

May I just put in a word of defence of the European court? I happened to visit it on numerous occasions. It has made some extraordinarily sensible decisions that have affected this country and particularly women, which is one of the reasons I support it. It is quite extraordinary that a Conservative Government, who I always thought had a broad view, should be quite unbelievably narrow-minded, and that some quite erroneous view of sovereignty should be taking over from the crucial role that the ECJ has to play in the work we are considering.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

I echo, from a non-legal point of view, the points made by the previous two speakers but, when looking at the European Court of Justice and its role under the protocol, I imagine that even the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, would not contradict the point that I am about to make, which is that the properly constituted British Government, supported by the properly constituted British Parliament, entered into a treaty that gave a role to the European Court of Justice. That is a simple fact. It is there, written. It is another simple fact that there is no provision in the protocol to remove that role of the European Court of Justice—none.

What we are talking about is a breach of our international commitments. I am sure one of the noble Lords on the Front Bench will again hotly deny that this is the case because, like the Red Queen in Alice, their only argument is, “It is so because I say it is so”. Fortunately, that is not a terribly convincing argument in this place, where occasionally—not all the time—reason has a way of prevailing. I should like to suggest that we recognise this reality, which is that the Government’s attempt to remove the European Court of Justice unilaterally from two international treaties, which they entered with the consent, support and approval of Parliament, is a breach of our international commitments.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, we had a brief debate on matters relating to the European court last week, which largely focused on the earlier parts of the Bill. It is helpful to have this opportunity to deal with some of these issues in more detail.

The agreement reached with the EU on the status and role of the CJEU in relation to the protocol and other parts of the withdrawal agreement was carefully crafted and informed part of the oven-ready deal the Conservative Party was proud to call its own. There is some logic in what Clause 20 seeks to achieve. If the protocol no longer functions as intended, the legal processes cannot either, but that is only if one accepts that it is acceptable to tear up a binding international agreement in the first place.

The power for Ministers to introduce some form of referral process is interesting and a little surprising. It seems to contradict the earlier power in subsection (2). From a practical point of view, would not any referral scheme work only if the EU and European court agreed to engage in the process? Would this point not need to be negotiated?

There has been a wide-ranging debate on these issues, but it seems that there are some very practical consequences of trying to put into place a new referral process while at the same time needing to negotiate with the organisation one has just torn up a formal agreement with. How would that work in practice?

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[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 56 deals with the

“Duty to seek an agreement on outstanding issues with the Northern Ireland Protocol”.


This amendment would make it a statutory requirement for the Government to seek a negotiated outcome with the EU and to exhaust legal routes under the EU withdrawal agreement before availing themselves of the powers in this Bill. The amendment would also require Ministers to provide regular updates to Parliament regarding the ongoing UK-EU negotiations.

In this amendment, we seek to bring together two issues in a single text: the negotiated settlement and the regular updates. This would ensure that the extraordinary measures in this Bill could not be used until all legal routes are exhausted. We know that the Government will say this amendment is unnecessary, yet the very existence of this Bill highlights the lack of good faith displayed by Ministers. We have been asked to trust in the new negotiations, but we have not yet had an update from the Foreign Secretary—although we are told we may get one later this week, and I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm that. Colleagues such as the noble Lords, Lord Hannay and Lord Kerr, often remind us of the Commission’s duties to the European Parliament, so why, after all this time, does the Conservative Party continue to sideline what they call the mother of Parliaments—this House? If the Government really are acting in good faith, they should take no issue with this amendment. It is a restatement of their own policy, coupled with a request for further information. I beg to move Amendment 56.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, I support this amendment. I have spoken on a number of previous occasions about the fact that we are fumbling around in the dark. The noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, made a noble attempt at an earlier stage in today’s debate to say something about what was going on but I am sorry to say that, if I was being impolite, I would say that what he said was the square root of nothing. Are we going to get something more than that? We ought to. That has been the practice of previous British Governments in negotiation as a third party when we were outside the European Union and in many other negotiations. I think it is pretty shocking that we are not getting that.

It also underlines a point which all our debates illustrate: that the Government have put the cart before the horse. Surely the right sequence would have been for the Government to enter into a serious process of negotiation from last February onwards; but they did nothing—absolutely nothing. We now know that nothing happened after February. As that process went along, they should have reported it to Parliament. At some stage or another, it would have been perfectly reasonable for the Government to say that we cannot go on like this for ever and, if we cannot get a negotiated agreement to sort out the implementation of the protocol in order to cure it of some of the imperfections which none of us contests, then we may have to go down a unilateral course.

