Ukraine

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Friday 25th October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

It is a privilege to speak in this debate after my noble and gallant friend Lord Stirrup. It is a well-known fact that the Cross-Benchers do not toe any party line, but I can say without any hesitation that I agreed with every single word in his contribution. It is also a privilege to speak after the maiden speech of the noble Lord, Lord Spellar. I was delighted that he raised the issue of what we are doing to counter the disinformation of the Russian regime of Putin. I raised that in the first debate that we had, two days after the invasion, and I am still waiting for a reply. When the Minister responds to this debate, I hope that in reply to the noble Lord’s maiden speech she will say something on that aspect.

My own contribution to this debate will be about the diplomatic, political and historical background to it, about which I have some modest knowledge, rather than the all-important military background, of which my experience is slight. It must be clear to any observer now that the West’s position of virtually unqualified support for Ukraine, backed up by economic sanctions and supply of funding and weapons, is getting less backing from what is known as the global South than it did at the outset of hostilities, when Russia invaded Ukraine. Some of that loss of support is due to a fairly classical game of playing two sides off against each other, which is like mother’s milk in the diplomatic services of developing countries, but some of it goes deeper and deserves careful consideration and countering. It is striking, to say the least, that so many of the states that have abstained in recent UN General Assembly votes on Ukraine, or voted against them, are small countries with larger and better armed neighbours that run the risk of being treated by them as Russia has treated Ukraine. That is pretty odd. Do they not appreciate the risk, or do they just discount it? We need to talk that through with these Governments in a calm and dispassionate way and try to persuade them that we all have a collective interest in deterring behaviour like Russia’s. It is all very well talking about a moral high ground, but the bottom line for every country tends to be its national interests.

Then there are those—a few in this House and many more elsewhere—who feel that we should push Ukraine to come to terms with Russia, accepting some pretty large losses of territory. I have just spent a few days during the Recess in the French regions of Alsace and Lorraine, and have become more familiar with their tragic historic background—conquered by France from the Holy Roman Empire in 1676, seized by the newly established German empire in 1871, returned to France in 1919, seized again by Hitler’s Germany from 1940 to 1944, and only finally at peace and in security within the post-war establishment of what has become the European Union. In between that time and during that course of events, many millions of people died because of those botched settlements and the determination to overthrow them. That is the risk of going down what could be called a Minsk III route.

Then there is the double standards argument, cited in many different forms—Suez, Vietnam, the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the failure to recognise a Palestinian state and neglect of the civil war in Sudan, as well as many more expressions of what I am afraid can be described as “what about?” arguments. Some of these have validity in their own right, but not one contains a scintilla of justification for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, in blatant disregard of its own guarantee of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity when that country handed over its nuclear weapons in the 1990s. Not one of those arguments contains a smidgen of legal or political backing for bombing and seizing large swathes of Ukrainian territory inhabited by Ukrainians. There are things that can and should be done to address the double standards criticisms, but those do not alter the basic case for reversing the aggression against Ukraine.

All this leaves the impression that there is much that an active diplomacy by western countries needs to do but that there is no justification for changing our basic policy of solid support for Ukraine—quite the contrary.