Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 3rd March 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, debates on the Northern Ireland protocol tend to generate more heat than light. Let us hope that today’s debate will buck that trend; my noble friend, Lord Jay, certainly set us off that way. At the end of this debate, it would be very useful to have a clear picture from the Government of the facts on the ground, the trends of the Northern Ireland economy since the protocol entered into force a little over a year ago, and how those trends compare with the rest of the island of Ireland and the rest of the UK.

However, a few salient political points stand out. First, the supporters of leaving the EU in the 2016 referendum grossly misled the public, particularly when the then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Theresa Villiers, assured all and sundry that leaving the EU would have no adverse or destabilising effect in Northern Ireland. Secondly, the vote in 2016 provided no democratic legitimacy for leaving in Northern Ireland since there was a clear majority for remaining. Thirdly, the solution finally enshrined in the protocol negotiated by the noble Lord, Lord Frost, whom I welcome to the Back Benches, was described by the former Prime Minister, Theresa May, as one that no British Prime Minister could accept. Fourthly, there was never at any point and at any time any basis for the assertion by the current Prime Minister that the protocol would require no checks and controls on trade in goods between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. No wonder there is so much confusion, disinformation and distrust.

Does that mean that the problems that have arisen over the implementation of the protocol are all the fault of one side ? Certainly not. Nor does it mean that the protocol is without blemish and could not be improved—of course it could. The European Commission has recognised that by coming to the table with detailed proposals for improvements. The sooner after the May elections those negotiations can be concluded the better.

What surely must be avoided is inflicting more damage on the structures of the Good Friday agreement by dragging out the process. That agreement was a massive and painful achievement. It needs to be preserved, not used as a pawn in the political manoeuvring over the protocol.

I have one final point. The fate of the Good Friday agreement is a matter of deep concern to our closest ally, the United States, and its current President. The sooner the problems over implementing the protocol can be sorted out, the sooner what has become a serious irritant in UK-US relations can be put behind us. The converse is also true: if the UK-EU negotiations drag on or, worse still, break down in acrimony, there should be no doubt about the negative consequences for our relationship with the United States.