If the Government had done that, I suspect that we would have had an agreement by now—but the lady who was Foreign Secretary at the time and who had her eye on higher things, which, alas, turned out to be a flash in the pan, went down another course, which was to put the cart before the horses. And that is where we are: with the cart firmly before the horses. Here we are, spending hours and hours discussing what we are going to do if this process of negotiation, which the Government say is their preference, fails. Well, the time to do that is when it has failed, when the Government have made a full and detailed report of why it had failed, and when we can see what the other side in the negotiation says about whether those reasons for failure are justified. Then Parliament can take a view on what to do next.

Instead of which, we are being asked to do all this now in the, alas, totally futile belief that this will somehow put the frighteners on Brussels. Well, it does not look to me as if Brussels is terribly frightened; nor has it been for many months. So I wish we could just get away from this and leave the process of deciding what we do if the Government’s preferred option fails, and then we will deal with that when we get to it. We will cross that bridge when we get to it.

[Lord Murphy of Torfaen (Lab)]

My Lords, I too support my noble friend’s amendment. When we look at this pointless and rather daft Bill, we realise that it has achieved absolutely nothing. They would have been more influenced by the man in the moon than by this Bill.

The Bill might have done something, but so far has done nothing, to achieve progress in Northern Ireland. I would be very interested if the people negotiating on the European Union’s behalf looked at a video of the last couple of hours’ debate in this Chamber. They would then realise that these are not the “technical issues” that we are told are being resolved at the moment. It is not about oranges, sausages and the rest of it; it is about people’s identity in Northern Ireland, whether they be unionists, who feel that their own British identity is threatened by the protocol, or nationalists, who feel that they are threatened in some other way.

The first thing the Government should understand is that in some ways the negotiations now have to be parallel: a negotiation between the European Union—with, as I said earlier, a much bigger involvement by the Irish Government—and the United Kingdom Government on the protocol itself, in parallel with negotiations to restore the institutions of the Good Friday agreement. Those institutions have effectively collapsed and there is a case for looking at them again. The noble Lord, Lord Dodds, referred to the Taoiseach’s comment about changing the rules on the way the Assembly and Executive operate—remembering, of course, that the St Andrews agreement changed the rules of the Good Friday agreement. But they were changed by agreement. That is the issue: they were not changed unilaterally by one side or the other.

In the next six months—I will come to that in a second—there should be a structured negotiation on the one hand with the European Union and on the other between the political parties in Northern Ireland and, where appropriate, on strands 2 and 3, with the Irish Government. I do not think that has entered the Government’s head over the past eight to nine months. For all sorts of reasons, which everybody knows about, they have not really been bothered; they have let things drift. There have not been proper negotiations. It seems to me that one of the Government’s most important responsibilities is to ensure that Northern Ireland does not go backwards 30 years—and it is quite possible that that could happen.

I think the European Union sometimes does not understand the absolute uniqueness of the Northern Ireland situation, of the Good Friday agreement and of the identity issue. There is no comparison anywhere within Europe, perhaps even in the world, with what has happened in Northern Ireland, and it seems to me that that has not been appreciated by the people doing the negotiating.

Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 31st October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bruce of Bennachie (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to support these amendments tabled by my noble friend Lady Suttie and signed by the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, and I thank both of them for the way they have introduced them. This is a Foreign Office Bill, but its implications are vital for the people of Northern Ireland and for the people of the United Kingdom, because it is a political Bill which is dangerous in terms of what the Government are playing with.

At the heart of the protocol is the debate about unfettered access to both the UK market and the EU single market. Of course, unfettered access to both those markets is what we had before we left the European Union, and leaving that Union inevitably led to a situation where an open border between the UK, GB, Northern Ireland and the EU is not compatible with the agreement post leaving the EU. That is clearly the source of the problem—but everybody knew that at the time when the agreement was struck and signed, including the UK Government and Northern Ireland politicians. However, on the face of it, from all the implications that the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, quoted, there is a clear majority for moving on—not for setting aside the protocol or, by implication, the trade and co-operation agreement or, frankly, the Bill to repeal EU law, when we have sweated for the past several years to transfer that EU law into UK law.

Do the Government really want to provoke a trade war when our economy is in such a fragile condition? The Prime Minister says, and I agree, that we are facing a profound economic crisis. Is tearing up the protocol more or less likely to alleviate this or help recovery in Northern Ireland? The issue, therefore, is surely not how to achieve the minimal friction. We all agree that we want minimal friction; we want as free access as we can get. The issue is not how to achieve it but how we can get it to the lowest compatible level for business to carry on with minimal cost and delay.

The case for consulting the Northern Ireland Assembly is overwhelming. Not least, it is not just a matter of the numbers. The whole point of legislatures is that they are where compromises can be negotiated and struck; where the balance can be found. And there is the rub. The DUP insists that the Irish Sea border must go. As I have said, it would of course be ideal to have no borders, but that would be inconsistent with being outside the single market and the customs union. So a low-friction agreement on implementation of the protocol appears to be the answer, appears to have wide support and could surely be negotiated with good will on all sides.

