The Importance of the Relationship Between the United Kingdom and India

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 19th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, at the beginning of this month, India took over the chair of the G20. In a few months’ time, it will overtake China as the world’s most populous nation—perhaps not an unmixed blessing but still one with geopolitical consequences. So what better moment to review our own country’s relationship with India? All credit and thanks are due to the noble Baroness, Lady Verma, for making that possible. The two excellent maiden speeches that we have had, as well as the unique valedictory speech, show the width of interest in our relationship with India.

The histories of Britain and India have been deeply intertwined for the past several hundred years, but as we look now to the future, we need to remember that the different views of our mutual experience are part of a complex picture, and not invariably a positive one. For many Indians, Britain stands for damage to their economy, for the use of force to overthrow their rulers, and for terrible human rights abuses—the Amritsar massacre prominent among them. For Britons, there may still be traces of imperial nostalgia, and there is justifiable pride at promoting a free press, freedom of speech, parliamentary democracy, the rule of law—my own grandfather was a High Court judge in Madras—and one of India’s accepted languages, our own tongue. These histories contain many contradictions which need to be borne in mind but not to be predominant.

Currently, one has to begin with trade relations, since negotiations for an India-UK free trade agreement are ongoing. That is a worthwhile objective. But we really should cease setting artificial deadlines for their completion—“all done and dusted by Diwali” last October was the most recent one—and we should remember that those who show excessive neediness for a deal are likely to pay a price for it. India has a history of trade protectionism—after all, it scuppered the Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations—so a free trade deal on the basis of effective reciprocity, a characteristic not always evident in some recent trade deals that the Government have struck, will be a challenge not best achieved by excessive haste.

The Indo-Pacific tilt proclaimed in the Johnson Government’s security review is currently the object of further reflection following Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine. That war has upended every previous analysis and cannot be ignored. Britain’s security requires not only continuing support for Ukraine but the strengthening of our contribution to NATO. That does not mean that we have lost an interest in seeing peaceful stability restored to India’s Himalayan border with China, in securing freedom of passage through the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea and the East China Sea, and in avoiding any attack on Taiwan. However, we cannot be everywhere and do everything, and we should not pretend that we can, if only because our claim would not be credible. I suggest that we need to look for ways of co-operating with India in sophisticated areas of military, technology and training to enhance the deterrence of an overassertive China.

We really must not neglect our soft power assets, which have a particular significance in our relationship with India, given our common use of the English language, the BBC’s overseas services, the British Council and our universities. But we are cutting back spending on the first two, and the Home Secretary seems to believe that making it easier for Indian students, particularly post-graduate students, to come to UK universities is something that should be discouraged, even when India clearly wants to make access easier. Does it make any sense to thus damage one of our most valuable invisible exports and, at the same time, to make conclusion of our trade negotiations more difficult?

I have said enough already to illustrate why the eminently desirable objective of strengthening Britain’s relations with India will not be entirely straightforward—and that is without even mentioning legitimate concerns about the effect of the Indian Government’s tendencies towards majoritarian treatment of their minorities and of their effect on their obligations under the UN and other international conventions. These cannot simply be overlooked, nor can the opportunistically limp Indian reaction to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

The noble Lord’s time is up.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

I am coming to a conclusion.

Let us hope that India’s chairing of the G20 will be marked, as it was in the case of Indonesia, by a better response to flagrant breaches of international law. I look forward to the Minister’s responses to some of these points when he replies to the debate.