Ukraine

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 21st September 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, it is a great privilege to follow two speakers with whom I am in such complete agreement, and who have stated the reasons for supporting Ukraine so eloquently. I begin by declaring an interest because your Lordships’ European Affairs Committee has just begun a new inquiry into the implications of everything that is happening in Ukraine on the UK’s relationship with the European Union. I am not speaking on behalf of that committee, as we have only just begun our report, but I assure the House that what is said in this debate will be a valuable contribution to what we are putting our minds to between now and the end of the year.

The debate we held in this House the day after Russia launched its war of aggression against Ukraine in February 2022 was a memorable one. It was memorable because it demonstrated from the outset that there were going to be no party divisions in this country in our response to that aggression and our support for Ukraine. It was memorable too because that unity was based on a clear-eyed recognition that Russia’s aggression was not only a contravention of international rules as fundamental as those in the UN charter and the 1990 Paris accords on European security, but because it would directly threaten our own security should Russia succeed in its attempt to overthrow the Ukrainian state. Those fundamentals remain as true today as they were then, and the Government and opposition parties deserve credit for standing by them and taking effective action to sustain them.

What has changed since our debate on the first day after the aggression began is the realisation of Ukraine’s remarkable resilience and success in repelling an onslaught from apparently superior military capabilities. This is all the more reason to stand firm now, even if the costs in both military and economic terms are inevitably painful—even more so in human terms for the Ukrainians.

Part of our response has been the array of sanctions on exports to and imports from Russia. We must recognise that, with Russia showing no signs of relenting in its aggression, these sanctions will be needed for the foreseeable future, and should be progressively strengthened in both their scope and, most particularly, their implementation. We need a more structured frame- work for co-operation in these tasks with the European Union and its member states, whose actions on sanctions have far exceeded what might previously have been expected. I hope, in replying, that the Minister will be less reticent about the need for such a framework, such as we have already with the United States.

We also need to co-operate with the EU and its member states in the planning and first stages of Ukraine’s reconstruction. One conference, welcome though it was, is not enough. The European Union, within the ambit of negotiating Ukraine’s accession, which I believe will be decided at the end of this year, will inevitably be the largest donor in civil terms—I am not talking about military support. It is only in our interest to work closely with it and to avoid any scope for being played off against each other.

We also need to find ways of giving effect to our commitment in the NATO summit communiqué last July for non-EU members of NATO—we are one of those—to contribute positively to the strengthening of EU defence and security policies. Our score on that is pretty skimpy so far: a bid to join the mobility partnership and only after the US and Canada have already done so. Is there not more in the pipeline, or are we content for EU-NATO co-operation to proceed without our direct involvement? I think that would be a mistake.

While we need to recognise that we have so far been less successful than we might have hoped in enlisting what is now known as the global South in support of sanctions and reconstruction, we must not accept that shortfall as inevitable or irremediable. The hard fact is that there are many countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America which are put at risk by Putin riding roughshod over the UN charter and which will be even more at risk if Russia succeeds in its aggression. We should not be too hesitant about explaining those points, although we should do so in polite and non-aggressive terms. I suggest that we also need to recognise that, if we are to list more countries in the global South, more attention must be paid to and action taken on the priorities of those countries, most particularly on climate change, health, the handling of debt and the supply of essential foodstuffs.

It is not the time now, while the war is still raging, to address decisively Ukraine’s bid to join NATO, but we will need to in due course. Talk of separate, non-NATO security guarantees does not seem terribly convincing, given that their deterrent effect will inevitably be less than that of NATO membership. So, when the time comes—and it will come one day, but not now—we should be ready to give a positive response to Ukraine’s bid.

So much for some of the diplomatic challenges we face in this new Cold War which Russia triggered by its aggression. It could well last as long as the previous one, and we should be prepared for that. What we cannot afford to do is flinch from the prospect because it will bring some unwelcome military and economic burdens.