Unfortunately, as I understand it—and I would be happy to be contradicted when the DUP enters the debate—the DUP is insisting on what it knows to be an impossible solution: no borders. The party has said that, unless it gets that solution, it will never re-enter the Assembly or the Executive. The Good Friday agreement—the Belfast agreement—is a power-sharing arrangement between the largest nationalist and largest unionist grouping. It is not a majoritarian arrangement, as the DUP rightly insists on telling us—but nor is it a never-ending veto. To share power is to seek and find compromise. Refusal to do so is to deny the spirit and probably the letter of the agreement. It is to deny democracy. Most important of all, it is to deny the people of Northern Ireland the delivery of essential services that they require and that they voted for—and, as the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, said, they desperately want solutions to be addressed.

So we are facing the prospect of a fresh election. I do not think anybody wants an election, and nor does anybody believe that it is likely to make a huge difference; it will not change much. I hope that it might further strengthen the Alliance but, on the whole, it is not likely to make a huge difference. If the DUP, before or after the election, blocks any compromise—I repeat, any compromise—is it not time to reconsider the arrangement? I have already said that power sharing requires compromise. Should refusing to compromise question the right to share power? Is it not time for some hard consideration of the rights of the people of Northern Ireland—their rights to have a functioning Government, to move forward and to have a solution that is based on reality, not fantasy?

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

I support the amendment, so ably moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, for a simple reason. It relates to what is frequently called the “democratic deficit”—a phrase that often finds itself in the mouths of those who support this Bill, among whom I am not numbered. They talk about the democratic deficit in Northern Ireland mainly in respect of the fact that the people of Northern Ireland do not have a say over the legislation for the single market, which will be passed in Brussels. They erroneously say that that is the only place in Europe where that happens. That is untrue; it is the same for Norway, which has no say over legislation passed in Brussels but accepts it when it is sent through on a fax. So the use of the words “democratic deficit” by the supporters of the Bill is in any case a bit erroneous. It is even more erroneous when you consider that the people of the Northern Ireland actually voted to remain in the European Union; that surely is something of a democratic deficit.

These amendments, which I imagine the Minister will explain the Government cannot support, are also an attempt to address the democratic deficit, to say that the people of Northern Ireland collectively should have some say in the operation of this deeply flawed legislation. So why will the Government oppose it? We know why: because a majority of Members of the Assembly who were elected in May have said they do not want any of it, and that would not be helpful to the Government’s objectives. When you bandy around phrases such as “democratic deficit”, you should follow them through to their logical conclusion, and that logical conclusion is in the amendments that the House is now debating.

[Lord Browne of Belmont (DUP)]

My Lords, the amendments would subject aspects of the Bill to the approval of the Northern Ireland Assembly. However, my contention is that they will work only if preceded by a prior vote on the protocol itself in accordance with the standards of cross-community consent put in place for the controversial matters set out by the Belfast/Good Friday agreement.

The Good Friday agreement is now very vulnerable because of the approach of the European Union in relation to two key principles at the heart of it. First, the Good Friday agreement is predicated on a commitment to affording the interests of both communities parity of esteem. The interests of unionism have not been afforded parity of esteem vis-à-vis those of nationalism with respect to the protocol. While the protocol represents an existential threat to all that unionists hold dear and is rejected by all the unionist parties, it authenticates that which nationalists and republicans desire: the breaking of the UK economy. Secondly, the Good Friday agreement is predicated on a commitment to non-majoritarian politics, which means that controversial decisions have to be made on the basis of cross-community consent. Again, that has been cast aside.

In the first instance, the EU sought to pressure the UK Government into the protocol without affording Northern Ireland any say in the matter, notwithstanding the fact that the effect of the protocol is to slash the value of the Northern Ireland vote, as 300 areas of lawmaking to which we are subject are taken from us and made by a legislature of a foreign power. When the EU finally agreed that the Northern Ireland Assembly should be given some say in the matter, it insisted for some bizarre reason that it should happen four years afterwards. It made provision for it to continue for at least another four years without cross-community support, resulting in eight years of government outside the confines of the Belfast agreement, which could of course continue indefinitely with regular four-year extensions.

That is the height of irony because anyone who studies democracy will know that leading academics in the field, such as Professor Arend Lijphart, are very clear that the EU is one of the most consensual, non-majoritarian polities in the world today. That the EU decided to betray its own commitment to non-majoritarianism by going out of its way to impose majoritarianism on a polity that it knew was based on non-majoritarianism is quite extraordinary.

This is a major problem not just for the Good Friday agreement but for the protocol. The protocol subjects itself to the Belfast agreement in all its dimensions through Articles 1 and 2. That is a problem for those who wish to argue that international law constrains those seeking to address the clear injustices of the Northern Ireland protocol, because Article 3 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is very clear that:

“When a treaty specifies that it is subject to … an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty prevail.”


Given that the convention also sets out mechanisms, such as Article 56(1)(b), whereby a state party can lawfully and unilaterally withdraw from a treaty, the refusal of the EU to amend the protocol so that it is properly brought into line with the prior treaty clearly gives grounds for our withdrawal.

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[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

I am most grateful to the Minister for giving way. Could he perhaps give an instance in which Norway has not immediately adopted a piece of European legislation since the EEA agreement came into effect?

[Lord Caine (Con)]

The noble Lord is a former diplomat. He is a far greater expert on these matters than I will ever be. However, my noble friend Lord Hannan has just whispered in my ear “the post office directive”. I will come back to the noble Lord with further details.

Genocide Determination Bill [HL]

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

2nd reading
Friday 28th October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the right reverend Prelate, who, like other speakers, set out the route by which we arrived at this Second Reading of the Bill—it was painful and too long. I support the Bill for a very simple reason: it helps to fill a gap in the implementation of our British international obligations under the 1948 genocide convention, signed and ratified by this Parliament, but all too often overlooked when heinous crimes are actually being committed. It is thus an essential reform, if we mean it when we say that we are stalwart backers of the rules-based international order.

As other speakers have said, the 1948 convention was of course a response to the Holocaust, designed to give effect to the worldwide feeling of revulsion and to the cry of “never again”. Unfortunately, that cry has proved to be grossly overoptimistic and, since then, there has been a rising number of instances of genocide. Some of them—those in Rwanda and Cambodia and at Srebrenica—were tried and punished, however belatedly, in international courts, but many were left untried and unpunished. Most shamefully perhaps of these were the genocide against Iraqi Yazidis by IS and the treatment of Rohingya Muslims in Burma—and there have been others.

Unfortunately, and misguidedly in my view, our Government have, so far, declined to take any steps to define emerging acts of genocide, either ones in the making or even those that are under way. They have sheltered behind the excuse that the determination of genocide lies in the hands of international tribunals, even when they know perfectly well, as we all do, that in some instances—the Uighurs in Xinjiang, for example —such a determination by an international tribunal will likely never be forthcoming. As someone whose conscience was scarred by sitting as Britain’s representative on the UN Security Council during the Rwanda and Srebrenica genocides, I say that this excuse—that is what it is—is shameful. It has been called a Gordian knot, something to be cut with a knife, but I would call it a Catch-22: a convoluted way of ensuring that nothing is done to determine whether a genocide is taking place, even when we know that it is.

This Bill will remedy that lacuna in our performance of our obligations under the genocide convention. It will not in itself prevent further genocides, but it will be a building block in deterring them and provide a basis for taking action against those perpetrating such appalling crimes. For the benefit of those who have marshalled the arguments in the FCDO, for which I used to work, I add that it would also, incidentally, provide a safeguard against excessively loose accusations of genocide. I hope therefore that the Government will feel able to assist the Bill’s passage into law in both Houses.

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[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his response. In his concluding remarks, I heard him say that the Government “are continuing to look at” this question, which at least leaves a door ajar. I therefore hope that the Government will support the committal of this Bill to a Committee of the Whole House, and that we can then start to look at the detail he has been discussing. I was very struck by his answer to my intervention, which was about the Human Rights Council but also the implications for the Security Council. Some countries veto any kind of action being taken on any issue concerning human rights, crimes against humanity, genocide or whatever it may be, on the “ladder” that the noble Lord, Lord Collins, was right to refer to.

We have heard a series of compelling and powerful speeches from all sides of the House on why our response to this horrific and grotesque crime of genocide must change. The noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, a former Minister, endlessly had to give the same arguments from the Dispatch Box that the current Minister has given today. We have heard these arguments as recently as this week, in a Procurement Bill Grand Committee debate about forced organ harvesting of Falun Gong and Uighurs in Xinjiang. In the Moses Room, the Minister said that this is a matter for the courts and not something on which the Government can decide. Yet little changes, even when the courts do decide—as in Germany recently, where, on the issue of the Yazidis in northern Iraq, the courts found that there was genocide. Why has that not changed the definition we are able to make, at least on that significant point, without there having to be further intervention?

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

Both the noble Lord, Lord Mann, and the Minister recognised that these are very complex matters. Surely, the answer to that is to say, “Yes, they are very complex matters, and that is why we need legislation such as that put forward by Lord Alton”. That would enable a court—not the Government, not Parliament—to say, “Yes, that is genocide”, or, “No, sorry, it isn’t genocide but it is a crime against humanity”. That is the case for this legislation and the very complexity of it.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

It is indeed. As our former distinguished ambassador to the UN has reminded us, we have had our consciences scarred so many times, whether in Rwanda, which my noble friend referred to earlier, or any of these other situations. We have a duty to act, yet, as he also said, what we have at the moment is a Catch-22 situation where we suggest that something is being done when we know that it is not.

The noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, with all the authority of a former Defence Secretary and Cabinet Minister, said that this is about not just good law but what we are compelled to do, and that it is consistent with our policy that this is a matter for the courts.

The noble Baroness, Lady Sheehan, quoted Raphael Lemkin’s role. More than 40 of his family were murdered in the Holocaust. He gave us this word “genocide” to answer the question that Winston Churchill posed about why this was a crime that we could not even describe.

The right reverend prelate the Bishop of Exeter reminded us of our commitment that we have to honour under recommendation 7 of the Truro report, which the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, referred to. He also reminded us of a quotation, which the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, referred to as well, from William Wilberforce: you can choose to look the other way but you cannot say that you did not know.

The noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin, said that we should not even need to have this debate. The noble Lord, Lord Mann, quite rightly said that there will be detail that we need to resolve and that this is not an answer to all these problems—I never suggested that it is.

I was very struck by the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Darzi. I have read The Forty Days of Musa Dagh by the Jewish writer, Franz Werfel. It is a novel about the experiences of the Armenians during their genocide. It is a very powerful account. It is not surprising that Adolf Hitler had that Jewish writer’s books burned, because, as the noble Lord told us, Hitler himself said, “Who now remembers the Armenians?”—effectively, “Why should we worry when nobody else seems to worry?”

I have been to Nagorno-Karabakh with my noble friend Lady Cox. I took my daughter with me, and said to her, “If ever you go into public life, speak up for those for whom there is no voice”. My grandfather gave me pictures that he brought back from the Holy Land during the First World War that showed executed Armenians who had been murdered as the Ottoman Turks retreated from Jerusalem. We saw those same photographs in the genocide museum in Yerevan. I was personally very taken not only by what the noble Lord, Lord Darzi, had to say but by what everyone has said in this debate.

This Bill should be committed to a Committee and we should have further discussion. We should thrash out the details and honour the promises that were given to me by two former Foreign Secretaries, who are also now former Prime Ministers. We should be as good as our word in politics. They said that this would be reformed. This Bill provides an opportunity for it to be reformed. I commend it to the House.

China: Security and Trade (IRDC Report)

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 20th October 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, particularly since he referred to a couple of themes I will mention myself: the pitiful state of our international aid performance and how that affects competition with China, and climate change.

We should perhaps be thankful for small mercies: we are debating this valuable report from the International Relations and Defence Committee a mere 13 months after it was published and nearly a year after the Government’s response to its conclusions and recommendations. I join those who say that if we cannot remedy that sort of delay, we are not performing very effectively. However, I would not give any criticism whatever to the excellent introduction and presentation by the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, at whose feet I sat for the years I was on the IRDC—not, I hasten to say, when this report was being written—and the noble Lord, Lord Howell of Guildford, who started that committee off on its voyage of discovery.

What a year it has been. It has upended some of the foundations of both the report and the Government’s response, principally with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and it is now concluding with President Xi’s likely coronation for a further five years in power—or perhaps longer. It is no wonder that the Government are said to be going to revisit their pre-predecessor’s security review; it would certainly be welcome to have the Minister’s indication on the timing of that when he replies to the debate.

The first requirement for such a review would be the rather overhyped “tilt” in our security and defence policy towards the Indo-Pacific region—overhyped because not much has actually happened since it was proclaimed, other than the very welcome AUKUS agreement over the provision of nuclear propulsion submarine technology. In any case, the trouble about a tilt towards something is that it is necessarily a tilt away from something else, and this is hardly the time—following the invasion of Ukraine and Russia’s nuclear sabre-rattling—to be tilting away from European security, which surely remains at the heart of this country’s overall security and to which NATO has now committed itself with renewed vigour and determination. How do the Government plan to adjust that balance or, I suggest, potential imbalance? Do the Government recognise that perhaps the best contribution Britain could make to the security of Taiwan is to ensure that Putin’s Ukraine gamble fails?

It was somewhat surprising to see nothing in the report, or in the response to it, about China’s role as a nuclear weapons state, one which without much shadow of a doubt is substantially increasing its nuclear capabilities and arsenal. The need to draw China into a serious discussion of strategic stability between the P5 recognised nuclear weapons states is surely more necessary than ever, however daunting the obstacles may now look in the short term. What is the Government’s view and policy on that critical issue?

I found some contradictions, in both the report and the Government’s response to it, between the section on China’s role in the multilateral system, on which the report and the Government’s response were critical and rather negative, and what was said about the handling of some of the vital global multilateral challenges such as climate change and trade rules—and one should probably add health pandemics to that list. The report states bluntly:

“The challenge of climate change cannot be addressed without engagement with China.”


That surely cannot be gainsaid, in which case we will have to accept that China will need to play a major role in the search for solutions to these challenges. There I slightly differ from my noble and gallant friend when he said that we must lay down the rules; good luck to him, going off to the Chinese, telling them that we need their full commitment to climate change and saying, “By the way, here are the rules”. That sort of approach may be manageable with Russia, which can be treated as a pariah state, but it cannot be successfully used with China.

The problem of China’s human rights record, which several noble Lords have referred to, clearly cannot, should not and must not be ducked—whether one is talking about Xinjiang or Hong Kong. However, we need a rapier rather than a battle-axe when responding to the abuses taking place. Do the Government agree with that analysis? By the way, how will we handle China’s bid to join the CPTPP if, as is to be hoped, we succeed in joining that group before China does and thus acquire a say in China’s accession? How will we use that say?

In conclusion, I add one caveat to the committee’s broadly very welcome call for a clear British strategy towards China. It must surely be evident that Britain cannot, on its own, hope to fashion or apply such a strategy. We must work one out in concert with our main allies and partners. We also need to recognise that we will not get a lot of support for such a strategy from the wide range of countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, which have been referred to by many participants in this debate, if we frame it simply as a “with us or against us” choice and, even more so, if we continue to shrink our overseas aid contribution to helping these countries face their own main challenges. We need to reach out to like-minded countries to fashion this strategy and not simply wrap a towel around our head and produce it ourselves. I noticed that the advice that the Foreign Minister of the European Union gave to the Heads of Government who are meeting today on toughening up the EU’s policy towards China bore a singular resemblance to the views expressed by many noble Lords around this Room this afternoon —so I think we know where to start.

Aiden Aslin and Shaun Pinner

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Tuesday 28th June 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord will be aware, prisoners of war cannot be prosecuted for taking part in direct hostilities. The whole process is about their early release, and they must be released and repatriated without delay at the end of hostilities, if not before. Certainly, that is the case we have been making. I can share with the noble Lord that, of course, these situations are extremely sensitive, but we need to remind Russia that it has an obligation to ensure it upholds the principles of IHL.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, can the Minister say what contact, if any, the Government have had with the Red Cross, whose role is very clearly defined in terms of the Geneva conventions and prisoners of war? It was very active in rescuing a lot of people from Mariupol and therefore has no problem about contact with these illegal authorities.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, we are engaging directly with all agencies on the ground. The noble Lord mentions the Red Cross; of course, it has played an important role in reaching many communities within Ukraine, including those in the occupied areas, and we will continue to engage with it. But even an organisation such as the Red Cross is facing real challenges in this respect.

Ukraine: Defence Relationships

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 9th June 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, the timely, multi-headed debate of the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, so well introduced by him a few minutes ago, surely requires us not only to recall but to act on Keynes’s dictum: “When the facts change, I change my views.” This is because an awful lot of facts have changed in the last few months which fundamentally affect our national security interests, and it is no good ignoring the need to change the conclusions we may previously have drawn. To recognise the need for change does not require us to admit that we were wrong before; it is just common sense.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has quite simply torn up the post-Cold War rule book on European security we all agreed to in Paris in 1990, as well as some of the basic precepts of the UN charter. The new Cold War is not going to be over any time soon; the war in Ukraine is going to require much determination and unity with our NATO and EU allies, if it is to be brought to a conclusion that does not reward Russia for its aggression and does not merely represent a prelude to further hostilities. That will require hard thought about what we ourselves are prepared to contribute to a newly shaped European security order; it will require more resources, both military and economic. It is not a beauty contest between allies. Evidently, there are consequences and reordered priorities for those—at the time, I believed they were quite well marshalled—in the integrated defence review. There should be no shame or defensiveness about admitting that. Every one of our partners is having to reorder its priorities, and some—Germany in particular—are doing so already in a much more substantial way than we have yet done.

The Indo-Pacific tilt, of which the Government are so proud, is not rendered inoperable; China’s rise and ambitions warn against that. However, the European theatre, and countering Russia’s actions, have again become our top priority. I suggest that we need to pay more attention to Africa, where we should be working in close concert with our European partners and where, together, we could make a real difference. That brings any analysis to our relationships with the EU, its member states and within NATO. Instead of working ourselves up into a frenzy about a European army, or the supposed threat from President Macron’s strategic autonomy, we should recognise that the rise in defence spending right across Europe is precisely what we have been calling for over decades. We need, as a crucial player in European security—and, with France, one of Europe’s two nuclear powers—to be there shaping its form and content, contributing constructive thinking and co-operation, not barracking from the side of the pitch.

That sort of constructive approach is what our principal ally, the United States, would like to see us making. We really should not, yet again, fall into the trap of thinking that we know better than it does what is in the US interest; we have done that quite often in the past, and it has proved pretty painful. The reality is that these fundamental shifts in the security structures around us present us with both opportunities as well as risks and costs. However, those opportunities will be realised only if we show a decent respect for other people’s priorities and not just for our own. That was how NATO was successfully fashioned in the late 1940s by Ernest Bevin, and that is how the NATO of the 2020s will be strengthened if we have the wisdom to throw our weight behind it.

Queen’s Speech

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Wednesday 18th May 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, any contribution to this debate must surely begin with Ukraine because that crisis is transforming radically so many of the parameters which previously defined the international scene in which we lived and operated. I will make three points on Ukraine.

First, we outsiders should, I suggest, avoid two extremes—both now and when the warfare ceases and diplomacy and negotiations begin, as they must sooner or later. We must not bully Ukraine into agreeing to terms which they believe to be unacceptable. That was the mortal sin of the 1938 Munich agreement and of Yalta. The other is to bid up those terms from afar with talk of engagement with Russia having ended, and with sweeping definitions of the geographical scope of any settlement. Secondly, we need to realise that the strongest card the Euro-Atlantic community has in its hand is its unity. This is not a beauty contest between its members; we and Ukraine need to recognise that. Thirdly, we need to do better on admitting Ukrainians who are fleeing for their lives. The Government’s response in that respect still falls well short; in particular, short of that of our continental neighbours.

If Ukraine has changed so much, how then does it affect our still excessively fraught relationship with the EU? It surely demonstrates the need for much closer and more structured co-operation on crisis management, economic sanctions and other aspects. This is not the time to drift into a confrontation over the implementation of the Northern Ireland protocol or to threaten to take unilateral action to set aside explicit provisions in the withdrawal agreement. That is the height of irresponsibility.

A better course would be to negotiate in good faith and with flexibility on both sides, with the aim of agreement on the protocol’s implementation by the summer break but with any wider governance issues, such as the role of the European Court of Justice, to be reconsidered at the time of the 2024 review of the protocol—when it will be possible to do that on the basis of solid evidence about what, if any, changes need to be made. There are so many ways in which the UK-EU relationship could be improved that are currently being blocked, in some cases unjustifiably, by this frozen negotiation over the protocol.

The Ukraine conflict has accentuated and brought into sharper focus the existential challenge to the rules-based international order which has been under way for some time now. The Government, quite rightly in my view, regard the preservation and strengthening of that order as being in this country’s fundamental national interest. But how much credibility does that policy position have in the outside world when legislation is brought forward and enacted which is inconsistent with our international obligations? That was the case with the internal market Bill, with the original version of the external operations Act, with the Nationality and Borders Act, and with our resiling from the UN target of 0.7% GNI for overseas aid, enshrined still in our domestic law but not being honoured. Now there is the threat unilaterally to set aside parts of the Northern Ireland protocol. I suggest there is very little credibility if we cannot close the gap between what we say and what we actually do.

Many aspects of last year’s integrated review need careful consideration in the light of the Ukraine, Covid and climate crises. Is the balance unchanged between the weight we give to European security on our doorstep and the Indo-Pacific tilt which the review proclaimed? I doubt it. Are we paying enough attention to our relations with the countries of Africa, where this country really could make a difference with trade, investment, aid and peacekeeping support, or are we taking our eye off that ball? Are we allowing the main instruments of our soft power—the BBC World Service, the British Council and the worldwide contribution of our universities—to wither on the bough for lack of resources? Are we doing enough to prepare for the next global health pandemic that comes along, as it surely will? Are we shaping an energy policy which will both reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian oil and gas and effectively combat climate change?

We are living now through a period when our foreign and security policy decisions really matter, in a way they perhaps have not to the same extent since the end of the Cold War some 30 years ago. I wish I was more confident that we were getting them right.

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 7th April 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, it is a convention to congratulate the noble Lord in whose name a debate is being held. On this occasion it is more than a convention, since the noble Lord, Lord Polak, has carefully drafted the title of the debate so as to recognise that, however much we may deplore and indeed condemn some of Iran’s regional activities, to have linked those issues with the resumption of the JCPOA on Iran’s nuclear programmes would have doomed the venture from the outset. That trap has been avoided—although I noticed that the noble Lord managed to slip back into it several times—and that is welcome. Resumption of the JCPOA is a matter of the highest priority and remains so despite the distractions of the crisis in Ukraine. With negotiations in Vienna at a delicate stage, I do not intend to say any more on that matter, except to point out that the JCPOA is so far the only way that has been put forward of avoiding Iran acquiring the capacity to make weapons-grade material, without the use of force.

The “regional issues” in which Iran is deeply involved are numerous—far too numerous, I would say. They include Yemen, where the announcement of a two-month truce is obviously welcome but does not take us very far, Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, Iraq, Gulf security and Afghanistan—quite a list. In some, that involvement is clearly contrary to our own interests and to the overall peace and security of the whole Middle East region; in others, Iran’s role is ambiguous and in some, such as Afghanistan, it has the potential to be positive. The one common feature is that we need to engage in a continuing dialogue with Iran on all of them. In recent years we have not done that, but the hard fact is that none of those trouble spots can be calmed down or resolved without the involvement of Iran, the most populous, and one of the most powerful, states in the region. Nor can they conceivably be resolved singlehandedly by Iran on its own terms. So the case for more active regional diplomacy on our part is a compelling one, and I would welcome it if the Minister would recognise that.

However, I hope that we will look beyond the individual problems, if we engage in a dialogue with Iran on these issues, and take a broader regional approach, an approach that recognises one, perhaps unwelcome, truth—that there will not be peace and stability in the Gulf and the wider regions of the Middle East and central Asia if Iran is not encouraged to play a constructive role commensurate with its size, geographical situation and long historical and cultural record. The most ambitious form that such an approach might take would be the establishment of a regional grouping which would commit all its members to respect the independence and territorial integrity of their neighbours, refrain from meddling in their domestic affairs and build up much closer economic co-operation between them. That may sound a trifle ambitious in present circumstances, but without some overarching set of rules and objectives, individual disputes will be all the more difficult to resolve peacefully. It is better surely than to see the region slip further towards chaotic turmoil—and better, above all, than to see it become the focus of a nuclear arms race.

Can the Minister say, at the end of the debate, whether what I have said bears any resemblance to the Government’s views and objectives?

Ukraine: War Crimes Allegations

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Monday 4th April 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

Of course I will be pleased to meet the noble Lord. As I have said right from the start of this conflict, we are working across parties and across your Lordships’ House to bring forward whatever is required. I pay tribute to everyone across both Houses for the speed of the legislation and the reform that was required when it came to sanctions policy. I look forward to engaging with the noble Lord. I am delighted that the Minister of State for the Home Office, my noble friend Lady Williams, is still here; she and I are keeping in very close contact, and if there is further legislation that we can consider, we will be pleased to consider it.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, could the Minister say a little more about what the Government are doing to resource the very welcome appointment of Sir Howard Morrison to assist the Ukrainian Government in pursuing this appalling evidence of crimes? If he cannot say this at the Dispatch Box, could he write a letter, setting out what resources Sir Howard will have and how he will be able to help? Could the Minister also say what progress the prosecutor at the court appears to be making in amassing evidence and what we are doing to provide him with evidence, if we have any?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, there is a lot of detail to be shared in answering the noble Lord’s questions. We are certainly working very closely with Sir Howard Morrison, who was appointed by my right honourable friend the Attorney-General in conjunction with the Deputy Prime Minister and Attorney-General of Ukraine. We are working very closely in resourcing and supporting, including with technical and financial support. On the ICC prosecution, we have already allocated an initial £1 million to the ICC investigation to cover some set-up costs. We are meeting the ICC prosecutor regularly in establishing the technical support, and are looking at IT support. The offer that we have given also ranges from police and military analysis to specialist IT help, which is all helping the ICC to collect and preserve evidence. Of course, in the UK, the Met police has set up access and channel points to collect evidence from Ukrainians who are arriving here.

Ukraine: NATO Membership

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Thursday 24th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord. He and I spoke earlier this morning, when I updated him on key parts of the situation as it unravels. He is of course correct; I believe that my right honourable friend the Prime Minister will be addressing the country as I speak. There will be further opportunities during the day to raise questions on elements of our response to this unwarranted, unnecessary and unprovoked aggression of the Russian state against Ukraine and the Ukrainian people.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, would the Minister not agree that this demonstrates what some of us have said all along: that the question of Ukraine’s NATO status has always been a smokescreen and a pretence by Russia, which is in fact determined to destabilise Ukraine and prevent it becoming a stable democratic country? If that is the case, I hope that we will hear tomorrow from him and other Ministers how we will respond to what is after all a war of choice and a war of aggression, and thus a war crime.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

The noble Lord speaks with great insight and experience. I assure him—indeed, all in your Lordships’ House—that the whole purpose of my being at the United Nations yesterday as part of the General Assembly debate was, again, because of the brinkmanship that was being shown by President Putin. He went to the brink and has now stepped over the line. We will of course outline further action and further details during the course of today. I understand from my right honourable friend the Chief Whip that a debate on Ukraine is also scheduled for tomorrow, and I am sure that we will be discussing further details of statements that will be made during the course of today.